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I

Background to the Revolt

The Dominican Republic's first free elections in 38 years were held a year and a half after Trujillo was assassinated in May 1961. Juan Bosch, long in exile, was elected President and took office in February 1963. Seven months later Bosch was overthrown by military leaders, with the support of business and other conservative elements, on the grounds that he was knowingly permitting the penetration of his government by Communists and leftist extremists.

Prominent in the military coup of September 25, 1963 against Bosch was Colonel (later General) Elias Wessin y Wessin, the leading military figure in the country and a strong anti-Communist. Bosch took refuge in San Juan, Puerto Rico, where he remained exactly two years. On September 25, 1965, after the April-August Dominican conflict had come to an end, Bosch returned to Santo Domingo.

A civilian "Triumvirate" came to power following the overthrow of Bosch. It was threatened from the outset by constant plotting among its opponents of both the right and the left. Donald Reid Cabral, who headed the "Triumvirate" during the last year of its existence, embarked on an economic stabilization program and took the first steps toward reform of the military establishment. He was unable, however, to attract significant popular support and his government's position remained precarious.

The elements plotting against the Reid government recognized the central role the armed forces would have to play in their plans. All factions endeavored to enlist military support. The military itself was split. Some officers, accustomed to their privileges and special status dating from the Trujillo era, opposed Reid's efforts to reform the armed forces. Other officers were

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dissatisfied with the rate of progress in cleaning up graft and corruption, and in retiring senior officers to make way for promotions. During the early months of 1965 there were widespread rumors that growing discontent would crystalize in a military coup by one group of officers or the other.

The Reid government was aware of the various plots against it and had taken several steps during the months preceding the April 1965 revolt to attempt to control the situation. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy and the Commanding General of the National Police were replaced, as were several key officers at lower levels. In January 1965, Reid removed the Secretary of State for the Armed Forces and assumed that position himself.

On April 24, Reid sent the Army Chief of Staff to one of the principal military camps just northwest of Santo Domingo to cancel the commissions of four officers accused of conspiring against the government. They were, in fact, involved with civilian elements and other military in planning a coup expected to take place in late May or early June. The surprise move against these officers precipitated action on their part before preparations for the coup had been completed.

Word was spread among disaffected middle- and junior-grade officers at the camp that more cancellations of commissions and even arrests were contemplated by Reid Cabral. Believing they had nothing to lose, these officers made the Army Chief of Staff prisoner and seized control of the camp.

News of the officers' uprising quickly circulated in Santo Domingo among the civilian opponents of the Reid regime. Early in the afternoon it was announced over a small radio station, owned by a leading supporter of Juan Bosch, that Reid had already been overthrown. A small group of civilians accompanied by several rebel officers

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seized temporary control of the government-owned Radio Santo Domingo and called upon the people to celebrate Reid's overthrow.

Popular sentiment seemed to be running against the Government as evidenced by the crowds of anti-Reid demonstrators that were quickly aroused to take to the streets. Some cheered for Juan Bosch, others shouted for the return of former President Joaquin Balaguer. The chief military commanders, however, appeared to be remaining loyal to the Government. Reid therefore appeared over Radio Santo Domingo television to demand publicly that the rebels surrender or be attacked in force the following morning. Rebellious Army officers, with troops under their command, decided to enter the city without delay. By midnight, rebel military elements were spreading out through the streets of Santo Domingo.

Early on April 25, Reid learned that the military commanders had decided not to commit their forces to support him. With both the regular military establishment and the police in Santo Domingo unwilling to oppose the rebel forces then marching on the National Palace, Reid could no longer remain in office. The maneuvering to establish a successor government began.

II

Outbreak of Civil Warfare

The rebels had seized the National Palace by mid-day, April 25. Army officers and political figures gathered to discuss the next step. Members of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), the party of Juan Bosch, had, earlier in the day, announced that they intended to install an interim government pending the expected early return of Bosch. This government would be headed by a PRD leader, Jose Rafael Molina Ureña, who had been President of the Chamber of Deputies during the Bosch administration.

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During the meetings at the National Palace shortly after noon on April 25, many of the military officers advocated the establishment of a military junta and the holding of early elections. Some of them were supporters of Joaquin Balaguer. Only a minority of the officers present were reported to favor the PRD plan to install Molina Ureña. However, together with the PRD representatives, and with the support of Communist leaders present at the National Palace (see Section IV), they prevailed, and Molina Ureña was selected as Provisional President.

While these meetings were going on, the National Palace was the scene of considerable turmoil. Large crowds of civilians, armed with rifles and clubs, had assembled at the Palace in response to rebel broadcasts. In nearby parts of the city, armed mobs had begun to loot stores and private homes.

The key element that altered the character of what first appeared to be a military uprising and that led to full-scale civil disorder was the distribution of arms to civilians. Because the military units under their control were outnumbered by the forces loyal to General Wessin and other senior commanders, some of the rebellious Army officers decided to arm civilians who would support the rebel movement. Several hundred weapons were distributed the night of April 24 to Army veterans, some of them discontented former officers who had been discharged from the service and who were hurriedly assembled that night at the 27th of February Military Camp, one of the two installations seized by the rebels.

In the early morning hours of April 25, the more widespread distribution of arms to civilians began. Pistols, rifles, and machine guns -- at least several thousand such weapons, some estimates placing the total at 7,000, with other estimates running much higher -- as well as grenades and other arms were sent into Santo Domingo by the rebel officers from the 27th of February and 16th of August Camps, both just a few miles northwest

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of the city. These officers arranged for trucks, busses and other vehicles to transport the weapons into the center of Santo Domingo for handing out to civilian sympathizers along the streets.

Communists, some of them already armed with weapons from secret caches, participated in this wide-scale distribution, and gained a substantial share of arms for their own followers. In some cases, Communist leaders took over control of the arms distribution and set up weapons depots in the homes of some of their members, which they quickly fortified with machine-gun emplacements. The rebels were later to obtain additional arms from the many police installations they seized.

Other senior military leaders who had not participated in the revolt were opposed to the establishment of any form of provisional government designed to restore Bosch to power. Officers representing them were present at the National Palace in the early hours of the afternoon of April 25. They demanded immediate agreement on a military junta to prepare for national elections in September 1965. They informed the rebel officers that the forces commanded by General Wessin and other military leaders, who controlled the San Isidro Air Base and the Air Force and armored units, would attack unless Molina Urena stepped aside and a military junta installed without delay.

In the absence of a response to this ultimatum, the Dominican Air Force, late in the afternoon of April 25, began rocket and machine-gun attacks on the National Palace. Subsequent Air Force attacks were directed, not only against the National Palace, but also against the western or rebel-held approaches to the Duarte Bridge over the Ozama River, and the 27th of February and 16th of August Camps on the northwest outskirts of the city. These attacks were not criticized by anti-rebels in Santo Domingo but aroused great resentment among the rebel elements. The Air Force attacks presented the rebel movement with an effective propaganda weapon against the military

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forces at San Isidro. Rebel radio broadcasts called upon the public to sack the homes of Air Force officers in retaliation. The families of some officers were forcibly removed from their homes by armed civilian bands. Wives of Air Force officers were paraded before rebel-held television cameras for propaganda purposes. Families of anti-rebel officers were also taken to the Duarte Bridge where they were placed in exposed positions as hostages against Air Force strafing.

Throughout April 26 and 27, lawlessness and violence mounted. Civil authority broke down completely and police protection in the city disappeared. The police were special targets of armed hoolums (known as "Tigres") who joined the rebel movement, and who hunted down and killed policemen wherever they could. Many policemen discarded their uniform and went into hiding.

Marauding bands were searching out and attacking suspected opponents of the rebel movement, and were firing indiscriminately in the streets. In the heat of passion at the moment, word spread rapidly throughout the city of numerous atrocities being committed by the mobs. Stories circulated about the wanton killing of innocent bystanders, executions before a "Paredon" of policemen and others regarded as "enemies" by the mobs, beheadings and the mutilation of bodies. Some of these atrocities actually appear to have taken place, but the chaotic situation in downtown Santo Domingo during the early days of the revolt and the impossibility for several months of on-the-spot investigations in the rebel zone have made it difficult to establish the facts.

The Dominican Red Cross has estimated that at least 1,300 people lost their lives in Santo Domingo from April 25 through April 29 (see Section III). While many of these fell in the street fighting, there is evidence indicating that a considerable number were killed by armed mobs. A further complication in the way of determining the facts is that, according to various reports, many bodies were disposed of by the armed gangs by throwing them into the sea.

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On the afternoon of April 27, tanks and infantry under General Wessin succeeded in crossing the Duarte Bridge. In addition, regular Army units numbering about 1,000 men began entering Santo Domingo from the west to attack the rebels. The Air Force continued to strafe rebel positions.

The provisional government of Molina Urena was in disarray. He and his colleagues believed, in the light of the military advances being made by anti-rebel forces, that their movement was facing imminent defeat.

By late afternoon on April 27, only two days after its installation, the so-called provisional government collapsed. Molina Urena himself took asylum in the Colombian Embassy, as did other members of his government and leaders of the PRD. Still others were given asylum by the Embassies of Mexico and of other Latin American countries, or hid out in private homes. Many of the principal military officers on the rebel side also took diplomatic asylum that same evening, among them Colonel Miguel Angel Hernando Ramirez, their leader and one of the four whose discharge from the Army, ordered by Reid Cabral on April 24, had precipitated the revolt. Although Hernando Ramirez was later to rejoin the rebel movement, leadership among the rebellious officers had passed to Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deño.

Most of the political figures and Army officers who took diplomatic asylum said they had done so because they feared for their lives. Some of them admitted that extremist elements had taken over the rebel movement. Later on, however, they were to deny, for obvious political reasons, that they had ever made such statements.

In taking diplomatic asylum or going into hiding from the anti-rebel forces which then appeared to be close to taking over the city, the PRD leaders and rebel officers abandoned the movement to the Communists. The latter were already in control of major elements of the rebel armed strength.

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III

Threat to American Lives

On the evening of April 25, in accordance with established procedures for the safeguarding of American citizens in danger areas, the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was ordered to proceed to a position off Santo Domingo to be prepared to evacuate American citizens if necessary. This force, with some 1,790 U.S. Marines aboard, was directed to remain offshore and out of sight.

In the midst of the disorders of April 25, the U.S. Embassy began taking steps to ensure the safety of Americans living in the Dominican Republic and of a number of tourists then in Santo Domingo. Americans began to request evacuation on April 26. Plans were made for their assembly at the Hotel Embajador on the western side of the city, and for their evacuation beginning the following day. The Embassy obtained assurances from both the rebel and anti-rebel sides that there would be no interference with the evacuation and that a cease-fire would be in effect during the operation.

Early on the morning of April 27, however, while American citizens were being processed for evacuation, rebel broadcasts called on their supporters to go to the Hotel Embajador in search of a Dominican anti-Communist newspaperman reported to have taken refuge there. A mob of rebels armed with automatic rifles and other weapons arrived at the hotel and ran about, firing wildly, jeopardizing the lives of the Americans gathered there. Fortunately, no American was injured.

Later in the day, the evacuees were taken by automobile and truck to the nearby port of Haina, west of Santo Domingo, to board U. S. Navy craft. Over 1,000 Americans and other foreign nationals were evacuated to safety through Haina on April 27. That same day, the U.S. Embassy had come under sniper fire, as had also several other Embassies in the city.

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More Americans and other foreigners, principally women and children, continued to arrive at the Hotel Embajador seeking safety. Plans were made for another evacuation the afternoon of April 23. Shortly before the scheduled move to Haina, however, the Embassy received reports that the road was no longer safe and that the port area at Haina was under sniper fire. Because no other evacuation route was open, Ambassador Bennett arranged for evacuation by U. S. Navy helicopters from a polo field adjacent to the Hotel Embajador directly to the naval vessels lying offshore.

Bloodshed in the city was mounting. In the fierce fighting which began on April 25, at the Duarte Bridge, and in the air attacks on the western approaches to the bridge, at least 900 to 1,000 were killed, according to estimates of the Dominican Red Cross. When Red Cross officials were finally able to enter the area on May 1, they arranged for the burial that same day of about 350 dead in a common grave and for the cremation of another 30 or 90 bodies.

Although the precise number of dead during the first violent days of the conflict may never be known, the extent of the tragedy is indicated by the estimate of the Dominican Red Cross that at least 1,300 were killed through April 29. At least another 700 Dominicans were to lose their lives in the remaining months of the conflict.

Any semblance of civil authority in Santo Domingo had disappeared with the collapse of Molina Urena's attempt to establish a government. On April 23, the military commanders at San Isidro named a three-man Military Junta under Colonel Pedro Benoit to act as the provisional government of the Dominican Republic.

When U. S. Embassy officers went to San Isidro in the early morning of April 28, they learned that the advances of the anti-rebel forces into the city of Santo Domingo had stalled, and that these forces were discouraged and disorganized. Colonel Benoit told the Embassy

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officials that the Armed Forces were unable to offer any protection to Americans in Santo Domingo and that, in his opinion, the lawlessness in the city was such that American lives were in danger.

Colonel Benoit's statement and a similar one made to the Embassy later that day by the Chief of the National Police were relayed by Ambassador Bennett to the Department of State by telephone early in the afternoon of April 28. That evening, for the purpose of documenting the position of the existing Dominican authorities and after the decision to land U. S. Marines had already been made, the Department of State asked Ambassador Bennett to obtain from Colonel Benoit confirmation in writing of his oral statement concerning the inability of the Military Junta to provide protection for American lives. The text of this written confirmation was telegraphed to Washington by the Embassy in the early morning hours of April 29.

On the afternoon of April 28, some hours after his oral statement regarding the danger to American lives, Colonel Benoit sent a communication to the U. S. Embassy to the effect that the Military Junta would welcome U.S. military intervention in its behalf.

Subsequently, Ambassador Bennett and his Country Team, composed of all senior U. S. officials in the Dominican Republic, determined that the further deterioration of the situation, the inability of the Junta forces to restore order, and the growing danger to American lives required the immediate landing of U. S. Marines. The Ambassador and his Country Team so recommended in a telegram received in Washington at 5:16 P.M., April 28.

The President ordered that U. S. Marines land. At approximately 7:00 P.M., Washington time, U. S. Marines from the Navy vessels offshore began landing in the area adjacent to the Hotel Embajador to establish a secure point for the continued evacuation of Americans and foreign nationals who desired to leave the Dominican Republic.

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In all, over 5,000 people, Americans as well as citizens of some 45 other countries, were safely evacuated from Santo Domingo during the early days of the Dominican crisis.

Of these evacuees, about 2,100 were foreign nationals. The largest groups, by nationality, other than U.S. citizens, were those of the following countries: Argentina (17 of its citizens were evacuated), Canada (55 evacuees), Colombia (27), Cuba (268), El Salvador (55), France (43), Germany (44), Italy (42), Mexico (53), Netherlands (62), Peru (12), Spain (224), Switzerland (18), United Kingdom (46), and Venezuela (30).

In addition, lesser numbers of citizens of the following countries were also evacuated: Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. Four stateless persons were among the evacuees, as were also about 300 Dominicans, most of whom were close relatives of foreign nationals, while others were among those Dominicans who had taken asylum in various Embassies in Santo Domingo.

IV

Threat of a Communist Takeover

There are three Communist parties in the Dominican Republic -- the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ); the Dominican Communist Party (PCD), previously known as the Popular Socialist Party (PSP); and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD).

The largest party, the APCJ, had about 2,000 active members early in 1965, most of them in Santo Domingo itself, but claimed a much larger membership. This party took its

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name from the landing in the Dominican Republic on June 14, 1959 of small groups of Dominican exiles coming from Cuba in an abortive attempt to overthrow Trujillo. As an anti-Trujillo movement, it attracted a wide cross-section of Dominicans.

With the passage of time, the APCJ was penetrated by Communists, and many of its responsible, non-Communist elements gave up their membership in the movement. By late 1963, Communists had captured many of the key positions in the party. It continued, however, to be regarded by many Dominicans as a progressive, patriotic movement -- although known to be pro-Castro -- and a portion of its rank-and-file membership was non-Communist. Its leaders, many of whom have had special training in Cuba, run the movement for Castro-Communist ends.

The PCD was known prior to the revolt as the Dominican Popular Socialist Party -- PSP or PSPD -- but took its present name -- Dominican Communist Party -- in August 1965. It was a clandestine organization with a membership, in early 1965, of between 500 and 700 concentrated in Santo Domingo, Santiago, and a few towns in the eastern part of the country. Most of its present leaders are "intellectuals" or have professional backgrounds. It follows the leadership of Moscow and has a special relationship with the Cuban Communist Party.

The MPD was also an underground group although, like the PCD, it has been conducting many of its less covert activities, such as propaganda work, much more openly since April. Prior to the outbreak of the April 24 revolt, the MPD had a membership estimated at about 300, concentrated primarily in Santo Domingo and in the La Romana-San Pedro de Macoris sugar mill area. It follows the Chinese Communist line and has been involved in numerous acts of violence in recent years.

After the Bosch administration was overthrown in September 1963, the Triumvirate Government declared the three Communist parties illegal. In the closing days of

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November of that year, the APCJ and the MPD initiated guerrilla activities in six different areas of the Dominican Republic. At least 25 of the guerrillas had just completed training in Cuba. A shipment of arms from Cuba destined for the guerrillas was captured by the Dominican authorities. The movement was suppressed, the mop-up operations reportedly involving the unnecessary killing of some guerrillas who were trying to surrender, and thereby providing the APCJ with its propaganda stand that it suffered brutal treatment at the hands of "Triumvirate" forces. Among the guerrillas killed was the APCJ leader, and now party "martyr", Manuel Tavaréz Justo. Those taken prisoner were later deported to Portugal and France, many of them subsequently traveling to Cuba, Communist China, and Soviet bloc countries. By April 1965, more than 45 exiled Communist leaders, many of them with recent training in Cuba, had returned to the Dominican Republic, some of them secretly, to rejoin their organizations.

In early 1965 in Puerto Rico, Bosch's PRD signed an agreement, known as the "Rio Piedras Pact" (named for the district in San Juan where Bosch lived), with representatives of the Dominican Social Christian Revolutionary Party (PRSC). The two parties agreed to work for the overthrow of the Reid Government and the restoration of the 1963 Constitution. The APCJ, privy to the negotiations leading to the agreement, wanted to join in the PRD-PRSC alliance and later publicly demanded the right to do so. Although some of the political figures in the PRD and PRSC supported the APCJ's demand, others reportedly believed it best that the agreement be limited to the two organized political parties. It appears, therefore, that the APCJ participated only informally in the work of the alliance.

The three Communist parties publicly supported the aims of the PRD-PRSC pact, advocating the overthrow of the Reid Government, the restoration of the 1963 Constitution, and the reinstatement of Bosch. One line of Communist propaganda called on the people to fight for the return of Bosch, not because this would solve national

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problems, but because it would be an important step forward in the continuing struggle of the working classes toward their "supreme objectives."

The Communist parties were not involved in the unplanned uprising by disaffected Army officers that precipitated the Dominican conflict. There has, therefore, been some unfounded public speculation that the Communists, allegedly caught by surprise, only belatedly joined the rebel movement. The facts are these:

(2) PCD leaders

maintained close liaison with political and military figures involved in coup plots; although without foreknowledge of the Army officers' uprising of April 24, precipitated by the "Triumvirate's" abortive attempt to oust four of the military conspirators. PCD leaders acted quickly to mobilize their resources, along with such other

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prominent PCD figures as

the PCD was fully engaged
in the rebel movement by the morning of that same day;
and

(3) MPD leaders were aware of the plots against the Reid government and had been brought into discussions early in April on an expected coup; no close working relationship had been established, however, probably because of the long-standing disputes and suspicions between this Communist Chinese-line party and the Moscow-line PCD and Castroist APCJ; the MPD was, moreover, the least well organized of the parties,

other
MPD leaders feared that the April 24 uprising was in the traditional pattern of coups by military factions, and hesitated at the outset to commit themselves; some of their leaders were, however, in touch with the APCJ on April 25, and by the following morning had agreed with PCD, APCJ and other rebel leaders on their participation in the rebel movement; with the help of the APCJ, they began arming MPD members and sympathizers on April 26.

Communists quickly capitalized on the events of April 24 and 25, both to create public disorder and to place themselves in leadership positions within the rebel group. Communist leaders issued orders to their followers to incite civilian crowds against the government. On April 24, many APCJ and PCD leaders had already armed themselves with weapons held by their parties, and by April 25 were organizing Communist para-military participation in the revolt. The distribution of thousands of weapons from Army installations seized by the rebellious military officers (see Section II) began in the early morning hours of April 25. Several rebel officers,

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arranged for truckloads of weapons to be sent into down-town Santo Domingo for handing out to civilian sympathizers along the streets.

the PCD, and other Communists participated in the distribution of weapons. They gained for their party members and supporters a substantial share of the arms passed out. In some instances, the Communists assumed control of the distribution of arms and established a number of weapons depots of their own --

PCD members carrying weapons,

gathered at Parque Independencia on the morning of April 25, urging civilian crowds to support the revolt

other APCJ members were also active that morning at Parque Independencia, which was to become the principal demonstration area for the rebels during the conflict. A station-wagon equipped with a loud-speaker, operated by was among the soundtrucks that moved about the city calling on the people to join the movement. Members of the Communist parties were particularly active in distributing bottles and gasoline to the public for the making of Molotov cocktails.

The offices of three anti-Communist political parties -- the National Civic Union (a major party whose candidate had lost to Juan Bosch in the December 1962 presidential election), the Liberal Evolutionist Party, and the Dominican Revolutionary Vanguard -- were sacked on April 25, the Liberal Evolutionist Party's building being put to fire. The plant of an anti-Communist newspaper, Prensa Libre, was also sacked and set afire by an armed mob. Some days later the Communists also took over the plant of one of Santo Domingo's leading newspapers.

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Listin Diario, and used its facilities to print their propaganda. The Communists also began, on April 25, to organize their weapons distribution points in buildings and private homes in the eastern section of Santo Domingo, and principally in Ciudad Nueva, the southeast corner of the city, which ultimately became the rebel stronghold. A number of Communist command centers and strongpoints were organized, as described later in this paper, and their number increased as days went by.

Several thousand civilians armed with rifles and clubs marched on the National Palace at noon on April 25 in response to calls issued over the rebel-held radio station. Armed Communist leaders were among them. Other Communists attended meetings in the National Palace which led to the installation of Molina Ureña as Provisional President, whose selection they supported.

Prominent among the many Communists active in the National Palace that day were:

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In addition to sacking the offices of the three anti-Communist political parties which had participated in the overthrow of Bosch, and to burning or taking over the plants of anti-Communist newspapers, Communist leaders also took over the direction of Radio Santo Domingo. Along with other rebel propaganda of pro-Bosch lines, Communist broadcasters appealed for wider mass support for the rebel movement and issued general instructions to the crowds (for example, the assembly of the mobs at the National Palace on April 25). Many of the "Commando" groups and armed bands carried transistor radio receivers with them, and moved to specific localities (for example, the scene of the fighting at the Duarte Bridge) or against particular targets (such as the families of Air Force and other anti-rebel officers) in accordance with orders issued them by the Communist radio broadcasters.

During April 26 and 27 additional civilians were armed and brought into the "Commando" units led by trained

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Communist guerrilla fighters. Some of these "Commandos" held strongpoints, weapons depots and other para-military installations controlled by the Communists. Others, while based at such installations, were mobile groups. Typical of the latter was the Commando "Gatillo Alegre" (Trigger Happy), composed of APCJ members and sympathizers, but also including some MPD members. This Commando roamed through the city in a truck, on which was mounted a .50-caliber machine-gun, looking for targets of opportunity.

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Numerous command posts, Commando headquarters, arsenals and other installations were set up by the Communists within the first few days of the revolt. Most of these were in the southeastern portion of the city, particularly in the "Ciudad Nueva" area, to which the rebel zone was confined after the landing of U. S. troops. Many rebel military and Communist posts were in the northeastern section of town, but these subsequently fell to the anti-rebel forces in the latter's sweep through that area in June:

The Commando units, varying in size from about a dozen men to as many as 300 or more in such important posts as "Commando Luperon", were generally concentrated in the

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city blocks around Parque Independencia, which was about the geographic center of what ultimately became the rebel zone and which was the principal public meeting place for the rebels.

Weapons and ammunition depots were established as early as April 25 by the APCJ and PCD. Some of these, like the parties' command posts and Commando headquarters, were in schools and other public buildings taken over by the Communists. Others were in private homes, either those of leading Communists

or in other homes commandeered by the Communists. Most of these arsenals and command posts, as well as strongpoints and key street intersections under Communist control were fortified with machine-gun emplacements, often on the roofs of low buildings. The Commando groups at these various installations were heavily armed with machine-guns and all members carried rifles and grenades, which were in ample supply. Non-Communist armed civilians relied on the Communist Commandos and depots for ammunition, grenades and Molotov cocktails.

Most of the many command posts, only a few of which have been described above, were manned by APCJ or PCD members and sympathizers, and were commanded by leading figures in these two parties. Military officers who defected from the rebel movement in June stated that three-quarters of all the units and installations in the zone were controlled by the APCJ and PCD, and that the rest were heavily infiltrated by Communists. The MPD had its own command post but had few other installations under its direct control, most MPD members and supporters forming part of Commandos identified with the other two Communist parties. One Commando was regarded as belonging to the PRSC (the Revolutionary Social Christian Party), according to PRSC members, but there were none which were considered by rebel elements as identified with Bosch's party, the PRD.

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Armed bands spread through the city during April 26 and 27, many of them shouting "Al Paredon" (to the execution wall) and "Viva Castro". Communist agitators continued to exhort the mobs. "Tigre" gangs were hunting down policemen and shooting wildly in the streets. There was increased looting and destruction of property, particularly of those regarded as "anti-democratic" or as identified with the "imperialists". Armed gangs broke into homes searching for some prominent Dominicans known to be strongly anti-Communist. These had already abandoned their homes and left the areas then dominated by the rebels. The mobs looted many of these homes and, in some cases, wantonly shot down the caretaker or servant left behind in the house.

On the evening of April 27,

the rebel movement entered a new phase. Non-Communist elements were left without political leadership of any kind. The rebel military force, from which there had already been a considerable number of defections in addition to the high-ranking officers who took asylum, was in the hands of politically immature Army officers who had little or no control over the armed civilians. The Communists remained as the most cohesive group in the rebel movement capable of moving into the existing political leadership vacuum.

By April 28, the Communists had direct control over many of the principal armed elements on the rebel side. Defections and some casualties among rebel officers and enlisted men had reduced their number, initially estimated at about 2,000 on April 24/25, to slightly above 1,000 by April 28.

At this point, the Embassy reported that there were between 2,500 and 5,500 armed civilians participating in the revolt. Subsequent evidence confirmed the higher range of this estimate, between 4,000 and 5,000 civilians being armed in the early days of the revolt.

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Of these, at least 1,500 were, according to the Embassy's report, members of the three Communist parties or Communist sympathizers under the direct command of trained Communist leaders. Later information confirmed this figure.

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Actually, within a matter of days after the beginning of the revolt, considerable information was developed on over 200 leading Communists, other than rank-and-file members, with some level of responsibility within the rebel movement or their parties' organization. These Communists, whose activities, often in day-to-day chronologies, were well known, included Central Committee leaders, trained guerrilla experts, commanders of Communist paramilitary installations such as "Commandos", strongpoints, arsenals, prisons and command posts, key agitators among students and labor groups, propaganda directors, and radio broadcasters.

Those who make the unwarranted assumption that there was no evidence beyond the 53 -- or 43 -- names of Communist strength in the rebel movement fail to accept these facts: (a) the 1,500 armed and organized Communists by the third day of the revolt; (b) the degree to which the Communists took over the distribution and stocking of weapons and ammunition; (c) their control over the other armed civilians and over the mobs through their direction of press and radio propaganda; (d) their influence over rebel military elements who accepted Communist advice on

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guerrilla tactics and political moves; and (e) the Communists' capacity fully to take over the rebel movement in the chaotic days following the collapse of the Molina Urena regime, when PRD and military leaders abandoned the movement to the Communists.

The landing of U. S. Marines on the evening of April 23 created an entirely different situation for the Communist leaders, even more sharply defined with the subsequent arrival, early on April 30, of elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and the establishment of the U. S. military corridor across eastern Santo Domingo the night of May 2-3. Communist leaders agreed that the presence of U. S. troops made it necessary that they withdraw from open participation in the direction of the rebel movement.

Communist propaganda began shifting to place greater emphasis on what the Communists alleged was broad popular support for the rebel movement. They asked that Cuban propaganda broadcasts over Radio Habana stop highlighting Communist leadership, or even participation, in the fighting.

The Communists continued, however, to organize and deploy the armed units under their control, and to strengthen their positions in the "Ciudad Nueva" area. Armed mobs under Communist leadership played an important role in the rebel assault on the police stronghold of Ozama Fortress on April 29. The Communists acquired a substantial additional quantity of arms and ammunition when the fortress fell on the following day.

On April 30, although the official rebel radio station broadcast instructions not to fire on U. S. troops, Communist Commando groups, led by members who had received guerrilla training in Cuba, attacked U. S. forces. They inflicted a number of casualties. These attacks continued beyond April 30 despite the cease-fire agreement reached that day. Communist propaganda took the line that the cease-fire was rigged to deceive the rebels, and that the armed civilians should hold on to their weapons.

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Large rallies and demonstrations were staged in the Ciudad Nueva area by Communist agitators who called for continued attacks on U. S. troops and urged a fight to the finish against the Junta forces. On May 2, a clandestine short-wave radio operated by Communists began calling on the armed mobs to shoot American troops on sight.

The three Communist parties gave full support to the "Constitutional Government" (so named for the Bosch Constitution of 1963) established on May 4 under Colonel Caamaño. Although differences were to arise from time to time during the course of the revolt between Caamaño's military headquarters and the para-military commands of the Communist parties, over which Caamaño and his officers had little or no control, the Communists worked closely with officials of the "Constitutionalist Government". Their propaganda stressed the purportedly wide popular support and "constitutionality" of the regime.

Because of the shift in tactics by the Communists following the landing of U. S. Marines and their attempt to minimize publicity on Communist participation in the revolt, some of the more prominent Communist leaders moved into the background. Such figures as Manuel Gonzalez Gonzalez, Roman Diaz, Despradel Roque, and others who had been highly visible around Caamaño's headquarters were seen less often and withdrew largely to their own command posts or "Commando" units. Other Communist leaders, like the Ducoudray Mansfield brothers, went into hiding, supplied with false identity cards prepared under the direction of a PCD member and photographer, Milvio Perez Perez, reportedly for the purpose of remaining underground to await another, future attempt at insurrection. In this connection, members of all three Communist parties were ordered, as early as the first days of May, to cache some of the arms and ammunition in their possession for possible use in future guerrilla operations. Quantities of arms were thus gradually hidden away in the Ciudad Nueva section

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of Santo Domingo, as well as smuggled out of the city for secret caches in other parts of the country.

Some of the Communist leaders who moved into the background in late April and early May subsequently resumed their former activity, although they generally continued to try to keep in low-key the importance of their role in the "Constitutionalist" camp. Many prominent Communists remained in the open, even during the phase when some of their leaders withdrew, to direct the activities of their Commando units and strongholds, which comprised the major elements of rebel armed strength.

Experts in guerrilla warfare and street-fighting, most of them trained in Cuba, continued to be among the principal advisers at rebel headquarters. Other Communists remained in close consultation with officials of the "Constitutional Government."

Most of the Communist leaders previously identified in this report were close associates of "Constitutionalist" officials, and often met with Colonel Caamaño, his "Presidential Secretary" Hector Aristy, and the "Foreign Minister", Jottin Curry. Prominent among those close to the "Constitutionalist" government leaders, although holding no government positions themselves, were Fidelio Despradel Roque, Rafael Mejia Lluberes, Rafael Taveras Roque, Daniel Ozuña, and Juan Miguel Roman Diaz (who was killed on May 19), all leaders of the APCJ, as well as the following top figures in the PCD: the brothers Antonio and Narciso Isa Conde, Asdrubal Dominguez Gueñeró, Hugo Tolentino Dipp, and Jose Guerra Nouel (whose brother, Diego, was the "Constitutionalist" Director of Security). At public rallies in Parque Independencia, when Colonel Caamaño delivered his public addresses, the program usually included other violently anti-American speeches by prominent Communists.

The extensive information received by the United States Government from the start of the revolt disclosed an organized effort by the Communists to capture the rebel movement and seize power in the Dominican Republic.

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There has been a great deal of independent testimony to the danger posed by Communist strength in the very early days of the conflict. At that time, for example, European and Latin American Ambassadors in Santo Domingo expressed the view that the rebel movement had come under Communist control. The Papal Nuncio was later quoted in the press as saying that it was his belief that the conflict in the Dominican Republic could have been resolved almost immediately had it not been for leftist infiltration.

Various Ambassadors to the OAS, who had gone to the Dominican Republic as members of a special Committee to investigate the situation, submitted their report to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers on May 7. On that occasion, they informed the Meeting of the serious Communist threat which had earlier existed, and continued then to exist, in the Dominican Republic. They brought out the fact that diplomats representing a number of countries in Santo Domingo were convinced that many active Castroites were participating on the rebel side; that Colonel Caamaño himself acknowledged the penetration of the rebel movement by Communists and said that he faced the problem of preventing them from seizing control; that members of the Committee agreed that the rebel movement could become an outright Communist insurrection; and that the danger existed that the prevailing conditions of chaos and anarchy could permit international Communism to convert the Dominican Republic into another Cuba.

V

U. S. Military Actions

On the evening of April 23, as previously stated, U.S. Marines aboard the Navy vessels lying off Santo Domingo were ordered to land. Their mission was to provide security for several thousand American citizens whom our Embassy could not protect and whose safety the Dominican authorities had said they could no longer guarantee. Specifically, the

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U. S. Marines were to ensure the safe evacuation from the Hotel Embajador of Americans and other foreign citizens who wished to leave the Dominican Republic.

Shortly after 7:00 P.M., Washington time, April 28, some 450 U. S. Marines began taking up positions around the Hotel Embajador, establishing a safety perimeter from which evacuation could continue. One Marine platoon reinforced the guard at the U. S. Embassy, which had been under sniper fire since April 27.

On April 29, about 1,300 additional Marine reinforcements were landed to strengthen the safety perimeter. Evacuation of Americans and other foreign nationals continued throughout that day.

The Embassy reported to the Department of State on April 29 that the growing violence in Santo Domingo might require the expansion of the safety perimeter to include the residential area from the Hotel Embajador to the U. S. Embassy, a section where many Americans lived and where most foreign diplomats resided.

The Embassy also reported that the units of regular Armed Forces under the command of the Military Junta were scattered in garrisons throughout the country. The Embassy estimated that effective forces under Junta command in the Santo Domingo area totalled about 2,000 men, but they were dispersed between San Isidro and the western edge of the city. The police force in Santo Domingo had been reduced substantially below its normal strength. A considerable number of policemen had been killed and many others had drifted away in civilian clothes. Moreover, the police were not equipped to confront the mortars and heavy weapons now in the hands of the rebels, and were limited to defending themselves in their barracks.

It was, therefore, the Embassy Country Team's appraisal that the Junta's military forces were unable to restore order

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in a chaotic situation. In addition to the complete breakdown of law and order and the growing bloodshed, there was a mounting danger that Communist guerrilla activity and violence could spread to other parts of the country. There was still the need to safeguard a large number of Americans.

The situation made it necessary to reinforce U. S. military strength in the Dominican Republic. Orders were issued on the afternoon of April 29 for the landing at San Isidro airfield of about 2,000 U. S. airborne troops, who had been alerted as a precautionary measure the evening of April 26. Two Battalion Combat Teams of the 82nd Airborne Division arrived at San Isidro at 2:30 A.M., Washington time, April 30. Shortly afterwards, the Marines extended the perimeter around the Hotel Embajador, establishing an international security zone in accordance with an OAS resolution.

On April 30, the two Dominican factions agreed to a cease-fire in response to the appeal by the OAS through the Papal Nuncio. However, rebel sniper fire continued in various parts of the city.

The U. S. forces based at San Isidro secured the area from the base to the eastern bank of the Ozama River as well as the Duarte Bridge, but, up to May 2, had not advanced beyond the western approaches to the Bridge. During the night of May 2-3, a line of communications, or safe corridor, was established between these forces and those holding the international security zone. This corridor provided a safe line of communications between the two elements. It also had the effect of interposing U.S. forces between the major elements of the rebels and anti-rebels, thus preventing killings on a much larger scale. The corridor facilitated the continued distribution of needed food and medical supplies by the United States to people living in both the rebel and anti-rebel zones.

U. S. troops in the Santo Domingo area secured several essential positions. These were: the international security

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zone extending from the U. S. Embassy westward to include the Hotel Embajador, an area approximately three miles across and over one mile deep; the Line of Communications between the security zone and the Duarte Bridge, about two miles in length; the Duarte Bridge, the eastern bank of the Ozama River, and the road to the San Isidro base, about seven miles east of the river; the area around the San Isidro base itself; and the facilities at the ports of Haina, about 7 miles west of the city, and of Boca Chica, about 23 miles to the east.

The entire perimeter of the area held by U. S. forces, excluding the detached positions at Haina and Boca Chica, was over 30 miles in length.

In addition to maintaining this long perimeter, U.S. troops carried out various police and humanitarian tasks. The troops protecting the safety zone aided in the evacuation of more than 5,000 persons. Troops stationed along the Line of Communications distributed food and medical supplies to Dominicans on both sides. With the disintegration of the Santo Domingo police force, and at a time of extreme emergency when law and order had broken down, the presence of U. S. troops prevented anarchy and provided protection for the civil population of Santo Domingo.

U. S. troops were frequently subjected to sniper fire and direct attacks by rebel forces in continuous violation of the cease-fire agreement. In these circumstances, and with the variety of tasks assigned them, a substantial number of U. S. troops was required. The highest number was reached on May 17, when 22,239 officers and men were engaged in holding a perimeter of over 30 miles, securing positions in and around Santo Domingo.

Upon the establishment of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), created for collective action by the OAS in its resolution of May 6, the United States placed its troops under IAPF command. As other American Republics contributed military contingents to the IAPF, and as the situation in the Dominican Republic permitted, the United States began withdrawing its own troops. As of October 15, U. S. forces

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in the Dominican Republic had been reduced to 8,294, and a further reduction was scheduled for November.

It was at no time the mission of U. S. forces to give military support to either Dominican faction. Much has been made by some reporters of accounts that a few U.S. enlisted men, in reply to questions from one or two press correspondents, identified the rebels as the "enemy". In a situation where U. S. troops were often under heavy fire from rebel forces, U. S. troops defended themselves and, for them, the rebels were indeed an enemy.

Actions taken in self-defense did not constitute support for, or intervention on behalf of, the junta forces against the rebels. In fact, the presence of U. S. military units ultimately prevented the anti-rebel forces from attempting a full-scale attack on the rebel stronghold in downtown Santo Domingo.

In summary, the first objective of the United States in sending troops to the Dominican Republic was to protect the lives of American citizens. These troops made it possible to evacuate Americans and other foreign nationals. Additional U. S. troops subsequently sent to the Dominican Republic prevented the spread of civil war and bloodshed to other parts of the country. They helped to restore law and order, and prevented a Communist takeover. The U. S. military presence also provided the OAS with additional time to take effective collective action.

In this endeavor, 26 United States soldiers gave their lives, and 155 were wounded in action.

VI

Role of the U. S. Embassy

The United States Embassy in Santo Domingo had extensive contacts with many persons on both sides during the crisis.

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It is the business of any Embassy to have close relations with government officials, civilian and military, as well as with all elements -- political, business, labor, student groups, farmers, and others -- in the host country.

From the very first hectic hours of the revolt against the Reid Government on April 24, Embassy officials were deluged with calls, visits, appeals and protests from Dominicans of all factions. Any attempt to catalog the activities of the Embassy in this connection would be beyond the scope of this paper. There were, however, developments of special importance, which are discussed below.

1. On April 24, William B. Connett was in charge of the Embassy in the absence of Ambassador Bennett, who had been ordered to Washington for consultation. Connett, who was in close touch with President Reid Cabral, urged Reid on the morning of April 25 that his future moves be aimed at keeping bloodshed to a minimum. Among the many telegraphic and telephonic reports by Connett to the Department of State that day was his report that he had learned during a conversation with Reid that military commanders were then discussing the establishment of a military junta. In reporting this conversation, Connett commented to the Department of State that the Embassy doubted such a junta would provide stability or be acceptable to the rebels, but thought it might offer a better possibility of avoiding bloodshed than a last-ditch stand by Reid Cabral.

2. An official of the PRD party called the Embassy on April 25 to report an alleged offer by Reid to turn the government over to the PRD. The PRD official said he had told Reid that such action must take place in the presence of a U. S. representative. Reid, with whom the Embassy had just been in communication, had given no indication that he had any such plan, nor was there any confirmation from PRD or other sources of the alleged offer. No action was taken by the Embassy, therefore, on the approach made by this PRD official. In any event, Reid abandoned office very shortly thereafter. He subsequently denied categorically that he had ever offered to turn the government over to the PRD.

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In view of the confused and rapidly changing situation, the Embassy recommended to the Department of State that the United States take no action which might associate it with any of the possible political-military combinations then taking shape.

3. Also on April 25, the Embassy was informed by officers of the Dominican Air Force that they would fight to prevent the return of Bosch, and that General Wessin had agreed to join them. These and other military leaders later asked whether U. S. support could be expected. No commitments were given. The Embassy's Country Team recommended to the Department of State against providing military support to the anti-rebel forces.

4. On the evening of April 25, leaders of the PRD called at the Embassy to ask that the Embassy persuade the Air Force to stop its attacks on the National Palace. Embassy officers stated they would do whatever they could to arrange a cease-fire to facilitate efforts by the two contending sides to meet. They appealed to the PRD leaders to persuade rebel military officials to negotiate in good faith and without preconditions with the San Isidro military leaders. They stressed that the Embassy could not be expected to intervene in direct support of either side. The PRD leaders made clear that they did not desire any such intervention. (On April 26 the Embassy arranged cease-fires on four separate occasions to enable both sides to negotiate.)

5. On the morning of April 26, General Wessin and other Dominican military commanders asked for U. S. military intervention. Embassy officials told them that the United States had no intention of intervening.

6. On April 26, the U. S. Army Attache telephoned a rebel leader, urging him to initiate discussions with the military commanders in an effort to reach a cease-fire and prevent further bloodshed. The Embassy's military attaches were active in other efforts during the day, as were other Embassy officers, to bring the two sides together.

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7. On the evening of April 26, an official of the PRD informed the Embassy that the Molina Ureña regime was planning to request U. S. acceptance of a diplomatic representative in Washington. The United States could not, in the light of the situation then prevailing in Santo Domingo, extend recognition to either of the contending factions. The PRD official was informed that the U. S. would not agree to such a request.

8. The U. S. Naval Attache met with Naval and Air Force officers of the anti-rebel military group before dawn on April 27 to urge them not to bombard Santo Domingo. His mission was not fully successful, but he did secure their agreement not to fire on areas where Americans and foreign nationals were assembling for evacuation.

9. On the morning of April 27, an official of the Molina Ureña regime made a personal appeal to the Embassy for its good offices in prevailing on the Dominican Air Force to cancel the heavy bombardment it had publicly announced for later in the day. He stated that it was impossible for the Molina Ureña government itself to make concessions at this point, but that military officers on both sides might be able to settle affairs among themselves. The Embassy again undertook to seek a suspension of Air Force attacks and to attempt to get the two sides together.

10. The Department of State informed the Embassy on the morning of April 27 that United States objectives were the protection of American lives, the restoration of law and order, and (because of mounting evidence of heavy Communist involvement) the prevention, if necessary, of a Communist takeover. The Department of State instructed the Embassy to continue to keep in close touch with the military leaders on both sides since it was apparent that Molina Ureña and his civilian colleagues were not in control of the situation. The military on both sides were to be urged to agree on a mutually acceptable provisional government for the reestablishment of law and order, and the scheduling of free and democratic elections as promptly as possible. The Embassy was further instructed by the

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Department of State to limit its actions to the extension of good offices to facilitate negotiations between the two sides, but not to become involved in details of the formation of any such provisional government.

11. On April 27, Ambassador Bennett returned to Santo Domingo. Among the many meetings he had that day was one with Captain Peña Taveras and several other rebel officers. Unable to reach Molina Ureña, Ambassador Bennett also talked to Antonio Martinez Francisco, Secretary General of the PRD. (It was Martinez Francisco who went to San Isidro on April 28 and broadcast, over the official anti-rebel station, an appeal to the rebels to lay down their arms.) Bennett told both the rebel officers and Martinez Francisco that the U. S. Government hoped a cease-fire could be arranged without delay. It was time, Ambassador Bennett told them, to put an end to the senseless slaughter and to make a real effort to reach agreement between both sides on a government that could effectively govern the country. He emphasized that the Embassy was talking to the anti-rebel side in precisely the same terms.

12. Later on April 27, Ambassador Bennett reported to the Department of State the Chief of the National Police had informed the Embassy that additional anti-rebel military elements, numbering about 1,000 men, were entering the city from the west; that troops under General Wessin had crossed the Duarte Bridge into the eastern edge of the city; that mop-up operations were underway; and that the Armed Forces would clear the streets of rebels that same night.

13. Late in the afternoon of April 27, Molina Ureña and other leaders of the rebel movement, including Colonels Hernando Ramirez and Caamaño, went to the U. S. Embassy. They asked that Ambassador Bennett dissuade General Wessin from entering the city and the Air Force from continuing its attacks. Bennett pointed out that the Embassy had on four occasions the previous day arranged suspensions of the air attacks to permit meetings between the two sides, but that each time the rebels had tried to take advantage

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of the cease-fires. Moreover, neither Molina Ureña nor his representatives had appeared for the meetings with the anti-rebels which the Embassy had arranged. Molina Ureña had insisted that the military commanders acknowledge his position as Constitutional provisional president by calling on him at the National Palace. This the military commanders refused to do.

Ambassador Bennett reminded Molina Ureña that the U. S. had strongly supported Juan Bosch and had made clear its emphatic disapproval of his overthrow. However, the current effort to restore Bosch to power had evidently failed. Ambassador Bennett appealed to Molina Ureña for an end to bloodshed and urged that a compromise solution be arranged.

Bennett protested the incident at the Hotel Embajador that morning in which American lives had been endangered by a band of armed rebels. He also made clear to the rebel leaders his concern over the growing Communist influence in the rebel camp as revealed by specific instances of Communist activity (citing some of those already reported in Section IV for the period April 24-27). Molina Ureña responded that these were simply details. Bennett stated that they were "details" of considerable importance to the United States.

Molina Ureña then proposed that Bennett personally participate in negotiations between the two sides which might be arranged, and at which the Acting Dean of the Diplomatic Corps (the Colombian Ambassador) and a representative of the Catholic Church might also be present. Bennett replied that it would not be appropriate for him to be a participant in a meeting of this kind, adding that it was the view of the United States that an accord between the two sides should be reached only by Dominicans talking to Dominicans.

Word was received during the meeting that the Air Force bombardment of the city had been suspended. Ambassador Bennett urged that this opportunity be seized and that the two sides get together. He told Molina Ureña that there was evidence that the anti-rebel military commanders were prepared

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to talk. Bennett emphasized to Molina Ureña, as he had to Martinez Francisco earlier, that the Embassy had also been making appeals along the same lines to the San Isidro military commanders.

Following this meeting, Molina Ureña made no attempt to meet or communicate with the anti-rebel military commanders but instead took asylum in the Colombian Embassy. One of his principal advisers had taken diplomatic asylum even before the meeting, and others, both civilian and military, including Colonel Hernando Ramirez, followed Molina Ureña by abandoning the rebel movement.

Distorted versions of this meeting between Molina Ureña and Bennett have been carried in the press. These have been based almost entirely on the story circulated by Colonel Caamaño. Caamaño later told correspondents that the rebel side was then "ready to agree not only to a cease-fire but to peace on any terms just to stop the killing." This is, of course, untrue. Molina Ureña and his senior officials, among them Colonel Hernando Ramirez, the chief among the rebel officers, were not ready to seek peace. They asked Bennett to persuade General Wessin, whose forces were then closing in on the city, to call off his attack. There was no indication that Molina Ureña would be willing to negotiate even then. Indeed, Molina Ureña had consistently refused to meet with the anti-rebel military commanders unless they acknowledged him as "provisional president" -- precisely the issue that caused the conflict.

Caamaño has also told correspondents that Bennett "laughed" at the rebels and told them they were "finished". This, too, is untrue. Caamaño had already taken diplomatic asylum the night of April 25, when he feared the revolt to have been defeated by the Air Force attacks, although he rejoined the rebel officers the following day. Now, following the April 27 meeting between Molina Ureña and Bennett, Caamaño returned to the fighting, vowing to "fight to the death", and becoming the chief military figure on the rebel side, replacing Col. Hernando Ramirez. Whatever Caamaño's motives in giving out his false version

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of the meeting at the Embassy, his story served to obscure the fact that he was the only rebel officer to seek asylum on April 25. His story was also politically useful to him within the rebel movement.

14. On the morning of April 28, the anti-rebel military and police commanders made an urgent request to the Embassy that the United States supply 50 walkie-talkie sets. At that point, the only possibility of curbing the violence in the streets of Santo Domingo and of bringing the marauding bands of armed civilians under control lay in actions the police and regular armed forces might be able to take. The Embassy believed adequate communication facilities among the scattered elements of these forces would facilitate their efforts to restore order. The Embassy therefore recommended that the walkie-talkie sets be made available.

15. On April 28, the military commanders appointed a three-man junta headed by Colonel Pedro Benoit, the formation of which was announced at noon over the San Isidro radio station. Colonel Benoit telephoned the Embassy early that afternoon, asking that the United States land Marines to restore peace. This appeal was followed by a written request for military assistance in which Colonel Benoit stressed Communist involvement in the rebel movement. In reporting Colonel Benoit's request, Ambassador Bennett and the Country Team, in a telegram received by the Department of State at 3:16 P.M., April 23, said that the Embassy had given Benoit no encouragement, and recommended against providing the military support requested by Benoit. Bennett and the Country Team did suggest that contingency planning be completed with a view to the possible emergency landing of U. S. Marines to protect American lives.

16. Subsequently, in a telegram received in Washington at 5:16 P.M., April 23, Ambassador Bennett reported that the situation had deteriorated rapidly, that the disorganized forces of the Military Junta could not restore order, and that American lives were in serious danger. The Ambassador and the Country Team therefore recommended that Marines be landed at the Hotel Embajador area without delay.

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17. On the morning of April 29, Ambassador Bennett met with other diplomatic representatives in Santo Domingo and found general agreement among them with the U. S. assessment of the situation. Several reported that their Embassies were completely without protection and had come under fire from rebel groups. A number of these Ambassadors had earlier asked Bennett to arrange for protection of their Embassies by U. S. Marines.

18. On April 30, Deputy Chief of Mission Connett and the U. S. Air Attache went with U. S. military officers to discuss the situation with the Junta group. They explained the OAS resolution reiterating an earlier appeal for a cease-fire and calling for the establishment of an international zone of safe haven. They informed the Junta that an international security zone had, therefore, been established by U. S. Marines and stressed that this zone was for the protection of U. S. citizens and other foreign nationals.

19. On the afternoon of April 30, Ambassador Bennett accompanied the Papal Nuncio and representatives of the rebel command to the San Isidro Base. There, a cease-fire agreement reached in accordance with the OAS resolution was signed by the rebel representatives and by Colonel Benoit and his principal military commanders. • Former Ambassador John Bartlow Martin, who had been sent to Santo Domingo to assist the Embassy in efforts to restore peace, also participated in this meeting.

20. That same night, Ambassador Martin, by telephone to Puerto Rico, urged Juan Bosch to ask Colonel Caamaño to sign and honor the cease-fire agreement which, although concluded that day, lacked Caamaño's signature. Bosch assured Martin he would do so. The next day, Caamaño and his principal lieutenants did sign the cease-fire agreement, and Ambassador Martin, together with the Papal Nuncio, met with them.

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As indicated in the foregoing summary, the U. S. Embassy made every effort from the outset of the revolt to persuade the two factions to stop fighting, to resolve their differences, and to find an acceptable Dominican solution to a Dominican problem.

Both sides believed, at various stages, that they were near victory. Passions were inflamed on both sides. There was savage violence in the streets. In such an atmosphere, neither faction was seriously prepared to negotiate with the other. In fact, neither the Papal Nuncio nor representatives of the OAS, during four months of subsequent negotiations, were able to bring the leaders of the two factions to the same table.

Rebel leaders created a "Constitutional Government" under the presidency of Colonel Caamaño on May 4. The "Constitutionalists" held themselves to be the legal government of the Dominican Republic and unsuccessfully sought diplomatic recognition from a number of countries on this basis. Their authority was, in fact, restricted to the small section of downtown Santo Domingo held by the rebels. At the same time, the Military Junta at San Isidro, although in effective control of the regular military and police forces in the country, could not function as a national government.

It was necessary that governmental machinery resume operation and that essential services again be provided throughout the country. Ambassador Martin therefore undertook to seek a consensus among prominent civilian and military figures on the composition of a new government to replace the Junta. As the result of these discussions, General Antonio Imbert emerged on May 7 as the head of a five-man "Government of National Reconstruction", which included three prominent civilians of moderate political views.

The "Government of National Reconstruction" restored governmental services and established its authority in the country. It was, however, a regime which the rebel side declared was unacceptable to it. In a further attempt to resolve the conflict and to restore peace, the United States Government later in May sent a high-level mission, headed by

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Mr. McGeorge Bundy, to Santo Domingo. It worked with the Embassy in exploring the possibility of an agreement between the two sides on a broad-based government to unify the country. Such an agreement could not be obtained at that time, but the efforts of the mission were continued by the Secretary General of the OAS and an OAS Committee which arrived in Santo Domingo shortly thereafter.

VII

Basis for Commitment of U. S. Forces

The initial landing of U. S. troops in the Dominican Republic on the evening of April 28 was, as stated previously, an emergency action to protect the lives of U.S. nationals and those of other countries. The rapid deterioration in public order made the introduction of military forces essential if Americans and other foreign nationals were to be successfully evacuated. The prevailing conditions of chaos, violence and bloodshed permitted no other course of action. Troops were landed only after local authorities had made it clear that they could not maintain public order and could not protect the lives of American citizens. Under the circumstances the action taken was justified on both humanitarian and legal grounds.

Under Articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter, member states are obligated not to intervene in the internal affairs of other member states. However, nothing in the Charter precluded the United States from taking action to save the lives of its nationals. Moreover, these obligations did not require the United States to withdraw its forces in the days immediately after their initial landing, when no local means existed for keeping order in Santo Domingo.

It would, in fact, have been irresponsible for the United States to withdraw its forces. Such a course would have meant the resumption of civil war, and could, because

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of the mounting evidence of Communist activity in the rebel movement, ultimately have endangered the security of the hemisphere.

The continued presence of United States troops in Santo Domingo, after their initial landing to protect American lives, permitted the OAS to function in the manner intended by its Charter and assist the people of the Dominican Republic in reestablishing democratic government under conditions of public order. The primary purposes for which the American States established the OAS, as set forth in Article I of the Charter, are "to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence." U. S. troops in Santo Domingo were fulfilling this role before the member states of the OAS could take collective action and establish the Inter-American Peace Force.

The United States is committed to the preservation of the right of all free peoples to choose their own course without falling prey to international conspiracy from any quarter.

The United States fully supports the OAS as the institution through which this right can be realized when outside interference makes collective assistance to a sister republic necessary.

VIII

Collective Action Through the OAS

The United States cooperated closely during the Dominican crisis with the other member states of the OAS in efforts to restore peace and provide a democratic solution through collective action within the Inter-American system.

The threat to American lives arising from the lawlessness and violence in Santo Domingo on April 23 made it

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necessary to land U. S. troops immediately. Although time did not permit prior consultation in the OAS on this emergency action, the United States kept in close touch with representatives of the other American Republics about the Dominican crisis. On April 27, officials of the Department of State had discussed the situation with several Ambassadors of OAS countries. At the request of the United States, the Inter-American Peace Committee had been convoked that afternoon to hear reports on the situation from the Dominican Ambassador and the U. S. Alternate Representative in the OAS.

At its regular session on April 28, the Council of the OAS heard another report from the Dominican Ambassador. That night, the Department of State informed the Ambassadors of the OAS countries that troops had landed in Santo Domingo to protect the lives of Americans and other foreign nationals. Immediately, the United States requested a special meeting of the OAS Council the next day.

At the meeting on April 29, the U. S. Ambassador to the OAS, Ellsworth Bunker, reviewed the developments that had made it necessary to land U. S. Marines. He proposed a Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS countries to be convened the following day, April 30. The Council sent a message to the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo requesting his good offices in arranging a cease-fire between the contending Dominican forces.

At a second meeting on the night of April 29, the Council adopted a resolution introduced by the U. S. reiterating the earlier appeal for a cease-fire and calling for the establishment of an international zone of safe-haven in Santo Domingo. In the early morning hours of April 30, the Council decided to convoke a Meeting of Foreign Ministers. In the afternoon, the Council decided to send Secretary General Mora to Santo Domingo. The same day, in Santo Domingo, the Papal Nuncio prevailed upon the contending factions to sign a cease-fire in accordance with the request to him by the OAS Council.

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The 10th Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs convened on May 1 and adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution establishing a five-nation Special Committee to investigate the situation in Santo Domingo and to seek the reestablishment of peace and normal conditions. The Committee was composed of representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and Panama. The United States also submitted a draft resolution at this meeting requesting Member States to offer military contingents to assist the Committee in carrying out its mission.

Upon its arrival in Santo Domingo, the Committee observed the widespread misery and hunger in the city and reported the urgent need for food and medicines. Accordingly, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers appealed to Member States to supply these needs through the OAS Secretariat. In response to this and other appeals, the United States made available more than 6,000,000 pounds of food and medical supplies for distribution, through the OAS, in both the rebel and anti-rebel areas during the crisis.

On May 5, as a result of the Committee's efforts, the two sides to the Dominican conflict signed the "Act of Santo Domingo" by which they ratified the cease-fire reached on April 30, recognized the establishment of the international safety zone, agreed to permit the evacuation of asylees, and undertook to assist the International Red Cross or other agencies in relieving hunger and suffering.

Acting on the recommendation of the Special Committee, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers on May 6 approved a resolution requesting Member States to provide military contingents for an Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic. The Force was created to serve "in a spirit of democratic impartiality . . . cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions." Subsequently, the Government of Brazil was requested to designate a commander of the Force, and the U. S., a deputy commander.

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In the Dominican Republic, on May 23, the formal act establishing the Inter-American Peace Force was signed. On May 29 a distinguished Brazilian General, Hugo Panasco Alvim, took command. Contingents from Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and officers from El Salvador, joined with units of the United States to make up this first peace-keeping force established by the members of the Inter-American system.

Meanwhile, the Special Committee having completed the initial phase of its mission, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers designated Secretary General Mora as its representative in the Dominican Republic. With the IAPF on the ground and as a result of the Secretary General's continuing efforts, the OAS was able to proceed to the next step in its endeavor to promote a peaceful solution to the Dominican conflict.

On June 2, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers adopted a resolution creating the "Ad Hoc Committee for the Restoration of Democratic Order in the Dominican Republic." This Committee, composed of Ambassadors Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil, Ramon de Clairmont Duenas of El Salvador, and Ellsworth Bunker of the United States, departed immediately for Santo Domingo with a mandate to help achieve "a climate of peace and reconciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions in the Dominican Republic and its economic and social recovery."

During the next three months the Committee conducted intensive negotiations with both sides to the conflict and met with hundreds of Dominicans from all walks of life in an attempt to find a democratic solution. The Committee's mission, as expressed in its two declarations to the Dominican people, was "not intervention but conciliation", the reestablishment of peace, and the finding of a solution that would allow the "Dominican people to decide their own future" through the exercise of their democratic rights. The Committee's efforts finally bore fruit on August 29 when agreement was reached on the "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" providing for the establishment of an impartial provisional government and the holding of free elections within nine months.

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The United States fully supported the work of the Committee, as it had all other OAS activities designed to restore peace and freedom to the Dominican Republic. From the outset, U. S. representatives and U. S. military forces, even before the latter became part of the Inter-American Peace Force, acted fully in consonance with the resolutions of the Council of the OAS and the 10th Meeting of Foreign Ministers. The closest consultation with OAS representatives was maintained. For example, when U. S. forces expanded the international security zone and opened the line of communication through the city, they did so only after obtaining the approval of these representatives.

The purpose of the OAS -- to restore peace and democratic institutions to the Dominican Republic so that the Dominican people could decide their own future -- was, at all times, the purpose of the United States as well.

IX

Establishment of the Provisional Government

On September 3, the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic headed by Dr. Hector Garcia Godoy took office in a ceremony at the National Palace. The two regimes of the contending forces in the Dominican conflict -- the "Constitutional Government" of Colonel Caamaño and the "Government of National Reconstruction" headed by General Imbert -- had previously resigned. Under the terms of the "Act of Reconciliation", signed by representatives of both factions, Dr. Garcia Godoy's government became the country's sole government. It was recognized by the United States and the other Member States of the OAS, as well as by the great majority of the countries outside the Western Hemisphere with which the Dominican Republic has traditionally maintained diplomatic relations.

In his inaugural speech, Dr. Garcia Godoy promised to establish an impartial government devoted to the development of a climate which would permit free and honest election. In accordance with the Institutional Act, under which the

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Provisional Government functions, these national elections are scheduled to be held between March 3, and June 3, 1966. It is intended that there be a political truce until three months before the elections. It is contemplated that a special OAS Commission will assist with the preparations for the elections, and that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission will help assure that the rights of all Dominicans are respected.

Great difficulties were encountered by the Provisional Government in reincorporating the "Constitutionalist" zone into the city of Santo Domingo because of continuing political problems between the two factions. Disorders and violence in the zone on the part of former rebels and extremists deterred the Provisional Government's police force from attempting to restore authority in the area. It took over a month and a half, and, ultimately, the temporary presence of IAPF troops in the former rebel-held area, to bring about its reincorporation into the city. By early November, Santo Domingo was reunited. Normal activity was restored in the downtown area, and the country's leading newspapers and banks, located in the former rebel zone, reopened after having been shut down for more than six months.

Progress has been slow in collecting the arms held by civilians who participated in the rebel movement. Serious problems have arisen in the reintegration into the regular military establishment of rebel officers and men as provided for in the "Act of Reconciliation."

By early November, only a few pistols, rifles, machine-guns, and mortars, as well as some grenades, had been recovered by the authorities in their search through the former rebel zone. The disappearance of large quantities of weapons--estimated at several thousand, although the exact figure may never be known--confirms the many earlier reports of secret caches set up in Santo Domingo and in other parts of the country.

Rebel military officers have not yet been reintegrated into the regular establishment. The military commanders and other anti-rebel officers agreed to accept all those who had rebelled, but at their regular, pre-revolt rank. Colonel

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Caamaño had, however, promoted most of the rebel officers, often by two or three grades, and insisted on reintegration at their higher "Constitutionalist" rank. Moreover, Caamaño had re-commissioned and promoted a fairly large number of former officers, dropped from the regular military establishment long before the revolt, and also demanded their reintegration. Both these demands were rejected by the military commanders. It seemed in early November, however, that Garcia Godoy might soon prevail on individual "Constitutionalist" military officers to accept reintegration at their pre-rebellion rank.

Garcia Godoy, upon taking office, had decided to eliminate a potential threat to stability by disbanding the Armed Forces Training Center (CEFA). He later decided to assign its controversial commander, General Wessin, to a post abroad. General Wessin opposed this decision and remained in effective control of the CEFA troops, loyal to him personally. Wessin also began maneuvering the CEFA tanks in such a manner as to constitute open defiance of the Provisional Government, which was still attempting to establish its authority. Garcia Godoy then requested the good offices of the OAS Ad Hoc Committee and of the Commanding General of the Inter-American Peace Force in persuading General Wessin to leave the Dominican Republic. On September 9, General Wessin, having accepted the post of Dominican Consul General in Miami, Florida, departed voluntarily on a U. S. Air Force plane provided at the request of the IAPF. Subsequently, General Wessin decided not to serve in the assignment offered him and alleged, without basis in fact, that force had been used to effect his departure from the Dominican Republic. He is now living in Miami as a private citizen.

Some of the appointments made by Garcia Godoy to government posts have involved individuals identified with the APCJ or regarded by many Dominicans as of the extreme left-wing. While it appeared by early November that Garcia Godoy would replace some of the more controversial figures, these appointments contributed to the continuing tension between left and right in the Dominican Republic. Extreme rightist elements, allegedly including anti-rebel military

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officers, have been accused by the former "Constitutionalists" of the assassination in October of the Governor of Valverde Province. On the grounds that the Ministry of Public Works had been taken over by Communists, an armed group of anti-Communists seized the Ministry building in Santo Domingo, but were later driven out by the police. Anti-Communists are said to have been involved in the bombing of the plant of the pro-rebel newspaper "Ahora". They are also accused of bombing the commercial radio station, "Radio Cristal", owned by a supporter of Juan Bosch and active in propaganda broadcasts during the revolt. The machine-gunning of the house of a Provisional Government official, regarded by some Dominicans as a Communist sympathizer, is also laid at the door of rightist elements.

• The Communists, too, have engaged in many acts of violence. They have staged demonstrations, attempted to take over control of the University of Santo Domingo, terrorized Government employees, and fought a pitched battle against a non-Communist labor union in the port area of the city. They have also tried -- so far without success -- to organize city-wide and nation-wide strikes. A Communist mob, having just left a PCD rally, found and murdered Severo Cabral, a prominent figure of the extreme right-wing.

The Castroist APCJ had embarked in June on an active campaign to recruit new members. It conducted courses in Communist ideology and gave guerrilla warfare training to several hundred young Dominicans, many of whom were brought in to the rebel-held area of Santo Domingo from other parts of the country. The APCJ shared with Lt. Col. Montes Arache, the commander of the Dominican Navy "frog-men" who were the "special mission" element in the rebel force, the direction of a training school in the rebel zone. About 300 men and women were given instruction in the school in sabotage, demolition techniques and hand-to-hand combat. In the final weeks of the conflict, the APCJ conducted daily and compulsory political indoctrination courses in a park in the rebel-held area, along with calisthenics and basic infantry drill, for between 1,200 and 1,500 young Dominicans.

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The Communist Chinese-line MPD conducted its own political indoctrination and guerrilla training courses for about 200 people. In August, the MPD staged a widely publicized party congress in the rebel area. It advocated the formation of a united front with democratic political parties. Looking also to the possibility of a nationwide pro-Communist uprising at some future time, the MPD proposed the creation of a clandestine "liberation front" among the Communist parties.

The Moscow-line PCD, like the MPD, called in August for the formation of a united front in which the Communist parties could ally themselves with democratic parties. The PCD also informed its members, however, that "direct action" might be the "correct policy" in the months ahead. The Central Committee of the PCD, in the August 16 edition of the party's official publication, boasted that the Communist Party had created a "popular movement" out of what would otherwise have been a cut-and-dried military coup by rebellious Army officers. The party called for greater effort on the part of its members to prepare, in its own words, "for victory in the next popular insurrection."

The Provisional Government and the Dominican people face serious problems. The bitter civil conflict of the past months has left deep wounds. The recovery of the nation -- its economic reconstruction, social development, and progress toward political stability -- will require intense effort for a long time to come on the part of all Dominicans. Nevertheless, a beginning has been made.

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Excerpt from President's News Conference of June 1, 1965

"Men were running up and down the corridors of the Ambassador Hotel with tommyguns, shooting out windows, and through the roof and through the closets. Our citizens were under the beds and in the closets and trying to dodge this gunfire. Our Ambassador, as he was talking to us, was under the desk. We didn't think we had much time to consult in any great detail more than we had talked about up to that time, but we did make the announcement about 8 o'clock and immediately asked the OAS for an urgent meeting the next morning."

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Excerpt from the President's News Conference of June 17, 1965

"In the Dominican Republic, forces moved in and overthrew the government. And while I am not passing on the merits of the actions that take place many times in many places, where they change governments -- and we believe in change of conditions, and we are trying to obtain them through the Alliance for Progress -- but in this particular instance, a fact that has been emphasized all too little, I think, some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads cut off, and six Latin American embassies were violated and fired upon over a period of 4 days before we went in.

"As we talked to our Ambassador to confirm the horror and tragedy and the unbelievable fact that they were firing on Americans and the American Embassy, he was talking to us from under a desk while bullets were going through his windows and he had a thousand American men, women, and children assembled in the hotel who were pleading with their President for help to preserve their lives."

On page 12, line 1 and 2, after the word "pay" in line 1 strike out the words "the Federal pro rata share of".

On page 16, line 15, after the word "pay" strike out the words "the Federal pro rata share of the".

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I would like to explain the purpose of the amendment which I have offered for myself and the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF]. The committee bill provides that the cost shall be allocated between the Federal Government and the States in the same proportion that costs are allocated for construction of the Interstate Highway and primary systems—that is, 90 percent to be paid by the Federal Government and 10 percent by the States, in respect to the Interstate Highway System, and 50 percent by the Federal Government and 50 percent by the States with respect to the primary system.

I support the objectives of the bill, and voted to report it to the Senate. But yesterday, at the close of the session, I stated my reasons for having presented this amendment in committee, and the reasons which lead me to offer it today.

In the subcommittee this amendment was adopted by a large vote, but in the full committee the action of the subcommittee was reversed by a vote of 8 to 5.

I offer this amendment for two principal reasons. One reason is that it is a national program. It is so declared by the bill and by the President.

The second reason for requiring the full amount to be paid by the Federal Government is that the bill would impose a penalty upon States not acceding to its program—the penalty being the denial of all Federal-aid funds for construction of highways. With such a penalty, and no State could accept such a penalty, the program proposed in the bill—worthy as it is—cannot be considered a true voluntary Federal-State aid program. The denial of all funds to a State would amount to millions of dollars to a State.

In the case of California it would amount to a denial of \$336 million annually. In my own State it would amount to \$74 million. In other States it would be in similar proportions.

The bill would effectually require the States to accept this program and that their legislatures appropriate money to pay for its cost. It is a worthy program. I voted to report it to the Senate, but I do not approve its mandatory features.

Over 100 Federal-aid programs have been enacted. None mandatorily requires State acceptance. If it is to be exercised, I believe the Federal Government should pay its full cost.

I understand there are others who desire to speak. I shall not speak further at this time.

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a moment?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I concur in this amendment for all of the reasons stated. This is a coercive program.

We are saying to the States that they have to go into the secondary road system where always we have had the pro-

vision that billboards were permitted. We are saying to them that they must remove billboards on the 50-50 allocation that has always been proposed.

There is a difference in the Interstate System, which is new, which goes through new areas and new territory. We say that under the law we will give the same proportion of assistance to the State to remove billboards that we gave for the financing of other highway systems, such as under the 90-10 Interstate System.

So far as the secondary systems are concerned, we have always had the right to erect billboards. This is a prevailing system in all the States. Yet, we are saying to the States that they must remove the billboards or they will not be permitted to share in the Federal highway program. It is coercion.

We are taking away from the States their police power to remove billboards and we are saying they have to make compensation.

This is a national program. We have decided we are going to remove billboards from the interstate and secondary systems. Therefore, I concur that we should pay that cost out of the national budget. We should not force the States to forgo all of their participation in the interstate program if they do not want to take away a man's livelihood, or a man's business, which he has had for many years.

I feel strongly that the States should use their funds for secondary road systems and the farm-to-market roads, and for the development of primary highways on the present allocation, and should not be forced to compensate the billboard operators. I feel strongly that the cost should come out of the Federal budget.

Therefore, I concur in the amendment.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, even though the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT], will not be germane to the pending legislation (S. 2084), I ask unanimous consent that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Senator FULBRIGHT] be allowed to speak for not to exceed 1 hour.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Young of Ohio in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered. The rule of germaneness is waived.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I do not intend to object, but I wish to have the assurance that the amendment which has been stated will be the pending question at the conclusion of the remarks by the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair states to the senior Senator from Kentucky that his amendment will be the pending question.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the formation of a provisional government in Santo Domingo under the leadership of Dr. Hector Garcia-Godoy is good news. It provides reason for cautious optimism as to the future and testifies as well to the arduous and patient efforts of the OAS mediating team. I wish to pay tribute especially to Ambassador Bunker for his wisdom and patience in handling this difficult affair. The formation of a provisional government is not the end of the Dominican crisis, but it does bring to an end a tragic and dangerous phase of the crisis. Many problems remain, particularly the problem of establishing the authority of a democratic government over the Dominican military. Nonetheless, the situation now seems to be moving into a less dangerous and more hopeful phase. At this time of relative calm it is appropriate, desirable and, I think, necessary to review events in the Dominican Republic and the U.S. role in those events. The purpose of such a review—and its only purpose—is to develop guidelines for wise and effective policies in the future.

I was in doubt about the advisability of making a statement on the Dominican affair until some of my colleagues made public statements on the floor. Their views on the way in which the committee proceedings were conducted and, indeed, on the Dominican crisis as a whole, are so diametrically opposed to my own that I now consider it my duty to express my personal conclusions drawn from the hearings held by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The suggestions that have been made that the committee was prejudiced in its approach against the administration's policies are, in my opinion, without merit. The committee was impartial and fair in giving a full and detailed hearing to the administration's point of view, so much so, in fact, that it heard only one witness from outside the Government.

U.S. policy in the Dominican crisis was characterized initially by overtimidity and subsequently by overreaction. Throughout the whole affair, it has also been characterized by a lack of candor.

These are general conclusions I have reached from a painstaking review of the salient features of the extremely complex situation. These judgments are made, of course, with the benefit of hindsight and, in fairness, it must be conceded there were no easy choices available to the United States in the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, it is the task

diplomacy to make wise decisions when they need to be made and U.S. diplomacy failed to do so in the Dominican crisis.

It cannot be said with assurance that the United States could have changed the course of events by acting differently. What can be said with assurance is that the United States did not take advantage of several opportunities in which it might have changed the course of events. The reason appears to be that, very close to the beginning of the revolution, U.S. policymakers decided that it should not be allowed to succeed. This decision seems to me to have been based on exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement in the initial stages and on distaste for the return to power of Juan Bosch or of a government controlled by Bosch's party, the PRD—Dominican Revolutionary Party.

The question of the degree of Communist influence is of critical importance and I shall comment on it later. The essential point, however, is that the United States, on the basis of ambiguous evidence, assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist dominated, or would certainly become so. It apparently never occurred to anyone that the United States could also attempt to influence the course which the revolution took. We misread prevailing tendencies in Latin America by overlooking or ignoring the fact that any reform movement is likely to attract Communist support. We thus failed to perceive that if we are automatically to oppose every reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end up opposing every reform movement, making ourselves the prisoners of reactionaries who wish to preserve the status quo—and the status quo in many countries is not good enough.

The principal reason for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo was faulty advice given to the President by his representatives in the Dominican Republic at the time of acute crisis. Much of this advice was based on misjudgment of the facts of the situation; some of it appears to have been based on inadequate evidence or, in some cases, simply inaccurate information. On the basis of the information and counsel he received, the President could hardly have acted other than he did.

I am hopeful, and reasonably confident, that the mistakes made by the United States in the Dominican Republic can be retrieved and that it will be possible to avoid repeating them in the future. These purposes can be served, however only if the shortcomings of U.S. policy are thoroughly reviewed and analyzed. I make my remarks today in the hope of contributing to that process.

The development of the Dominican crisis, beginning on April 24, 1965, provides a classic study of policymaking in a fast-changing situation in which each decision reduces the range of options available for future decisions so that errors are compounded and finally, indeed, there are few if any options except to follow through on an ill-conceived course of action. Beyond a certain point the Dominican story acquired some of the inevitability of a Greek tragedy.

Another theme that emerges from the Dominican crisis is the occurrence of a striking change in U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic and the possibility—not a certainty, because the signs are ambiguous, but only the possibility—of a major change as well in the general Latin American policies of the United States. Obviously, an important change in the official outlook on Dominican affairs occurred between September 1963, when the United States was vigorously opposed to the overthrow of Juan Bosch, and April 1965, when the United States was either unenthusiastic or actually opposed to his return.

What happened in that period to change the assessment of Bosch from favorable to unfavorable? It is quite true that Bosch as President did not distinguish himself as an administrator, but that was well known in 1963. It is also true, however, and much more to the point as far as the legitimate interests of the United States are concerned, that Bosch had received 58 percent of the votes in a free and honest election and that he was presiding over a reform-minded government in tune with the Alliance for Progress. This is a great deal more than can be said for any other President of the Dominican Republic.

The question therefore remains as to how and why the attitude of the U.S. Government changed so strikingly between September 1963 and April 1965. And the question inevitably arises whether this shift in the administration's attitude toward the Dominican Republic is part of a broader shift in its attitude toward other Latin American countries, whether, to be specific, the U.S. Government now views the vigorous reform movements of Latin America—such as Christian Democracy in Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, APRA in Peru and Accion Democratica in Venezuela—as threatening to the interests of the United States. And if this is the case, what kind of Latin American political movements would now be regarded as friendly to the United States and beneficial to its interests?

I should like to make it very clear that I am raising a question not offering an answer. I am frankly puzzled as to the current attitude of the U.S. Government toward reformist movements in Latin America. On the one hand, President Johnson's deep personal commitment to the philosophy and aims of the Alliance for Progress is clear; it was convincingly expressed, for example, in his speech to the Latin American Ambassadors on the fourth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress—a statement in which the President compared the Alliance for Progress with his own enlightened program for a Great Society at home. On the other hand, one notes a general tendency on the part of our policymakers not to look beyond a Latin American politician's anticommunism. One also notes in certain Government agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, a preoccupation with counterinsurgency, which is to say, with the prospect of revolutions and means of suppressing them. This preoccupation is manifested in dubious and costly research projects,

such as the recently discredited Camelot; these studies claim to be scientific but beneath their almost unbelievably opaque language lies an unmistakable military and reactionary bias.

It is of great importance that the uncertainty as to U.S. aims in Latin America be resolved. We cannot successfully advance the cause of popular democracy and at the same time align ourselves with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies; yet that is what we seem to be trying to do. The direction of the Alliance for Progress is toward social revolution in Latin America; the direction of our Dominican intervention is toward the suppression of revolutionary movements which are supported by Communists or suspected of being influenced by Communists. The prospect of an election in 9 months which may conceivably produce a strong democratic government is certainly reassuring on this score, but the fact remains that the reaction of the United States at the time of acute crisis was to intervene forcibly and illegally against a revolution which had we sought to influence it instead of suppressing it, might have produced a strong popular government without foreign military intervention. Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning, the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere.

We simply cannot have it both ways; we must choose between the Alliance for Progress and a foredoomed effort to sustain the status quo in Latin America. The choice which we are to make is the principal unanswered question arising out of the unhappy events in the Dominican Republic and, indeed, the principal unanswered question for the future of our relations with Latin America.

It is not surprising that we Americans are not drawn toward the uncouth revolutionaries of the non-Communist left. We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary nation on earth; we are, on the contrary, much closer to being the most unrevolutionary nation on earth. We are sober and satisfied and comfortable and rich; our institutions are stable and old and even venerable; and our Revolution of 1776, for that matter, was not much of an upheaval compared to the French and Russian revolutions and to current and impending revolutions in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Our heritage of stability and conservatism is a great blessing, but it also has the effect of limiting our understanding of the character of social revolution and sometimes as well of the injustices which spawn them. Our understanding of revolutions and their causes is imperfect not because of any failures of mind or character but because of our good fortune since the Civil War in never having experienced sustained social injustice without hope of legal or more or less peaceful remedy. We are called upon, therefore, to give our understanding and our sympathy and support to movements

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which are alien to our experience and contrary to our preferences and prejudices.

We try to understand social revolution and the injustices that give it rise because they are the heart and core of the experience of the great majority of people now living in the world. In Latin America we may prefer to associate with the well-bred, well-dressed businessmen who often hold positions of power, but Latin American reformers regard such men as aliens in their own countries who neither identify with their own people nor even sympathize with their aspirations. Such leaders are regarded by educated young Latin Americans as a "consular bourgeoisie," by which they mean business-oriented conservatives who more nearly represent the interests of foreign businessmen than the interests of their own people. Men like Donald Reid—who is one of the better of this category of leaders—may have their merits, but they are not the force of the future in Latin America.

It is the revolutionaries of the non-Communist left who have most of the popular support in Latin America. The Radical Party in Chile, for example, is full of 19th century libertarians whom many North Americans would find highly congenial, but it was recently crushed in national elections by a group of rambunctious, leftist Christian Democrats. It may be argued that the Christian Democrats are anti-United States, and to a considerable extent some of them are—more so now, it may be noted than prior to the intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic—but they are not Communists and they have popular support. They have also come to terms with the American copper companies in Chile; that is something which the predecessor conservative government was unable to do and something which a Communist government would have been unwilling to do.

The movement of the future in Latin America is social revolution. The question is whether it is to be Communist or democratic revolution and the choice which the Latin Americans make will depend in part on how the United States uses its great influence. It should be very clear that the choice is not between social revolution and conservative oligarchy but whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies, we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro in Chile.

In my Senate speech of March 25, 1964, I commented as follows on the prospect of revolution:

I am not predicting violent revolutions in Latin America or elsewhere. Still less am I advocating them. I wish only to suggest that violent social revolutions are a possibility in countries where feudal oligarchies resist all meaningful change by peaceful means. We must not, in our preference for the democratic procedures envisioned by the Charter of Punta del Este, close our minds to the possibility that democratic procedures may fail in certain countries and that where democracy does fail violent social convulsions may occur.

I think that in the case of the Dominican Republic we did close our minds to the causes and to the essential legitimacy of revolution in a country in which democratic procedures had failed. That, I think, is the central fact concerning the participation of the United States in the Dominican revolution and, possibly as well, its major lesson for the future. I turn now to comment on some of the events which began last April 24 in Santo Domingo.

When the Dominican revolution began on Saturday, April 24, the United States had three options available. First, it could have supported the Reid Cabral government; second, it could have supported the revolutionary forces; and third, it could do nothing.

The administration chose the last course. When Donald Reid Cabral asked for U.S. intervention on Sunday morning, April 25, he was given no encouragement. He then resigned, and considerable disagreement ensued over the nature of the government to succeed him. The party of Juan Bosch, the PRD, or Dominican Revolutionary Party, asked for a "U.S. presence" at the transfer of government power but was given no encouragement. Thus, there began at that time a chaotic situation which amounted to civil war in a country without an effective government.

What happened in essence was that the Dominican military refused to support Reid and were equally opposed to Bosch or other PRD leaders as his successor. The PRD, which had the support of some military officers, announced that Rafael Molina Urena, who had been President of the Senate during the Bosch regime, would govern as Provisional President pending Bosch's return. At this point, the military leaders delivered an ultimatum, which the rebels ignored, and at about 4:30 on the afternoon of April 25 the air force and navy began firing at the National Palace. Later in the day, PRD leaders asked the U.S. Embassy to use its influence to persuade the air force to stop the attacks. The Embassy made it clear it would not intervene on behalf of the rebels, although on the following day, Monday, April 26, the Embassy did persuade the military to stop air attacks for a limited time.

This was the first crucial point in the crisis. If the United States thought that Reid was giving the Dominican Republic the best government it had had or was likely to get, why did the United States not react more vigorously to support him? On the other hand, if the Reid government was thought to be beyond salvation, why did not the United States offer positive encouragement to the moderate forces involved in the coup, if not by providing the "U.S. presence" requested by the PRD, then at least by letting it be known that the United States was not opposed to the prospective change of regimes or by encouraging the return of Juan Bosch to the Dominican Republic? In fact, according to available evidence, the U.S. Government made no effort to contact Bosch in the initial days of the crisis.

The United States was thus at the outset unwilling to support Reid and un-

willing to support if not positively opposed to Bosch.

Events of the days following April 24 demonstrated that Reid had so little popular support that it can reasonably be argued that there was nothing the United States could have done, short of armed intervention, to save his regime. The more interesting question is why the United States was so reluctant to see Bosch returned to power. This is part of the larger question of why U.S. attitudes had changed so much since 1963 when Bosch, then in power, was warmly and repeatedly embraced and supported as few if any Latin American presidents have ever been supported by the United States.

The next crucial point in the Dominican story came on Tuesday, April 27, when rebel leaders, including Molina Urena and Caamano Deno, called at the U.S. Embassy seeking mediation and negotiations. At that time the military situation looked very bad for the rebel, or constitutionalist, forces. Ambassador Bennett, who had been instructed four times to work for a cease fire and for the formation of a military junta, felt he did not have authority to mediate; mediation, in his view, would have been "intervention." Mediation at that point might have been accomplished quietly and without massive military intervention. Twenty-four hours later the Ambassador was pleading for the marines, and as we know some 20,000 soldiers were landed—American soldiers.

On the afternoon of April 27 General Wessin y Wessin's tanks seemed about to cross the Duarte bridge into the city of Santo Domingo and the rebel cause appeared hopeless. When the rebels felt themselves rebuffed at the American Embassy, some of their leaders, including Molina Urena, sought asylum in Latin American embassies in Santo Domingo. The administration has interpreted this as evidence that the non-Communist rebels recognized growing Communist influence in their movement and were consequently abandoning the revolution. Molina Urena has said simply that he sought asylum because he thought the revolutionary cause hopeless.

An opportunity was lost on April 27. Ambassador Bennett was in a position to bring possibly decisive mediating power to bear for a democratic solution, but he chose not to do so on the ground that the exercise of his good offices at that point would have constituted intervention. In the words of Washington Post Writer Murrey Marder—one of the press people who, to the best of my knowledge, has not been assailed as prejudiced:

It can be argued with considerable weight that late Tuesday, April 27, the United States threw away a fateful opportunity to try to prevent the sequence that produced the American intervention. It allowed the relatively leaderless revolt to pass into hands which it was to allege were Communist.

The overriding reason for this mistake was the conviction of U.S. officials, on the basis of evidence which was fragmentary at best, that the rebels were

¹ Washington Post, June 27, 1965, p. E7.

dominated by Communists. A related and perhaps equally important reason for the U.S. Embassy's refusal to mediate on April 27 was the desire for and, at that point, expectation of an antirebel victory. They therefore passed up an important opportunity to reduce or even eliminate Communist influence by encouraging the moderate elements among the rebels and mediating for a democratic solution.

Owing to a degree of disorganization and timidity on the part of the antirebel forces which no one, including the U.S. Embassy and the rebels themselves, anticipated, the rebels were still fighting on the morning of Wednesday, April 28. Ambassador Bennett thereupon urgently recommended that the antirebels under Air Force General de los Santos be furnished 50 walkie-talkies from U.S. Defense Department stocks in Puerto Rico. Repeating this recommendation later in the day, Bennett said that the issue was one between Castroism and its opponents. The antirebels themselves asked for armed U.S. intervention on their side; this request was refused at that time.

During the day, however, the situation deteriorated rapidly, from the point of view of public order in general and of the antirebels in particular. In mid-afternoon of April 28 Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, head of a junta which had been hastily assembled, asked again, this time in writing, for U.S. troops on the ground that this was the only way to prevent a Communist takeover; no mention was made of the junta's inability to protect American lives. This request was denied in Washington, and Benoit was thereupon told that the United States would not intervene unless he said he could not protect American citizens present in the Dominican Republic. Benoit was thus told in effect that if he said American lives were in danger the United States would intervene. And that is precisely what happened.

It was at this point, on April 28, that events acquired something of the predestiny of a Greek tragedy. Subsequent events—the failure of the missions of John Bartlow Martin and McGeorge Bundy, the conversion of the U.S. force into an inter-American force, the enforced stalemate between the rebels under Caamano Deno and the Imbert junta, the OAS mediation and the tortuous negotiations for a provisional government—have all been widely reported and were not fully explored in the committee hearings. In any case, the general direction of events was largely determined by the fateful decision of April 28. Once the Marines landed on that day, and especially after they were heavily reinforced in the days immediately following, the die was cast and the United States found itself deeply involved in the Dominican civil conflict, with no visible way to extricate itself, and with its hemisphere relations complicated in a way that few could have foreseen and no one could have desired.

The danger to American lives was more a pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. intervention that began on the evening of April 28. In fact, no American lives were lost in Santo Do-

mingo until the Marines began exchanging fire with the rebels after April 28; reports of widespread shooting that endangered American lives turned out to be exaggerated.

Nevertheless, there can be no question that Santo Domingo was not a particularly safe place to be in the last days of April 1965. There was fighting in the streets, aircraft were strafing parts of the city, and there was indiscriminate shooting. I think that the United States would have been justified in landing a small force for the express purpose of removing U.S. citizens and other foreigners from the island. Had such a force been landed and then promptly withdrawn when it had completed its mission, I do not think that any fair-minded observer at home or abroad would have considered the United States to have exceeded its rights and responsibilities.

The United States intervened in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of preventing the victory of a revolutionary force which was judged to be Communist dominated. On the basis of Ambassador Bennett's messages to Washington, there is no doubt that the threat of communism rather than danger to American lives was his primary reason for recommending military intervention.

The question of the degree of Communist influence is therefore crucial, but it cannot be answered with certainty. The weight of the evidence is that Communists did not participate in planning the revolution—indeed, there is some indication that it took them by surprise—but that they very rapidly began to try to take advantage of it and to seize control of it. The evidence does not establish that the Communists at any time actually had control of the revolution. There is little doubt that they had influence within the revolutionary movement, but the degree of that influence remains a matter of speculation.

The administration, however, assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist-dominated, or would certainly become so, and that nothing short of forcible opposition could prevent a Communist takeover. In their apprehension lest the Dominican Republic become another Cuba, some of our officials seem to have forgotten that virtually all reform movements attract some Communist support, that there is an important difference between Communist support and Communist control of a political movement, that it is quite possible to compete with the Communists for influence in a reform movement rather than abandon it to them, and, most important of all, that economic development and social justice are themselves the primary and most reliable security against Communist subversion.

It is, perhaps, understandable that administration officials should have felt some sense of panic; after all, the Foreign Service officer who had the misfortune to be assigned to the Cuban desk at the time of Castro's rise to power has had his career ruined by congressional committees. Furthermore, even without this consideration, the decisions regarding the Dominican Republic had to

be made under great pressure and on the basis of inconclusive information. In charity, this can be accepted as a reason why the decisions were mistaken; but it does not change the conclusion that they were mistaken.

The point I am making is not—emphatically not—that there was no Communist participation in the Dominican crisis, but simply that the administration acted on the premise that the revolution was controlled by Communists—a premise which it failed to establish at the time and has not established since. The issue is not whether there was Communist influence in the Dominican revolution but its degree, which is something on which reasonable men can differ. The burden of proof, however, is on those who take action, and the administration has not proven its assertion of Communist control.

Intervention on the basis of Communist participation as distinguished from control of the Dominican revolution was a mistake in my opinion which also reflects a grievous misreading of the temper of contemporary Latin American politics. Communists are present in all Latin American countries, and they are going to inject themselves into almost any Latin American revolution and try to seize control of it. If any group or any movement with which the Communists associate themselves is going to be automatically condemned in the eyes of the United States, then we have indeed given up all hope of guiding or influencing even to a marginal degree the revolutionary movements and the demands for social change which are sweeping Latin America. Worse, if that is our view, then we have made ourselves the prisoners of the Latin American oligarchs who are engaged in a vain attempt to preserve the status quo—reactionaries who habitually use the term "Communist" very loosely, in part out of emotional predilection and in part in a calculated effort to scare the United States into supporting their selfish and discredited aims.

If the United States had really been intervening to save American lives, as it had a moral if not a strictly legal right to do, it could have done so promptly and then withdrawn and the incident would soon have been forgotten. But the United States did not intervene primarily to save American lives; it intervened to prevent what it conceived to be a Communist takeover. That meant, in the terms in which the United States defined the situation, that it was intervening against the rebels, who, however heavily they might or might not have been infiltrated by Communists, were also the advocates of the restoration of a freely elected constitutional government which had been forcibly overthrown. It also meant that the United States was intervening for the military and the oligarchy—to the detriment of the Dominican people and to the bitter disappointment of those throughout Latin America who had placed their hopes in the United States and the Alliance for Progress.

On the basis of the record, there is ample justification for concluding that, at least from the time Reid resigned, U.S.

policy was directed toward construction of a military junta which hopefully would restore peace and conduct free elections. That is to say that U.S. policy was directed against the return of Bosch and against the success of the rebel movement.

In this connection it is interesting to recall U.S. policy toward Bosch when he was in power in the Dominican Republic between February and September of 1963. He had been elected, as I have already mentioned, in the only free and honest election ever held in the Dominican Republic, in December 1962, with 58 percent of the votes cast.

The United States placed such importance on his success that President Kennedy sent the then Vice President Johnson and Senator Humphrey, among others, to attend his inauguration in February 1963. In September 1963, when he was overthrown in a military coup, the United States made strenuous efforts—which stopped just short of sending the Marines—to keep him in power, and thereafter the United States waited almost 3 months before recognizing the successor government. Recognition came, by the way, only after the successor government had conducted military operations against a band of alleged Communist guerrillas in the mountains, and there is a suspicion that the extent of the guerrilla activities was exaggerated by the successor government in order to secure U.S. recognition.

It may be granted that Bosch was no great success as President of the Dominican Republic but, when all his faults have been listed, the fact remains that Bosch was the only freely elected President in Dominican history, the only President who had ever tried, however ineffectually, to give the country a decent government, and the only President who was unquestionably in tune with the Alliance for Progress.

Despite these considerations, the United States was at the very least unenthusiastic or, more probably, opposed to Bosch's return to power in April 1965. Bosch himself was apparently not eager to return—he vacillated in the very early stages and some well-informed persons contend that he positively refused to return to the Dominican Republic. In any case, he missed a critical opportunity. But the United States was equally adamant against a return to power of Bosch's party, the PRD, which is the nearest thing to a mass-based, well-organized party that has ever existed in the Dominican Republic. The stated reason was that a PRD government would be Communist dominated.

This might conceivably have happened, but the evidence by no means supports the conclusion that it would have happened. We based our policy on a possibility rather than on anything approaching a likelihood. Obviously, if we based all our policies on the mere possibility of communism, then we would have to set ourselves against just about every progressive political movement in the world, because almost all such movements are subject to at least the theoretical danger of Communist takeover. This approach is not in the

national interest; foreign policy must be based on prospects that seem probable, hopeful and susceptible to constructive influence rather than on merely possible dangers.

One is led, therefore, to the conclusion that U.S. policymakers were unduly timid and alarmist in refusing to gamble on the forces of reform and social change. The bitter irony of such timidity is that by casting its lot with the forces of the status quo, in the probably vain hope that these forces could be induced to permit at least some reform and social change, the United States almost certainly helped the Communists to acquire converts whom they otherwise could not have won.

How vain the hopes of U.S. policymakers were is amply demonstrated by events since April 28. The junta led by Gen. Antonio Imbert, which succeeded the junta led by Colonel Benoit, proved quite intractable and indeed filled the airwaves daily with denunciations of the United States and the Organization of American States for preventing it from wiping out the Communist rebels. These are the same military forces which on April 28 were refusing to fight the rebels and begging for U.S. intervention. Our aim apparently was to use Imbert as a counterpoise to Caamaño Deno in the ill-founded hope that non-Communist liberals would be drawn away from the rebel side.

In practice, instead of Imbert becoming our tractable instrument, we, to a certain extent, became his: he clung tenaciously to the power we gave him and was at least as intransigent as the rebels in the protracted negotiations for a provisional government.

The resignation of Imbert and his junta provides grounds for hope that a strong popular government may come to power in the Dominican Republic, but that hope must be tempered by the fact that the military continues to wield great power in Dominican politics—power which it probably would not now have if the United States had not intervened to save it from defeat last April 28. Even with a provisional government installed in Santo Domingo, and with the prospect of an election in 9 months, there remains the basic problem of a deep and widespread demand for social change. The prospect for such social change is circumscribed by the fact that the military has not surrendered and cannot be expected voluntarily to surrender its entrenched position of privilege and outrageous corruption.

The United States has grossly underestimated the symbolism of the Bosch constitution of 1963. It can be argued that this contains unrealistic promises, but it has stirred the hopes and idealism of the Dominican people. The real objections to it, the part of conservative Dominicans, seem to be that it provides for separation of church and state and that it provides that Dominican citizens have the right to live in the Dominican Republic if they so desire—that is, that Dominican citizens who happen also to be Communists cannot be deported. In passing, one may note a similarity to the U.S. Constitution on both of these points.

The United States has also misread the dedication of the Dominican military to the status quo and to its own powers and privileges. It may be said that the United States has overestimated its ability to influence the military while failing to use to the fullest the influence it does have.

The act of United States massive military intervention in the Dominican Republic was a grievous mistake, but if one is going to cross the bridge of intervention, with all of the historical ghosts which it calls forth throughout Latin America, then one might as well cross all the way and not stop in the middle. It is too late for the United States to refrain from intervention; it is not too late to try to redeem some permanent benefit from that intervention. Specifically, I think that the influence of the United States and the Organization of American States should be used to help the Dominican people free themselves from the oppressive weight of a corrupt and privileged military establishment. It is entirely possible, if not likely, that if the military is allowed to retain its power it will overthrow any future government that displeases it just as it has done in the past. The OAS mediating team made a contribution by bringing about the installation of a provisional government; the OAS can still make a solid contribution to Dominican democracy by urging or insisting that as part of a permanent solution the Dominican military establishment be substantially reduced in size and some of the more irresponsible generals be pensioned off or sent on lengthy diplomatic holidays abroad. If the United States and the OAS are going to impose a solution in the Dominican Republic, they might as well impose a good solution as a bad one.

Since preparing these remarks, I note in this morning's press that General Wessin has been induced to leave the Dominican Republic. This, I believe, is a step in the right direction.

The Foreign Relations Committee's study of the Dominican crisis leads me to draw certain specific conclusions regarding American policy in the Dominican Republic and also suggests some broader considerations regarding relations between the United States and Latin America. My specific conclusions regarding the crisis in Santo Domingo are as follows:

First. The United States intervened forcibly in the Dominican Republic in the last week of April 1965 not primarily to save American lives, as was then contended, but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement which was judged to be Communist-dominated. The decision to land thousands of marines on April 28 was based primarily on the fear of "another Cuba" in Santo Domingo.

Second. This fear was based on fragmentary and inadequate evidence. There is no doubt that Communists participated in the Dominican revolution on the rebel side, probably to a greater extent after than before the landing of U.S. marines on April 28, but just as it cannot be proved that the Communists would not have taken over the revolu-

tion neither can it be proved that they could have. There is little basis in the evidence offered the committee for the assertion that the rebels were Communist-dominated or certain to become so; on the contrary, the evidence suggests a chaotic situation in which no single faction was dominant at the outset and in which everybody, including the United States, had opportunities to influence the shape and course of the rebellion.

Third, The United States let pass its best opportunities to influence the course of events. The best opportunities were on April 25, when Juan Bosch's party, the PRD, requested a "United States presence," and on April 27, when the rebels, believing themselves defeated, requested United States mediation for a negotiated settlement. Both requests were rejected, in the first instance for reasons that are not entirely clear but probably because of United States hostility to the PRD, in the second instance because the U.S. Government anticipated and desired a victory of the antirebel forces.

Fourth, U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic shifted markedly to the right between September 1963 and April 1965. In 1963, the United States strongly supported Bosch and the PRD as enlightened reformers; in 1965 the United States opposed their return to power on the unsubstantiated ground that a Bosch or PRD government would certainly, or almost certainly, become Communist dominated. Thus the United States turned its back on social revolution in Santo Domingo and associated itself with a corrupt and reactionary military oligarchy.

Fifth, U.S. policy was marred by a lack of candor and by misinformation. The former is illustrated by official assertions that U.S. military intervention was primarily for the purpose of saving American lives; the latter is illustrated by exaggerated reports of massacres and atrocities by the rebels—reports which no one has been able to verify. It was officially asserted, for example—by the President in a press conference on June 17 according to an official State Department bulletin—that "some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads cut off." There is no evidence to support this statement. A sober examination of such evidence as is available indicates that the Imbert junta was guilty of at least as many atrocities as the rebels.

Sixth, Responsibility for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo lies primarily with those who advised the President. In the critical days between April 25 and April 28, these officials sent the President exaggerated reports of the danger of a Communist takeover in Santo Domingo and, on the basis of these, recommended U.S. massive military intervention. It is not at all difficult to understand why, on the basis of such advice, the President made the decisions that he made.

Seventh, Underlying the bad advice and unwise actions of the United States was the fear of another Cuba. The specter of a second Communist state in the

Western Hemisphere—and its probable repercussions within the United States and possible effects on the careers of those who might be held responsible—seems to have been the most important single factor in distorting the judgment of otherwise sensible and competent men.

I turn now to some broader and long-term implications of the Dominican tragedy, first to some considerations relating to the Organization of American States and its charter, then to the problem of reaction and revolution in Latin America, finally to a suggestion for a freer and, I believe, healthier relationship between the United States and Latin America.

Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States says that:

No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.

Article 17 states that:

The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever.

These clauses are not ambiguous. They mean that, with one exception to be noted, all forms of forcible intervention are absolutely prohibited among the American States. It may be that we should never have accepted this commitment at Bogotá in 1948; it is obvious from all the talk one hears these days about the obsolescence of the principle of nonintervention that some U.S. officials regret our commitment to it. The fact remains that we are committed to it, not partially or temporarily or insofar as we find it compatible with our vital interests but almost absolutely. It represents our word and our bond and our willingness to honor the solemn commitments embodied in a treaty which was ratified by the Senate on August 28, 1950.

There are those who might concede the point of law but who would also argue that such considerations have to do with our ideals rather than our interests and are therefore of secondary importance. I do not believe that is true. We are currently fighting a war in Vietnam, largely, we are told, because it would be a disaster if the United States failed to honor its word and its commitment; the matter, we are told, is one of vital national interest. I do not see why it is any less a matter of vital interest to honor a clear and explicit treaty obligation in the Americas than it is to honor the much more ambiguous and less formal promises we have made to the South Vietnamese.

The sole exception to the prohibitions of articles 15 and 17 is spelled out in article 19 of the OAS Charter, which states that "measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in articles 15 and 17." Article 6 of the Rio Treaty states:

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political in-

dependence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extracolonial or intracontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent.

The United States thus had legal recourse when the Dominican crisis broke on April 24, 1965. We could have called an urgent session of the Council of the OAS for the purpose of invoking article 6 of the Rio Treaty. But we did not do so. The administration has argued that there was no time to consult the OAS, although there was time to consult—or inform—the congressional leadership. The United States thus intervened in the Dominican Republic unilaterally—and illegally.

Advising the Latin American countries of our action after the fact did not constitute compliance with the OAS Charter or the Rio Treaty; nor, indeed, would advising them before the fact have constituted compliance. One does not comply with the law by notifying interested parties in advance of one's intent to violate it. Inter-American law requires consultation for the purpose of shaping a collective decision. Only on the basis of advance consultation and agreement could we have undertaken a legal intervention in the Dominican Republic.

It is possible, had we undertaken such consultations, that our Latin American partners would have delayed a decision; it is possible that they would have refused to authorize collective intervention. My own feeling is that the situation in any case did not justify military intervention except for the limited purpose of evacuating U.S. citizens and other foreigners, but even if it seemed to us that it did, we should not have undertaken it without the advance consent of our Latin American allies. We should not have done so because the word and the honor of the United States were at stake just as much—at least as much—in the Dominican crisis as they are in Vietnam and Korea and Berlin and all the places around the globe which we have committed ourselves to defend.

There is another important reason for compliance with the law. The United States is a conservative power in the world in the sense that most of its vital interests are served by stability and order. Law is the essential foundation of stability and order both within societies and in international relations. A great conference is taking place here in Washington this week on the subject, World Peace Through Law. As a conservative power the United States has a vital interest in upholding and expanding the reign of law in international relations. Insofar as international law is observed, it provides us with stability and order and with a means of predicting the behavior of those with whom we have reciprocal legal obligations. When we

violate the law ourselves, whatever short-term advantage may be gained, we are obviously encouraging others to violate the law; we thus encourage disorder and instability and thereby do incalculable damage to our own long term interests.

There are those who defend U.S. unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic on the ground that the principle of nonintervention as spelled out in the OAS Charter is obsolete. The argument is unfortunate on two grounds. First, the contention of obsolescence justifies an effort to bring about changes in the OAS Charter by due process of law, but it does not justify violation of the Charter. Second, the view that the principle of nonintervention is obsolete is one held by certain U.S. officials; most Latin Americans would argue that, far from being obsolete, the principle of nonintervention was and remains the heart and core of the inter-American system. Insofar as it is honored, it provided them with something that many in the United States find it hard to believe they could suppose they need: protection from the United States.

Many North Americans seem to believe that, while the United States does indeed participate in Latin American affairs from time to time, sometimes by force, it is done with the best of intentions, usually indeed to protect the Latin Americans from intervention by somebody else, and therefore cannot really be considered intervention. The trouble with this point of view is that it is not shared by our neighbors to the south. Most of them do think they need protection from the United States and the history of the Monroe Doctrine and the "Roosevelt corollary" suggest that their fears are not entirely without foundation. "Good intentions" are not a very sound basis for judging the fulfillment of contractual obligations. Just about everybody, including the Communists, believes in his own "good intentions." It is a highly subjective criterion of national behavior and has no more than a chance relationship to good results. With whatever justice or lack of it, many Latin Americans are afraid of the United States; however much it may hurt our feelings, they prefer to have their security based on some more objective standard than the good intentions of the United States.

The standard on which they rely most heavily is the principle of nonintervention, however obsolete it may seem to certain U.S. officials, it remains vital and pertinent in Latin America. When we violate it, we are not overriding the mere letter of the law; we are violating what to Latin Americans is its vital heart and core.

The inter-American system is rooted in an implicit contract between the Latin American countries and the United States. In return for our promise not to interfere in their internal affairs they have accepted a role as members of our sphere and to support, or at least not to obstruct, our global policies. In the Dominican Republic we violated our part of the bargain; it remains to be seen whether Latin Americans will now feel free to violate theirs.

In the eyes of educated, energetic and patriotic young Latin Americans—which is to say, the generation that will make or break the Alliance for Progress—the United States committed a worse offense in the Dominican Republic than just intervention; it intervened against social revolution and in support, at least temporarily, of a corrupt, reactionary military oligarchy.

It is not possible at present to assess the depth and extent of disillusion with the United States on the part of democrats and reformers in Latin America. I myself think that it is deep and widespread. Nor am I reassured by assertions on the part of administration officials that a number of Latin American governments have secretly expressed sympathy for our actions in the Dominican Republic while explaining that of course they could not be expected to support us openly. Why cannot they support us openly, unless it is because their sympathy does not represent the views of their own people and they do not dare to express it openly? In fact, real enthusiasm for our Dominican venture has been confined largely to military dictators and ruling oligarchies.

The tragedy of Santo Domingo is that a policy that purported to defeat communism in the short run is more likely to have the effect of promoting it in the long run. Intervention in the Dominican Republic has alienated—temporarily or permanently, depending on our future policies—our real friends in Latin America. These, broadly, are the people of the democratic left—the Christian and social democrats in a number of countries, the APRA Party in Peru, the Accion Democratica Party in Venezuela, and their kindred spirits throughout the hemisphere. By our intervention on the side of a corrupt military oligarchy in the Dominican Republic, we have embarrassed before their own people the democratic reformers who have counseled trust and partnership with the United States. We have lent credence to the idea that the United States is the enemy of social revolution in Latin America and that the only choice Latin Americans have is between communism and reaction.

If those are the available alternatives, if there is no democratic left as a third option, then there is no doubt of the choice that honest and patriotic Latin Americans will make: they will choose communism, not because they want it but because U.S. policy will have foreclosed all other avenues of social revolution and, indeed, all other possibilities except the perpetuation of rule by military juntas and economic oligarchies.

The dominant force in Latin America is the aspiration of increasing numbers of people to personal and national dignity. In the minds of the rising generation there are two principle threats to that aspiration—reaction at home and domination from abroad. As a result of its Dominican actions the United States has allowed itself to become associated with both. We have thereby offended the dignity and self-respect of young and idealistic Latin Americans who must now wonder whether the United States will one day intervene against social revolu-

tions in their own countries, whether one day they will find themselves facing U.S. marines across barricades in their own home towns.

I, myself, am sure, as I know President Johnson and, indeed, most U.S. citizens are sure, that our country is not now and will not become the enemy of social revolution in Latin America. We have made a mistake in the Dominican Republic, as we did at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, but a single misjudgment does not constitute a doctrine for the conduct of future policy and we remain dedicated to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

We know this ourselves but it remains to convince our true friends in Latin America that their social revolutions will have our sympathy and support. It will not be easy to do so, because our intervention in Santo Domingo shook if it did not shatter a confidence in the United States that had been built up over 30 years since the liquidation of the Caribbean protectorates and the initiation of the "good neighbor policy."

It will be difficult but it can be done. President Johnson took a positive step on the long road back in his statement of rededication to the Alliance for Progress to the Latin American Ambassadors on August 17. It remains for us to eliminate the ambiguity between the anti-revolutionary approach symbolized by Project Camelot and the preoccupation with problems of counterinsurgency on the one hand and the creative approach of the Alliance for Progress on the other. If we do this—and I am both sure that we can and reasonably hopeful that we will—then I think that the Dominican affair will be relegated in history to the status of a single unhappy episode on the long road toward the forging of a new and creative and dignified relationship between the United States and Latin America.

In conclusion, I suggest that a new and healthier relationship between the United States and Latin America must be a freer relationship than that of the past.

The United States is a world power with world responsibilities and to it the inter-American system represents a sensible way of maintaining law and order in the region closest to the United States. To the extent that it functions as we want it to function, one of the inter-American system's important advantages is that it stabilizes relations within the western hemisphere and thus frees the United States to act on its worldwide responsibilities.

To Latin Americans, on the other hand, the inter-American system is politically and psychologically confining. It has the effect, so to speak, of cooping them up in the western hemisphere, giving them the feeling that there is no way to break out of the usually well-intentioned but often stifling embrace of the United States. In their hearts, I have no doubt, most Latin Americans would like to be free of us, just as a son or daughter coming of age wishes to be free of an over-protective parent. A great many of those Latin Americans for

whom Castro still has some appeal—and are now more, I would guess, than the last April 28—are attracted not, I feel, because they are infatuated with communism, but because Cuba, albeit at the price of almost complete dependency on the Soviet Union, has broken out of the orbit of the United States.

It is the nature of things that small nations do not live comfortably in the shadow of large and powerful nations, regardless of whether the latter are benevolent or overbearing. Belgium has always been uncomfortable about Germany and France; Ireland has never been able to work up much affection for Great Britain. And in recent years some of the Eastern European governments have demonstrated that, despite the Communist ideology which they share with the Soviet Union, they still wish to free themselves as much as they can and as much as they dare from the overbearing power of Russia. It is natural and inevitable that Latin American countries should have some of the same feelings toward the United States.

Perhaps, then, the foremost immediate requirement for a new and more friendly relationship between Latin America and the United States in the long run is not closer ties and new institutional bonds but a loosening of existing ties and institutional bonds. It is an established psychological principle—or, for that matter, just common sense—that the strongest and most viable personal bonds are those which are voluntary, a voluntary bond being, by definition, an arrangement which one is free to enter or not to enter. I do not see why the same principle should not operate in relations between nations. If it does, it would follow that the first step toward stronger ties between Latin America and the United States would be the creation of a situation in which Latin American countries would be free, and would feel free, to maintain or sever existing ties as they see fit and, perhaps more important, to establish new arrangements, both among themselves and with nations outside the hemisphere, in which the United States would not participate.

President Frei of Chile has taken an initiative to this end. He has visited European leaders and apparently indicated that his Christian Democratic Government is interested in establishing new political, economic, and cultural links with European countries. For the reasons suggested, I think this is an intelligent and constructive step.

I think further that it would be a fine thing if Latin American countries were to undertake a program of their own for "building bridges" to the world beyond the western hemisphere—to Europe and Asia and Africa, and to the Communist countries if they wish. Such relationships, to be sure, would involve a loosening of ties to the United States in the immediate future, but in the long run, I feel sure, they would make for both happier and stronger bonds with the United States—happier because they would be free, stronger because they would be dignified and self-respecting as they never had been before.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I should like to express my complete accord with the position taken by the Senator in his most interesting and very important speech about the Dominican Republic and the events which have taken place there.

It has been my privilege as a junior member of the Committee on Foreign Relations to sit through most of the hearings which have been held on the Dominican Republic and to read that part of the testimony which I did not actually hear.

I believe that this speech is overdue, sound, and wise. I hope that it will be given great effect by the policymakers of the executive branch of our Government.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much for his comment.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas is certainly entitled to his opinion with regard to the action of the President of the United States, as are all Senators. However, I should like to say as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I do not believe the Senator from Arkansas' remarks reflect the sentiment of that committee on this matter. The members of the committee were invited by the President to give him advice on the decision to send American troops to the Dominican Republic. That is true of the distinguished chairman of the committee also. When that decision was made, not one dissenting voice was heard. The Senator was there. He had an opportunity to advise the President about what should be done. I believe his advice was taken on that occasion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator is mistaken. We were not asked as to what action should be taken. We were told what had been done. As far as we knew, it had been done.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. That is not my impression. My impression is that the Senator attended the meeting at the White House. He was there. I know I was there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was there.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Not one American marine had been landed up to that time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the decision had been made.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am not going to quote the Senator because that was a secret meeting and much secret information was discussed.

My understanding was that the President—and I say this with regard to our Republican friends also—said certain things to indicate that he did not want to act until he had consulted with us; and the decision had not been made.

My impression of the matter was that the Senator from Arkansas made a suggestion of what should be done. He can use his best judgment on the protocol about matters of that sort. But my impression was, insofar as the Senator's suggestion, was concerned that it was followed.

So far as I am concerned, this was simply a matter of whether this country was going to stand aside and risk another Cuban type Communist takeover, or whether we were going to move on the theory that this looked very much as though it might be a Communist takeover, and that we would rather take the chance of moving when it might not be necessary, than take the risk—as President Eisenhower did—that this would be a Communist takeover.

We have information now that the Communists in the Dominican Republic are stronger than Castro was when he started out to take Cuba.

We have information, available to the Senator from Arkansas, to lead us to believe there is a real threat of Communist subjugation and conquest of that island. That we do not wish to see take place.

I have heard some criticism of the fact that the President sent more troops than were necessary. In Louisiana we had some contact with this type of problem.

I recall a time, while my father was a prominent official in Louisiana government, when some people who could not win an election decided to take charge and organized an army at the airport. The National Guard arrived and the only fellow who was injured was a man who shot himself with his own shotgun trying to get through a barbed wire fence.

At another time, in the city of New Orleans, when the police force was under control of the existing organization, which was opposed to our group and would not assure our faction an honest election count, we called out the National Guard. After awhile we agreed on a procedure to assure a fair election and we took out the National Guard. We got an honest count.

On both occasions the man in charge of the troops did not have to shoot anybody, but he said:

The best way to be sure you do not have to fight is to have enough troops there so the opposition will know that they cannot defeat you if there is to be fighting.

That would be my advice to the President. "Do not send 200 or 300 marines and have them exterminated. Send enough boys so that if there is a fight, and the opposition will know that if they start a fight, they will be defeated."

The Senator had a different idea than I did in regard to the Bay of Pigs. My thought about the Bay of Pigs was that the idea of helping people to go there and liberating that island was not a bad idea. The only thing was that we did not send enough people to whip Castro.

If that were to have been done, that would have been the time to do it, in my judgment. Many people would like to be free of Castro's enslavement on that island. If the general philosophy of the Senator's speech had been followed, Castro would have taken not only that island, but the Dominican Republic, also.

If we follow the general view that if the Communists attempt to take over, we ought to do what is within our power to keep that from happening, not only would we not have lost the Dominican

Republic to the Communists; we would never have lost Cuba to the Communists. Suppose President Eisenhower had it to do all over again, and he had heard one group argue the Fulbright doctrine: "Do not interfere; you might be criticized"; and another group saying, "This is a Communist takeover; go on in." Suppose President Eisenhower, sincere, anti-Communist, and good man that he is, had been confronted with such a situation again.

I believe he would not have taken a chance that there would be a Communist takeover. He would have gone in. He would have resolved the doubt in an effort to try to save the people from Communist subjugation.

So far as I know—and I believe this is correct—every responsible person who had any contact with the matter urged the President to do what he did; and the President proceeded to do what he thought was best, after explaining the problem as he saw it. He invited everyone, including the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT], to offer advice. I had the opportunity to offer my advice. My advice was: "If you have any thought whatever that this might be a Communist takeover, please, Mr. President, move, because the American people will never forgive you if you merely sit here and watch the Communists take that island."

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. SMATHERS. I want to associate myself with the remarks just made by the distinguished Senator from Louisiana. I am one of those who was privileged to sit in on the particular meeting that has been referred to. There were many there from both sides of the aisle. As I recall, the distinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN] was present, as, of course, was the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. I believe the overwhelming consensus was that we wanted to be certain that the island of the Dominican Republic was not lost to the Communists. No one was absolutely certain as to what was happening. At this point there was no time for a study by the Foreign Relations Committee or any other committee. The country was on fire; people were dying; property was being destroyed; Communists were on hand and chaos was in charge. Something had to be done and it had to be done based on the best information then available. The President was told by our Ambassador, by the representatives of the CIA, the Peace Corps, the USIA, and the Air Force, the Army, the Marines, and the Navy. All spoke with a loud and unanimous voice—and they said, "the revolution has been going on for 4 days—it is now out of hand and you Mr. President must send in troops to save lives and property." It was very clear that at the White House, at that time that the overwhelming consensus was of the belief that we had better send in enough forces to make certain that the indiscriminate shooting and looting would be stopped, and that the Commu-

nists would not take over. I do not agree that too many troops were sent into the Dominican Republic. For that matter, I do not believe we are sending too many troops to Vietnam. If one argued the same philosophy as that expressed by the Senator from Arkansas, perhaps he could say we are sending too many troops to Vietnam, because we are now beginning to win there.

Surely no one would argue that we are not supposed to win just because we are opposing Communists, and some misled liberals who are on their side. We are fighting Communists in Vietnam. We are having to oppose them—one way or another, all around the world, and for a certainty they sought to take over the Dominican Republic just as they did Cuba, and that was a matter of grave concern to us when the President sent in our troops to Santo Domingo. I do not see anything wrong with that, as the distinguished Senator from Louisiana has indicated. What is wrong with trying to save a country from communism?

We had already lost Cuba to Castro. It has been admitted that there were only about 12 known Communist leaders in Cuba with Castro when he started his revolution. He was acclaimed—when he started out—the greatest social revolutionary to come along in modern day. I remember when the New York Times and other newspapers were writing lyrical articles about Castro and what a great man he was. I recall his appearance before the American Society of Newspaper Publishers and Editors, where he was lauded and applauded. I also recall when he sat with the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Capitol and I asked him, "When are you going to have elections?"

Castro replied, "There is no use in having elections, because I will be elected over and over again."

Castro made that statement in the Committee on Foreign Relations, and still many thought he was a great democratic leader. Castro proved that it was not necessary to have a large number of Communists present in order to deliver a country to communism. When a country like Cuba falls to communism it costs us hundreds of lives and millions of dollars. So we could not afford to take a chance in the Dominican Republic.

I do not understand the philosophy of the Senator from Arkansas in this respect. I have the greatest affection and highest respect for my former chairman, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], but I do not understand, for the life of me, what the objection is to sending enough troops to the Dominican Republic to do the job, or even perhaps sending 200 or 300 more. The job was done. The country has not been lost. It is today moving in the direction of establishing a constitutional government, so that, hopefully, constitutional rights will be in the near future preserved.

I again totally associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, if it could be done as the Senator from Arkansas proposes, I would much prefer to treat the Communists with

Christian fellowship, love, and truth, without having to resort to violence. A number of fine people, such as Cardinal Mindszenty, used that approach, but did not get fair with it. If we are to keep the Communists from taking over, we cannot rely on them to tell the truth; we cannot rely on them to admit that they are Communists; we cannot rely on their regime not to murder and exterminate people who do not agree with communism.

I would be willing to take a chance on meeting Communists in free elections. Why will they not agree to free elections? They will not agree to them here or anywhere else. About the only time Communists are willing to agree to free elections is when the Communists cannot win by force of arms nor by blackmail, assassination, or brutality. They have yet to win their first free election.

A program of good will, kindness, truth, and love they neighbor, while it is fine to be extended toward Communists, is never seen coming from the opposite direction, toward us.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, to try to keep the record straight—and it was not my intention to engage in a general, running debate on how much we disagree with communism—I assure the Senator from Louisiana that I am not a Communist and do not wish to promote that system.

The policies I am talking about involve a judgment as to whether they do or do not promote communism.

The only election in the Dominican Republic that we are told was absolutely free and without any threat, was the one that resulted in the election of Mr. Bosch. But he was thrown out by a coup.

The Senator from Louisiana is saying that the whole movement of U.S. troops was to prevent Communists from taking over. At the meeting at the White House it is my impression—and I believe the press reports will confirm it—that we were told that the movement was to save American lives. Much was said about the saving of 1,500 American lives and several hundred other lives. It was put on the basis of saving innocent people, particularly Americans and the nationals of other countries. I said in my speech that I thoroughly agreed with that proposal.

When a situation endangers the lives of people who had nothing to do with the occurrence, it is quite proper for us to act. That was the theory on which our action was based at the meeting. We were not told that a Communist takeover was in progress.

I recall asking—and perhaps someone else asked—what the situation was with respect to communism. We were told that three individuals had been identified as Communists. This is out of several thousand who were engaged in the uprising.

I must say this in all charity to the Director of the CIA, who had been sworn in that very noon, so he could not have been expected to know what had taken place. He had been the Director of the CIA only about 10 hours, perhaps 6 hours. I do not blame him at all for either inadvertence or anything else. About a

week later, after the situation had been reviewed, it was announced that 55 persons were Communists.

No one believed that Rafael Molina Urena was a Communist. He had been the President of the Senate under the Bosch regime. Under their Constitution, as I understand it, since Bosch did not return, Molina was what we would consider to be the legitimate successor. I understand that that was the process of succession. He was designated by the party in power, the PRD Party, which is the only legitimate party which had won an election, by 58 percent, in 1962. The party was thrown out by a coup, as the Senator knows.

This was an effort to reestablish themselves. The leaders of this revolution were not accused of being Communists. The Senator is assuming the very fact in controversy. The very fact that I question is that there was any firm and convincing evidence that this was a Communist takeover, that the revolutionary power, the revolutionary movement was dominated and controlled by Communists.

We had 13 meetings on this matter. To me, there is very little evidence from the testimony of administration witnesses. Every witness was an administration witness except Muñoz-Marín, who is certainly no enemy of the administration. He has been a very close friend of this administration. As the Senator knows, he was a long-time Governor of Puerto Rico. There was no serious and convincing evidence, or even anything close to being convincing evidence, that the leaders of the revolution in the beginning were Communists. They were members of the PRD Party. They were people who wished to reaffirm their claim to the presidency. They had been thrown out by a coup.

The Senator assumes that this was a Communist takeover.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I decline to yield further.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I raised the point in my speech that there was not any evidence to show that it was a Communist plot. I think that it was more likely a PRD revolution.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator has failed to distinguish between non-Communist liberals who were involved there and the hard-core Castro-trained Communists who were trained to take over. When Castro took over Cuba, knowing the experience we have had if we had followed the Fulbright doctrine, the takeover would have occurred nevertheless, because many sincere liberals were opposed to Batista while hard-core Communists were prepared to kill the Socialist or non-Communist liberals and take the place over.

That is what they did and they did it as quickly as these honest and sincere people who believed in freedom discovered that they had made a mistake and fallen into a trap. The people discovered that it was then too late. They could not extricate themselves. Some of those people gave up their lives and were injured and taken prisoners at the Bay of Pigs invasion when they tried to liberate Cuba from Castro.

We had enough information to know that the Dominican revolt was a move in the direction of communism. This country had all the justification that it needed to intervene. It had sufficient justification to require our going in there and protecting our citizens and the citizens of other countries.

Oddly enough, De Gaulle can find more reason to criticize our country, a country which has defended France more than any other country, than any man who has ever had a position of great responsibility and power in the free world.

Mr. de Gaulle found fault with the United States sending troops to a country to protect human life. However, De Gaulle's Ambassador rushed down and asked that the French Embassy be protected by American troops against irresponsible revolutionaries who were running down the corridors with machine-guns and killing people. We took it upon ourselves to protect innocent people from friendly nations, people who were not a party to the revolt at all.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is no question about that.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator suggests something that is inconsistent, with respect to this Nation contributing troops in this situation. We did not do it when Mr. Bosch was run out of there.

As a practical matter, the President was right in taking the position which he did in the military coup which involved Mr. Bosch. It was a fight between one crowd of anti-Communists and another crowd. I do not believe that we would have had any right to go in there with troops at that time. However, on the other hand, if this were a Communist takeover, or if it had the possibility of being a Communist takeover, if we had the information, which we did, that a great many hard-core Communist Moscow-trained or Castro-trained Communists were in there seeking to start a revolution and to take charge and take over the country, we should have attempted to frustrate that effort if we could.

I believe the record shows that every person whose advice the President sought on Capitol Hill, be he Republican or Democrat—and if any Senator wants to question this statement, he can say so—either advised the President to go or did not advise him not to go.

I believe that every single person advised the President to go, with the exception of the suggestion made by the Senator from Arkansas, and, to the best of my knowledge, the President followed that advice.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas talks about his recollection with regard to how many Communists we thought were in Santo Domingo. It was all a guess. My recollection is that it was approximately 58. And the 58 were Communist leaders. Actually nobody had any idea for a certainty how many Communists were there or how many of the revolutionists were on the Communist side.

At the time that Bosch was thrown out

by internal revolution, I do not believe that anybody advised the then President of the United States that our people were being fired on and that our property was being destroyed, nor that we should send troops. I do not believe that the then Ambassador, nor the Army, nor the Navy, nor the CIA, nor the Peace Corps gave such advice. I do not believe that any of the people who, on this April 1965 occasion, advised the President that we needed troops there to protect our property and the lives of people, advised that we should send troops on that other occasion. When Bosch was forced by a coup to leave Santo Domingo and move to Puerto Rico.

I believe that it might be said about that meeting at the White House to which we have been making reference, and I do not believe this will violate to any great extent the rules with regard to keeping such meetings secret—that everybody who was there recalls that when the President was advising us as to what he was going to do—a telephone call came through, the fellow who was talking from the Dominican Republic said that he was at that moment under the table and the bullets were coming through the window and surging all around him.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Bullets were whizzing through the window of the Embassy by the Ambassador.

Mr. SMATHERS. The Senator is correct. At the very moment of the telephone conversation, bullets were coming through the window. What is the President supposed to say—"Let us go out and reason with these people?" This was no time to reason. These people were not in a reasoning mood. Something had to be done, and the President was advised to take a firm and courageous course and he took it.

At that time, we thought that some 1,560 people were killed in the first few days. Remember the President did not send our troops until the revolution had been going on for 4 days. Everybody's hindsight is better than their foresight. It may be that there were not 1,560 people killed. However, many of them were killed, and millions of dollars worth of property was destroyed. Our Embassy was being fired upon. Other embassies were being looted. Thank God our troops finally showed up.

The Senator from Louisiana has pointed out that by virtue of the fact that we had our troops down there, some 5,600 people, nationals of other countries, were safely evacuated. Because of the presence of our troops there was no great loss of life.

If we had delayed; if we had had a study; if the President had vacillated, hundreds and hundreds of other people would have been killed and untold damage would have been done. But most importantly that country would be in the hands of the Communists today.

One of the significant things that is never talked about when we discuss this Dominican matter is the Organization of American States. At its fourth inter-parliamentary session—in the official meetings or consultations, the Organization of American States directed that one of their groups go to Santo Domingo

and make a study. These are Latin people, not from the United States—but from various countries of Latin America. The OAS group concluded that the President of the United States did the only sensible and practical thing that could have been done under the circumstances, when he dispatched troops to restore law and order.

I repeat these are Latins, familiar with the area, the conditions, the people. They approved the President's action. It seems to me that what we ought to be doing is applauding the President. Thank God that most of the people are doing that. The Gallup poll shows that 85 percent of the people approve of what the President did in Santo Domingo. I believe that those people who approve of the action of the President are correct. And I believe a majority of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and a majority of this Senate believe our President acted correctly and courageously.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, the President had the advice of a nine-man American team in Santo Domingo. The team included those who had responsibility, anybody in charge of any organization, from the Peace Corps up to the Ambassador himself. He had the advice of the State Department, and the advice of his own White House staff, which is supposed to be available to him for such purpose. Some reference was made to the fact that the man from the CIA had only been there a short time. But that man was a naval admiral, and I was not merely saying what he learned in 5 days; he was giving the best judgment he could based on the advice of experts who have been studying such problems for many years.

If those who had responsibility to tell us how to deal with the Communists in Santo Domingo, and how to deal with the Communists in the Dominican Republic, and all those people, so far as I know unanimously—and the record will show—provided such advice to the President, who would say that should be done?

The Senator said when he was there that perhaps he did not advise us not to go because he thought the decision had been made. That is my understanding. My understanding is that the President had taken the precaution to do what he should have done, that is, to put the carriers in a position so that he would have the troops available if the decision was made to go in.

Now he has been criticized for going in with too much. I suppose next year he will be criticized for going too soon.

But if we were compelled to move, I would want to be able to avoid a complete Communist takeover. If we had to go in, it was better to go with too much too soon than to go with too little too late.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the question of what the record shows, I based my speech upon the records of the hearings before the committee. Many wild rumors were published in the newspapers which our own people did not confirm. For ex-

ample, the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] says 1,560 were killed in the first 4 days.

As of May 8, the Red Cross confirmed a count of 150 dead and 605 wounded in hostilities. They were not Americans. No American citizens was killed or shot or injured until after the Marines were landed and the Marines exchanged shots with the revolutionists.

So subsequent events did not confirm the advice about the necessity and the danger that came from the Embassy.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I believe I have the floor.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, who has the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana has the floor at this moment, unless he will yield for a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I have not yielded, Mr. President. I wish to make this statement, and I will try to cut it short.

I know the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has a responsibility to the Senate. He is trying to discharge it. I shall try to cooperate with him.

It is one thing to think about these matters, ask for hearings, bring people in, see what the record shows, and take a nice vacation and analyze the matter, and come back in a week and say, "I am not sure this was necessary at all."

But it is quite another thing if the man is there, and shooting is going on, and he must move now or it will be too late. He cannot stop to figure whether 315 or 575 or 1,500 people have been killed. He must move now.

It is easy to find fault with the President of the United States. Senators have, and I am sure they will continue to do so.

But one thing we cannot say about the man who is President of the United States: We cannot say he cannot move. I say to the Senate that when hurricane Betsy hit Louisiana last week, the worst disaster in our history, I called the President and said, "Mr. President, the most horrible thing that has ever happened to Louisiana has just occurred. The people ought to see you and know that their Government and their President are interested in their welfare. It will give them the courage to try to hold out and try to help themselves, if they just know that help is on its way, and that they have this great country on their side."

That man has on his hands the war in Vietnam, but he called me and said, "Be at the White House in 15 minutes. If you are not at the White House in 15 minutes, I will be on my way to Louisiana by myself." I got there and we went down there, and he told those people that all of the redtape would be cut, and that help was on its way.

We are getting help. If I had to choose between one man who thinks it might not be all that serious, and says, "Let us wait and get the report and analyze it and think about it a little longer," and the man who says, "Wait a minute; if we do all this, it might be

too late," I think I would take the fellow who could move.

Many battles have been lost by waiting to see. The South would be a separate nation today—and I am glad we are not—had it not been that a citizen of Louisiana, Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard, waited until the smoke lifted on the first day of the Battle of Shiloh, down in Tennessee.

Had that man had the aggressive instincts of our President, he would have pushed Grant's army into the Tennessee River before General Buell was able to bring up a whole new Federal Army to join the fight. On that occasion, Albert Sidney Johnson had bled to death in his saddle pressing the attack. When Johnson died, and Beauregard found himself in command, he preferred to halt the attack and renew it on the following day. By that time Beauregard was facing two Union armies instead of one.

Had Beauregard possessed the initiative of our President, he would have run the Union Army into the river on the evening of the first day, and instead of Grant defeating the Southern Army, and proceeding to capture one army at Vicksburg and another at Appomattox, Grant would have been relieved of duty as an incompetent, and Lincoln would have never found himself a great general.

But, Mr. President, we have a President who moved. He moved in the tradition of our great country, and in the tradition of all great Americans, who do not believe in waiting until the smoke lifts in Santo Domingo or until the dust settles in China to do something about these things. Mr. President, I thank the merciful Lord that our President possesses a sense of urgency and that he possesses initiative.

I yield the floor.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, the Senator from West Virginia will cooperate, as always, with his colleagues. He knows that the subject matter which has been discussed is important. As the assistant majority leader has stated, legislation is pending in the Chamber. It, too, deals with important subject matter of concern to the American people.

I ask unanimous consent, however, that the Senator from Delaware be permitted to address the Senators on a subject which is not germane.

Mr. ROBERTSON. How long does the Senator from Delaware wish to hold the floor?

Mr. RANDOLPH. Approximately 10 minutes. He talked with me about an hour and a half ago about his request. At that time, we did not know that the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Louisiana would take as much time as they have taken.

I, too, wish to go forward with the pending legislation, but I feel that I at least implied to the Senator from Delaware that I would submit this unanimous-consent request, and I do so with the understanding that he speak not more than 10 minutes.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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DE RUESSD 779S 2070810

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FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY (260)

STATE GRNC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L - JULY - [SECONE OFOUR] - JULY 26TH

PASS DIA

SUBJECT: TAD SZULC ARTICLE ON SANTO DOMINGO IN JULY 31 EDITION OF SATEVEPOST.

COUNTRY TEAM HAS GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY TO SZULC ARTICLE AND FINDS IT FULL OF DISTORTIONS, QUOTATIONS OUT OF CONTEXT, SLY PERSONAL INNUENDO AND OUTRIGHT MISSTATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS OF FACT.

PAGE TWO RUESSD 779S C O N F I D E N T I A L
SZULC HIMSELF ADMITS HE DID NOT ARRIVE IN DR UNTIL APRIL 29-- FIVE DAYS AFTER REVOLUTION BEGAN AND 18 HOURS AFTER FIRST US TROOPS LANDED. BY THE TIME HE ARRIVED, WORST OF WIDESPREAD DISORDER WAS OVER, ANARCHY AND KILLING HAD BEEN BROUGHT UNDER SOME CONTROL AND MAJOR DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN. HIS INFORMATION WAS NECESSARILY BASED ON HEARSAY AND HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY HIS CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH BOSCH. HIS ABSENCE FROM SCENE DURING MOST CRUCIAL DAYS OF CRISIS IS ESSENTIAL WEAKNESS IN HIS UNDERSTANDING OF EVENTS. HIS ADMITTED BIAS COLORED HIS WRITING AND MADE HIM MORE AN ADVOCATE THAN AN OBJECTIVE REPORTER. HIS DESCRIPTION OF EM REPORTING WOULD IN OPINION OF MANY BE MORE APPLICABLE TO HIS OWN WRITING -- "FREQUENTLY OVER-EMOTIONAL, EXAGGERATED AND PARTISAN."

IMPORTANT POINTS IGNORED, UNDERSTATED OR DISTORTED IN SZULC ARTICLE INCLUDE FOLLOWING:

A. INADEQUATE TREATMENT OF COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC ORDER, SACKING OF OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTY OFFICES AND OF HOMES AND BUSINESSES, CASTRO-STYLE RADIO AND TV, ABANDONMENT OF MOVEMENT BY PRD LEADERS ON APR 26 AND 27 DURING WORST VIOLENCE.

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1976 JUL 26 AM 4 25

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Authority STATE 4-15-76

By LW, NARS, Date 6-11-76

7/26/76

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-2- 260, JULY 26, FROM SANTO DOMINGO (SECTION ONE OF FOUR)

PAGE THREE RUESSD 7795 C O N F I D E N T I A L

B. EMB'S CONSISTENT EFFORTS FROM BEGINNING TO OBTAIN CEASE FIRES AND TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL SOLUTION BY URGING BOTH SIDES TO TREAT ON HONORABLE BASIS.

C. BOSCH-DIRECTED REFUSAL BY PRD LEADERS TO ACCEPT COMPROMISE. WHEN ONE (MARTINEZ) DID HE WAS AT FIRST EXPELLED FROM PARTY, THEN TAKEN BACK IN ORDER AVOID APPEARANCE OF PARTY DISUNITY.

D. OBJECTIVE ESTIMATES (POLLS AND OTHERWISE) THAT PRD AND BOSCH DID NOT REPRESENT MAJORITY OF DOMINICANS AND FACT THAT COMBINATION OF PARTIES THAT TOGETHER DID REPRESENT MAJORITY FAVORED PEACEFUL SOLUTION THROUGH PROVISIONAL GOVT AND ELECTIONS (EMBTLS 1047, 1052).

E. EMB'S LONG AND INTIMATE CONTACTS WITH PRD LEADERS AND LEADERS OF OTHER NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL MOVEMENTS.

F. RECORD OF PRD'S SELF-ADMITTED CONCERN OVER EXTREMIST INFILTRATION AND GROWING INFLUENCE IN THEIR ORGANIZATION OVER MONTHS PRIOR TO COUP; AND YET THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO MAKE BREAK WITH EXTREMISTS.

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 7795 C O N F I D E N T I A L

G. DETAILED REPORTS (PRESUMABLY NOT AVAILABLE TO SZULC) OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITY FROM EARLIEST MOMENTS OF REVOLUTION.

H. FACT THAT AT NO TIME DID REBELS CONTROL MORE THAN PART OF CITY OF SANTO DOMINGO.

THERE FOLLOW SPECIFIC STATEMENTS FROM SZULC ARTICLE, TOGETHER WITH EMB COMMENT. STATEMENTS FOLLOW CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER IN ARTICLE WITH SOME PICK-UP FROM PARAGRAPHS FARTHER DOWN WHERE SAME POINT COVERED TWICE OR FROM SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT ANGLE.

I. SZULC: OAS COMPROMISE PROPOSALS--"...ONE FINDS IT HARD TO WONDER WHY SAME IDEAS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADVANCED AT OUTSET OF CRISIS..."

FACT: BASIC OAS PROPOSAL IS FOR CREATION PROVISIONAL GOVT AND EARLY ELECTIONS. EMB EARLY IN CRISIS URGED SIMILAR SOLUTION AS DID MOST OF COUNTRY'S DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL LEADERS. BUT REBELS, HOPING WIN QUICKLY, REJECTED ELECTION PROPOSALS.

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-3- 260, JULY 26, FROM SANTO DOMINGO (SECTION ONE OF FOUR)

PAGE FIVE RUSSD 7705 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. SZULC: "LATER, THE EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATIONS PLAYED A PART IN UNDERMINING, IN EFFECT, PEACE-KEEPING EFFORTS OF SPECIAL WHITE HOUSE ENVOYS."

FACT: PURE BUNK. NOWHERE IN ARTICLE DOES SZULC PRESENT EVEN SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT MISCHIEVOUS CHARGE SUCH AS THIS. THIS EMB IS NOT AT WAR WITH ITS OWN.

3. SZULC: "...EMBASSY FIRST CAUGHT UNAWARES BY EVENTS..."

FACT: SINCE JAN, SANTO DOMINGO AGITATED ALMOST CONSTANTLY BY COUP ATTEMPTS, COUP RUMORS AND COUP SUPPRESSIONS -- 10 SEPARATE COUP ATTEMPTS OR STRONG RUMORS BETWEEN JAN 7 AND APRIL 24. (ADAMS HAS MEMO ENTITLED "MAJOR POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES IN 1965", PREPARED BY BENNETT. CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO INSERTING IT IN RECORD.) COUP THAT WAS ACTUALLY KICKED OFF APRIL 24 WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED TO COME OFF JUNE 1. COUP PREMATURELY TRIGGERED WHEN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF ATTEMPTED ON APR 24 TO TAKE INTO CUSTODY FOUR KEY INTRIGUERS WHO HAD BEEN DISCOVERED AS ACTIVE IN PLOT OF PREVIOUS WEEK. THESE OFFICERS INSTEAD SEIZED ARMY COMMANDER AND CRISIS BEGAN. CAAMANO HIMSELF SAID LATER APR 24 NOT PLANNED AS DATE OF UPRISING. REID TOLD AMB ON APR 22 HE EXPECTED NO SERIOUS TROUBLE IN COMING DAYS.
BENNETT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O 4:35 AM, JULY 26, 1965.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CINCSO, CINCLANT, CIA 4:50 AM, 7/26/65.

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SS FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

G TO SECSTATE WASHDC (PRIORITY 260)

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IO C O N F I D E N T I A L - (SETWO OFOUR) - JULY 26TH

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INR C-18, C-21, C-22, C-25, C-26.)

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4. SZULC: "IT BEGINS WITH REVOLT IN SANTO DOMINGO ON SATURDAY, APRIL 24, BY GROUP CIVILIANS AND YOUNG MILITARY OFFICERS TO BRING BACK DEPOSED PRESIDENT, JUAN BOSCH."

FACT: SOME TRUTH IN THIS STATEMENT BUT "OLD GUARD" GENERALS AND MAJORITY ARMY TROOPS PARTICIPATING IN FIRST PHASES THOUGHT

PAGE TWO RUESSD 779S/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
THEY WERE TRYING FOR MILITARY JUNTA. RESTORATION OF BOSCH WAS OBJECTIVE OF ONLY MINORITY OF THOSE MILITARY WHO JOINED REVOLT IN INITIAL STAGE.

5. SZULC: "JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION RE-ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIP THREE MONTHS LATER AND NOT LONG THEREAFTER REID WAS ELEVATED TOP SPOT IN TRIUMVIRATE."

FACT: PASSAGE IMPLIES US PUT REID IN POWER. NO BASIS FOR SUCH ASSUMPTION. NICKNAME "EL AMERICANO" FOR REID POSSIBLY USED BY ONE PERSON OR SMALL GROUP BUT EMB CAN FIND NO ONE WHO HAS HEARD OF IT. "EL PATO" AND "CHICHIGUITA" WERE NAMES HEARD WITH RESPECT TO REID.

6. SZULC: "...FINALLLY ON THURSDAY, APRIL 22, DONALD REID HIMSELF HEARD ENOUGH DETAILS OF PLOT TO FIRE SEVEN AIR FORCE OFFICERS INVOLVED..."

FACT: DATE WAS APRIL 24, NOT APRIL 22 (SEE REID STATEMENT TO AMB IN (3) ABOVE), AND NO AIR FORCE OFFICERS INVOLVED. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF CONCLUDED ON APRIL 24 AFTER SEVERAL CONVER-

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-2- 260, JULY 26, FROM SANTO DOMINGO, SETWO OFOUR

SATIONS WITH REID THAT AT LEAST SEVEN ARMY OFFICERS IN PLOT. AS INDICATED (3) ABOVE, ARMY CHIEF'S EFFORTS TAKE THESE MEN IN CUSTODY WAS SPARK THAT IGNITED REVOLT.

PAGE THREE RUESSD 779S/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L

7. SZULC: "ALTHOUGH REBELS AT TWO ARMY CAMPS IGNORED 5 PM ULTIMATUM TO SURRENDER, REID CABRAL BROADCAST THAT EVENING THAT UPRISING HAD BEEN STAMPED OUT...AMERICAN EMBASSY DUTIFULLY PASSED ON TO STATE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT REVOLT NOW OVER, ALONG WITH ITS OWN CONCLUSIONS THAT DONNIE REID HAD WEATHERED STORM."

FACT: REID REPORTED IN RADIO-TV ADDRESS TO NATION AT 8:35 PM THAT NATION CALM AND UNDER COMPLETE CONTROL GODR EXCEPT FOR TWO ARMY BASES NEAR SANTO DOMINGO (EMBTel 1038). HE GAVE ULTIMATUM THAT MILITARY ACTION WOULD COMMENCE AT 5 AM, APRIL 25, IF CAMPS DID NOT SURRENDER. HOUR WAS NOT 5 PM, APRIL 24. BASIS FOR CLAIM EMB BELIEVED REVOLT OVER SAT EVENING CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED. EMBTELS 1035, 1036, AND 1038 ALL REFLECT CONTRARY VIEW, POINT TO DETERIORATING SITUATION, AND NOTE "LOYALIST" MILITARY LEADERS NOT DISPOSED CARRY OUT REID'S ORDER TO ATTACK. IN VIEW MILITARY ATTITUDE, REID'S BROADCAST TURNED OUT TO BE FATAL TACTICAL MISTAKE SINCE IT REVEALED EXTENT OF ARMY DEFECTIONS FOR FIRST TIME TO ELEMENTS IN REVOLT AND TO EXTREMIST GROUPS AND GREATLY ENCOURAGED THEM.

8. SZULC: "MR. BENNETT LATER EXPLAINED HE HAD EXPECTED TROUBLE AND FOR PRECISELY THAT REASON HAD GONE TO WASHINGTON, FEELING IT WAS HIS LAST OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS DOMINICAN PROBLEM BEFORE TROUBLE CAME."

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 779S/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L

FACT: DET AWARE OF FACTS BEHIND ITS SUGGESTION FOR CONSULTATION AND MY CONCURRENCE WITH PLAN. CORRECT THAT I CONSIDERED THIS THE LAST "SAFE" TIME TO GO TO WASH, DUE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN DR AND WARNING OF POSSIBLE PRECIPITATE DECLINE IN EMBTEL 980 OF APRIL 4.

9. SZULC: "ON THURSDAY BENNETT HAD SENT HIS REGULAR WEEKLY REPORT TO STATE DEPARTMENT, AND IN IT HE MENTIONED NEW TALK

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-3- 260, JULY 26, FROM SANTO DOMINGO SET TWO OF FOUR
IN SANTO DOMINGO THAT SOME GENERALS MIGHT TRY OUST REID DURING
WEEKEND. BUT, BENNETT NOTED, THIS SEEMED ONE OF THOSE
'USUAL SANTO DOMINGO RUMORS.'

FACT: NO SUCH REPORT WAS SENT ON THURS, APR 22. EMB'S WEEKLY
REPORT, SENT ON APR 20, (A-426), DOES NOT HAVE THIS PASSAGE IN
IT.

10. SZULC: "...INCREASINGLY NERVOUS REPORTS FROM SANTO DOMINGO
THAT LEFTISTS AND COMMUNISTS WERE DOMINATING WHAT WAS SUPPOSED
TO BE PRO-BOSCH MOVEMENT... IN ONE OF HIS EARLIEST CABLES TO
WASHINGTON, CONNETT...WARNED BOSCH'S RETURN WOULD MEAN
EXTREMISM IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WITHIN SIX MONTHS."

PAGE FIVE RUESSD 779S/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L

FACT: EMB REPORTED ACCURATELY COMMUNIST EFFORTS TAKE ADVAN-
TAGE OF REVOLUTION. EVIDENCE THEN APPARENT, SUCH AS 'COMANDOS'
UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL, AND NOW OF COMMUNIST-DIRECTED
GUERRILLA TRAINING SCHOOL, HAS NOT DISAPPEARED. NO PREDICTION
MADE BY EMB THAT BOSCH'S RETURN WOULD MEAN "EXTREMISM IN SIX
MONTHS." HOWEVER EMB DID WARN OF DANGERS IN BOSCH RETURN IN
VIEW EXTENT OF COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN REVOLUTION ALREADY
CLEAR, ARMS ALREADY WIDELY DISTRIBUTED TO CIVILIANS, MOB
RULE TAKING OVER CITY, AND REPORTS OF REBEL LEADERS INTEND-
ING TO WORK WITH COMMUNISTS IN AND AFTER REVOLUTION. NO STEPS
WERE TAKEN TO PREVENT HIS RETURN, HOWEVER, AND NONE WERE
RECOMMENDED BY EMB. EMB CONTINUED MAINTAIN CONTACT BOTH SIDES
TO GET FIGHTING STOPPED AND ENCOURAGED SOLUTION LEADING TO
DEMOCRATIC GOVT.

1. SZULC: "ALSO ABSENT FROM SANTO DOMINGO THAT CRUCIAL WEEK-
END WERE 11 OF 13 OFFICERS ATTACHED TO MAAG."

FACT: POINT SHOULD BE MADE THAT, WHILE THESE MAAG TRAINING
OFFICERS WERE ABSENT ON OFFICIAL DUTY, ALL THREE SERVICE
ATTACHES, WHO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLITICAL AND INTEL-
LIGENCE REPORTING ON MILITARY AND ARE OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE IN
REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION, WERE IN DR. IT IS STANDING PRACTICE
THAT AT LEAST TWO ATTACHES ARE ALWAYS IN COUNTRY. EMB'S ENTIRE
POLITICAL TEAM WAS "ON DECK".

BENNETT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 7/26/65, 5:15 A.M.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CINCSO, CINCLANT, CIA 7/26/65, 5:30 A.M.

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CONFIDENTIAL - SETRE OFOUR - JULY 26TH

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12. SZULC: "...ALL RANKING OFFICERS, INCLUDING BENNETT, HAD SERVED THERE FOR RELATIVELY SHORT TIME."

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FACT: BENNETT HAD BEEN IN DR 13 MONTHS AS AMB. PLUS 2 1/2 YEARS OF EARLIER SERVICE IN COUNTRY. CHIEF POLITICAL SECTION HAD ALSO SERVED IN SANTO DOMINGO 13 MONTHS AND HAD ADDITIONAL 18 MONTHS IN COUNTRY AS CONSUL IN SANTIAGO BEFORE COMING TO CAPITAL. AIR ATTACHE HAD BEEN IN COUNTRY FOR 20 MONTHS. PAO HAD ALMOST FOUR YEARS' SERVICE. MEMBERS COUNTRY TEAM HAD TOTAL 19 YEARS AND TEN MONTHS SERVICE IN DOMREP AT OUTBREAK OF CRISIS.

13. SZULC: "AMBASSADOR ESTABLISHED CLOSE AND CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT REID CABRAL AND WITH BUSINESSMEN, LANDOWNERS AND MILITARY...." NO CONTACTS "TO LEFT OF ROTARY CLUB".

FACT: IMPLICATION IS THAT CONTACTS CONFINED TO SMALL CIRCLE. QUITE TO CONTRARY, PERUSAL OF AMB'S TRAVEL AND INVITATION LISTS (MEMO TRANSMITTED TO DEPT) SHOWS CONSIDERABLY MORE EMPHASIS ON LABOR AND CULTURAL--INTELLECTUAL GROUPS THAN ON, FOR INSTANCE, LANDOWNERS. BUSINESS CONTACTS WERE KEYED TO CIVIC AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT GROUPS. INVITATION LISTS AVAILABLE.

14. SZULC: "AMBASSADOR AND HIS TOP ASSOCIATES SEEMINGLY MAINTAINED FEW CONTACTS OF FRIENDSHIPS WITH FOLLOWERS OF DOCTOR BOSCH, OTHER OPPOSITION POLITICIANS OR ANY OF YOUNG OFFICERS ...NEITHER MARTIN NOR EMBASSY KNOWN HAVE MADE ANY EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE DEMOCRATS AGAINST COMMUNISTS....US, WHILE FEARING COMMUNIST TAKEOVER, DID NOTHING IN REVOLT'S EARLY DAYS TO ENCOURAGE DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS AMONG REBELS."

FACT: REPEATED SZULC CHARGES OF THIS NATURE CANNOT BE SUBSTANTIATED. AMB HAD VARIOUS MEETINGS WITH PRD LEADERS OVER LENGTHY PERIOD, AND HIS DOOR WAS ALWAYS OPEN TO THEM, AS IT

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-2- 260 JULY 26 FROM SANTO DOMINGO (SECTION IV OF IV)

WAS TO OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES. HE PREVENTED DEPORTATION BY REID GOV OF PRD PROPAGANDA CHIEF PENA GOMEZ ON TWO OCCASIONS. PENA GOMEZ HAS CONSISTENTLY ACKNOWLEDGED AMB'S ASSISTANCE TO HIM IN THIS RESPECT. CHIEF OF POLITICAL SECTION AND OTHER EMB POLITICAL OFFICERS MAINTAINED CLOSE AND FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH PRD NATIONAL LEADERS, MORE THAN WITH ANY OTHER PARTY, AND AMONG OTHER THINGS FREQUENTLY DISCUSSED MUTUAL CONCERN OVER AND PRD FAILURE ACT AGAINST RISING EXTREMIST LEFTIST ACTIVITY IN 1965, INCLUDING INFILTRATION OF PRD ORGANIZATION. IN JAN AND FEB OF 1965 EMB WAS UNDER ATTACK FROM RIGHT-WING ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTIES RATHER THAN FROM LEFT. HOWEVER, IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE FOR EMB TO HAVE IDENTIFIED ITSELF DIRECTLY WITH INTERESTS OF PRD ANY MORE THAN WITH ANY OTHER SPECIFIC POLITICAL PARTY. PRD LEADERS SEEMED TO RESENT THIS ATTITUDE ON PART OF EMB.

EMB DID NOT SUPPORT ANTI-BOSCH MILITARY AS POLITICAL FORCE. HOWEVER, WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT PUBLIC ORDER HAD BROKEN DOWN COMPLETELY AND SITUATION FAVORABLE TO COMMUNISTS CREATED, EMB MOVED TO ENCOURAGE ONLY EXISTING FORCES CAPABLE OF RESTORING PUBLIC ORDER AND KEEPING CHAOS FROM SPREADING THROUGHOUT COUNTRY TO DO SO. TO HAVE DONE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE BEEN TO SUPPORT ANARCHY, NOT DEMOCRACY.

AS TO UNDERSTANDING FORCES AT WORK IN REVOLUTION, RECORD ALSO CLEAR. CABLE SENT ON EVENING OF APRIL 24 (EMBTTEL 1037) ACCURATELY PICTURED POLITICAL FORCES AT WORK. SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES ON APRIL 25 (EMBTTELS 1047, 1052) REPORTED VIEWS OF NATION'S OTHER MAJOR POLITICAL LEADERS. EMB ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PROBLEM LIKELY TO BE FACED WAS SENT ON EVENING OF APRIL 25 (EMBTTEL 1062). THIS PROVED TO BE ACCURATE BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.

RECORD CLEAR THAT PRACTICALLY EVERY FOREIGN AMB IN SANTO DOMINGO, NOT TO MENTION AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND OTHER GROUPS INCLUDING FIRST OAS COMMITTEE, VIEWED POLITICAL SITUATION AS DID EMB AND SUPPORTED EMB ACTIONS IN FIRST WEEK OF REVOLUTION.

15. SZULC: "...ILL AT EASE WITH PEOPLE WHO WERE NOT WELL DRESSED AND TO WHOM HE HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY INTRODUCED."

FACT: SZULC SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FIND A LESS TIRED CLICHE ABOUT THE FOREIGN SERVICE. STATEMENT HARDLY JIBES WITH SZULC STATEMENT IN SAME PARAGRAPH RE MY WIDE TRAVEL IN DR (23 OF 26 PROVINCES--DESCRIPTION OF THESE ACTIVITIES AND RANGE OF MEETINGS AND CONTACTS IN MEMO WHICH HAS BEEN FURNISHED DEPT).

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TELEGRAM Department of State

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SAH C O N F I D E N T I A L - SEC FOUR OF FOUR - JULY 26

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USIA 18. SZULC: "REBELS HAD BY NOW OPENED ARSENALS AT TWO ARMY
NSC CAMPS THEY CONTROLLED AND AT FEW DOWNTOWN POLICE STATIONS THEY
INR HAD CAPTURED...MEN, WOMEN, TEEN-AGERS--COMMUNISTS AND NON-
NSA COMMUNISTS ALIKE--WERE ALLOWED TO HELP THEMSELVES TO ANYTHING
RSR THEY WANTED."

FACT: ACTUAL ARMS DISTRIBUTION TO CIVILIANS HAD BEGUN NIGHT
OF SATURDAY/SUNDAY AT ARMY CAMPS. ALTHOUGH SUNDAY DISTRIBUTION
INDEED INDISCRIMINATE, THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE COMMUNISTS
ASSISTED REBEL MILITARY IN DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS TO CIVILIANS

PAGE TWO RUESSD 779S/4 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(LARGELY TAKING OVER THIS DISTRIBUTION IN SHORT TIME).
"COMMANDOS" UNDER CONTROL OF COMMUNISTS, PARTICULARLY PSPD
AND 14TH OF JUNE, WERE ACTIVATED. IN RECENT PATRIA ARTICLE
(EMBIEL 236), 12-YEAR-OLD BOY TELLS HOW HE GOT ARMS SUNDAY
MORNING AND PARTICIPATED IN FIGHTING.

19. SZULC: "THERE WERE UNQUESTIONABLY COMMUNISTS AND PRO-
CASTRO ELEMENTS IN REVOLUTION FROM OUTSET, BUT THERE SEEMS
TO HAVE BEEN NO BASIS FOR EMBASSY'S WARNING THAT EXTREMISTS
WERE ABOUT TO CAPTURE MOVEMENT."

FACT: EXTENT AND INFLUENCE OF EXTREMIST INFLUENCE IN REBEL
MOVEMENT DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN MEMO PREPARED BY ADAMS AND
INSERTED BY MANN IN RECORD OF SENATE HEARINGS.

ADDITIONAL COMMENT FOLLOWS IN SUBSEQUENT TEL.

BENNETT

BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O 5:38 a.m., July 26.

Passed White House, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, CINCLANT 5:50 a.m.

July 26.

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43.
INCOMING TELETYPE: Department of State

16

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Action: DECLASSIFIED
IT: EMBEGR
APA: DE EMBEGR 7825 103043
Info: ZNY 00000
P 270345Z 2EA
FM AMEMBASSY (SANTO DOMINGO)
TO SECSTATE WASHDC (PRIORITY) (S)
G: STATE GRNC
SP: BT
SAH: C O N F I D E N T I A L JULY 26

18464
1265 JUL 27 AM 3 29

H: (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: STATE 4-15-76
By: LW, NARS, Date: 6-11-76

P: PASS DIA

USIA

NSC

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(RSR)

RE EMBTELS 260, 263
FURTHER COMMENT ON SZULC ARTICLE, TAKING UP CHRONOLOGICALLY
WHERE EMBTEL 263 LEFT OFF.

29. SZULC: NOW BOTH VESSIN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES HAD TO
RESPOND TO RENEWED REBEL THREAT.

FACT: THIS WAS NOT SO MUCH RENEWED THREAT AS THREAT OF NEW
NATURE-THREAT OF ARMED MOBS NO LONGER RESPONSIVE TO LEADERSHIP
OF PRD, WHOSE PRINCIPAL FIGURES HAD FLED THE FIELD (POINT 26).
PRD SECGEN NOT ONLY RECOGNIZED THIS BUT COURAGEOUSLY STATED IT
PUBLICLY APRIL 28 OVER RADIO. PRIVATELY, HE ADDED HE WAS
CONVINCED COMMUNISTS WERE TAKING OVER MOVEMENT, BUT SAID HE

PAGE 2 RUESSD 7825 C O N F I D E N T I A L
DARED NOT SAY THAT PUBLICLY FOR FEAR OF REPRISALS. IT IS WORTH
RECALLING THAT PRD SECGEN HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER
COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN REVOLT AS EARLY AS SATURDAY NIGHT APRIL
24 (EMBTEL 1037).

30. SZULC: "THE EMBASSY HAD DECIDED THAT INTERVENTION WAS
NECESSARY, BUT A LEGALISM HAD TO BE SATISFIED: SOMEONE HAD TO
REQUEST US MILITARY HELP. ACCORDINGLY IN MID-MORNING, THREE-MAN
MILITARY JUNTA WAS ESTABLISHED AT SAN TIDISRO WITH EMBASSY
GUIDANCE."

FACT: BUILDING ON FALSE PREMISE AS OF MORNING APRIL 28, SZULC
CONSTRUCTS SERIES OF STEPS LEADING TO MARINE LANDING. FLAW IN
HIS PREMISE IS THAT EMBASSY ON MORNING OF APRIL 28 HAD NOT

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-2- 266, JULY 16, (SECTION I OF III) FROM SANTO DOMINGO

"DECIDED INTERVENTION WAS NECESSARY." POSSIBILITY OF NEEDING MARINES TO PROTECT US CITIZENS IN EVEN LOCAL FORCES COULD NOT CONTAIN SITUATION WAS FIRST RAISED IN EMBTEL 1146 SHORTLY AFTER NOON ON APRIL 28. SZULC SUMMARIZES THIS CABLE IN LST PARA, 2ND COLUMN, PAGE 42 OF SATEVEPOST ARTICLE. THIS TELEGRAM WAS SENT AFTER BENOIT JUNTA HAD BEEN FORMED AND ANNOUNCED QUITE INDEPENDENTLY. WASHINGTON WAS FIRST URGED TO GIVE THOUGHT TO POSSIBLE NEED IN INTERVENTION TO GO BEYOND PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN EMBTEL 1155 IN EARLY EVENING APRIL 28. EMBTEL 1167 OF EARLY MORNING APRIL 29 (ALREADY READ INTO FOREIGN RELATIONS

PAGE 3 RUESSD 782S C O N F I D E N T I A L
COMMITTEE RECORD IN LARGE PART), STRESSING RELUCTANCE TO RECOMMEND INTERVENTION, CLEARLY GIVES LIE TO THOSE WHO SAY EMBASSY ALREADY ON MORNING APRIL 28 HAD DETERMINED ON INTERVENTION.

AS REGARDS FORMATION MILITARY JUNTA, IN ACCORD WITH INSTRUCTIONS EMBASSY HAD CONTINUED TO URGE TWO SIDES TO GET TOGETHER. NO OFFICER OF EMBASSY, INCLUDING ATTACHES AND MAAG OFFICERS, WAS CONSULTED BY ARMED FORCES REGARDING COMPOSITION OF SAN ISIDRO JUNTA. IN FACT, WE HAD HAD REPORT MID-MORNING APRIL 28 OF POSSIBLE 5 MAN JUNTA AND HEARD RADIO ANNOUNCEMENT AT APPROXIMATELY 11 AM OF THREE-MAN BENOIT JUNTA (EMBTEL 1143) WITH SOME SURPRISE. THERE WAS NO REPEAT NO EMBASSY GUIDANCE IN ITS FORMATION.

31. SZULC: "AT 7:30 PM (APRIL 28), AFTER MARINE PLATOON HAD BEEN DRIVEN TO EMBASSY, BENNETT SENT TELEGRAM MARKED FOR UNDER SECRETARY MANN. SNIPERS HAD BEEN FIRING AT EMBASSY BUILDING FROM ACROSS STREET, AND MARINES SHOT SEVEN OF THEM."

FACT: HERE AGAIN APPEARS FAVORITE SZULC THESIS, WHICH HE WAS ALREADY PROPOUNDING WHEN HE ARRIVED HERE APRIL 29, THAT ARRIVAL US FORCES PROVOKED ATTACKS ON EMBASSY. IN FACT, EMBASSY WAS UNDER FIRE MORE THAN 24 HOURS BEFORE ARRIVAL FIRST MARINE. SEVERAL EMBASSIES HAD HAD THEIR PREMISES VIOLATED.

PAGE 4 RUESSD 782S C O N F I D E N T I A L
SZULC STATEMENT IMPLYING THAT MARINES SHOT SEVEN SNIPERS ON NIGHT APRIL 28 (NO STATEMENT THIS TYPE APPEARS IN EMBTEL 1155 TO WHICH SZULC REFERS) IS INCORRECT BOTH AS TO NUMBER AND TO TIME. 2ND LIEUTENANT TUCKER, IN CHARGE OF FIRST UNIT OF 45 MARINES TO REACH EMBASSY AT 6:30 PM APRIL 28, IN STORY PUBLISHED WASHINGTON EVENING STAR DATED SANTO DOMINGO MAY 24 CONFIRMED

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3- 266, JULY 26, (SECTION I OF III) FROM SANTO DOMINGO

EMBASSY UNDER "HEAVY ATTACK" WHEN HE ARRIVED THERE. TUCKER IS QUOTED "WE WERE UNDER FIRE ALL NIGHT LONG BUT WE DIDN'T SHOOT BACK THE FIRST EVENING...THE NEXT DAY THEY KEEP POPPING AWAY AT US...FINALLY WE GOT THE OKAY TO FIRE BACK WHEN FIRED ON. WE KILLED EIGHT OF THEM AROUND THE EMBASSY AREA." EMBASSY HAD BEEN UNDER FIRE SINCE APRIL 27 AND LOCAL POLICE GUARD HAD KILLED ONE SNIPER BEFORE ARRIVAL MARINES.

32. SZULC: RADIO MESSAGE BETWEEN BENNETT AND BENOIT. "ONE MESSAGE AT 9:25 ON THURSDAY MORNING SAID ...BELIEVE WITH DETERMINATION YOUR PLAN WILL SUCCEED."

FACT: DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL EXTREME URGENCY OF DETERIORATING SITUATION ON APRIL 29. THERE WERE NO OTHER COMMUNICATIONS AND, AS EXPLAINED IN EMBTEL 1230, THIS WAS CALCULATED RISK IN DESPERATE EFFORT TO BUCK UP JUNTA FORCES TO DO THEIR JOB OF CONTAINING THE SPREADING CHAOS AND THUS RENDER US INTERVENTION

PAGE 5 RUESSD 782S C O N F I D E N T I A L
UNNECESSARY. MESSAGE COULD PERHAPS HAVE BEEN MORE OBSCURELY WORDED BUT THEN ITS MEANING WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE GOT THROUGH. IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT ANYONE COULD SERIOUSLY ARGUE DESIRABILITY OF EXPORTING ANARCHY AND KILLINGS THEN PREVALENT IN SANTO DOMINGO TO REST OF COUNTRY.

33. SZULC: "THAT THURSDAY EVENING BENNETT BRIEFED GROUP OF NEWSMEN WHO HAD COME ASHORE FROM BOXER. HE TOLD THEM THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF COMMUNIST DOMINATION IN REBEL MOVEMENT, THEN DISTRIBUTED TYPEWRITTEN COPIES OF 54 COMMUNISTS OR COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS WHO, BENNETT SAID, WERE ACTIVE IN REBEL LEADERSHIP."

FACT: CAS CONSIDERS LIST WAS AND IS VALID AND ACCURATE SAMPLING: IT WAS NEVER INTENDED TO BE, NOR WAS IT PRESENTED AS, ALL-INCLUSIVE. NOR WAS LIST AN EMBASSY INITIATIVE. WHEN EMBASSY SPOKESMAN AT EARLIER BRIEFING MADE POINT ABOUT COMMUNISTS IN REBEL CAMP, NEWSMEN PRESENT SAID EDITORS WOULD DEMAND MORE EVIDENCE AND ASKED FOR LIST OF NAMES. IN EFFORT COOPERATE EMBASSY PREPARED AND DISTRIBUTED LIST.

34. SZULC: "BENNETT ALSO TOLD NEWSMEN THAT NIGHT OF REBEL ATROCITIES...IT SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPED THAT NONE OF THESE REPORTS WERE ACCURATE." BENNETT
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:01 A.M. JULY 27, 1965
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AT 4:20 A.M. - 7/27/65

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USIA FACT: IN COURSE OF BACKGROUND SESSION WITH NEWSMEN ON APRIL 29, NSC AMBASSADOR SOUGHT TO SHARE SUCH INFORMATION AS WAS AVAILABLE INR IN CHAOTIC SITUATION WITH PRESUMABLY SERIOUS CORRESPONDENTS. NSA RE-RANGED OVER MANY SUBJECTS IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS. THIS ACCOUNT, HOWEVER, SELECTS ONLY THREE ITEMS AND SAYS AMBASSADOR WAS INCORRECT; SZULC GOES ON TO CHARGE "DELIBERATELY OR BECAUSE OF FAULTY INFORMATION, EMBASSY WAS PASSING OUT INACCURATE REPORTS." AN AMBASSADOR, AS IN CASE OTHER PUBLIC OFFICIALS, HAS BASICALLY TWO ALTERNATIVES WITH REGARD TO CORRESPONDENTS: TO REFUSE TO SEE NEWSMEN AND INCUR THEIR WRATH, OR TO MEET WITH THEM AND PASS ALONG SUCH REPORTS AS HE CAN WITHIN BOUNDS OF SECURITY WHILE TRUSTING IN THEIR GOOD FAITH. THREE INCIDENTS MENTIONED--ONE SEVERED HEAD, MASS EXECUTION, AND SHOOTING OF COLONEL CALDERON--WERE BASED ON UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION. COMING IN TO EMBASSY AND WERE PASSED ON AS "REPORTS", NOT AS CONFIRMED FACTS, AS RODMAN ARTICLE IN JULY 15 ARTICLE IN THE REPORTER MAKES CLEAR. SOME OF OTHER CORRESPONDENTS ATTENDING SAME SESSION SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD AMBASSADOR THEIR RECOLLECTIONS OF MEETING DID NOT JIBE AT ALL WITH SZULC'S REPORTS IN NEW YORK TIMES, WHICH HAD SUBSTANTIALLY SAME TONE AS SATURDAY EVENING POST PASSAGE. THEY WENT OUT OF WAY TO APOLOGIZE FOR SZULC'S BEHAVIOR AND HIS DISTORTED USE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED THEM.

WHILE THESE PARTICULAR ATROCITY REPORTS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED, NEITHER HAVE THEY BEEN DISPROVED, EXCEPT IN CASE OF COL. CALDERON, WHO FORTUNATELY ONLY RECEIVED NECK WOUND. AS REGARDS REPORT OF BEHEADING, AT MEETING OF TWO SIDES WHICH PAPAL NUNCIO AND I ATTENDED ON APRIL 30, BENOIT DENOUNCED BEHEADING OF INDIVIDUAL AND PARADING HIS HEAD ON POLE. REBEL REPRESENTATIVES DID NOT DENY THIS OR OTHER ATROCITY CHARGES BUT EXPLAINED THEY WERE UNABLE TO CONTROL MANY OF FORCES THEN RUNNING WILD IN STREETS (EMBIEL 1217).

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-2- 266 JULY 26 FROM SANTO DOMINGO (SECTION II OF III)

35. SZULC: "ONE EVENING AN OFFICIAL STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED INTELLIGENCE THAT COL. CAAMANO HAD MET WITH FIVE COMMUNIST LEADERS (AND OFFERED CERTAIN GUARANTEES)... SEVERAL DAYS LATER (SPOKESMAN) ACKNOWLEDGED EMBASSY NOT AT ALL SURE OF THIS INFORMATION."

FACT: NAMES OF PERSONS PRESENT AT THIS MEETING ARE KNOWN. EVIDENCE THAT THIS WAS REPORT, WHICH BY NATURE DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM 100 PERCENT, LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN CORRECT PROVIDED IN OTHER CAS REPORTS. FOR EXAMPLE, USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED MAY 3 THAT IMPORTANT PSPD MEMBERS SAID PSPD SHOULD MOVE IN CLOSE TO CAAMANO TO TAKE ADVANTAGE HIS POLITICAL FUTURE; SAME SOURCE REPORTED ON TWO SUBSEQUENT OCCASIONS THAT CAAMANO HAD BEEN MEETING WITH PSPD LEADERS.

SZULC HERE TRIES TURN FACT THAT MUCH OF SUCH INFORMATION CANNOT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO REPORTERS TO DISCREDIT EMBASSY REPORTING. FURTHER, IMPLICATION THAT ACTIONS SHOULD ONLY BE BASED ON ABSOLUTELY CONFIRMED REPORTS IN FAST-MOVING SITUATION IS NAIVE.

36. SZULC: "AT HIS STAFF MEETINGS, BENNETT REFERRED TO REBELS AS 'THAT COMMUNIST SCUM' OR 'THAT BUNCH DOWNTOWN'."

FACT: NOT TRUE. NOT MY STYLE. MEMBERS OF STAFF HAVE BEEN QUERIED AND DO NOT RECALL THESE STATEMENTS.

37. SZULC: "REQUESTS FROM DOMINICAN PROFESSIONAL GROUPS--BUSINESSMEN, LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND ENGINEERS--FOR CONTACT WITH EMBASSY TO EXPLAIN THEIR CONTENTION THAT "CONSTITUTIONALIST" REVOLUTION WAS NOT COMMUNIST, WERE NOT GRANTED."

FACT: NOT TRUE. AMBASSADOR AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS RECEIVED LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE, DEFINITELY INCLUDING THOSE WITH SYMPATHIES FOR REBELLION. IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT IN RUSHED AND CONFUSED CIRCUMSTANCES OF THAT PERIOD SOME MEETING MAY HAVE HAD TO BE CANCELLED OR SOME REQUEST MAY NOT HAVE GOT THROUGH. TO IMPLY, AS SZULC DOES, THAT IT WAS POLICY NOT TO RECEIVE PEOPLE IS TENDENTIOUS.

38. SZULC: "JOHN BARTLOW MARTIN ...SPENT AFTERNOON CONFERRING AT CAAMANO COMMAND POST AND IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED...REVOLUTION TAKEN OVER BY COMMUNISTS."

FACT: SZULC OBVIOUSLY HAS SOME TROUBLE WITH FACT THAT MARTIN, A RECOGNIZED LIBERAL OF WIDE REPUTATION, FOUND COMMUNISM IN DOMINICAN SITUATION. HIS METHOD IS TO DISPOSE OF MARTIN MISSION

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-3- 266 JULY 26 FROM SANTO DOMINGO (SECTION II OF III)

IN ONE PARAGRAPH, ALTHOUGH NOT WITHOUT CHARACTERISTIC INNUENDO. MARTIN, WHO HAD WORKED HARD IN EARLIER PERIOD TO SUPPORT CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN DR, ARRIVED APRIL 30. FROM MOMENT HIS ARRIVAL HE CONFERRED EXTENSIVELY WITH INDIVIDUALS ON BOTH SIDES OF CONTROVERSY. ONE OF THEM WAS CAAMANO. NEWS CONFERENCE HELD MAY 2. REFER MARTIN'S OWN ARTICLE IN LIFE.

39. SZULC: "FOR TEN DAYS NO FURTHER CONTACTS BETWEEN U.S. AND REBELS."

FACT: THERE CONTINUED TO BE CONTACTS, AS THERE HAVE BEEN THROUGHOUT CRISIS. THEY WERE REDUCED AT THAT TIME WHEN EMBASSY EFFORT MOVED TO SUPPORT EFFORTS OF FIRST OAS COMMISSION.

40. SZULC: "TO ASSIST IMBERT, U.S. MADE AVAILABLE \$750,000 ON MAY 9 TO PAY SALARIES OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN AREA NOT UNDER REBEL CONTROL. NO SIMILAR OFFER MADE TO CAAMANO."

FACT: NO SUCH OFFER MADE TO IMBERT. DOM ECONOMY HAD BEEN CHOKED TO STANDSTILL BY REBELLION. EFFORT MADE TO RELIEVE SUFFERING AND HOLD NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE TOGETHER BY PUTTING MONEY INTO CIRCULATION THROUGH PAYMENTS ALREADY DUE TO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES. OPERATION CARRIED OUT DIRECT THROUGH LONG-TIME CAREER EMPLOYEE OF FINANCE MINISTRY WITHOUT ENGAGING POLITICAL LEVEL OF IMBERT GOVERNMENT. NO QUESTIONS ASKED ABOUT POLITICAL SYMPATHIES AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES LIVING IN CAAMANO TERRITORY WERE FREE TO PICK UP THEIR CHECKS. MANY DID SO.

41. SZULC: "NEWSMEN AND TELEVISION CAMERAMEN RECORDED TRUCKLOADS OF IMBERT TROOPS PASSING FREELY THROUGH AMERICAN CHECKPOINTS ENROUTE TO BATTLE REBELS."

GP-3.
BENNETT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 3:55 A.M. JULY 27
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FACT: RECORDING ON FILM OF THESE ALLEGED EVENTS--PARTICULARLY THOSE MADE BY CBS-- WERE SHOWN BY SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION TO BE COMPLETELY OUT OF CONTEXT. DETAILS CONCERNING MATTER AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON. FACT THAT DAF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS PREVENTED THROUGH US ACTIONS, ALONG WITH OTHER RESTRAINTS IMPOSED ON DOM MILITARY FORCES BY US AND INTER-AMERICAN FORCES, IS COMPLETELY IGNORED BY SZULC.

42. SZULC: "JUST BEFORE BUNDY MISSION'S ARRIVAL, IMBERT AIRCRAFT BROKE OAS-ARRANGED TRUCE...STRAFING RUNS ON REBEL-HELD SANTO DOMINGO...AMBASSADOR SHOUTING "I SHALL PROTEST THIS".

PAGE TWO RUESSD 784S CONFIDENTIAL
FACT: THIS IS A SHOUT THAT NEVER GOT SHOUTED. WHILE SITUATION WAS UNDOUBTEDLY DRAMATIC, IT WAS BY NO MEANS SO HISTORIC AS SZULC SEEKS TO MAKE IT. THIS GNR CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION WAS IN FACT FORMALLY PROTESTED, AS WERE MORE THAN 900 REBEL VIOLATIONS OF CEASE-FIRE. SZULC HAS CHOSEN TO IGNORE THE MANY REBEL VIOLATIONS--THE REPEATEDLY MOUNTED, PURPOSEFUL ATTACKS ON PEACE-KEEPING FORCES--ALTHOUGH IT WAS THESE REBEL ATTACKS WHICH CAUSED THE DEATHS OF MORE THAN 20 AMERICAN SOLDIERS AND MARINES.

43. SZULC: "REBEL CHIEF (CAAMANO) HAD CANCELLED APPOINTMENT WEEK EARLIER WHEN ONE OF TOP AIDES KILLED BY GUNFIRE, APPARENTLY SHOT BY U.S. TROOPS MANNING SECURITY CORRIDOR."

FACT: SZULC HERE MAKES HIMSELF A CARRIER OF CAAMANO PROPAGANDA. OFFICER IN QUESTION WAS PARTICIPATING IN ARMED ATTACK ON NATIONAL PALACE IN VIOLATION OF CEASE FIRE. IN COURSE OF ATTACK UN-

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-2-, 255. JULY 26. FROM SANTO DOMINGO. (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

PROVOKED FIRE WAS DIRECTED INTO US POSITION IN NEARBY CORRIDOR. SEVERAL PERSONS WERE KILLED IN ENSUING CROSS-FIRE AMONG THREE SEPARATE FORCES.

PAGE THREE RUESSD 784S C O N F I D E N T I A L

44. SZULC: "THERE WAS GENERAL BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN AMERICANS AND DOMINICANS ATTEMPTING TO END CIVIL WAR WITHOUT FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE, AND WHERE NO FORMULA SEEMED OFFER PEACEFUL SOLUTION."

FACT: IT INTERESTING NOTE PRESENT OAS FORMULA FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION IS IN ESSENCE VERY SIMILAR TO THAT PROPOSED BY GREAT MAJORITY OF DOM POLITICAL LEADERS AND URGED BY EMB IN EARLY DAYS OF REVOLUTION. TIMELY ACCEPTANCE OF THIS FORMULA BY PRD LEADERS IN LATE APRIL WOULD HAVE BROUGHT END TO CIVIL WAR AND TO FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE. IN EFFECT INTRANSIGENCE OF BOSCH-DIRECTED REBEL LEADERS (THERE WERE AFTER ALL PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS FOR BALAGUER AS WELL AS FOR BOSCH) PREVENTED COMPROMISE AND GAVE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE STRONG BID FOR POWER TO COMMUNISTS, WHO HAD LONG SEEN ADVANTAGE FOR THEMSELVES IN PRD DRIVE FOR RETURN TO POWER BY FORCE.

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN AMERICANS AND DOMINICANS WHO WANTED END TO BLOODSHED ON HONORABLE BASIS WERE ADEQUATE. LINES WERE OPEN BUT IT TAKES TWO TO TALK. LESSON HERE NOT THAT DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONS THAT HAPPEN TO SUFFER COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION ARE DOOMED TO FAILURE THROUGH INTERVENTION. IT IS PERHAPS IN PART THAT DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONS CAN ONLY BE TRULY SUCCESSFUL WHEN LEADERS ACT WITH RESPONSIBILITY AND WITH ADEQUATE APPRECIATION OF DANGERS INVOLVED IN FLIRTATION AND COOPERATION WITH EXTREME LEFT.

CONCLUSION

I WOULD BE GLAD, IN FACT I WOULD WELCOME, OPPORTUNITY APPEAR AGAIN BEFORE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE IN CONNECTION WITH SZULC ARTICLE OR OTHER ASPECTS OF DOMINICAN SITUATION IN EVENT DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS IT DESIRABLE.

GP-3. BENNETT

BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 7-27-65 4:13 A.M.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CINCSO, CINCLANT, CIA
7-27-65, 5:10 A.M.

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ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		25	
ARA-8			AIRGRAM		POL 23-8 DOM REP	
R	REP	AF	(5) A438		POL 23-9 DOM REP	
EUR	FE	FOR RM USE ONLY				
NEA	CU	INR	LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		(X) EP 6 Santo Domingo	
E	P	IO	TO : SecState WASHINGTON		HANDLING INDICATOR	
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AGR	COM	FRS	FROM : Amembassy, SANTO DOMINGO		X	
INT	LAB	TAR			X	
TR	XMB	AIR	SUBJECT: Shooting Incident at Hotel Embajador on April 27.		X	
ARMY	CIA	NAVY			X	
3	10	3	REF :		X	
OSD	USIA	NSA			X	
25	8	3	13		X	
NSC	6	6			X	
1965 JUN 14 PM 3 02			Enclosed are ~~XXXX~~ memorandums recounting the details, from the vantage points of the various writers, of the confused and dangerous shooting fray at the Hotel Embajador on the morning of April 27. As the Department is aware, the hotel grounds and lobby were filled largely with American wives and children at the time. The April 27 incident invokes some of the tragic atmosphere of unreason which existed among Dominicans at that time, an atmosphere by no means yet dissipated.		X	
COPYFLO-PDR					X	
Enclosures:			As stated.		X	
For the Ambassador:					X	
Benjamin Ruyle			First Secretary of Embassy		X	
13					X	
FORM 4-62 DS-323			LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		FOR DEPT. USE ONLY	
By: BRuyle:jh			Contents and Classification Approved by:		X In ☐ Out	
Clearances:					X	
William E. Connett, Jr.			13		X	
13					X	

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A-438
Santo Domingo
PAGE 1 of ENCLOSURE 1.

Shortly after I returned to the Embassy from dropping my family at the Hotel Embajador on the morning of April 27, Mr. Connett instructed me to get back to the hotel. He explained the rebel radio was announcing that Rafael Bonilla Aybar ("Bonillita") had been seen at the hotel. He understood the radio was calling on rebels in the area to converge on the hotel and he was afraid there might be serious trouble.

As I approached the hotel, I noted assorted automobiles filled with armed youths closing in from different directions, obviously headed toward the hotel. Traffic was blocked at the corner of the street which leads into the hotel, people were hiding in their cars and behind their cars, and gunfire was being exchanged.

I walked through the rebel group toward the hotel to try to locate someone in charge of the rebels. When I reached the hotel parking lot I began calling out that the person who commanded the rebels should order them to cease firing. A member of the rebel group came toward me with a portable loud speaker and moved out to order those outside the hotel to hold their fire.

In the hotel lobby, someone who identified himself as Dr. Yeara Nasser seemed to be in charge. I asked him what was going on. He replied that Bonilla Aybar was in the hotel and they were going to find him. I told him a peaceful evacuation had been agreed to and they were not going through the hotel looking for Bonilla until the evacuation had been completed. He countered by saying the firing had begun from one of the upper floors of the hotel. He claimed the rebels had not started it. Someone else said the firing had been started from one of the top floors by Dr. Fernando Muniz. I replied that I would go through the hotel looking for Muniz, and meanwhile the rebels should see to it their men held their fire.

Yeara Nasser and the other rebels in the lobby agreed, and Commander Bob Holmes and I went through the hotel from top to bottom, trying doors, calling out for Dr. Fernando Muniz, and asking those on the lower floors (the upper floors were vacant) where the firing had started and whether they had seen Muniz. At the eastern extreme of the third floor, we were admitted to a room which had been badly shot up from outside. There were bullet holes in the windows, in the draperies and in the walls. The man who received us opened the closet door to show us his wife and children huddled on the floor, terrified. His wife begged him to close the door.

Bob Holmes and I returned to report to the rebels we had been unable to find either Muniz or Bonilla. One of the rebels asserted Bonilla had with him two traveling bags stuffed with greenbacks, extracted from the blood of the Dominican people, and they had no intention of allowing him to escape. I replied I was in no position to prevent them from searching for Bonilla, but a peaceful evacuation had been agreed to and the women and children had to be

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PAGE 2 OF ENCLOSURE 1

got out of there without further trouble. One of the rebels said they had no intention of interfering with the evacuation. I replied it had already been interfered with, and lives had been endangered. It was agreed the rebels would suspend their operations until the evacuation was completed. One of them said they would even help the women and their luggage. The rebels who surrounded the hotel were ordered to report to Col. Vinicio Fernandez for instructions to this effect.

I explained to one of the Embassy officers at the hotel that it looked to me as if the evacuation could proceed. Before returning to the Chancery, I went into the Embassy Room of the hotel, where most of the evacuees had taken refuge when the firing began. Bartan Connett told me everyone was still apprehensive and asked me to say a few words to try to calm them. I explained to them there was to be no more gunfire and that some of those who had been firing had even volunteered to help with the luggage. I said I believed there was no further cause for alarm.

Upon my return to the Embassy, I reported to Mr. Connett that I believed the evacuation could be carried out without further incident. A few minutes later, checking by radio to find out how the evacuation was coming along, I was told it had not yet begun. Apparently there was some question whether the road to Haina was safe for travel. Col. Heywood said he was on his way to Haina (I believe he was going out to meet the Ambassador) and if he should encounter anything at all which might make travel appear inadvisable for the women and children, he would immediately turn back to stop the convey.

I went out again to the hotel to urge that the evacuation be carried out as rapidly as possible. It had still not started. There seemed to be some question as to when the Navy would reach Haina and be ready to start evacuating. I said I thought the women and children would be calmed more by getting moving than they were going to be if they stayed huddled on the floor of the Embassy Room of the hotel, that the road to Haina was safe to travel now, but might not be later, and that, in any case, the Navy was on its way and would probably be in Haina before the convoy. Most important to me was the question in my mind as to how much time the rebels were going to allow us.

At this point, however, I could not find the Embassy officers who were responsible for getting the convoy loaded, and moving. I finally located them in the office of Manuel Lovatón Pittaluga, President of the Hotel Corporation. Also present were Col. Vinicio Fernandez and other rebels. A question seemed to have arisen over the possible evacuation of Muniz, who I learned at that time claimed to be an American citizen.

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I learned that Col. Fernández had agreed that if the American Embassy wished to give its protection to Muniz, the rebels would not interfere, although they considered Muniz a Dominican and a criminal. I was told later both Lovatón and Vidal (the hotel manager) knew where Muniz was hiding--in a small room off the cashier's office on the ground floor-- but I do not believe he was evacuated at that time.

Vidal left, however. He told me he had been in many tight spots during his career, but had never seen anything such as the terror and panic of that morning. He said he had seen one man grab his wife's dress from the rear and literally drag her across the hotel grounds and into the building. He said he had also seen a small child knocked down and trampled on. He did not know how badly the child was injured.

Vidal said it had been his plan to remain on the job, but his experience during that morning had forced him to the conclusion he had to get out of this country. So far as I know, he has not returned.

Benjamin Ruyle

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Office of the Army Attache
Santo Domingo, D.R.

31 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM RE EVACUATION OF U.S. CITIZENS FROM
SANTO DOMINGO, 27 April 1965.

1. As per request by Mr. Brown on 20 May 1965, the following is a personal account of my activities in connection with civilian evacuation from Santo Domingo on 27 April 1965.

2. I personally took my dependents to the Embajador Hotel for evacuation processing at 1045 on 27 April 1965. A very large number of persons in front of the hotel were awaiting transportation at that time and my overall impression was that - although there seemed to be a question as to "what do we do next?", outwardly people appeared calm and orderly. I then departed for my office.

3. At about 1130 hours LtCol Heywood informed me that he had just received word from the Embassy to the effect that "They were shooting at Americans at the hotel". Col Heywood and I immediately drove in his car to the hotel. Upon arriving at the intersection of the hotel drive and Avenida Bella Vista we encountered what appeared to be armed rebel irregulars. We dismounted from the car and Col Heywood asked one armed individual to accompany us to the hotel. At about this time Vampire Jets were attacking installations North of the hotel (Camp 27th of February) and were circling just North and West of the hotel before making their strafing passes. This caused many uninitiated in area to take cover or fall to the ground and the armed rebels were firing sporadically at the aircraft. After being assured that we were not being attacked, the same individual got in the car with us and indicated that we should approach the West end of the hotel by way of the Polo Field, which we did. More similarly armed rebels were found at the service entrance. We then were led through a hallway towards the lobby where we found evacuees very upset by first, an outdoor exchange of shots by rebels and unknown persons on the upper floors of the hotel, followed by, firing within the lobby. No casualties were observed. Rebels indicated that they were in pursuit of Bonilla Aybar, who had taken refuge in the hotel in order to escape with the evacuees. After considerable talk rebels agreed to go outside and surrounded hotel, rather than search further among evacuees. Order seemed restored within the hotel, except there did not appear to be any effective centralized control of rebels who continued to wander or run excitedly in and out, but no other shooting occurred in lobby.

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At this stage evacuees emerged from dining room and casino into lobby whereupon they were informed that busses were enroute to take them to Haina. Many of them tried to or did move outdoors to claim their baggage despite being warned that this was unsafe at the time. The undersigned while attempting to get people back in hotel, observed the approach of armed policemen. Fearing that police or rebels might open fire at one another, I went out to meet the police and explain the situation. While talking to what appeared to be the police officer in charge (OIC), Col Vinicio Fernandez Perez, EN, a rebel officer known to me, appeared on the scene. I explained the situation to him and firmly made it clear that the irresponsible actions of his people were jeopardizing the lives of American citizens. Whereupon, he called for the individual in charge of the rebels around the hotel to come forward. An individual in olive green fatigues carrying a hand operated electronic loudspeaker came out. Col. Fernandez spoke to this individual and the OIC of the police, stating that he was now in charge and that all personnel subordinate to them would assemble on the North side of the parking lot and remain there for further instructions. This was slowly accomplished. Col Fernandez, 2 OIC's, myself and others then entered the hotel and went to an office off the lobby where it was agreed that first, the way had to be cleared to permit the busses to approach the hotel, and then people must be permitted to claim their baggage. By the time I had returned to the lobby evacuees had again pushed outdoors. At this time the police for some unknown reason moved towards the hotel into the former processing area where baggage had been left and appeared to expect firing at them from the upper floors of the hotel. Again, with some help from MAAG officers and male civilians, evacuees were induced to return to the lobby of the hotel. No shooting actually occurred. After considerable delay, busses arrived and an attempt to organize departure for people was made. What started as an orderly move to baggage and busses turned into a pushing, shoving mob scene which was uncontrollable. Behavior of most male evacuees at the point was disgraceful. People departed frantically using both busses and PCV's indiscriminately, so that even police and rebels were overcome. Busses scheduled to return for second loads failed to materialize but small groups continued to depart by trucks and civilian cars until only a few persons remained. At this time a new crisis occurred. A black Mercedes Benz containing three men, a woman and two children arrived at the hotel. Rebels in the parking lot ~~dragged~~ and jerked these people from the car and were threatening to shoot them. When I arrived on the scene, the rebels claimed that one man was a Cuban Pilot for Wessin and that he had been one of those killing Dominicans at the bridge. After talking to this group of people I determined that they were in fact SFC Rivera-Vega (MAAG), Mrs. Madina (Wife of TSgt Madina, MAAG, then in Panama) her two children, and two male American citizens names unknown. I

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informed rebels if this fact, but they refused to believe explanation since car, borrowed from friend, had San Isidro Air Force license plates. After almost an hour and a half of talking and after all other evacuees had departed, Col Fernandez arrived and permitted Mrs. Madena and children plus the two civilians to depart but insisted that SFC Rivera-Vega must go to the palace for identification check. I immediately notified embassy by radio of this action. No other evacuees remained at hotel so departed for embassy with Mr. Quintanilla and his assistant (1600 hours). Later I was informed that Embassy had secured release of SFC Rivera-Vega, who was unharmed.

J. W. Weyrick
LTCOL GS
U.S. Army Attache

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*Sent.
Domuez*

I was a member of the Embassy group which organized the evacuation of US citizens and others from the Hotel El Embajador on April 27.

I arrived at the hotel at 6:00 AM, together with most of the other officers, to help complete the administrative arrangements for the evacuation which had been scheduled for 12:00 noon. Throughout the first part of the morning I was located on the lawn of the front of the hotel where the evacuees were being processed. The arrangements progressed smoothly until Bonilla Aybar appeared at approximately 9:30 AM with several heavily armed friends. Apparently, he wished to be evacuated even though he had been refused permission to do so by the Embassy. His presence at the hotel was reported to the Embassy on the walkie-talkie, which was on a table located within the lawn area where the processing was taking place.

I didn't notice Bonilla Aybar after his first appearance, but approximately 20 minutes later I saw a group of about 30 armed men dressed in fatigues run into the lobby of the hotel. At the time I felt that there would be trouble because I had seen only two policemen on duty at the front of the hotel. A part of the group that had entered the hotel lobby then came running out and started looking through the mass of people located on the lawn. Several of them found a Cuban and started to knock him around because they thought he was one of the men for whom they were looking. They kept shouting that he wasn't a US citizen and he kept shouting that he was a citizen. I went to the group and found out that he was a US resident alien and tried to tell the men around him what his status was, but they wouldn't listen and started to wave their sub-machine gun excitedly. The leader of the group (he called himself a Captain of the Constitutionalist forces) ran up with a drawn revolver and pointed it at the Cuban. While the Captain was yelling at the Cuban, a machine gun started firing and everyone in the group threw themselves to the ground. The people on the lawn had either fallen to the ground or were running toward the hotel entrance.

The firing increased in volume almost immediately as more machine guns started to fire. I got up and tried to move as many people as possible against the side of the hotel so that they would be protected from stray bullets. At that time, I was at the back of the lawn approximately mid-way from either side. I knew that the firing was coming from my right (as I looked out from the hotel), but I could not identify the exact area where most of the firing was taking place. A member of the "Constitutionalist" group had picked up an Embassy loudspeaker and was telling the members of his group to cease firing.

After the first few minutes the lawn was practically clear of people except for the area next to the hotel wall, where a large number were huddled for protection. After approximately three minutes the firing ceased and the officers who were on the lawn started moving

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people into the lobby because it afforded them greater protection. However, the members of the "Constitutionalists" group kept running around the lobby in a dangerously excited way. It appeared to me that most of them were not regular soldiers, that they didn't know how to use firearms properly, and that they were highly agitated by the bombing of the 16th of August military camp, which was being attacked that morning. I believed that there was a good possibility that a number of people would have been killed in the firing if one of the men they were seeking had made an attempt to escape through the hotel.'

The atmosphere was one of great tension, fear and uncertainty. Mr. Bleakley and I got to the hotel switchboard and tried to maintain an open line to keep the Embassy informed of what was happening. We tried to make the point that we knew of no casualties, but that there was a possibility of things getting seriously out of hand. People were surging up and down the corridors in confusion and were throwing themselves on the floor whenever there was a burst of firing. We continued to report to the Embassy and eventually had the Captain talk to Mr. Connett on the phone. We tried to convince the Captain to let the evacuees leave, but he admitted that he didn't know if his men would obey him or shoot him if he allowed them to leave. In addition, he was under strict orders from "Radio Santo Domingo" to get Bonilla Aybar and Fernando Muniz, whom he believed to be in the hotel.

Shortly after the Captain's talk with Mr. Connett, Mr. Ruyle arrived and immediately started to talk to the Captain about the situation. Mr. Ruyle then went upstairs to see if Muniz could be located. The sense of panic had notably declined by that time and most of the evacuees had been gathered in the dining room and night club of the hotel, but the members of the "Constitutionalist" force were still very excited. In approximately 45 minutes, a regular Army Colonel arrived and was met by Mr. Quintanilla and the Captain. The tension mounted greatly amongst the "Constitutionalists" in the hotel when they saw the forces of the Colonel, and it appeared that trouble might start at any moment.

Eventually, after a conference between Mr. Quintanilla and the leaders of the various armed elements at the hotel, it was agreed that the evacuation could continue. We, therefore, loaded all the evacuees aboard the available transport and left the hotel headed for Haina at approximately 12:00 noon.

William Sergeant

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Santo Domingo

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June 1, 1965

FROM : H.Woods

SUBJECT: Incident April 27, 1965 at the Hotel Embajador

The roots of this incident, I believe, were laid in the Hotel on the previous evening. The first incident occurred when a number of rebel soldiers entered the hotel late April 26 and arrested a Cuban pilot (I think his name was Maza and had been flying for the Dominican Airlines) on a suspicion that he had been flying an Air Force plane and bombing rebel positions. He was later released. There were well-founded rumors that rebel agents were all over the hotel and were reporting the names of certain evacuees-to-be and spying in general. It was said that they were hiding arms in the Hotel. ~~additionally they have been seen in the area sniping from the hotel.~~ All this may have been borne out in that sniping from the Hotel was reported later on the Marine positions alongside the Hotel.

I worked throughout the night of April 26 in the Hotel registering Americans and others for evacuation. About 6:30 a.m. of April 27th I went outside where the registration tables had been set up. This area is located in front of the Hotel to the right as one leaves the building by the main door. Everything seemed to be proceeding smoothly and things were generally quiet. I noticed that about three rebel soldiers with guns were mixing in with the evacuation group; they were just walking around, looking, and made no attempt to be friendly or unfriendly. This was a short time after I had come outside.

Sometime later, a group of armed rebel soldiers (possibly 8 or 10) came walking down the road (from the main road) towards the Hotel. When they had crossed the grassy plots in front of the Hotel, they rushed into the Hotel holding their arms ready for use. This produced some excitement but no panic among the evacuees- the armed men seemed to be running around aimlessly and gave the impression of not knowing what they were looking for. Rumor had it then that they were looking for two men reportedly hiding in the Hotel: Bonilla Aybar (who had been there and had reportedly left) and Dr. Fernando Muniz (who had been put in the Asst. Manager's office by a hotel employee). The aimless rushing about of these men produced no material results and they started to rush around the outside particularly in the area where the evacuees were congregated.

All of a sudden a series of shots were heard coming from the side of the building. Apparently the men thought that the two wanted men were hiding in a room on the side of the hotel, and on the slightest provocation, or on imagining a figure cross the window, they shot up and down the building from the outside. At one time, they all stood

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near a tree, and I (as well as others) were sure that they were shooting at someone hiding in the tree. All this was alongside the group of evacuees. With the first shots, those immediately in front of the Hotel jumped off chairs and baggage and rushed as fast as they could into the building. Those caught in the parking lot hid behind automobiles, and tried to get into the building running in a crouched position. One woman with a baby was in a car, and she crouched down in the rear and stayed there for about an hour or two.

Inside the hotel, the rebels had everybody stay close to both walls of the lobby so that they could continue running back and forth. This was a rather confused period in which people would suddenly dive into open spaces behind a chair, into a telephone booth or into a room, as there was occasional shooting outside - apparently without reason or discipline. Two women went hysterical - I could hear them but didn't see them. Mr. Ruyle and Mr. Quintanilla (who had been speaking to someone over the walkie-talkie) appeared and seemed to be in discussion with some of the rebel men. Later I saw Mr. Ruyle and one of the rebels walking up and down a corridor calling for Dr. Muniz. About this time one of the rebels, who had been walking back and forth with a public address system in the lobby, announced that the lives of all foreigners were guaranteed and that nobody would be harmed. This seemed of minimum value since the men appeared to be irregulars, undisciplined, and shot in a general direction - not aiming well, if they were aiming at all.

One incident, which could have had serious results, occurred shortly after the announcement that the lives of foreigners were safe. I was standing near the elevator near the rebel with the speaker when a wild-eyed rebel came running into the lobby calling to the man on the speaker in a loud wild voice in Spanish, "They are killing Dominican civilians over there (the Dominican Air Force had just bombed the rebel camp a few kilometers away) - what are you going to do with the civilians here?" The man with the speaker told him that lives of the people here had been guaranteed. The wild-eyed one became much more excited, "You mean you're going to let them kill Dominicans and do nothing about the civilians here?" He appeared to take a menacing attitude, and the man with the speaker told him to get out. When he refused to do so, the man with the speaker took him outside physically and took the magazine out of his gun, and took the magazines out of the guns of about two more. I saw him return to the Hotel carrying the magazines.

By this time, the rebels were wandering on the various floors with guns in a poised position, in some cases entering rooms. They blocked all entrances in the lobby to the elevators and to the employees' section. Everybody had to show some identification to go up or come out. I tried

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to go up to my room in the Hotel to get some last minute belongings for my wife and daughter (all evacuees were concentrated by this time in the main dining room, Embassy Room, and the Casino) and was not permitted to do so except by an armed escort who accompanied me to my room with a submachine gun. He made very little effort to converse with me, but apparently knew me. He did state, however, that they were looking also for some automatic weapons which may have been hidden in the Hotel to be used against them (rebels).

I took a look outside and noticed some rebels watching the cars and later making all outgoing cars show some identification. In one instance, they refused to permit a car to leave, claiming it was an Air Force car. Some of the men shot the bolt (they had bolt action guns here) home and aimed at the driver, but their officer told them he did not mean for them to shoot - he just didn't want the car to leave. I don't know what happened to the driver.

In one incident, on a lighter vain, a young boy about 20 or slightly under, was talking to his mother in the lobby when a rebel came up and spoke to him. The rebel then called up a nearby soldier with orders to arrest the boy. The mother started arguing loudly to no avail; the officer just walked away. In the meantime, the rebel soldier met a friend and started talking to him, disregarding the young boy. The officer, noticing this, returned and requested the arrest of the boy. The soldier said he would do so after this conversation. Since it turned out to be a long conversation, the young boy and his mother walked away and disappeared.

During all this, I walked around continually and tried to make myself as useful as I could. For the most part, I found myself calming semi-hysterical women and their excited husbands.

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Following is an account of my personal recollections of the events which transpired at the Hotel Embajador the morning of April 27, 1965.

My wife, Jane, and I arrived at the Hotel Embajador at 5:30 a.m. She was to be evacuated; I was to assist in the documentation and preparation of persons for evacuation.

By 9:30 a.m., the bulk of the approximately 1,000 people present at the Embajador had received evacuation cards and were calmly waiting on the lawn or in the lobby. At this point, I noticed a man who I was told was Bonilla Aybar carrying a tommy-gun and loitering near the documentation table. Mr. Quintanilla relayed the information to the Embassy by radio. Bonilla then disappeared into the crowd around the lobby and a few seconds afterwards two cars left the premises from that direction. It was impossible to verify at that time whether or not he was in one of the cars.

Approximately 20 minutes after this had transpired, at about 10:00 a.m., several open vehicles full of men rapidly approached the front of the hotel. The armed men, dressed mostly in khaki uniforms, spread quickly into the hotel lobby and onto the lawn. I moved from the documentation desk on the lawn in the direction of the hotel lobby and had just reached the lobby when a commotion in the middle of the lawn began. By the time I reached the area, a circle of bystanders was gathered around. Several of the armed men had in custody the short, stocky man who had been seeking evacuation for the Bonilla family. He was screaming that he was a United States citizen and waving a green alien registration card. The officer of the armed men was calling for a representative of the United States Embassy. Mr. William Sergeant made his way through the crowd and found himself in the middle of a very animated discussion. I located Mr. Charles Rice, confirmed that the man in question was not entitled to the protection of the United States Government, and proceeded to squeeze through the crowd in an attempt to relay this information to Mr. Sergeant and thus extradite him from what appeared to be a very uncomfortable position. Before I could reach him, machine gun fire broke out from one of the windows near the downtown side of the hotel.

As might be expected, confusion was everywhere. People dived for whatever cover they could find and armed men scrambled among them taking up vantage points. I crawled along the wall of the hotel and soon reached the lobby where confusion was equally present. The armed men were racing around the lobby, guns at the ready and people were scrambling out of the way. I vaulted the reception desk, asked the switchboard operator to contact the American Embassy and picked up the phone at the front desk. It took several minutes for the call to be put through. During that time the captain who appeared to be in charge of the armed group came to the desk and demanded to use the telephone to call Radio Santo Domingo. I refused, explaining that it was a direct.

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line to the U.S. Embassy. He accepted that explanation and went off into the rapidly expanding crowd just as the Embassy came on the wire. My call was put through to Mr. Connett at once. I briefly explained to him that an armed band of approximately 35 men had arrived at the hotel within the last ten minutes, that they were searching for someone, and that machine gun fire had broken out. There was still intermittent fire at that time. At that point our connection was broken. I instructed the switchboard operator to replace the call and had Mr. Connett back on the wire just as the captain was passing the desk. I handed the telephone to the captain and asked him to talk to the Embassy. The captain talked briefly and hung up explaining to me that it was not his troops that were shooting and that he didn't want to bother Americans. I suggested that if this was his intention he would do better to stop his men from racing around among the civilians in the lobby creating a situation which would lead to slaughter. The captain flatly stated that these men were irregulars and that if he attempted to stop them they might very well shoot him, too. He appeared to be sincerely concerned about what now seemed to be an uncontrollable situation. Fortunately, Mrs. Connett, Gene de la Torre, and others succeeded in organizing the evacuees and getting the women and children into the dining room. The men then moved along the walls and eventually were allowed to enter the other large rooms off the lobby.

Meanwhile, Mr. Sergeant joined me at the desk phone and was able to give a fuller report to Mr. Connett on what was happening around the hotel. John Bushnell arrived at the desk shortly afterwards with more information. Mr. Ruyle also arrived in the hotel lobby which was cleared of civilians by that time.

There was machine gun fire in one of the upper halls of the hotel. I was informed that it was on the 4th floor where my wife and other Americans were supposed to be waiting in Mr. Wood's room. A call to the room failed to yield an answer. I was relieved since I was able to assume that she had moved from that area.

By 10:30 things had begin to quiet down. It appeared that Mr. Ruyle had come to an agreement with military officials who had also arrived on the scene. I was able to reestablish a documentation desk in the lobby. The armed men were zealously guarding the luggage which was strewn about the front lawn. I was too busy documenting people for evacuation to take note of what was going on around me for the next hour and a half before we left for Haina.

Kenneth Bleakley

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MEMORANDUM CONCERNING ACTIVITIES AT THE EMBAJADOR HOTEL ON THE MORNING OF
April 27, 1965

I had received word that I should have my family at the hotel at six a.m. This was done but because of delays in processing, we decided we would drive to my home and have breakfast. A few friends joined us but they went in their personal cars.

When I started driving back to the hotel from my home, which is at No. 3 Cub Scouts Street in the Naco area, I had my wife, Helen and my eleven year old daughter Juanita. My wife and I were in the front seat while Juanita was in the back seat of our 1961 Oldsmobile 98 Sedan.

This was sometime around 9 a.m. to the best of my recollection although it could have been later.

Over our car radio we heard a vicious sounding announcer saying that Bonillo Aybar, whose radio station had been destroyed by rebels, had taken refuge in the Hotel Embajador and that the "pueblo" should take their newly acquired arms, go to the hotel and kill him.

As we drove back to the hotel we saw several hundred armed men proceeding toward the hotel in various types of vehicles, ranging from three wheeled motorcycles and motorscooters to automobiles and even trucks.

I turned in to the road leading directly to the hotel but by this time I could see the situation was bordering on chaos with armed men everywhere shouting and waving their guns. I attempted to turn my car around but as I got it crossways of the street, a man in civilian attire stuck a Browning Automatic fifty caliber rifle in my face and ordered me out of the car. When I got out he made me open the trunk. As I got it open, what I think was a 30 caliber machine gun opened up from the third or fourth floor of the hotel, spraying the ground close to my automobile. I jerked my wife out and had her lay down on the street in back of the left front wheel. I had my daughter get down between the seats and I lay down behind the back of the left wheel. The man with B.A.R. gun laid it across my trunk and began systematically shooting at the windows in the house. This brought fire again from the machine gun and some of the bullets skidded under my automobile.

By this time I was able to talk the man with the Browning into moving away from the car and when he did I got my wife and myself back in the car and drove out of the street and back toward Abraham Lincoln.

I returned about half an hour later to find the rabble completely in charge of things and denying Americans the right to leave the hotel until

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they told them they could go. I had asked the police to send us an escort of police and when they arrived we were then able to get the people out of the hotel and into a convoy toward Haina.

Lee E. Echols
Public Safety Advisor

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I was moving my auto away from the hotel toward Sarasota Ave. when several civilian autos turned off Sarasota Ave. into the hotel. Armed civilians jumped out and motioned me to return to the hotel. I parked the car and returned to my family (wife and two children) who were seated on the NE corner of the hotel yard.

Soon I noticed armed civilians circulating in the near vicinity. They were looking toward, and upward, the hotel. They appeared to be very excited and were making quite a flourish with their guns.

I suggested to my family they stand up and be ready to move as something was going to happen. Within seconds the shooting started.

During the next 45 minutes or so we took cover under cars, in pickups and finally in a ditch. We were too far to move toward the hotel and moved toward Sarasota Ave. where some very poor people took us into their home, gave us cool drinks and in general were most courteous.

Harold B. Bauman

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Santo Domingo
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June 1, 1965

TO : The Ambassador
FROM : C.J. McIntosh, Consular Officer
SUBJECT: Incident at Hotel El Embajador During Evacuation Process

On the morning of April 27, 1965 I reported to the Embajador hotel at 6 a.m. to begin documentation of evacuees who had been alerted to assemble at the hotel. The night before my wife had assisted in notifying some of the Americans then she and my children moved into the hotel so they would be there and ready to evacuate. I stayed in the consular office all night telephoning Americans in our registration lists and giving them instructions.

Since there was at the El Embajador Hotel a group of more than a hundred brewer conventioners from Puerto Rico and other Caribbean points who had gotten trapped by the revolution and were unable to leave, and since they had been highly critical of the Embassy and its unwillingness to help them leave, Mr. Woods of the Consular staff was sent to the hotel the evening of the 26th to prepare the documentation for these people to evacuate next morning. As it turned out, Mr. Woods worked the entire night as hundreds of evacuees arrived at all hours and sought documentation. When I reached the scene next morning I found that practically all of the hundreds of people there awaiting evacuation already had their papers. The pressure of documentation was thus off and it was no problem to take care of the new arrivals, and to put tags on all the luggage.

We worked from tables set up on the front lawn of the hotel and people were told to relax with their luggage and papers until the evacuation could begin.

I do not recall the time, but would guess it was around 7 a.m., when a Spanish speaking, sort of stooped man, approached me and said he was from the Guatemalan Embassy, that he was a Secretary there, and that Bonilla Aybar wanted to be evacuated. He told me that he planned to bring Aybar over right away. I informed him that everyone leaving had to have an Evacuation Form issued by us and that we were primarily interested in getting Americans out. I told him not to bring Aybar but I did agree at his insistence to take a look at Aybar's papers if he produced them. (If the man were a resident of the U.S. as claimed he fell within the group who could be evacuated). The fellow disappeared and meanwhile I learned -- I believe from Mr. Bleakley -- that Aybar was controversial and that the Embassy did not favor his evacuation with our people. While I was working behind the documentation table, the stooped man turned up again and introduced me to the mother of Mr. Aybar who asked about the evacuation of her son. I told her that I was sorry but that I could not include him; that I understood the matter had already been

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discussed with the Embassy. She was disappointed but after a couple of futile pleas to me she went away.

Again the time escapes me but it was probably 8 a.m. or between 8 and 9 a.m., when Aybar himself turned up. He was brought straightup to me by the stooped man and he was flanked by two military guards each carrying automatic rifles. I was not working at the documentation table at that time and was standing about 20 feet from it. Aybar himself was in disguise, with a heavy growth of whiskers, a straw hat, sports shirt. The go-between introduced Aybar to me and said "Now, will you let him go". I interpreted this as a demand, or else, and since a number of the evacuees attracted by the sight had begun to collect around us, and some were showing considerable anxiety, my immediate reaction was to handle this matter routinely, just like all the others we had been taking care of. I recall that my uppermost thought was that this thing must not get out of hand and that nothing should be done to provoke an incident, especially with armed men on the scene. Therefore, I did not attempt to argue with either Aybar or the man accompanying him and simply said that he'd have to get an evacuation slip at the table. The presence of armed men, who were obviously ill at ease, but earnest, continued to attract looks but the group which had started to collect broke up when they saw there apparently was no argument or anything of interest going on. I do not believe they recognized Aybar.

The group moved over to the table to get an evacuation slip. I do not know what happened there or if evacuation papers were completed. Soon afterwards Aybar and the guards left, in somewhat of a hurry. Someone, Mr. Quintanilla I believe, asked to check to be sure Aybar had left and this I did. It is now a bit foggy, but I am pretty certain that they got into a car and left the hotel.

Almost immediately thereafter I saw armed men run up to the hotel and into the lobby. I had heard that the rebels had been in the hotel off and on the day and night and assumed at the time that this was just another of their routine visits. But these fellows continued to run here and there seemingly looking for somebody and eventually they also began to infiltrate our ranks on the front lawn. Everyone gave way to them as they moved about; no words were spoken. Rumor was beginning to spread that they were looking for Aybar.

About this time I became conscious of the stooped man (I had since learned he was Cuban) moving with me on my right side. As I moved, he moved, obviously using me as some sort of shield. Then one of the rebel

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PAGE 3 of ENCLOSURE 8

- 3 -

A-43 *Santo Domingo*

group in passing sort of put his hand on this man's shoulder, apparently greeting him. I thought this odd and decided that the rebels were not after him. But the Cuban began to hang on to my coat as a large, business-looking, dark rebel with an automatic rifle loomed on my left. I started to move and the Cuban asked if I wasn't going to protect him. I continued my movement, with him hanging on to my coat and somehow, somewhere I shook him off. When I glanced back he had latched on to another consular officer. Eventually the rebel got the Cuban clearly in his gun sights and in a loud, gruff voice, standing right near one of our tables, declared the man his prisoner, and made him sit on the ground in a corner near the hotel. That was where I saw him last.

I recall that I was walking near the east end of the hotel when suddenly a rebel ran around from the back and looking up, he dropped to his knees and fired several bursts from his automatic rifle and in the direction of the upper floor of the hotel. This was the first firing that I recall and since this man was somewhat obscured from the group as a whole, there was immediate panic among the evacuees. Most of them fell to their stomachs, women began to scream and to shout hysterically that there were children present, and most tried to wiggle over to the wall of the hotel to gain some cover. The firing continued and attracted more armed insurgents, who also fired, and also the group commander. This man I immediately recognized as one of the two key announcers on the rebel TV programs of Sunday when the families of the pilots had been brought before the camera. He wore the same cap and leather jacket at the hotel that he had on the TV program. He stooped down along side our "transportation" table being run by Mr. Quintanilla, picked up our portable loud speaker and repeatedly called to him men to be careful where they shot; that women and children were present, and foreigners whom they did not wish to harm. His words seemed to have little effect though. As quickly as possible the people vacated the open lawn for the inside of the hotel, leaving their luggage all over the lawn. The rebels continued to circle the hotel, infiltrate it, and occasionally they fired at the building.

My time thereafter was spent mostly inside the hotel, in the lobby which was packed full of scared people, and on the third floor east (where the original shooting had taken place and where my own family had occupied a corner room). The upstairs corridors soon filled with women and children who left the hotel lobby to escape the shooting and the armed men. My own family was huddled on the floor the room was full of other dependents and children from the Embassy who were also on the floor, all trying to find safety from the sporadic firing outside but being aimed at the upper floors of the hotel. From this room I also observed the arrival of more rebel troops on the far out road leading to the hotel. I also saw them

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PAGE 4 of ENCLOSURE 8

- 4 -

A-43 *Forti Domingo*

approach the hotel fanned out across the open fields in battle formation. I recall remarking that these looked more like regular troops than the rebels doing the firing and for a moment I wondered if they had not come to fight the rebels.

In the lobby of the hotel I observed that the armed men continually infiltrated the milling crowd; that some Americans were taking motion pictures of the rebels; that one elderly man was on a couch being resuscitated by his wife and other relatives after apparently having given them some anxious moments; that some American was endeavoring to get women and children into the dining room and the men into the casino room to get them out of the lobby. The place was mass confusion, with the armed men continually running in and out and every now and then there was an inward surge of people from the main entrance as more shooting took place outside. I tried to help here and there in any way I could but the confused condition prevailed for sometime until arrangements were made eventually for the evacuation to start.

When we finally did get under way just after noon the convoy moved unmolested, with police escort, to the Haina naval base where later in the afternoon all evacuees left on U. S. ships or helicopters.

As far as I know there were no casualties and I saw no one hurt during the long ordeal of the day.

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To: The Ambassador
From: Richard J. Marroquin, Vice Consul
Subject: Incident at Hotel Embajador on April 27, 1965.

On the morning of April 27, 1965 at approximately 5:45 I arrived at Hotel Embajador with my wife and four children. I had gone to bed at about 3:30 that same morning as the night before I had been working with my colleagues in the Consular Section informing by telephone a few hundred United States citizens first, of possible evacuation and then later that same night, of definite plans for evacuation the following morning--April 27.

After arrival at the hotel I was immediately engaged in the processing of United States citizens, dependents and other nationals, including Dominicans, for evacuation to United States soil. By 7:30 a.m. there must have been at least 1000 persons, including women and children, gathered in front of the hotel awaiting evacuation.

At approximately 7:45 a.m. I noticed what appeared to be soldiers, armed with automatic weapons and machineguns. They began to enter the hotel. I did not pay much attention first because I was too busy with my work and secondly because I thought they were soldiers who were sent to act as a military escort on our trip to the port of Haina which was the point of embarkation for our evacuees. Within minutes I saw crowds of armed civilians walking toward us in combat style from the grounds in front of the hotel. As these crowds milled around in front of the hotel, their numbers swelled to at least a hundred. Some were armed with Molotov cocktails carrying one or two in each hand, others were armed with automatic weapons and machineguns. These people appeared determined to engineer social strife and violence.

Then machinegun and automatic weapons were fired. Someone commanded that we should all lay out on the ground, which I believe everybody did. My wife began screaming, begging them to stop the fire in order to give the parents a chance to get the children inside the hotel. I do not know if her words were heard or not, but immediately after her appeal, the machinegun fire stopped for a couple of minutes and everybody had a chance to rush into the hotel. While we were entering the hotel firing of automatic rifles continued. Once in the hotel the shooting continued for approximately 30 to 45 minutes. By this time some women and children were hysterical. The scene was simply pathetic.

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To: The Ambassador Date: June 7, 1965
From: Ainslie B. Minor, USIS
Subject: Events of April 27, 1965

The Minor family, Ainslie, Nancy, and daughters Dorothy and Charlotte, arrived at the Embajador Hotel at approximately 6:00 a.m. We stacked our luggage on the front lawn to the east of the entrance drive, received travel orders and evacuation cards from Embassy officers, and waited, wandering in, out, and around.

The first unusual incident was the arrival of a man said to be Bonilla Aybar, under guard. He went to the consular registration table, which was set up on the lawn, relatively close to the hotel. After a brief conversation with officers there he turned away, embraced a woman I took to be his wife, and went away. I did not see him again.

At perhaps 8:00 a.m., Nancy and I were in the lobby of the hotel, when a few--four or six perhaps--Dominican soldiers entered, armed with various types of firearms, calling out for everyone to line up against the wall. We went outside onto the lawn and found our daughters and stayed there for a while.

A considerable time later, when the incident seemed over, Mr. Quintanilla requested me to go telephone the Del Gigante residence to see what was delaying them. I went to the house telephone near the hotel desk. No one answered the Del Gigante phone, and I had started back out to so inform Mr. Quintanilla when a much larger group of armed men entered the lobby, on the double. People scattered in front of them. In a very short time they ran out the front entrance again, when firing began outside. From the entrance door I could see Embassy personnel, and others (including my wife and daughters), lying on the ground taking shelter behind suitcases and shrubbery. I started toward them but retreated to the entry when the firing picked up again. The soldiers seemed to be firing to the east and southeast, around the corner of the hotel. I was not aware of any returning fire. The firing stopped and people began getting up and running to take shelter behind cars parked in front of the hotel. They were held there for some time when firing was resumed. At last this episode ended and people hurried into the hotel lobby.

As we were entering, a man came toward us with a sub-machine gun. Perhaps inadvertently he pointed it at a Latin American woman running

just

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Page 2 of Enclosure 10
A- 438 Santo Domingo

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just in front of us. When she began screaming hysterically, he took her arm and led her into the lobby.

Soldiers made us line up along the walls, but were not very firm about it and lots of people were wandering around. I was over by the hotel desk again when there was another rush of people and I took shelter temporarily in the men's washroom. As soon as I could, I went back to where I had left my family. Women and children were being herded into the dining rooms, and I could only assume that Nancy and the girls were there, as I with other men were then instructed to enter the room opening on the back terrace of the hotel. There was a sudden burst of firing and I found myself sprawled on the floor against the wall, with someone else sitting in my lap. A soldier ripped down the draperies and opened the sliding door onto the terrace, but did not fire from there. Shots continued to be heard. A soldier explained that they were protecting us from some bad men (including one he named from Mexico) who had sneaked into the hotel. It is my memory that MAAG officers were participating in the search, or at any rate receiving reports on a portable transceiver that one floor after another had been searched.

After firing ceased and tension relaxed, I found the way out into the kitchen and into the other dining rooms, where I located my family. From here on it was mostly weary waiting. At one point we were instructed to be ready to leave the room, but nothing happened. I was informed that there was an unfriendly crowd outside and that they were being persuaded to leave. Soon thereafter, Mr. McLean went to get the buses. When these arrived, everyone exited from the hotel, reclaimed their luggage, and got into buses and automobiles, and departed for the embarkation point in Haina.

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To: The Ambassador
From: Matt Rettinger, Bi-National Center
Subject: The Day of the Evacuation

My family and I were taken to the Hotel Embajador with Mr. Malcolm McLean and family. We arrived at the Hotel Embajador at about 0615. Mr. McLean dropped us off at the staying area and left. We then proceeded to locate our baggage in a central area near a large tree just to the left of the main entrance, if one is facing main entrance. My wife, Patricia and Beth Hoke stayed with the children and baggage as Mrs. McLean went to the information table. We were given forms to fill out, which we did. In the meantime we just hovered near our baggage, for it was shady under the tree.

I would say roughly about 0730 I saw four haphazardly attired army men with automatic weapons escorting an individual wearing a large straw sombrero, large colored glasses, a white shirt--tied at the waist, white duck trousers, and shod in sandals. A perfect Mexican peon outfit. Only it was not a peon; it was Bonilla Aybar. I happened to be standing in their path. I was more or less forced to give way to them, for they were keeping a tight guard on Bonilla Aybar. An individual, who seemed to be in charge, went up by the tables at which were seated Mr. Quintanilla and Mr. Sargent. The man approached, removing his hat. Bill Sargent arose. I could not hear what was said, but through the motions I gathered it had something to do with whether Bonilla Aybar could be evacuated. I saw Bill Sargent shake his head. The man put on his cap, and the men closed in on Bonilla Aybar to lead him off. As they passed, I heard Bonilla Aybar say "Yo soy cubano." They all proceeded to get in a car and drive off.

Shortly after this happened, shots were heard. The shots seem to be coming from one of the upper floors of the Hotel above us. There suddenly appeared more army with weapons, who were led by an army officer. These men began weeding through us and the baggage as though looking for someone. Suddenly they surrounded a short, deformed individual. He, hotly denying something, suddenly bolted toward the far end of the hotel away from the army group. Suddenly there were several quick shots. Immediately we pushed the children behind the luggage, and we all hit the ground. The next thing I heard was the army officer over a bull horn, which he took from one of his men, saying "Don't shoot." We are armed forces. There are women and children here. There are many diplomatic people. Then the army officer began to run in the direction the deformed man had taken. In the lull there began the mad scramble of getting the

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children into the main lobby. No sooner had most of us gotten into the lobby, when more shots were heard. Then a group of army men, most of whom seemed very young, began to search the lobby. Then we were told to get into the casino room and the dining room, which faced an open terrace. My family and I were herded into the dining room. The army men told us to get down by making a motion with their weapons at waist level. We proceeded to make some kind of protection for the children and ourselves against the far wall away from the open terrace by up-ending tables. I could see that the army men were searching the back area of the hotel. Two army men with automatic weapons were posted at each end of the terrace. I really cannot say how long we were in the dining room. Someone would pass the word that everything was all right. The army was looking for three men on the upper floors. Later Colonel Heywood came into the dining room to say everything was over, but to stay where we were until the cars could be brought up and the caravan formed. We kept milling about until we were told to go out to our baggage and get into cars. My family, the McClaans and Beth Holk were taken to Haina by John Swallow. We were there only a short time before the helicopters came and transported us to the Boxer.

Matt Rettinger

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To: The Ambassador
From: GySGT. Jack E. Moorman, NCOIC, Marine Security Guard
Subject: Incident at Hotel Embajador During the Evacuation Process

On 26 April, I was advised that an evacuation would be effected on the following morning for all dependents desiring to leave the Dominican Republic.

My wife and thirteen year old son were the only dependents of Marine Security Guard Personnel, so I decided to have them evacuated.

We were told to be at the Hotel Embajador at 0600 on 27 April for processing.

I arrived at the Hotel at 0600 accompanied by my wife and son.

We immediately went to work helping to organize the evacuees, under the direction of Mr. Quintanilla the officer in charge, outside the hotel on the front lawn. I was busy helping issue travel orders and making announcements on the small P.A. system when a group of approximately 30 or 40 armed men approached down the driveway leading to the front of the hotel.

These men were not regular Dominican Army troops. Some were in Army uniforms and some in civilian clothing. All were armed. Two had .22 cal. rifles with telescopic sights and one man had a shotgun. Most were armed with bolt action rifles and Dominican carbines.

They immediately began searching through the crowd of evacuees as if looking for someone.

At this time more men appeared and stationed themselves in the parking lot about 30 yards in front of the hotel.

A group of armed men approached a man standing behind me, pointed their weapons at him and started leading him away. At that time several shots were fired from the vicinity of the right side (east) of the hotel. A rebel standing on the lawn fired with a pistol over the head of the crowd. I started yelling for people to get down on the ground. Probably 30 to 40 shots were fired by the rebels out in the parking lot. They were shooting over the heads of the evacuees toward an upper story of the hotel. I do not know if fire was being returned from the hotel.

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I was looking for my family when about 8 or 9 rebels ran into the hotel waving weapons and started searching for someone. They were joined by more a few seconds later. We were told by an English-speaking rebel to clear the lobby and move into the Casino, the Embassy Room and the dining room. My family and I moved to the rear dining room along with approximately 300 others. I stationed myself near the door when the same English-speaking rebel ran into the room and started screaming "On the floor" "On the floor." Everyone sat on the floor and more rebels entered. The continued to search for someone.

I asked the English-speaking rebel who they were looking for and he didn't seem to know or wouldn't tell me. His reply was "The man we are looking for is very bad. He brought germs to the Dominican Republic. He is going to start germ warfare here. We will all get sick and die. We have to kill him." He repeated this several times all the while waving an automatic carbine around and pointing it directly at those of us who were near the door.

Firing continued outside the hotel and seemed to be coming from the upper floors inside as well, but all evacuees were by this time out of the line of fire.

The rebels were asked by Mr. Quintanilla and Maj. Hammons if we would be allowed to leave for the Port of Haina. We were given permission to load the buses and cars. As this word was passed, the evacuees swarmed into the lobby and were about to leave the hotel. I was standing on the front entrance when I glanced up the driveway. Approaching down the driveway were approximately 30 to 40 Dominican Police. The rebels who were between the hotel and the Police turned and took up positions to fight. Col. Weyrich, Maj. Hammons, and Cmdr. Holmes went out and talked the two groups out of "shooting it out" right among the evacuees. The Police withdrew.

We then proceeded to bring the buses around where the people could get aboard and after asking several more times they were allowed to get their luggage which was still on the front lawn of the hotel.

All evacuees picked up baggage, loaded aboard buses, cars, and trucks and proceeded to the helicopter pad at Haina without further incident.

The above statement was made approximately 40 days after the incident occurred. If any mistakes were made it is due to memory. The statement is true to the best of my knowledge.

Jack E. Moorman
GySgt. U.S.M.C.

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To: The Ambassador
From: William L. Stephens, USAID
Subject: April 27, 1965, Shooting Incident at Hotel Embajador

This memorandum is prepared to record my recollection of the subject incident. I have not been able to recall many details of the occurrence so can only provide a sketchy report.

At the time the incident took place, most of the U.S. personnel assembled for evacuation were gathered at the lawn area to the front of the east wing of Hotel Embajador. My wife and I were standing near her luggage on the northeast corner of the lawn in front of the hotel. While we were waiting for instructions for travelling to Haina, a group of irregulars of the rebel forces came running through the area and disbursed along the northeast corner borders on the lawn area; some took shelter behind trees. A number of them began firing at a target in or near the northeast corner of the hotel.

When the firing commenced, most of the U.S. employees and dependents lay on the ground to avoid being hit. Some of the irregulars were firing from positions where the U.S. employees and dependents were lying on the ground. As I recall, after some firing, part or all the rebel group ran around the back of the hotel in an attempt to catch the persons they were after.

After the shooting incident took place, all the waiting people were directed to take refuge inside the hotel where they remained for, I would estimate, at least three hours before departing for the Haina embarkation point. Shortly after gathering in the hotel lobby a group of the rebel irregulars with their guns ready for firing came charging through the occupied areas inside the hotel in pursuit of the persons for whom they were looking.

The only other activity of the rebel group, of which I can remember, was their occupying the entrance of the hotel and apparently controlling entry to and exit from the hotel.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

October 22, 1968

TO: Ambassador Bowdler

FROM: George E. Brown

SUBJECT: Shooting incident near Embassy Santo Domingo
which interrupted cease fire discussion on
April 30, 1965 during Dominican crisis

In Embassy cable number 1212 on April 30 Ambassador Bennett reported that about 1:00 pm (Dominican time) the Nuncio arrived at the Embassy to talk with the Ambassador about the cease fire agreement which the Nuncio said was to have gone into effect about 11:45 am. Besides the Ambassador and the Nuncio there were present Lt. Col. Subervi, of Dominican Air Force; Capt. Hector Conde, Constitutionalist Army; and Fausto Caamano Jr., Mediator. The Naval Attache Marine Col. Ralph Heywood also attended. The Ambassador also reported that "During course of meeting, sniper commenced firing at Embassy Building and group had to retire to inner chamber for safety".

You have asked me to add any further details to this report which I can recall. At the time I was the Ambassador's Staff Assistant and was present throughout the shooting incident. When the Nuncio and the other members of the group entered the Ambassador's office, Ambassador Bennett was talking by phone with Under Secretary Mann in Washington. Mr. Mann wanted to keep this connection open while the talks went forward in order that the Ambassador might report immediately the substance of these talks and discuss what our position might be. To keep the line occupied so it wouldn't be cut off, Ambassador Bennett asked me to take the phone (which was on his desk) and talk with Mr. Crockett in Mr. Mann's office. The Ambassador then joined the Nuncio and other members of the group on the sofa on the other side of the office next to the west side windows. As I recall

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Mr. Crockett and I were having general conversation about nothing in particular when shooting broke out nearby. At least some of it was automatic weapons fire and made a lot of noise. It seemed to be very close to the side windows where the Ambassador, the Nuncio and other members of the group were seated. They all got up promptly and withdrew to a small inner foyer where there is a storage closet and the Ambassador's bathroom.

I told Mr. Crockett what was happening and then explained that I was going to leave the phone briefly to close the outside shutters to the front windows. When I returned and picked up the phone, Mr. Crockett was apparently explaining to someone in the office with him what was happening in Santo Domingo. I heard only the end of this conversation and as I recall he was saying "...and the young Foreign Service Officer on the other end of the line is under (or behind) the desk." This wasn't precisely the case, but I didn't try to correct his statement. Certainly it was not substantively misleading as to the situation at the time. Everyone had in fact taken refuge and I was across the room out of the way.

I have no recollection as to how long the firing lasted, probably only a few minutes. In any case it stopped shortly and the group returned to the office and resumed the talks. At some point the Ambassador talked to Mr. Mann again but I do not recall clearly whether it was before or after the shooting incident.

There had been a good deal of shooting around the Embassy, so we didn't attach much importance to this particular incident. No one, to my knowledge, bothered to find out who had been shooting at whom. I can imagine, however, that for those in Washington it was a vivid experience since they got a play by play account as it took place. It may have even been possible for Mr. Crockett to hear the firing since we had a good connection. Whatever the details of this matter it was a valid indication of the conditions existing in Santo Domingo then.

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SECRET

April 28, 1965

TELECONFERENCE
BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND

ON

American Embassy, Santo Domingo

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State Ex 311/76

By

mg

NARS, Date

8/25/77

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P-1

RUESSD DE RUEHCR

TELECON: 28/2230Z

May 28 630 pm EDT
UNDER SECY BALL

PRESENT: DEPUTY UNDER SECY MANN
ASS'T SECY VAUGHN
DEPUTY ASS'T SECY SAYR
MR. KENNEDY CROCKETT
EXECUTIVE SECY BEN READ

SUBJECT: DOMINICAN SITUATION

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

P-2

SECSTATE ITEM 1 28/2242Z

WE HAVE AUTHORIZED TASK FORCE 44.9 TO LAND MARINES IN NECESSARY STRENGTH TO ESTABLISH SECURE POINT OR POINTS FOR EVACUATION U.S. NATIONALS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS. TASK FORCE WILL EXECUTE ON AMBASSADOR'S ORDERS.

SECURE POINT OR POINTS WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR DURATION OF EMERGENCY SITUATION.

WE INTEND ISSUE STATEMENT HERE EXPLAINING:

(1) THIS ACTION TAKEN AS RESULT OF NOTIFICATION GIVEN US BY DOMINICAN AUTHORITIES THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO SAFEGUARD AMERICAN LIVES.

(2) WE CONTINUE TO DEPLORE SITUATION IN DOM-REP AND CALL ON BOTH SIDES TO CEASE FIRE;

(3) WE HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO SIT DOWN AND RECONCILE DIFFERENCES.

PROVIDE CURRENT SITREP.

END ITEM 1

P-3

~~SECRET~~

ITEM 2 28/2300Z

FIRST DRAFT OF ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE
HERE FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
HAS BEEN INFORMED BY MILITARY
AUTHORITIES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
THAT AMERICAN LIVES ARE IN DANGER, THAT
THE AUTHORITIES ARE UNABLE TO GUARANTEE
THEIR SAFETY AND THAT THE ASSISTANCE
FO UNITED STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL IS
NEEDED FOR THAT PURPOSE.

ACCORDINGLY, I HAVE ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO TAKE
NECESSARY STEPS TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY
WITH THE EVACUATION OF THE SEVERAL
HUNDRED AMERICANS STILL IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC. OUR ASSISTANCE WILL ALSO BE
AVAILABLE TO NATIONALS OF OTHER
COUNTRIES RESIDING IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC SOME OF WHOM HAVE ALREADY
REQUESTED ASSISTANCE.

I AM SURE THAT THE DOMINICAN PEOPLE IN
THIS HOUR OF THEIR TRIBULATION WILL
UNDERSTAND THAT WE CONTINUE TO HOPE
AND TO WORK FOR A CESSATION OF H
HOSTILITIES, THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND
ORDER AND THE SPEEDY RETURN TO THE
NORMAL PROCESSES OF GOVERNMENT. END QUOTE.

END ITEM 2

~~SECRET~~

P-4

~~SECRET~~

TELECON NOTE 1
MARINES HAVE LANDED AND IN GOOD TIME
SINCE EVACUATION AREA ALREADY UNDER
FIRE FROM IRREGULAR FORCES

P-5

~~SECRET~~

SECSTATE ITEM 3 282305

ARE YOU IN TOUCH WITH TASK FORCE
COMMANDER. YOUR ANSWER THIS QUERY SHOULD
PRECEED ALL OTHERS.

END ITEM 3

~~SECRET~~

P-6

SDOM ITEM 2 HAVE ESTABLISHED DIRET COMMO FROM
EMB AND ARE COMMUNICATING WITHOUT
DIFFICULTY.

END ITEM 2

~~SECRET~~

P-7

~~SECRET~~

SECSTATE ITEM 4 282307Z

HOW MANY U.S. CITIZENS ARE STILL IN SANTO
DOMINGO -- OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE?

ARE THERE CONCENTRATIONS AT LOCATIONS
OTHER THAN THE HOTEL ENBAJADOR?

DO YOU WISH TO EVACUATE OFFICIAL
DEPENDENTS?

END ITEM 4

~~SECRET~~

P-8

~~SECRET~~

SDOM ITEM 44 (REF)
APPROX 1000 ALL OF WHICH DO NOT
DESIRE TO LEAVE. MANY PERMANENT RESIDENTS
RELUCTANT.

NO OTHER CONCENTRATIONS THAN AT HOTEL EMBAJADOR.

SOME PEOPLE ARE IN EMB CHANCERY. AND WILL GIVE
REFUGE IN RESIDENCE TONIGHT

TO EXTENT POSSIBLE.

IN EVENT ADDITIONAL MARINE PLATOON NOW SUPPLEMENTING
EMB SECURITY GUARD.

IS ABLE TO COVER RESIDENCE ON SAME PROPERTY
AS WELL.

EVACUATION ROUTE THROUGH HAINA NO LONGER
BEING USED.

MANY OFFICIAL DEPENDENTS HAVE ALREADY
DEPARTED.

~~SECRET~~

R-5

P-9

SDOM ITEM-3

CURRENT SITREP

PRESENT SITUATION IS THAT SECOND INCRMENT 300 MARINES NOW LANDING AT EMBAJADOR HOTEL TO PROTECT AMERICANS WHO ARE UNDER FIRE THERE AND WHO HAVE ASKED FOR AUTHORITY TO SHOOT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, WHICH WE HAVE GIVEN THEM. APPARENTLY PLATOON EARLIER SENT THERE WAS NOT ADEQUATE TO COVER BOTH HELIOPORT AT POLO FIELD AND HOTEL. WE HOPE THAT WITH ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENTS THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE.

ONE PLATOON MARINES CAME BY CAR FROM EMBAJADOR TO GUARD EMBASSY CHANCERY AND ARE NOW IN POSITION ALONG WITH SOME 38 POLICEMEN. THEY CLAIM THEY CAN DEFEND PERIMETER AGAINST SMALL ARMS ATTACK, BUT WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY CONTAINING SITUATION IF REBELS BRING IN MORTARS, ARTILLERY, OR TANKS, ALL OF WHICH THEY HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL.

END ITEM 3

~~SECRET~~

P-10

~~SECRET~~

SDOM ITEMS

FRENCH GOVT HAS SENT SENT TRANSPORT MEDOCTO TAKE OFF
FRENCH NATIONALS.

INT OSL K

~~SECRET~~

p-11

~~SECRET~~

SDOM
ITEM 4

I HAVE TOLD DEAN OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS THAT WE WOULD OFFER
PROTECTION TO ANY MEMBERS CORPS WHO MIGHT WISH GO TO EMBAJADOR

COLOMBIAN AMB. HAS ASKED WHETHER WE CAN SUPPLY ^{MARINES} FOR PROTECTION
OTHER EMBASSIES. BUT I AM TELLING HIM WE DO NOT
HAVE ENOUGH MARINES FOR THAT PURPOSE.

R-8

P-12

~~SECRET~~

ITEM 6

PRD SECRETARY GENERAL MARTINEZ FRANCISCO JUST HEARD OVER AIR FORCE RADIO, SPEAKING IMMEDIATELY AFTER PAPAL NUNCIO AND ACCOMPANIED BY LATTER DURING REMARKS.

MARTINEZ READ AGREEMENT HE SAID HE HAD REACHED WITH MILITARY JUNTA. AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR:

- A. UNCONDITIONAL RESIGNATION OF JUAN BOSCH.
 - B. WIDE GUARANTEES AND FREE CONCURRENCE OF PEOPLE TO ELECTIONS SUPERVISED BY OAS; MARTINEZ THEN READ MESSAGE JUNTA HAD SENT TO OAS REQUESTING IT IMMEDIATELY SEND STUDY MISSION TO DETERMINE WHEN SITUATION WOULD PERMIT FREE ELECTIONS;
 - C. PRD MEMBERS ARE GUARANTEED SECURITY UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN GUILTY OF CRIMES (NOT CLEAR WHETHER DURING REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD ONLY OR IF ALSO DURING PERIOD LEADING UP TO IT);
 - D. PRD IN TURN PLEDGES RESPECT RESULTS OF ABOVE ELECTIONS.
- MARTINEZ ENDED WITH EXHORTATION THAT ALL DEPOSE ARMS. EXTREME DIFFICULT JUDGE WHAT REBEL REACTION WILL BE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW FACT MARTINEZ AT NO TIME CLAIMED BY SPEAKING FOR BOSCH HIMSELF.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

P-13

IT IS TO BE HOPED ACCORD WILL AT LEAST BE ABLE SPLIT OFF SOME
NON EXTREMISTS FROM REBEL CAUSE.

NUNCIO IS APPARENTLY NOW TRYING DO SOMETHING SIMILAR WITH
MOLINA URENA WHO IS IN COLOMBIAN EMBASSY AND IS BRINGING LATTER INTO CONTACT

WITH REPRESENTATIVE OF MILITARY JUNTA.

I HAVE GIVEN FULL SUPPORT TO THESE MEDIATION EFFORTS AND WE ASSISTED
IN GETTING PASS, TRANSPORT, AND ESCORT FOR MARTINEZ FRANCISCO
FROM HIS ASYLUM IN MEXICAN EMBASSY TO SAN ISIDRO.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

115a 115

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4
Action

SS

Info

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DE RUESSD 271 29/0755Z
O 290750Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1168
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ APRIL 29

LIMDIS

IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 3/1/76
By mmg, NARS, Date 8/29/77

59

DONALD REID CABRAL AND RAMON CACERES TRONCOSO, NOW IN HIDING IN PRIVATE HOME HAVE INQUIRED WHETHER THEY MIGHT TAKE ASYLUM IN EMBASSY. THEY CITE PRECEDENTS OF IMBERT AND AMIAMA WHOM WE LODGED NOT TOO LONG AGO.

WITH FERAL TACTICS NOW BEING EMPLOYED BY COMMUNIST ELEMENTS-- MURDER OF COLONEL CALDERON TODAY IS ONLY ONE EXAMPLE-- REID AND CACERES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE KILLED IN COLD BLOOD IF FOUND. THEY BARELY ESCAPED BEING DONE AWAY WITH WHILE BEING HELD PRISONER IN PALACE OVER WEEKEND AND SITUATION MUCH DETERIORATED SINCE THEN.

IN VIEW OF PRECEDENT ALREADY SET IN THIS COUNTRY I WOULD BE GLAD GIVE SHELTER THESE TWO FRIENDS OF US UNLESS DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONSIDER IT UNWISE. THERE IS NO BETTER ELEMENT IN THIS COUNTRY WHICH IS SO BEREFT OF DECENT LEADERSHIP. WOULD WELCOME DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE.

GP-3
BENNETT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 4:11 A.M. APRIL 29
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 4:30 A.M. APRIL 29

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APR 29 8 03 AM '65

Origin
SS

ACTION: AMB. Gassy SALVO DOMINGO - IMMEDIATE 668

REF: Embtel 1168

LEADS

We share your concern for safety Reid and Caceres. Agree they would probably be murdered if communists laid hands on them. For them to seek asylum in some Latin American embassy would provide little if any security given fact irregulars have already violated a number of Latin American embassies over past day or two. At same time, providing them asylum or arranging their evacuation would, if it became known, gravely prejudice the position we have thus far successfully maintained of not involving ourselves in bitter and deadly internal Dominican strife.

We wish to consider alternatives.

Could they be moved safely and in secrecy to secure area at Hotel Lubajador for evacuation to Bonaire at first light? Among variety of dangers inherent in evacuating them would be demands that would follow from other Dominicans for

Dated by: AM/STP: [illegible] 4/29/65
Classified by: [illegible] (substance by teletype)
[illegible] Mr. Bowdler (substance by telephone)

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: [illegible]

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Authority: State Dep. 12/21/76
By: [illegible] NARS, Date: 8/29/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

same consideration if word of operation leaked.

Alternatively, could they be moved secretly and safely to Nunciatura? Would they be safe there?

Take no action on request from Reid and Caceres for present.

END

GP-3

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE
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Origin

ACTION ALL ARA DIPLOMATIC POSTS

IMMEDIATE

Info

Please inform soonest President of country to which you are accredited or if this is not feasible Foreign Minister of the following:

Since the outbreak of violence in the Dominican Republic the US made repeated but unsuccessful attempts to arrange an effective cease fire. Only when there was a complete breakdown in public order were more than 1100 persons evacuated at their request.

Subsequently, and only after the situation had deteriorated further and violence had increased, did US military forces establish a small perimeter to receive groups of people collected near the area seeking evacuation as well as others seeking to reach the evacuation point. Hundreds more have been evacuated through this perimeter, including people of many nationalities.

The evacuations still continue. More than a thousand American citizens as well as citizens of other countries

During

TCMann:dp

Circances

S/S - Mr. Killiker

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by

Thomas C. Mann

~~SECRET~~

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By

NARS, Date

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143a

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Series C-1

Circular 2075

138

~~SECRET~~

SEC

Classical Mechanics

~~SECRET~~
Classification

The US wishes to clarify in this connection two separate points which appear to have caused some confusion:

First, the USG believes that the Dominican people themselves should, under the established principle of self-determination, select their own government in free elections after the present crisis has been overcome. The US has no intention of supporting any particular political candidate.

Second, the US understands clearly that the great majority of those who joined the insurgent cause in the Dominican Republic are not communists. In particular,

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(Bosch's party)

particular, the US has never believed that the PRD is an extremist party. Our cooperation with Bosch and his government during his tenure speaks for itself.

We wish to make equally clear, however, that while it would appear that the PRD planned and led, during its first hours, the revolutionary movement against the Reid regime, well-known communists, consistent with their usual tactics, quickly seized control of parts of the mobs in the streets, obtained arms in large quantities and organized, within a very short time, an effective para-military force under its own control. Various PRD leaders, at least partly because of this Communist force, later took asylum, thereby reducing the number of moderate leaders in the revolutionary

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movement. Since then the number of murders of Dominicans for political reasons has increased. We believe that when the facts are known all governments will be repelled by the acts of political terrorism which have taken place.

At least 45 extremists have returned to the Dominican Republic since October 1954. Many of them are known to have received training in Cuba or elsewhere in the Communist bloc. Of these, the US has already been able to identify at least eight as active rebel leaders. Four of them are known to have received guerrilla training in Cuba. We are confident that in a relatively short period of time it will be possible to present cogent evidence concerning the degree and extent of the influence and activities of these communist elements.

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Names of the 45 individuals and data concerning them are available on request.

This does not mean that the revolutionary movement should be classed as communist led. There are ^{many} ~~non-~~ communist, moderate ^{elements} ~~elements~~ both military and civilian, both from PRD and other political movements, who are involved. It does mean that there is a clear and present danger ~~that~~ that a small group of communists will, because of their discipline, training and determination, be able to capitalize on the chaos and confusion now existing in the Dominican Republic and lay the basis for Communist

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domination of that country in the Castro pattern.
believes

The US/~~has~~ believes that the OAS, in its efforts to support principles of democracy, self-determination and non-intervention, should keep this clear and present communist danger in mind. It will be no service to the cause of democracy if the ultimate outcome of the present Dominican crisis is the emergence of another communist dictator. It will be no service to the cause of non-intervention if, out of the present crisis, a communist regime should emerge which, like Cuba, constitutes itself a beachhead for communist intervention by subversion and terror throughout the hemisphere.

But beyond this, there is involved a matter of security to the US and to the hemisphere as well. It should be clearly understood that the US would view with grave concern the

emergence

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emergence in this hemisphere of another communist beachhead.

It believes that the communizing of the Dominican Republic must be prevented. The security interests of the Western Hemisphere are, in the view of the USG, entirely compatible with Inter-American principles of collective action, non-intervention, self-determination and democracy.

We believe therefore that the OAS must, on the most urgent basis possible, address itself to the Dominican problem with the aim of helping the Dominican people to return their government as quickly as feasible to constitutional government and democracy and to be free of the intervention of organized communist para-military elements.

~~SECRET~~
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Page 10 of telegram to CIRCULAR TO ALL ARA DIPLOMATIC POSTS

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Telegraph Branch
send ffm for information to:

USNN London
Moscow
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Amman
Kuala Lumpur
Abidjan
The Hague
USUN
DOD
CINCLANT

~~SECRET~~
Classification

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 30, 1965

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

(AS ACTUALLY DELIVERED AT 7:07 PM EDT)

Good evening ladies and gentlemen: For two days American forces have been in Santo Domingo in an effort to protect the lives of Americans and the nationals of other countries in the face of increasing violence and disorder. With the assistance of these American forces, over 2,400 Americans and other nationals have been evacuated from the Dominican Republic. We took this step when and only when, we were officially notified by police and military officials of the Dominican Republic that they were no longer in a position to guarantee the safety of American and foreign nationals and to preserve law and order.

In the last twenty-four hours violence and disorder have increased. There is great danger to the life of foreign nationals and of thousands of Dominican citizens, our fellow citizens of this hemisphere. By an outstanding effort of mediation the Papal Nuncio has achieved an agreement on a cease-fire which I have urged all those concerned to take. But this agreement is not now, as I speak, being fully respected. The maintenance of the cease-fire is essential to the hopes of all for peace and freedom in the Dominican Republic.

Meanwhile there are signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control. Thus, the legitimate aspirations of the Dominican people and most of their leaders for progress, democracy and social justice are threatened and so are the principles of the Inter-American system.

The Inter-American system, and its principal organ, the Organization of American States, have a grave and immediate responsibility. It is important that prompt action be taken. I am informed that a representative of the OAS is leaving Washington very shortly for the Dominican Republic. It is very important that representatives of the OAS be sent to the Dominican Republic, just as soon as they can be sent there, in order to strengthen the cease-fire and in order to help clear a road to the return of constitutional processes and free elections. Loss of time may mean that it is too late to preserve freedom, which alone can lead to the establishment of true democracy. This, I am sure, is what the people of the Dominican Republic want. Late action, or delay, in such a case could mean a failure to accomplish the agreed objectives of the American states.

The eyes of the hemisphere are now on the OAS, both in its meeting today and on the meeting of its foreign ministers contemplated tomorrow. The wisdom, the statesmanship, and the ability to act decisively of the OAS are critical to the hopes of peoples in every land of this continent.

The United States will give its full support to the work of the OAS and will never depart from its commitment to the preservation of the right of all of the free people of this hemisphere to choose their own course without falling prey to international conspiracy from any quarter.

E N D

SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SEEK THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT
OF PEACE AND NORMAL CONDITIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC^{1/}

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Decides to establish a special committee composed of representatives of the following five member states: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panamá.
2. Instructs the Committee to go immediately to the city of Santo Domingo, to do everything possible to obtain the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions, and to give priority to the following two functions:
 - a. To offer its good offices to the Dominican armed groups and political groups and to diplomatic representatives for the purpose of obtaining urgently:
 - i. A cease-fire; and
 - ii. The orderly evacuation of persons who have taken asylum in diplomatic missions and of all foreign citizens who desire to leave the Dominican Republic; and
 - b. To investigate all aspects of the current situation in the Dominican Republic that led to the convocation of this Meeting.
3. Requests the Committee to submit a report to the Meeting, as soon as possible, on the progress of its work, with the conclusions and recommendations that it may consider appropriate.
4. Requests the governments of the member states and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee.
5. Instructs the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to transmit to the Security Council of the United Nations the text of this resolution, in accordance with the provisions of Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(Adopted at the first plenary session, held on May 1, 1965)

^{1/} Registered as Doc. 11 Rev. 2 of the Meeting.

MAY 2, 1965

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

(10:00 PM EDT)

Good evening ladies and gentlemen: I have just come from a meeting with the leaders of both parties in the Congress which was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. I briefed them on the facts of the situation in the Dominican Republic. I want to make those same facts known to all the American people and to all the world.

There are times in the affairs of nations when great principles are tested in an ordeal of conflict and danger. This is such a time for the American nations.

At stake are the lives of thousands, the liberty of a nation, and the principles and the values of all the American Republics.

That is why the hopes and the concern of this entire hemisphere are on this sabbath Sunday, focused on the Dominican Republic.

In the dark mist of conflict and violence, revolution and confusion, it is not easy to find clear and unclouded truths.

But certain things are clear. And they require equally clear action. To understand, I think it is necessary to begin with the events of eight or nine days ago.

Last week our observers warned of an approaching political storm in the Dominican Republic. I immediately asked our Ambassador to return to Washington at once so that we might discuss the situation and might plan a course of conduct. But events soon outran our hopes for peace.

Saturday, April 24 --eight days ago-- while Ambassador Bennett was conferring with the highest officials of your government, revolution erupted in the Dominican Republic. Elements of the military forces of that country overthrew their government. However, the rebels themselves were divided. Some wanted to restore former President Juan Bosch. Others opposed his restoration. President Bosch, elected after the fall of Trujillo and his assassination, had been driven from office by an earlier revolution in the Dominican Republic.

Those who opposed Mr. Bosch's return formed a military committee in an effort to control that country. The others took to the street and they began to lead a revolt on behalf of President Bosch. Control and effective government dissolved in conflict and confusion.

Meanwhile the United States was making a constant effort to restore peace. From Saturday afternoon onward, our embassy urged a ceasefire, and I and all the officials of the American Government worked with every weapon at our command to achieve it.

On Tuesday, the situation of turmoil was presented to the peace committee of the Organization of American States.

On Wednesday, the entire Council of the Organization of American States received a full report from the Dominican Ambassador.

Meanwhile, all this time, from Saturday to Wednesday, the danger was mounting. Even though we were deeply saddened by bloodshed and violence in a close and friendly neighbor, we had no desire to interfere in the affairs of a sister Republic.

MORE

(OVER)

On Wednesday afternoon, there was no longer any choice for the man who is your President. I was sitting in my little office reviewing the world situation with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Mr. McGeorge Bundy. Shortly after 3 o'clock I received a cable from our Ambassador and he said that things were in danger, he had been informed the chief of police and governmental authorities could no longer protect us. We immediately started the necessary conference calls to be prepared.

At 5:14, almost two hours later, we received a cable that was labeled "critic", a word that is reserved for only the most urgent and immediate matters of national security.

The cable reported that Dominican law enforcement and military officials had informed our embassy that the situation was completely out of control and that the police and the government could no longer give any guarantee concerning the safety of Americans or any foreign nationals.

Ambassador Bennett who is one of our most experienced Foreign Service officers, went on in that cable to say that only an immediate landing of American forces could safeguard and protect the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of other citizens of some thirty other countries. Ambassador Bennett urged your President to order an immediate landing.

In this situation hesitation and vacillation could mean death for many of our people, as well as many of the citizens of other lands.

I thought that we could not and we did not hesitate. Our forces, American forces were ordered immediately to protect American lives. They have done that. They have attacked no one, and although some of our servicemen gave their lives, not a single American civilian and the civilian of any other nation, as a result of this protection, lost their lives.

There may be those in our own country who say that such action was good but we should have waited or we should have delayed, or we should have consulted further, or we should have called a meeting. But from the very beginning, the United States, at my instructions, had worked for a ceasefire beginning the Saturday the revolution took place. The matter was before the OAS peace committee on Tuesday, at our suggestion. It was before the full Council on Wednesday and when I made my announcement to the American people that evening, I announced then I was notifying the Council.

When that cable arrived, when our entire country team in the Dominican Republic, made up of nine men -- one from the Army, Navy and Air Force, our Ambassador, our AID man and others -- said to your President unanimously: Mr. President, if you do not send forces immediately, men and women -- Americans and those of other lands -- will die in the streets. Well, I knew there was no time to talk, to consult or to delay. For in this situation delay itself would be decision -- the decision to risk and to lose the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of innocent people from all lands.

I want you to know that it is not a light or an easy matter to send our American boys to another country, but I do not think that the American people expect their President to hesitate or to vacillate in the face of danger just because the decision is hard when life is in peril.

The revolutionary movement took a tragic turn. Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold, joined the revolution. They took increasing control. And what began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social justice, very shortly moved and was taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a band of communist conspirators.

Many of the original leaders of the rebellion, the followers of President Bosch, took refuge in foreign embassies because they had been

superceded by other evil forces, and the Secretary General of the rebel government, Martinez Francisco, appealed for a ceasefire. But he was ignored. The revolution was now in other and dangerous hands.

When these new and ominous developments emerged the OAS met again and it met at the request of the United States. I am glad to say they responded wisely and decisively. A five nation OAS team is now in the Dominican Republic acting to achieve a ceasefire to ensure the safety of innocent people, to restore normal conditions, and to open a path to democratic progress.

That is the situation now.

I plead, therefor, with every person and every country in this hemisphere that would choose to do so, to contact their ambassador and the Dominican Republic directly and to get firsthand evidence of the horrors and the hardship, the violence and the terror and the international conspiracy from which United States service men have rescued the people of more than thirty nations from that war-torn land.

Earlier today I ordered two additional battalions --2000 extra men-- to proceed immediately to the Dominican Republic. In the meeting that I have just concluded with the Congressional leaders, following that meeting I directed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue instructions to land an additional 4500 men at the earliest possible moment. The distribution of food to people who have not eaten for days, the need of medical supplies and attention for the sick and wounded, the health requirements to avoid an epidemic because there are hundreds that have been dead for days that are now in the streets, and other protection and security of each individual that is caught on that island require the attention of the additional forces which I have ordered to proceed to the Dominican Republic.

In addition, our servicemen have already, since they landed on Wednesday night, evacuated 3000 persons from 30 countries in the world from this little island. But more than 5000 people, 1500 of whom are Americans --the others are foreign nationals-- are tonight awaiting evacuation as I speak. We just must get on with that job immediately.

The evidence that we have on the revolutionary movement indicates that it took a very tragic turn. Many of them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder and to gain a foothold, joined the revolution. They took increasing control. What began as a popular democratic revolution that was committed to democracy and social justice moved into the hands of a band of communist conspirators. Many of the original leaders of the rebellion, the followers of President Bosch, took refuge in foreign embassies and they are there tonight.

The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another communist government in the Western Hemisphere. This was the unanimous view of all the American nations when, in January, 1962, they declared, and I quote: "The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the Inter-American system."

This is what our beloved President John F. Kennedy meant when, less than a week before his death, he told us: "We in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere."

This is and this will be the common action and the common purpose of the democratic forces of the hemisphere. For the danger is also a common danger, and the principles are common principles.

So we have acted to summon the resources of this entire hemisphere to this task. We have sent, on my instructions the night before last, special emissaries such as Ambassador Moscoso of Puerto Rico, our very able Ambassador Averell Harriman and others to Latin America to explain the situation, to tell them the truth, and to warn them that joint action is necessary. We are in contact with such distinguished Latin American statesmen as Romulo Betancourt and Jose Figueres. We are seeking their wisdom and their counsel and their advice. We have also maintained communication with President Bosch who has chosen to remain in Puerto Rico.

We have been consulting with the Organization of American States and our distinguished Ambassador, than whom there is no better; Ambassador Bunker has been reporting to them at great length all the actions of this government and we have been acting in conformity with their decisions.

We know that many who are now in revolt do not seek a communist tyranny. We think it is tragic indeed that their high motives have been misused by a small band of conspirators who receive their directions from abroad. To those who fight only for liberty and justice and progress I want to join with the Organization of American States in saying in appealing to you tonight, to lay down your arms, and to assure you there is nothing to fear. The road is open for you to share in building a Dominican democracy and we in America are ready and anxious and willing to help you. Your courage and your dedication are qualities which your country and all the hemisphere need for the future. You are needed to help shape that future. And neither we nor any other nation in this hemisphere can or should take it upon itself to ever interfere with the affairs of your country or any other country. We believe that change comes and we are glad it does, and it should come through peaceful process. But revolution in any country is a matter for that country to deal with. It becomes a matter calling for hemispheric action only --repeat-- only when the object is the establishment of a communist dictatorship.

Let me also make clear tonight that we support no single man or any single group of men in the Dominican Republic. Our goal is a simple one. We are there to save the lives of our citizens and to save the lives of all people. Our goal in keeping with the great principles of the Inter-American system, is to help prevent another communist state in this hemisphere. And we would like to do this without bloodshed or without large-scale fighting.

The form and the nature of the free Dominican government, I assure you, is solely a matter for the Dominican people, but we do know what kind of government we hope to see in the Dominican Republic. For that is carefully spelled out in the treaties and the agreements which make up the fabric of the Inter-American system. It is expressed, time and time again, in the words of our statesmen and the values and hopes which bind us all together.

We hope to see a government freely chosen by the will of all the people.

We hope to see a government dedicated to social justice for every citizen.

We hope to see a government working, every hour of every day, to feeding the hungry, to educating the ignorant, to healing the sick -- a government whose only concern is the progress and the elevation and the welfare of all the people.

For more than three decades the people of that tragic little island suffered under the weight of one of the most brutal and despotic dictatorships of the Americas. We enthusiastically supported condemnation of that government by the Organization of American States. We joined in applying sanctions and when Trujillo was assassinated by his fellow citizens we immediately acted to

protect freedom and to prevent a new tyranny and since that time we have taken the resources from all of our people at some sacrifice to many, and we have helped them with food and with other resources, with the Peace Corps volunteers, with the AID technicians; we have helped them in the effort to build a new order of progress.

How sad it is tonight that a people so long oppressed should once again be the targets of the forces of tyranny. Their long misery must weigh heavily on the heart of every citizen of this hemisphere. So I think it is our mutual responsibility to help the people of the Dominican Republic toward the day when they can freely choose the path of liberty and justice and progress. This is required of us by the agreements that we are party to and that we have signed. This is required of us by the values which bind us together.

Simon Bolivar once wrote from exile: "The veil has been torn asunder. We have already seen the light and it is not our desire to be thrust back into the darkness."

Well, after decades of night the Dominican people have seen a more hopeful light and I know that the nations of this hemisphere will not let them be thrust back into the darkness.

And before I leave you, my fellow Americans, I want to say this personal word: I know that no American service man wants to kill anyone. I know that no American President wants to give an order which brings shooting and casualties and death. I want you to know and I want the world to know that as long as I am President of this country, we are going to defend ourselves. We will defend our soldiers against attackers. We will honor our treaties. We will keep our commitments. We will defend our nation against all those who seek to destroy not only the United States but every free country of this hemisphere. We do not want to bury anyone as I have said so many times before. But we do not intend to be buried.

Thank you. God bless you. Good night.

E N D

LS:DFBarnes:ju
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2172

Approved in S
5/14/65

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

7372

1980

DATE: May 3, 1965

SUBJECT: Situation in the Dominican Republic

PARTICIPANTS: For the United States:

For Venezuela:

The Secretary
The Chief of Protocol
Donald F. Barnes (OPR/LS)

Former President Betancourt
DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By isp, NARS, Date 12-20-77

COPIES TO: S/S White House
G Amembassy CARACAS
INR/OD Amembassy SANTO DOMINGO
CIA
S/P
ARA

The Secretary welcomed the opportunity to hear Mr. Betancourt's views on the serious problems that had arisen in the Dominican Republic. He had heard from very reliable sources that the Venezuelan Communist Party planned a stepped-up terrorist campaign, to begin around May 4, and directed against the American Embassy, its personnel, and American companies such as Sears & Roebuck. Should this campaign begin, he wondered if it would be limited to attacking Americans, or whether it would also include the Government of Venezuela.

The situation in downtown Santo Domingo at present was similar to the one prevailing on the previous day. It seemed that no single group was in authority or control among the rebels. In fact, various factions had their own radio stations, and seemed to be competing among themselves. The responsible leaders of the P.R.D. had either sought asylum or had left the center of the city, and extremist groups had come to the fore, urging violence.

The situation, as seen by the U.S. from the beginning, was not a problem of conflict between the forces supporting Juan Bosch, other democratic elements, or even the military, since the differences among these groups could be worked out. The problem was how to deal with irresponsible groups, who were not heeding the cease-fire appeal and were sending organized bands of terrorists into the center of town. He offered to furnish Mr. Betancourt with the names of some of the extremists who had been identified.

/ The

FORM DS-1254
3-61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

GPO 908992

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

The Secretary said that a preliminary report had been received from the O.A.S. Commission, which had been appalled at the conditions its members saw in Santo Domingo. In fact, Colonel Caamano has informed the members that the only way they could get into town was in an ambulance; any other vehicles would surely be fired upon; They had refused, considering this mode of transportation [as] inappropriate for an O.A.S. group.

A total of 5,000 people wished to be evacuated from the Republic, added to the 3,000 persons from 26 countries who had already been removed. There were others who had requested stand-by evacuation.

The Secretary hoped that the Papal Nuncio, Mr. Mora, and the O.A.S. Commission might establish contact with responsible elements on all sides, to work out at least some sort of provisional government arrangement pending elections, should the Commission feel this to be the solution. He hoped that in the meantime forces from other American Republics might be sent to the island, thus enabling the U.S. to reduce its own forces there.

The Secretary wondered if on the basis of the Dominican experience, it might not be advisable to consider the establishment of an inter-American force, capable of acting quickly once it received political leadership.

The Secretary said that the crucial cable was received from the American Embassy at 5:15 p.m., and the Marines landed at 7:00 p.m. The hotel and polo field where hundreds of Americans and others were waiting to be evacuated was threatened with firing; it was difficult to tell what would have happened had there been a two-or three-hour delay in the arrival of the troops. A pogrom had not been planned, but the lives of these people would have been endangered. As soon as the Marines had landed, the U.S. had informed the O.A.S. representatives of this fact, and had called for a Council meeting. At the preceding O.A.S. Council meeting, the U.S. had not foreseen the necessity of sending in troops, this being the position of the American Embassy at that time. At 3:00 p.m., word was received that the military authorities in Santo Domingo had said that they were incapable of guaranteeing the safety of the Americans there.

The situation that arose in Santo Domingo raises a problem affecting the entire Hemisphere: what should be done in the case of an upheaval where there is or could be external interference. Over the past four years the Hemisphere Foreign Ministers had clearly recognized that there was a new form of intervention in the Hemisphere, which was the efforts of Communists, Castroites and others to subvert established governments. This new approach was not fully understood, even in this country, since there had been no analysis of its techniques or methods devised to deal with it effectively.

In Venezuela, for example, it had been dealt with effectively internally, and had then been brought before the Foreign Ministers as an international problem. What would have happened, for example, had Venezuela been faced with a much larger shipment of arms, and had not been able to handle the problem with its own resources?

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A problem that was a source of great concern to the U.S. was that of ways to achieve a democratic and stable government in the Dominican Republic. When Juan Bosch was elected, this country hoped that he could lead the Dominican Republic on the road to democracy. However, Mr. Betancourt himself had said during his state visit, that he doubted that Bosch would finish even one year in office; he had actually lasted only seven months. Speaking privately, no members of the present Junta, or Wessin y Wessin, could form a government, since they had no popular support. This was one more reason for the presence of American forces, since it did not seem wise to depend on the military elements in the Republic. In this way, the O.A.S. and other parties would have a free hand in exploring ways to bring about a democratic and stable government.

Finally, the Secretary asked for suggestions of persons who might be able to bridge the gaps between the various parties, and lead to the formation of a decent and stable government.

Mr. Betancourt said that he understood the problem created by the need for evacuation of Americans in the Dominican Republic. However, the United States had committed a serious error; it should have called a meeting of the O.A.S., be it at midnight or at dawn, to inform the Latin American Ambassadors that Marines were on the way and why they were being sent. The Secretary must have realized the waves of protest in Latin America because of the belief there that here was another case of unilateral intervention, with no collective backing. He recalled that even in the dramatic case of the missiles in Cuba, an urgent meeting of the O.A.S. had been called, with the result that the quarantine was supported by the Latin American governments. A meeting could have been called in this instance, to inform the representatives that the Marines were on the way, to avoid Latin America being faced with a fait accompli.

Mr. Betancourt said that the Venezuelan consul in Santo Domingo, a Mr. Mattei, was a perceptive and well-informed man. They had spoken on the telephone, and the consul had informed him that in the so-called "rebel" or "constitutionalist" forces the democratic elements prevailed, and not any Communist groups. It would be interesting to compare the consul's information with that in the hands of the State Department.

Mr. Betancourt said that it was true that, during his state visit to the U.S. in 1962, he had expressed doubts as to Juan Bosch's ability to head a stable government; he considered Bosch to be a democratic and honest man, and a great short-story writer, who lacked political acumen.

Mr. Betancourt was glad to hear that no thought was being given to Wessin y Wessin or to any other Trujilloist military leaders of government, since all of them had been rejected by the people.

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He regretted that he did not know the Dominican scene well enough to suggest possible leaders, but was confident that responsible persons could be found who would preside over elections, perhaps under the supervision of the O.A.S., with free participation by all political groups.

Mr. Betancourt said that he was to meet shortly with Jose Figueres and Luis Munoz Marin, and believed that the three of them could prevail upon Bosch not present himself as a candidate again.

Mr. Betancourt said that the events that had transpired in the Dominican Republic justified the thesis that had been sustained for so long by Venezuela, that is, de facto regimes were a menace to the Hemisphere. What had happened in the Dominican Republic could well take place in Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, or Bolivia. The O.A.S. meeting to be held later in the month in Rio had to approve a resolution that would prevent coups d'etat.

Mr. Betancourt said that he personally was strongly in favor of an inter-American armed force, similar to the combined forces that had served under United Nations command in the Congo and elsewhere.

One question that was being asked widely in Latin America was why did the U.S. find it necessary to send 15,000 troops?

The Secretary replied that the area to be secured was very large, running from the airfield to the port at Haina. In the second place, there was the problem of evacuating over 5,000 more people, who were scattered all over the country. In the third place, the U.S. had undertaken to provide medical and food supplies needed by three and one half million people. There was fear of an epidemic, and no machinery existed for distribution of the supplies, a task that required a great deal of manpower. Finally, it was hoped that those who refused to follow the cease-fire request would realize the hopelessness of their cause, and would stop their military activities, thus greatly reducing casualties. The U.S. wanted to be sure to cut down dependence on local military authorities, to prevent them from exerting pressure on the OAS Commission in its efforts to find a way towards a stable and democratic government.

On this same morning, several embassies had asked to be included in the international security zone. It should be borne in mind that patrolling this area was a 24 hour a day job, and the men could not function on this schedule for several days in a row. Also, under normal conditions, Santo Domingo required a police force of 8,000 men; therefore, under present conditions, more men were needed to maintain law and order.

Mr. Betancourt said that both he and the Government of Venezuela were wholeheartedly in favor of any measures that would prevent another Castro in the Caribbean. Secondly, he was sure that the U.S. was not going back to the

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days of the "Big Stick", and that the Marines would not stay long. Whatever he had said had been spoken as a friend in commenting on what he considered to be the negative aspects of the American action. He was sure that the Marines would not spawn another Trujillo, as they had during their previous stay in the Dominican Republic.

The Secretary said that it was vital to make a distinction between prevention and cure, and not to repeat the mistake that had been made in Cuba, when nothing was done about Batista or about Castro and the 17 men who landed with him in Cuba. A cure was always more difficult. For example, during the missile crisis, the U.S. had estimated that an American invasion of Cuba would cost upward of 50,000 Cuban and between 10,000 and 15,000 American casualties. President Kennedy had recognized that an action of this sort would leave scars in the Hemisphere that would remain for a long time.

The Secretary said that the U.S. was not suggesting that the P.R.D. was a communist party, but he could not help recall Hitler in the Munich beerhall. He was sure that the Dominican people did not want a communist government, and no one should interfere with their desire to have a democratic government.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he hoped to keep in touch with Mr. Betancourt, and that he valued his advice, especially with regard to any suggestions that might help the O.A.S. Commission to find the basis for a viable democratic solution for the Dominican Republic.

MAY 3, 1965

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT

TO THE

BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL

AT THE

WASHINGTON-HILTON HOTEL

(5:20 PM EDT)

Mr. Hagerty, members of the Building and Construction Trades Department, friends from the Building and Construction Trades Department, ladies and gentlemen:

I knew you were meeting today and I wanted very much to come over and drop in and give you a word of welcome and say howdy and thank you. But when I looked at my schedule and saw the cables that were being brought to my desk I did not see how in the world I could make it. Then I got a telegram. It wasn't about repealing 14b, although I know that is important to you, and it is important to me. It wasn't about the various legislative proposals which you are interested in, important as they are. It was about the most vital issues in this country, and for that matter, in the whole world, which are peace and freedom.

So I have stolen these few minutes to come over here just to say thank you. Thank you for saying to the world that this nation of ours, the United States of America, speaks in unity with one voice from one heart. Thanks to you for saying that we believe in freedom and we believe in peace. Thanks to you for saying that we will not buy peace at the price of losing freedom anywhere, anytime, in the world. Thanks to you for saying that American labor, the champions of freedom here at home, knows that freedom's frontiers are today in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic, where both are under attack.

So thank you for putting first things first, for being leaders of the free America today, for being, even before that, the leaders of America herself, and before I overlook it, I want to thank you for what we did last November.

As citizens you must be proud of the fact that you are the builders of America. You know what it is to make something rise with toil and sweat and effort. The product of your labor is not just buildings, and not just homes, and not just monuments. The product of your labor is the face of America itself throughout all of the world.

We have seen that face change many times, you and I. We have worked through the darkness in distressing periods. We have worked through the depression, or at least wanted to work during the depression. We have worked through the challenge of conflict through the prosperity of an uneasy peace.

706 We share in the legacy of great American leaders, from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to John Fitzgerald Kennedy. And I came here this afternoon to pledge to you that together we are going to build an America that Roosevelt began, that Harry Truman worked for, and that John Kennedy died for. We are going to build a great society where no man or woman is the victim of fear or poverty or hatred; where every man and woman has a chance for fulfillment, for prosperity, and for hope. That is the direction that you are going. That is the direction that we are going to continue. And I promise you here today

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that no one, no group here or in any land, is ever going to stand in our way as we march forward.

There is crisis and conflict in many lands at this hour, and we have very great and overpowering responsibilities in a very turbulent world, but we are going to fulfill those responsibilities. Let me make this clear. No world problem must be allowed to keep us from meeting the needs and the desires of our own people. Trouble abroad will never divert us from the task of building the great society at home.

There are some that would say turn the clock back, stop, look, and listen. We have problems in Viet Nam and in the Dominican Republic. Before you get back to the office we may have some in other lands in the world. And for that reason let's put off until another day the poverty program, the Appalachia program, the medical care program, the education program. Well, they are just talking through their hat. We are not going to put anything off.

I worked last night on some thoughts that I want to incorporate when I get the recommendations from your leaders, and from the leaders of the Government concerned with your welfare into a message that I will send to Congress in the next few weeks. By the way, while we are talking, I want to make an arrangement with you today, while you are here in person, to realize that we don't just send these messages up to Congress to be read. We send them up there to be acted upon and voted upon, up or down. And as Andy B. Miller plows through the dark corridors of the House Office Building calling "wolf" to the White House, I don't want you fellows to run under the bed and hide either.

There are talkers and there are doers. An old man told me the first year I was in Washington, which was 34 years ago, and I was inquiring about the processes of the Congress, and he said, "Son, there are two kinds of congressional horses, the work horse and the show horse." Well, we want to be work horses, and before this Congress, this 89th Congress, closes its first session, the work horses are going to establish it as the most productive, the most enlightened, the most progressive Congress for all the people that ever sat in Washington.

That is why I came out here this afternoon. I came out here to ask your help. I came out here to call upon you to help me do what you have been doing so well for more than a half century -- to help build America, in the cause of freedom, and the cause of prosperity, build it here and build it abroad.

We have much to be thankful for. We have much to remember. The figures for the first quarter, January, February, and March, are just out of the typewriter. They show that we have 71,300,000 people working today. That is exactly 1,500,000 more than were working this day last year, one year ago. The figures out of the typewriter show that wages and salaries amount to \$347,000,000,000. That is up more than \$25,000,000,000. I said up now, not down. That is an increase in wages and salaries over last year of 8 percent.

The corporation profit figures for this quarter are just in, and they are running at the rate -- for the end of the quarter -- but they are running at the rate of \$36,000,000,000 after taxes. That is up 13 percent.

So our employment is up, our wages are up, our business profits are up. You just don't know until you talk to the leaders of 114 other nations how much you have got to be grateful for; how much you have got to be proud of.

I have been your President for 17 months. I have met every week with the titans of industry and the great corporate leaders of this country. I have

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met every week with the religious and spiritual leaders of this country, ranging from Cardinal Spellman to Billy Graham. I have met every week with your leaders, Mr. Hagerty and Joe Keenan and Andy Biemiller, and that great statesman, George Meany. They have sat in the Cabinet Room. They have met face to face with each other, and they have met privately in the little offices off the corridors. We have started some strikes and we have settled some, but I think I can say without peradventure of a doubt that never in the history of the Republic has there been more cooperation with any President, the 35 men that have preceded me, than the cooperation that I have received from labor, from business, from Government.

The Judicial Branch, the Legislative Branch, the Congress, headed by that great leader, John McCormack, and Mike Mansfield in the Senate, are work horses. And the Executive and the Legislative and the Judiciary have never gotten along better, just as the employer and the employee and their Government have never gotten along better.

I am happy that the corporations got \$36 billion dollars after taxes. I don't begrudge them a dime. I helped them make it. They had \$72 billion dollars before taxes, and I took half of it. And the more the incentive system and the free enterprise system makes, the more they have to pay decent wages, and the more they have to let their Government use for medical care, and for education, and for beautification.

I don't object to the payrolls running \$347 billion, because we have some men scattered in district offices all over the land with their scissors that cut out that little withholding from every dollar of that \$347 billion. All I want them to do is to do better because the better they do the better the country does.

Last Saturday, a week ago, our Ambassador from the Dominican Republic was here in Washington. He had been called back here to report on very disturbing developments in that little nation of 3 million off our shores in this hemisphere.

While he was talking to us, the government was overthrown. We rushed him back to his post of duty. Since that time certain undesirable elements have stepped in and tried to take control of that nation.

Today, there are between 1000 and 1500 dead people whose bodies are in the streets of Santo Domingo, threatening an extreme epidemic. There were 8000 American and foreign nationals in that country whose lives were in danger.

At approximately 3:30, our Ambassador wired me -- well, he was here Saturday, we rushed him back -- on Tuesday we went before the OAS Peace Council and discussed that serious problem. On Wednesday, the Organization of American States met and they talked about the gravity of the situation, discussed it thoroughly, and adjourned.

On Wednesday afternoon we were meeting there with what I thought was the greatest problem that we had on our hands - Viet Nam.

Mr. Rayburn used to say, when these Congressman poured into his office every day, the fellow would say, "I have the most important problem in the world." He said, "That's what that fellow said that you met going out of here."

I thought this was the most important until I got a cable at 3:16 saying the Chief of Police, and the governmental authorities, telling us that American lives are in danger and we can no longer offer them any protection. We notified the appropriate people to stand in readiness and we went ahead to conclude our conference on Viet Nam.

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By 5:16 we had another cable that said, "You must land troops immediately or blood will run in the streets, American blood will run in the streets."

And that is the unanimous decision of every man on the American team. There are nine of them, one from the Army, one from the Air Force, one from the Navy, the Ambassador, one from the USIA, and so forth -- what we call a country team, the board of directors in that specific country.

Well, I said I have a meeting on the balance of payments with a bunch of bankers and big businessmen in the next room. You get the troops on the way, and you ask the Congressmen, the leadership, to come to the White House and we'll meet at 7 o'clock. That was about 6 o'clock, a little before. I went on with my meeting without discussing it. When we met at seven, talking to the leaders, while I was talking to them, I was handed a note by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which said the Marines have landed. That's a great tribute to Bob McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for competence and efficiency, that within an hour they can put men ashore without the loss of a single life.

No President ever has a problem of doing what is right. I have never known one to occupy this office -- and I have worked with five of them -- that did not want to do what is right. The big problem is knowing what is right. But I knew this, this was no time for indecision, or procrastination, or vacillation. The American people hadn't elected their President to dodge and duck and refuse to face up to the unpleasant.

Since that time we have evacuated 2500 Americans. The Michigan State University jazz band was down there. We got them home. The brewers, the brewery people --- I guess they didn't know you were all meeting here in Washington, they were having their convention down there, and we got them home.

There hasn't been a drop of civilian blood shed although five of our Marines have died because of sniper action, and 41 of our boys are wounded. We have 5000 nationals from 30 other countries and Americans yet to be evacuated from Santo Domingo and all over the countryside. We will by tonight have 14,000 Americans there to get that job done.

I have had the Papal Nuncio send me a cable congratulating us and commending us for our assistance. The leaders and ambassadors from many countries have told us that the streets would have run red with human blood except for the presence of American troops. The representatives of 30 countries, six of whose embassies were torn to pieces, are expressing their gratitude, but we still have 5000 to get out. We still have the job of feeding 350,000 people, both the rebels and the loyalists have to eat because we are humanitarians and we don't want to starve people to death. We have the hospitals and they are running out of their ears. So we have taken some of David Dubinsky's mobile hospital units and we are putting them in the Dominican Republic to take care of their health.

We are taking sanitary measures so that a serious epidemic won't break out. We have established an international peace zone and asked the Organization of American States of these republics to go there and present us with some plan for setting up a stable government.

We covet no territory. We seek no dominion over anyone. All we want to do is live in peace and be left alone if they will do it. But if they are going to put American lives in danger, where American citizens go that flag goes with them to protect them. You don't know how they appreciate it.

As a little boy I learned a declamation that I had to say in grade school. I don't recall all of it but a little of it is appropriate here this afternoon. It went something like this:

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I have seen the glory of art and architecture. I have seen the sun rise on Mount Blanc. But the most beautiful vision that these eyes have ever held was the flag of my country in a foreign land.

Now I am the most denounced man in the world. All the communist nations have a regular program on me that runs 24 hours a day. Some of the non-communist nations just kind of practice on me. Occasionally I get touched up here at home in the Senate and House of Representatives. But that is not important. What is important is just two things in this hemisphere. Number one, that we know, and that they know, and that everybody knows, that we don't propose to sit here in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the communists set up any government in the Western Hemisphere.

We have said to the people of the Dominican Republic that we are hopeful that the other nations of this hemisphere will provide some troops to help us clean up this operation, to preserve law and order and peace. We'll provide our share of them and we'd like to bring our boys home as soon as we can evacuate our people.

We have two purposes: We want to evacuate our citizens and we want to preserve, to see that a plan is worked out where the people themselves can select their own government, free from any international conspiracy or any dictatorship of any kind.

We believe the Organization of American States will make such a recommendation. We are not intervenors in the Dominican Republic. The people that intervened in the Dominican Republic were the people who had been trained outside of the Dominican Republic in guerilla warfare and came in there to help overthrow that government and to have a communist seizure of that country. We are there to protect those people and we propose to protect them.

It reminds me of a story I heard as a youngster when Huey Long was here and everybody in the Senate was denouncing him because he had taken a sound truck and went into Arkansas and helped to elect the first woman elected to the Senate -- Mrs. Caraway. People weren't accustomed to electing women to the Senate in those days. The Senators in those days campaigned for somebody else and they were a little upset about it, and they were denouncing Long for forgetting states' rights and leaving his state and going into another state. He sat there all afternoon and let one Senator after another denounce for importing his sound truck and telling other people what to do and dictating to them. He had this chocolate silk suit on -- I'll never forget it -- and he had brown and white shoes, and he was marching back and forth. And it came his time to answer, and he got up and said, "Mr. President, I have been denounced all afternoon." He looked over at Senator Robertson, who was the majority leader and the most powerful man in the Senate, a very robust man, a very rotund man, he had a great big stomach and had a cigar that he always smoked and kept in the corner of his mouth -- he was the most powerful man in the Senate. He walked right over to Joe Robertson, and put his hand on his shoulder in a very affectionate and friendly way, and said, "I wasn't in Arkansas to dictate to any human being. All I went to Arkansas for was to pull these big, pot-bellied politicians off this poor, little woman's neck."

All we are in the Dominican Republic for is to preserve freedom and to save those people from conquest. The moment that the Organization of American States can present a plan that will bring peace on the island, and permit us to evacuate our people, and give us some hope of stability in government, we will be the first to come back home.

Now, in these times our enemies want to divide us. They want us to argue among ourselves. They want us to chew on each other.

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I read the cables every day and up to the last three weeks they have really believed that in Viet Nam the pressure would become so great on the American President that he would have to pull out. Well, I have had plenty of pressure but they don't know the American President. He is not pulling out until aggression ceases. But they have that hope.

So I warn you and I plead of you, if you have any suggestions or any views, or any differences, with your President -- and all of you do at times, we don't see everything alike or we would all want the same wife. But communicate them to me through Uncle Sam, or Western Union, or directly, or through your friends. Don't send them through my intelligence bulletin via Peking, or Hanoi, or Moscow.

A great man said, "United we stand; divided we fall." There never was a period in our national history when unity, and understanding, perseverance, and patriotism would pay larger dividends than it would pay now

I expect the leaders of the labor workers' movement in this country to come up, punch that time clock, stay on that shift until we preserve democracy for ourselves and for free people all around the globe.

Thank you very much.

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Authority State Ch. 5/15/78
By lhu, NARS, Date 7/20/78

CHRONOLOGY OF DOMINICAN CRISIS -- 1965

Saturday, April 24, 1965

- 5:04 p Charge Connett sent CRITIC ONE reporting coup against Reid Government. (1)
- 5:28 p Connett sent CRITIC TWO giving further details of military revolt under Lt. Col. Miguel Angle Hernando Raminez. (2)
- 6:00 p Secretary Mann called the President.
- 8:35 p Reid addressed nation on radio and TV reporting nation calm and giving rebels until 5:00 a.m. to surrender. Curfew imposed. (3)
- 11:03 p Connett sent assessment of revolt: involvement still unclear but it looks like PRD with some military elements. (4)

Sunday, April 25, 1965

- 3:44 a Embassy Santo Domingo reported that the situation is rapidly deteriorating. Rebel Army troops entering capital. Scattered shooting. Rebel forces are trying to take Radio Santo Domingo. Army mobilizing to support Reid. (5)
- 4:26 a Embassy Santo Domingo reported Wessin named Secretary of State for Armed Forces. Police are doing nothing. (6)
- 5:31 a Embassy Santo Domingo reported the Dominican Air Force (DAF) is unwilling to fight and seeking a peaceful solution. (7)
- 7:50 a Charge Connett called to report people in the streets calling for overthrow of Reid and return of Bosch. Some army units supporting rebels. Electric power off. Airport closed. All public order gone. (8)

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- 9:45 a Connett called to report mob was marching on the palace. Reid called Connett to Palace. Reid rejecting suggestion of some advisers that he resign. Reid asked for US intervention, but agreed there was little US could do to help him except to urge the military to remain loyal. Situation growing increasingly tense. Police are doing nothing to maintain order. (9)
- 10:32 a JCS instructed CINCLANT to send minimum number of vessels to evacuate 1200 people. To stay on the horizon. (10)
- 11:00 a Reid reported to be resigning in favor of his Secretary of Interior, General Montas Guerrero, pending formation of a military junta. (11)
- 12:18 - 3:52 President held several individual telephone conversations with Bundy, Rusk, McNamara and Mann.
- 12:50 p Radio Santo Domingo in rebel hands reporting the Reid Government had been overthrown and the country was returning to constitutionality under Bosch. (12)
- 1:10 p Various political parties met and asked the US to press for moderate, non-partisan interim government. (13)
- 1:33 p Radio Santo Domingo (RSD) announced Wessin is only holdout and Bosch would return when he surrendered. RSD called on army officers to lay down arms and for people to go into the streets to support Bosch and his Congress. (14)
- 1:45 p Connett called to say PRD (Bosch) Party now controls the Presidential Palace and RSD. President of Chamber of Deputies under Bosch, Molina Urena, reported to become provisional president until Bosch returns. (15)
- 2:00 p Connett called Sayre to say Molina Urena apparently being sworn in as President. (16)

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- 2:25 p State instructed Connett to tell both sides we planning to evacuate Americans and other foreigners wishing to leave in ships now standing off shore. (17)
- 3:00 p Connett called to report that the Air Force under General de los Santos now aligned with Wessin and Navy in opposing Bosch's return. (18)
- 4:22 p General de los Santos announced that the Air Force will fight to block the return of Bosch. General Wessin has agreed to work with the Air Force. Both believe fight is now against communists and not exclusively with rebel elements of the Army. Embassy reports no identifiable authorities exercising control. Situation near anarchy. (19)
- 5:10 p Charge Connett called to say 4 F-51's are circling the Palace. Businesses and homes of Reid and Trujillo Governments reportedly being sacked. (20)
- 5:41 - 6:24 p President met with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Mann, Reedy, Moyers, Valenti and Bundy in Cabinet Room. (21)
- 5:45 p Charge Connett called to report 2 F-51's were strafing the Palace to prevent the swearing in of Molina Urena as Provisional President and to gain time for formation of a military junta consisting of Mota, Benoit and Ubiera. (22)
- 6:24 - 10:55 p President had several separate telephone conversations with Ball, Bundy and Rusk.
- 8:25 p RSD urges all people to support the rebels and stay in the streets. (23)
- 8:45 p Charge Connett called to report no shooting for last hour. Bosch is broadcasting from Puerto Rico urging popular support for Molina Urena pending his return. Communists very active. (24)
- 9:00 p PRD representatives came to Embassy to ask Embassy to use its pressure to stop the bombing. (25)

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- 10:15 p Embassy summary: Wessin (Army), de los Santos (AF) and Rivera Caminero (Navy) are united in opposing return of Bosch. Best hopes appear to be Junta which promises early elections. (26) ✓
- 11:20 p Statement by anti-Bosch elements of Armed Forces promising elections on September 1, 1965. (27)

Monday, April 26, 1965

- 2:00 a Radio and TV facilities still in rebel hands. (28)
- 5:30 a Air Force began bombarding Ozama Bridge and Wessin explained plan to move across bridge. Both requested US troops, but Charge Connett told them we had no such plans. (29) ✓
- 7:20 a Navy Chief of Staff Rivera Caminero told Naval Attaché Dominican Navy siding with newly formed rebel government. (30)
- 7:45 a Embassy reported that rebels take Air Force pilots' and wives to line of fire on Ozama Bridge. RSD exhorts public to sack pilots' homes. (31)
- 9:18 a
- 9:25 a Bombing switched to Palace. (32)
- 9:30 a Charge Connett reported that Wessin-de los Santos position is weakening. Only US intervention can prevent return of Bosch. Connett recommends against intervention and told Wessin not to expect it. Embassy believes there is serious threat of Communist take-over and supports creation of a military junta with September elections. US show of force may be needed but not now. (33) ✓
- 9:35 a President talked by phone with Mann. (34) ✓
- 10:23 a Families of pilots paraded on TV with announcement they were being taken by rebels to bombing targets "so they can also be assassinated." (35)

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- 10:30 a Mann, Bennett, Vaughn and Crockett met in State. (36) ✓
- 11:12 a Acting Mayor of Santo Domingo called Embassy to request it do something to alleviate present dangerous situation. (37)
- 11:22 a Aerial attack resumed against Palace. Police evacuating people nearby. (38)
- 11:40 a Secretary Rusk met with Mann, Vaughn, Bennett, Sayre, Read. (39) ✓
- 12:06 p Embassy reported it went into Phase One of E and E at 10:30 a.m. local time. Americans being advised to prepare for possible evacuation. (40)
- 12:13 p Embassy given one hour by de los Santos to try to reach rebel leaders to arrange a meeting between the two camps to stop further bloodshed. Embassy trying make contact but communication difficult. (41)
- 1:05 - 1:50 p President met with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Mann, Vaughn, Bennett and Bundy. (42)
- 2:55 p Charge Connett recommended approach to Bosch on establishing a Junta that would take country to elections on September 1. (43)
- 3:00 p Secretary Rusk met with Bunker and Ball. (44)
- 3:45 p Secretary Rusk met with Cleveland and Mann. Mann told by Vance that JCS had decided no evacuation yet. DOD awaiting further instructions from State. (45)
- 4:30 p Connett sent recommendations on operational aspects of evacuation. (46)
- 6:05 p Embassy reported Rebel leader Molina Urena appeared on TV at 3:45 p.m. local time as Provisional President of Dominican Republic. (47)

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6:10 p Ambassador Bennett left Washington for the Dominican Republic via Ramey. ✓

6:20 p Secretary Rusk met with Mann. (48)

7:15 p Secretary Rusk met with Ball. (49)

7:49 p JCS instructed CINCLANT to alert two airborne combat teams and supporting units. (50) ✓

7:59 p Charge Connett relayed unconfirmed report that Police Colonel Nin beheaded by mob and head paraded through streets. (51)

8:30 p Charge Connett reported both sides willing declare cease fire and give guarantees to enable evacuation of Americans. Connett recommends it start at 6:00 a.m. April 27. (52)

9:20 p Mann and Vaughn talked about evacuation. (53)

10:00 p Ambassador Bennett reported to be in Ramey. (54)

11:21 - 11:48 President met with principal advisers in Cabinet Room. (55) • ✓

Tuesday, April 27, 1965

12:06 a Embassy estimates 800-1000 persons seeking evacuation. Requests no helicopters land because of small arms fire around Hotel Embajador assembly point. (56)

2:37 a Rebels announce military units at Santiago marching toward Santo Domingo. (57)

5:30 a Embassy gives green light for elements of CTG 44.9 to enter Port of Haina for evacuation. (58)

7:17 a President talked by phone with Mann. (59) ✓

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- 8:40 a Rebel "Foreign Minister" asked Embassy to make last minute effort to mediate to stop bombing. (60) ✓
- 9:00 a DAF announced that it would bomb rebel positions and asked people evacuate areas. (61)
- 9:05 a Vaughn, Sayre and Crockett met on evacuation .
- 9:30 a Bennett called from Puerto Rico to report shooting incident at Hotel Embajador. Embassy also reported incident. (62) ✓
- 9:45 a Vaughn and Vance discussed evacuation.
- 10:15 Following up rebel request, Embassy urged loyalist to negotiate and postpone bombardment. ✓
- 10:20 a Vaughn told Ball 1000 Wessin men moving into Santo Domingo from the west and 1000 Americans awaiting evacuation.
- 10:25 a Moyers asks Vaughn for Press statement for President.
- 10:35 a President talked by phone with Vaughn.
- 11:00 a Vance and Vaughn discussed hotel shooting.
- 11:10 a Uruguay's OAS Ambassador, Oribe, came to see Vaughn at the former's request. He was the first Latin American Ambassador to mention to State the belief that the OAS should be involved. He felt the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) should be concerned and the OAS called into action and Mr. Vaughn heartily agreed. There was some talk of Oribe's taking action but he said he had only talked to the Dominican Ambassador to the OAS, Bonilla, so far and further, he (Oribe) was not a member of the IAPC. Since the US was an IAPC member, it was agreed that Ward Allen, Deputy to Ambassador Bunker, call the IAPC together. ✓
- 11:15 a Connett telephoned to give further details on hotel shooting. Americans moving to Haina by bus. No junta yet. Cease-fire arranged by Embassy. (63)

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- 11:37 a Secretary Rusk sent Connett cable stating US objectives are restoration law and order, prevention possible communist takeover, protection American lives. Since we understand provisional government not in control, urge Embassy encourage establishment military junta. Bennett should get to Santo Domingo as he might make difference in keeping forces together. (64) ✓
- 11:42 a Secretary Rusk instructed Connett to proceed with evacuation when he thought it safe to do so. (65) ✓
- 12:00 noon Ward Allen, Bunker's Deputy, requested the Colombian Ambassador to the OAS, Vasquez, who is chairman of the IAPC, to convene an urgent IAPC meeting. He also called the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa, in Sevilla-Sacasa's role as Nicaraguan Ambassador and member of the Peace Committee. He called the Dominican Ambassador, Bonilla, to suggest that the Ambassador be prepared to brief the IAPC.
- 12:05 p Secretary Rusk met with Ball, Vaughn, Crockett, Read, Greenfield (Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs).
- 12:15 p CRITIC THREE reports DAF officers leaving meeting with Naval Attache to start bombardment. They promised to respect evacuation route. Mediation efforts seem to have failed. (66) ✓
- 12:27 p Vaughn and Moyers discussed having Munoz Marin talk to Bosch.
- ✓ 12:40 p Bennett arrived Santo Domingo. (67) ✓
- 12:41 p Bundy and Vaughn discussed Presidential statement. ✓
- 12:55 - 2:15 p President met with Rusk, McNamara, Ball and Bundy. ✓
- 1:30 p CTG 44.9 reported sending ships to Haina to start evacuation. (69)

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- 2:15 p Bennett reported talking with leading rebel military officer and PRD Secretary General stressing importance of cease-fire and negotiations to form interim government. (70)
- 2:45 p Bennett called Vaughn to say he'd asked US ships to move into sight to dispel rumors US involved in bombardment. Cease-fire not working. (71)
- 3:10 p Secretary Rusk met with Ball, Mann, Vaughn, Read, Sayre and Crockett.
- 3:34 p Embassy reported evacuation from Embajador Hotel to Haina completed without incident. Helicopters on ground ready to start air lift to ships. (72)
- Bennett reports Wessin tanks crossing Ozama Bridge into city with infantry following. (72)
- 3:40 p President talked by phone with McGeorge Bundy and Vaughn.
- 4:00 p Rebel Provisional President Molina Urena and his principal political and military advisers, including Colonels Hernando Ramirez and Caamano, to ask Bennett help in negotiating settlement. Bennett lectured them on violence, urged them negotiate with loyalists, but declined to participate in negotiations. (73)
- 4:00 p Inter-American Peace Committee meets. Participants were Colombia, Argentina, the Dominican, Nicaragua, and the US. After hearing the Dominican Ambassador, Bonilla, report of the revolt's origins, developments and apparent growing Castro-communist involvement, the IAPC considered whether it had any jurisdiction to act under Resolution IV of the 5th MFM (Meeting of Foreign Ministers). No decision was taken, nor did the Dominican Ambassador request IAPC or OAS action, but the Argentine and Colombian Ambassadors stressed the need for the IAPC to keep informed of further developments.
- 4:03 p Secretary Rusk met with Ball and Greenfield.

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- 5:20 p CTG 44.9 reports Haina refugee evacuation completed. (74)
- 6:47 p Bennett urges police chief Despradel restore order after "these bloody days." Despradel said restoration of order under way and "mop up" was to begin soon. (75)
- 11:32 p Bennett request Task Force return tomorrow after discharging refugees in Puerto Rico. (76)
- 11:30 p Bennett reports anti-rebels De los Santos, Rivera Caminero and Wessin declared martial law. Heavy gunfire continuing. Embassy residences hit. (77)
- 11:45 p Bennett gives roundup of events of past three days for use with press and OAS. (78)

Wednesday, April 28, 1965

- 12:25 a Bennett reports Molina Urena and other prominent rebel leaders have taken asylum. (79)
- 9:05 a Secretary Rusk met with Ball to discuss situation. (80)
- 10:00 a Mann and Cleveland briefed Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- 10:04 a Bennett reported disorder continues unabated. Armed civilians shooting and looting. Anti-rebel radio claims Wessin forces ready to resume attack. (81)
- 10:15 a Bennett called Vaughn. Reports PRD civilian leaders in asylum. Arms being distributed to communist groups. Fight now straight communist and non-communist struggle. (82)
- 11:29 a Bennett reports Imbert took National Palace. Progress being made in establishing Junta. Imbert would assume presidency. Wessin would not be member of Junta. (83)

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- 11:53 a Bennett reports anti-rebel radio warning people to move out of rebel areas to designated safe haven areas prior to resuming of attack. (84)
- 12:00 noon Secretary Rusk met with Ball.
- 12:29 p Anti-rebel radio announces formation of junta: Benoit (Air Force), Casado Saladin (Army) and Santana Carrasco (Navy). Purpose is to prepare nation for free elections. (85)
- 12:30 p At end of regular COAS session Dominican Ambassador reported on events, highlighting Castro-communist involvement. No action was requested or taken and no other OAS members spoke.
- 12:35 p Bennett reports rebels have overrun two police stations. Caamano reportedly surrounded by anti-rebel forces at Palace of Justice. Shooting around Presidential Palace. (86)
- 1:07 p Bennett reports heavy bombing going on. DAF warning civilians leave target areas. (87)
- 1:33 p Bennett reports southeast section of Santo Domingo in rebel hands. (88)
- 2:50 p Bennett reported phone call from Junta member Benoit requesting US land 1200 Marines to help restore peace. " Bennett does not believe situation justifies such action at that time. Adds that psychological advantage lies with rebels and Wessin is not making aggressive showing. (89)
- 3:45 p PRD-SYG says Party is no longer connected with the struggle. If rebels win it will be extreme left victory. (90)
- 4:15 p CRITIC FOUR relays text of Junta's request US "lend us its unlimited and immediate military assistance. " (91)
- 4:40 p In CRITIC FIVE Bennett reports "situation deteriorating rapidly. " Country Team unanimously of the opinion that "time has come to land Marines. " To protect US lives Marines should establish a beachhead at Hotel Embajador. Also Embassy grounds. Bennett: "I recommend immediate landing. " (92)

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- 4:45 - 6:01 p President meets with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Bundy and Moyers. Two CRITIC messages arrive during course of the meeting. Decision taken to land troops and to issue statement explaining action is to protect 2000 US citizens and calling on both sides to negotiate. (93)
- 5:46 p CINCLANTFLT instructed CTH 44.9 to alert Marines for landing. (94)
- 6:10 p Secretary Rusk met with Ball, Mann, Vaughn, Sayre, Lowenfeld (Legal Office), Crockett and Read. (95)
- 6:20 - 6:26 p President spoke to Abe Fortas about Dominican Republic situation.
- 7:50 p Telecon ^{between} ~~with~~ Bennett ^{and} ~~including~~ Ball, Mann, Vaughn.
- Marines are authorized to land to evacuate. Will announce in Washington that (1) action taken because Dominicans notified US they unable safeguard lives our citizens; (2) US urges both sides ceasefire; (3) US hopes differences can be resolved. (96)
- 7:55 p CTG 44.9 reported one BLT ashore at Hotel Embajador and one platoon around Embassy. (97)
- 7:02 p In CRITIC SIX Bennett reports that Police Chief says he cannot protect Americans. Benoit again requests US military intervention. Delegation of US citizens believe leftist mobs will sack homes. Embassy urging Americans to Embajador Hotel. AID offices broken into. Evacuation area being fired on. (98)
- 7:14 p Secretary Rusk met with Bunker and Crockett.
- 7:15 p Bennett reports situation worsening and asks Washington to consider armed intervention beyond protection of US lives. (99)
- 7:21 p JCS instructs Task Force to close on Santo Domingo and be prepared to land on Bennett's request. (100)
- 7:27 - 8:10 p President and Secretary Rusk brief bipartisan Congressional leadership. (101)

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- 8:00 p Mann, Vaughn, Bunker, Crockett met to discuss how to deal with OAS. (102)
- 8:20 p President talked by phone with Mann. (103)
- 8:30 p MMCC reported 2 Marine companies ashore. (104)
- 8:47 p President went to Theater to announce troop landing. (105)
- 9:00 p US requests special COAS meeting for April 29.
- Between 9 - 12 p Sayre ordered ARA office directors to brief all Ambassadors and/or Charges by telephone or a personal call on the Dominican developments; said many Latin American Ambassadors in Santo Domingo had requested US help; that the Marines had landed; that extremists among the rebel group had grown; and that the US was requesting that a special OAS meeting be held the following morning.
- 9:37 p Bennett reports rebels shooting policemen or soldiers with crowd crying "paredon." (106)
- 10:50 p NMCC says Bennett wants no overflights, no additional landings until he talks with Task Force in morning. (107)
- 11:00 p Bennett reports all but 10 Americans at Hotel Embajador safely evacuated. Marines have established secure perimeter around adjacent polo field. Several Embassies invaded by rebels. (108)
- 11:27 p Riot control totally ineffective, members deserting. Looting sacking of houses of British residents. British Vice Consul reports downtown area given over to armed bands. (109)
- 11:32 p President spoke by phone with Mann. (110)

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CHRONOLOGY (CONTINUED)

DECLASSIFIED

Thursday, April 29, 1965

Authority State Ltr. 5/15/78
By Chuv, NARS, Date 7/20/78

- 12:37 a In appeal for medicines Bennett relayed Dominican Red Cross estimate 400 dead, 1200 wounded. (111)
- 1:10 a Bennett relayed message from Benoit saying he can no longer provide adequate protection to American lives and asks for "temporary intervention to restore public order." (112) ✓
- 1:15 a Bennett reported Nuncio very concerned over leftist domination of rebel movement. (113)
- 3:35 a Bennett recommended against intervention pending canvass of situation in the morning. (114) ✓
- 3:50 a Bennett asked Department's guidance on giving asylum to Donald Reid and Ramon Caceres. Both made inquiry from hiding. Department replies: take them to San Isidro. (115)
- 8:47 a President spoke by phone to Raborn about situation. (116) ✓
- 10:30 a COAS met in special session. Bunker explains landing of Marines is to protect US lives and secure evacuation of US and other foreign nationals. ✓

Ambassadors of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica expressed distress at turn of events in Dominican Republic and indicated concern over US unilateral action. Under instructions from their governments they called for hemispheric action to consider this new urgent problem and the convocation of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers (MFM) was raised.

The COAS also approved a message (117) to the Apostolic Nuncio, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo, requesting that he arrange for a cease-fire. The meeting was recessed in order for the representatives to seek instructions on convoking an MFM.

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An immediate Circular Telegram was dispatched instructing the US Ambassadors to urge the member states to support a convocation of the MFM and all the OAS Representatives were requested to recommend to their governments that they be given authority to vote in favor of such a meeting. (118)

- 10:21 a Bennett reported morale of Junta forces "very low." Main Rebel forces are still in center of town, but there is report of 3 rebel tanks moving west through city. (119)
- 12:00 noon State sent letter to UNSC President on troop landing. (120)
- 12:00 - 12:27 p President met with McNamara and Mann. (121)
- 1:10 p Bennett transmitted copy of Junta request to OAS that it make immediate study to determine when free election can be held. (122)
- 1:25 p Bennett sent another situation report listing rebel advances and growing threat to American homes and businesses. (123)
- 2:12 p Ball informed Bennett that the President had ordered debarkation of the remaining Marines on the Boxer. (124)
- 2:26 p Ball asked Bennett to send estimate by FLASH message whether US intervention necessary to save situation. "We cannot afford permit situation deteriorate to point where Communist takeover arises." (125)
- 2:54 p Bennett reports on meeting of diplomatic corps: They decided no basis diplomatic intervention this time. US Ambassador given list of food needed by all Embassies. Embassies of Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Mexico violated. Colombian Ambassador said he'd cabled Bogota that without Marines, Dominican Republic another Cuba. (126)
- 3:10 p President talked by phone with Mann. (127)

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4:00 p Bennett in CRITIC SEVEN reported heavy sniper fire at Embassy. Embassy of El Salvador violated. As result, Bennett authorized CTG 44.9 Commander to bring ships near to shore preparatory to landing. (128)

4:15 p NMCC informed State balance of Marines on CTG 44.9 have been directed to go ashore at Santo Domingo. Also two airborne battalions (POWER PACK I) have been ordered to move from Fort Bragg to Ramey AFB. (129)

4:40 p Bennett reported evacuation of Americans and other foreign nationals continuing. (130)

4:50 p NMCC informed State 500 Marines are being ordered from Cherry Point to Guantanamo. (131) ← ? (129)

6:40 p Rusk, Ball, McNamara, Wheeler and Raborn held a telecon with Bennett. Bennett asks for more forces. State suggests to Embassy establishment of an international safety zone for all foreigners and OAS action to achieve a political settlement. (132)

7:30 - 9:10 p President met with Rusk, McNamara, Raborn, Mann, Wheeler, Vaughn, Helms and Bundy. (134)

8:56 p JCS instructed CINCLANT to establish cordon around rebel area hopefully in connection cease-fire. (135)

10:00 p OAS Council resumed session to consider Dominican developments. Bunker introduces resolution asking MFM to send OAS Committee urgently to the Dominican Republic.

10:00 p NMCC informed State that part POWER PACK I scheduled to fly from Bragg to Ramey are being diverted to San Isidro. (136)

10:10 p NMCC informs State that all Marines (1700) on CTG 44.9 including tanks and amphibious tractors are ashore. (137)

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- 11:11 p Mann sends cable to Bennett saying about 2000 airborne troops will land at San Isidro at about 11:00 p.m. Santo Domingo time. (138)
- 11:21 - 11:48 p President meets with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Wheeler, Raborn, Klein, Bundy, Moyers, Smith, Valenti and Watson. (139)
- 11:50 - 11:56 p President met alone with Rusk.

Friday, April 30, 1968

- 1:27 a JCS instructed CINCLANT to postpone setting up cordon around controlled area pending OAS action. Planning to set up INZ should go forward. (140)
- 2:00 a State issued statement on landing of Marines and 82nd Airborne. (141)
- 2:00 a OAS Council passed Chilean sponsored resolution (142) convoking MFM under Article 39 of the Charter. Vote was 18-1 (Uruguay)-1 (Dominican Republic). Uruguay voted against the proposal because its government considered the revolution to be an internal matter and the Dominican Republic abstained because the reason given for convoking the meeting did not explicitly state the communist threat. A US proposal for the MFM to convene on April 30, rather than May 1, lacked one vote for approval. At the close of the meeting, the US made an advance presentation to the COAS of a resolution for adoption by the MFM calling for the naming of a Committee of the MFM to investigate the situation in the Dominican Republic and calling for the cooperation of all the member states. Mann sends telegram to our Embassies instructing they seek approval of the resolution for prompt adoption by the MFM. (143)
- OAS Council also approved resolution calling on both sides in the Dominican Republic to accept a cease-fire and permit immediate establishment of an international neutral zone (ISZ). (144)

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2:08 a CJTF 122 submits initial plan for 82nd Airborne to move to banks of Ozama River on east and Marines will establish cordon in west, with Junta troops patrolling line in between. (145)

2:16 a 82nd Airborne began landing at San Isidro. (146)

2:50 a Bennett reported on Papal Nuncio's efforts to obtain a cease-fire. (147)

9:40 - 10:45 a President met with Rusk, McNamara, Raborn, Wheeler, John B. Martin, Mann, Vance, Smith, Bundy, Valenti, Moyers, Ball and Goodwin. (148)

10:45 - 10:52 a President met alone with Secretary McNamara.

11:00 a Bunker arranged for OAS-SYG Mora to fly to Santo Domingo.

11:15 a Martin and Shlauderman left for Santo Domingo to help Bennett cultivate the non-Communist left and thwart the rebels. (149)

11:36 a Mann sent Bennett a cable outlining our strategy: (1) to establish ISZ and (2) to seal off rebels downtown and give Junta time to regroup. (150)

12:00 noon British Embassy reported appalling situation in Santo Domingo. (151)

1:00 p Nuncio informed Bennett he had worked out cease-fire agreeable both sides. (152)

1:39 p Bennett reported that Fortress Ozama had been overrun by rebels. Embassy under heavy sniper fire. (153)

3:45 p Amb. Stewart met with Betancourt. Betancourt stated US would be in embarrassing position and under increasing pressure from Latin Americans unless it induced OAS to move fast. He advocated Figueres' plan for OAS caretaker government for DR with agreement of the principal Dominican parties. The group would be buttressed by token forces from OAS countries and would make preparations for elections within a short period of time. (154)

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3:45 p Bunker talked with many Latins prior OAS meeting. Decided no resolution on Mora trip -- rather that Bunker would announce it.

4:00 p OAS Council met. Bunker briefed on the landing of US airborne troops and the situation in the DR in accordance with our promise of keeping the Council informed. Mora reported on communications he had received from Nuncio in Santo Domingo and his efforts to achieve a ceasefire. At US initiative Mora authorized to go to Santo Domingo to establish an initial OAS presence and to prepare the arrival of the OAS Committee which was expected to be designated by the MFM.

4:17 p CJTF 122 informed CINCLANT it had taken eastern approaches to Ozama River and established contact with Junta forces on west bank. (155)

4:25 p Bennett reported Junta had sent him letter expressing appreciation for arrival of US troops but expressing hope they would not "take an active role in the struggle," but he got it withdrawn. (156)

4:45 p NMCC informed State that Martin and Shlauderman had arrived in Santo Domingo. (157)

5:10 p Bennett reported DCM, Air Attache and Generals York and Tompkins had gone to San Isidro during morning to explain establishment of ISZ. Junta members seemed favorably disposed. (158)

7:00 p Bennett reported cease-fire had been signed at 5:30 p.m. at San Isidro. (159)

7:06 p President went to Theater to give statement on Dominican Republic situation. Stressed importance of prompt OAS action. (160)

10:35 - 11:29 p President visited Secretary McNamara at his residence.

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Saturday, May 1, 1965

4:40 a Martin submitted first report on contacts with Bosch
Carramano and Molina Urena. (161)

5:00 a Bennett reported quieter night after announcement of
the cease-fire but gunfire still going on. (162)

9:00 a Connett called to report Benoit plans to transfer seat
of Junta from San Isidro into Santo Domingo. Asks
for instructions regarding Junta seat inside INZ. (163)

9:00 a OAS-SYG Mora arrived in Santo Domingo.

9:40 - 10:35 a President met with Rusk, McNamara, Rowan,
Raborn, Bunker, Ball, Wheeler, Mann, Valenti,
Moyers, Goodwin, Smith, Bundy. (164)

10:11 a - 12:12 p Various military units directed to deploy
toward Dominican Republic. (See military chronology.)

10:a MFM holds opening session: organization of conference
and general debate.

12:42 p Bennett reported rebels shelling electric plant. (165)

12:54 p Bennett recommended landing more troops in line with
General Palmer's recommendations. (166)

1:14 p Bennett reported reliable CAS report that rebels using
cease-fire to arm themselves. (167)

? Presidential statement issued on further troop landings.
(168)

2:45 p Bennett reported that with rebel consent ISZ being
extended two blocks eastward to give Embassy greater
buffer. (169)

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- 3:00 p Meeting of MFM General Committee. Considered five draft resolutions. Two are from US calling for: (1) establishment of Committee to go to the Dominican Republic and (2) military contingents from other member countries. Compromise draft co-sponsored by seven states (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, US) approved by vote of 19-0-1 (Chile). Resolution establishes 5-nation Committee and fixes terms of reference. Committee composed of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and Panama. (170)
- 3:04 p Bennett reports that Canamano has assured Martin and Nuncio he will not destroy power stations. (171)
- 6:00 p MFM plenary meets and ratifies the General Committee's decisions by same vote.
- 6:45 p General Palmer reported to Vice Admiral Masterson that gap between 82nd and Marines is in effect controlled by rebels so that cordon has not been closed by Junta troops. Problem is how to close it without breaking cease-fire. (172)
- 6:30 p MFM hears first report from SYG Mora stating he meeting with representatives of the contending forces and cease-fire being violated in some sectors of Santo Domingo.
- 6:45 p Bennett reports 500 persons evacuated during day. (173)
- 7:05 p Bennett relayed CAS reports that rebels distributing to civilians arms captured at Ozama Fortress and are preparing for long fight. (174)
- 7:05 p Soviets requested urgent Security Council meeting on the Dominican Republic. (175)
- 7:15 p 5-man Commission meets to plan trip. US offers full collaboration.
- ? President issues statement on OAS decision to send Commission to Dominican Republic. (176)

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Sunday, May 2, 1965

12:33 a Bennett and Martin told to submit their personal estimates of situation by 7:00 a.m. (177)

3:55 a President talked by phone with Bennett.

4:10 a Martin submitted second sitrep: Reports meeting with Caamano at rebel Hq. May 1. Caamano stated people want Bosch back, that he and other Bosch supporters are in full control of 25,000 armed men; that rebels will honor cease-fire and agree to INZ as mapped. Martin says Caamano "dangerous man," intelligent, crafty. Could become DR's Castro. Not crazy, as some think. (178)

4:32 a President talked by phone with Palmer.

5:00 a Bennett and Martin transmit estimates: Both pessimistic that cease-fire will last. Foresee more fighting ahead. Political solution between opposing forces not possible given existing circumstances. (179)

6:30 a 5-nation OAS Commission left Andrews AFB for Dominican Republic. Bowdler going as liaison. (180)

9:13 a President spoke by phone with Mann.

10:30 a Bennett transmitted message from Nuncio to President thanking him for help in saving human lives. Bennett commented Embassy spent quietest night in past four. (181)

12:00 noon OAS Commission arrived San Isidro. Airlifted to Hotel Embajador. (182)

12:15 - 1:35 p President met with Rusk, McNamara, Mann, Bundy and Moyers. (183)

1:46 p President spoke by phone with Mann.

1:59 p President spoke by phone with Mann.

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- 2:00 p Bennett reports situation in rebel area increasingly ugly. He, Martin and Country Team recommend prompt establishment of LOC. Mora informed and agrees. (184)
- 2:42 p Bennett informed of decision to establish LOC and instructed to inform OAS Commission and try to obtain their endorsement. (185)
- 2:50 p Bennett instructed do everything possible to encourage OAS Commission to recommend Latin American troop contributions. (186)
- 5:05 p Bennett informed that Solomon designated to coordinate all economic efforts in Dominican Republic. (187)
- Martin made public statement that revolt had now come under complete domination of Castro-Communism. Bennett gives his judgment that establishment of LOC and Martin's statement places us in new position where we do not have to negotiate with rebels. (188)
- 6:24 p President spoke with Bennett by phone. (189)
- 6:30 - 8:35 p President briefed Congressional leaders. (190)
- 6:44 p Bennett instructed to suggest to OAS Commission that it broaden its action: repeat cease-fire appeal, appeal for surrender of arms, assume responsibility for relief activities. (191)
- 7:49 p Bennett requested to discourage Wessin's identification with US and himself. (192)
- 7:55 p Bennett reports OAS Commission agrees to LOC and requests authority to go ahead. (193)
- 8:10 - 8:25 p President met with Raborn and Cline. (194)
- 8:45 p President talks with Bennett by phone and tells him to go ahead with LOC. (195)

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- 10:00 p President gave TV report to the nation on the Dominican situation. (196)
- 10:10 p Secretary Rusk outlines program for moving toward establishment of more broadly based provisional government than Junta and asks Bennet's and Martin's comment. (197)
- 11:00 p Embassy reported 2500-3000 evacuees taken out by US of which 1500 US citizens.

Monday, May 3, 1965

LOC established during early morning hours.

- 3:15 a President spoke with Martin.
- 10:00 a Secretary Rusk talked to Romulo Betancourt. (198)
- 10:43 a Bowdler's report on first day's work of OAS Commission and mood of members. They are appalled by what they have seen and are talking of greater OAS involvement. (199)
- 11:31 a - 1:17 p President met with Betancourt. (200)
- 12:30 p OAS general committee met in closed session. Bolivia called for joint action on humanitarian and communist takeover grounds. Ecuador opposed unilateral action as direct violation of OAS Charter. Brazil announced full support of the US resolution for military contingents. Bunker gave situation report on US activities, said US would help transmit supplies and personnel from all points. The US Resolution calling for urgent economic aid to the Dominican Republic was approved.

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Bunker then argued for contingents from other members. He emphasized that US regretted no such force available in time, and US acted in absence such force. Ecuador and Mexico wanted to ask Investigating Committee for more troops, but Argentina said troops now there should first be internationalized.

Plenary session then opened and approved US Resolution for urgent aid. (201)

- 1:35 p Bowdler reported OAS Commission believes US intervention saved Dominican Republic from chaos and communist take-over. (202)
- 4:45 p General Palmer reported first military convoy goes through LOC safely. (203)
- 4:49 p State told Bennett that LA Ambassadors to Dominican Republic who wish to have their embassies included in INZ should request OAS team to seek Caamano's agreement do this, and request their respective FOs to support them in petition. No action towards extension of INZ until agreement with Washington. (204)
- 5:01 p President spoke with Martin in San Juan.
- 5:16 p Bennett asked to submit joint Army-State-CIA sitrep with specific details reinforcing US charges of Communist infiltration and domination of the rebel movement. (205)
- 5:20 p President addressed Building Trades Council and spoke on Dominican Republic. (206)
- 6:45 p General Committee of MFM met to consider proposed drafts. Chile opposed US draft on ground Charter does not justify multilateral armed force, and US has violated Article 15 by unilateral action. Chile said meeting must condemn US action. Colombia called for a truly international force under supreme authority of OAS. Bolivia and Paraguay announced support for

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US draft. Ecuador wanted purposes of forces more precisely defined. Costa Rica lamented US intervention but said system should not be paralyzed by elevating single principle of non-intervention to exclusion other principles, particularly representative democracy. Uruguay said they would vote for withdrawal of US troops before establishment of inter-American force and added present inter-American anti-communist instruments do not envisage mission outlined by the President May 2. Mexico reiterated that it would not legalize act it considers contrary to principle of non-intervention. Ambassador Bunker closed emphasizing US objective was to protect lives, restore order, and assist in recovery of the Dominican Republic.

- 8:26 p Bennett relayed reports rebels giving up organized resistance. Caamano apparently trying to work out deal with OAS Commission on Provisional Government in order to join status. (207)
- 8:50 p Bennett reported militarily situation more quick, but politically more confused. More data on foreign influence in rebel ranks. (208)
- 9:00 p Mann talked to Betancourt about his statement on call on the President.
- 9:56 p President talked by phone with Bennett to get sitrep.
- 10:50 p State instructed Bennett and Bowdler to try to get OAS Commission to recommend troop contribution. (209)

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CHRONOLOGY (CONTINUED)

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Tuesday, May 4, 1965

Authority State Dep. 5/15/78
By Chw, NARS, Date 7/20/78

- 12:30 a Martin submitted report on his May 2-3 talks with Bosch. Outlines scenario acceptable to Bosch. (210)
- 3:15 a Bennett sent his country for getting interim government launched using existing Junta as base. (211)
- 4:10 a Bennett and Bowdler report shift in mood of OAS Commission. Members now focussing on detailed new cease-fire agreement. They reluctant recommend Latin American troops contribution. (212)
- 10:10 - 11:15 a President briefed members of Senate and House Appropriations, Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. (213)
- 11:30 a Bennett reported rebels have taken political initiative by announcing a provisional government under Caamano. Recommends formation of broad based junta under Imbert. (214)
- 2:27 p Bowdler called White House Situation Room to report OAS Commission had decided to recommend to MFM that a multinational force be established under OAS. (215)
- 2:30 p Bennett reported OAS Commission request that INZ be extended to cover all Embassies. (216)
- 4:36 p Bennett asked to explain to OAS Commission we do not think either side capable of running the Dominican Republic and need for formation of a broadly-based group. (217)
- 6:09 p State authorized extension of INZ. (218)

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- 6:50 - 8:30 p MFM continues discussion of establishment of an inter-American military force. (219)
- 10:30 p President talked by phone with Mann.
- 10:55 p Bennett and Bowdler report OAS Commission has prepared a new cease-fire agreement ("Act of Santo Domingo") to be presented to Caamano and Benoit. They want US to subscribe to its terms. (220)
- 11:15 p Bowdler reported on efforts of OAS Commission to get Caamano and Benoit to sign "Act of Santo Domingo." Commission pressing for data on Communism. Commission plans to return to Washington as soon as Act signed. (221)
- 12:00 In May 4 roundup Bennett explained steps he is taking
midnight with Martin to replace existing San Isidro Junta with a new provisional regime: "National Council of Reconstruction." (222)

Wednesday, May 5, 1965

- 9:00 a MFM's General Committee resumed discussion of IAF resolution which lasted throughout day and into early morning hours of May 6.
- 9:18 a Bennett reported setting up National Council of Reconstruction is proving difficult. Capable people scarce and those qualified are reluctant to serve. (223)
- 10:00 a President talked with Mann by phone.
- 10:38 a Department rescinded requirement that Bennett discuss enlarging and restructuring of junta. He was authorized to continue unilateral efforts recognizing that OAS will be back in picture when present Commission revamped. (224)
- 1:00 p Mann talked to Betancourt, Figueres and Facio about Betancourt's proposals. (225)

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- 2:00 p Betancourt reported to Stewart his belief the US multi-lateral force resolution would pass. He confirmed he, Figueres and Munoz Marin had encouraged acceptance of the resolution. He said the Chilean and Peruvian Ambassadors had agreed to nominate Betancourt and Lleras Camargo as OAS commissioners if US resolution on this passed. Venezuela would nominate Munoz Marin. (226)
- 5:46 p President spoke with Mann by phone.
- 6:01 p Bennett informed special team headed for Dominican Republic to gather materials on communist penetration. (227)
- 8:24 p Bowdler reported that OAS Commission had gotten both sides to sign "Act of Santo Domingo." Chairman asked that US response be given him in Washington. Most members headed back tonight. (228)
- 12:00 midnight Martin submitted status report on establishing NCR. Not happy with possibilities but feels must be established ASAP. Imbert looks like best bet. Recognizes OAS will play prime role in political settlement. Cammiano still ahead politically. (229)

Thursday, May 6, 1965

- 12:00 midnight All of OAS Commission except Panama's Morrice left for US.
- 2:00 a MFM General Committee reached agreement on IAF resolution and passed it to MFM where it was approved 14-5 (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay - 1 (Venezuela)). (230)
- 3:45 a Bennett restated his view that Junta Hq should be relocated to Congress building near INZ. (231)

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- 9:22 a Caamano asks recognition from other countries.
- 12:35 p Brazilian Embassy informed State that President Castello Branco had paved way to get Congressional approval to send troops to Dominican Republic.
- 1:36 - 3:15 p President met with Rusk, McNamara, Vaughn, Mann and Bundy. (232)
- 3:25 p Bennett authorized to let Junta transfer from San Isidro to Congress building. (233)
- 5:42 p Bennett reported Aristide⁹ gaining control over Caamano, but supporting him for President to fill Bosch's unexpired term. Caamano's forces said to be dispersing but difficult hard core estimated at around 1000 remains. Problem continues to be formation of an acceptable junta to oppose Caamano. (234)
- 8:54 p State informed Bennett be named coordinator of US group to work with other countries in establishing IAPF. US will accept Latin American commander if deputy is from US. (235)
- Through- Bunker held round of conversations with OAS Ambassadors Betancourt, Figueres and Munoz Marin on out day resolution setting up an OAS committee to form a provisional government. (236)

Friday, May 7, 1965

- 12:32 a French Ambassador told Bennett events following classic communist pattern and that British, German and Italian Ambassadors agreed. (238)
- 1:37 a AP story quotes Caamano as saying he had ordered rebel radio to state that arms are available to anyone. (239)

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2:30 a Embassy transmits information collected on communist participation in rebel movement. (240)

10:30 a MFM to receive report of OAS Commission, Ambassadors orally reported on Commission in rebel movement. (241)

Bunker continued consultations on expanded OAS to help establish a new provisional government in the Dominican Republic.

12:28 - 12:45 p President met with Mann, Bundy and Bunker.

2:38 p Martin reported new Council of National Reconstruction (Imbert, Benoit, Postigo, Grisolia, Zeller) former, to be sworn in later in day. Bennett recommends immediate recognition. Imbert says Caamano wants to talk to him. (242)

5:11 p Mann wired Bennett that we welcome CNR, but we are not contemplating recognition because we seek collective OAS responsibility in setting up the provisional government. (242) (243)

5:30 p CNR Government sworn in. (244)

5:26 - 5:50 p President met with Rusk and Bundy. (245)

7:13 p Circular to all ARA posts explained our attitude toward CNR. (246)

8:48 p Bennett and Palmer given specific instructions on how to react with military force to save Palace held by Imbert men should rebels attack it. (247)

During
afternoon
and
midnight Bunker continued negotiations on new resolution.
Bunker delivered Rusk letter to OAS Commission replying to request that we adhere to "Act of Santo Domingo." (248)

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Saturday, May 8, 1965

1:55 a Bennett pointed out need to develop popular support for CNR and asked whether Balaguer would issue supporting statement. (249)

3:10 a MFM adjourned session started the previous day to consider OAS Commission report.

9:14 a President spoke with Mann byphone.

9:15 a Panama's Morrice begs to return to US under criticism for staying in Dominican Republic. (250)

9:26a President spoke with Mann by phone.

11:35 a Martin and Bennett request US hold up recognition of GNR. (251)

2:25 - 3:30 p President met with Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Mann, Vaughn, Harriman, Gaud, Raborn, Helms, McNaughton, Ball and Valenti. (252)

3:05 p Department told Bennett they would work on Balaguer. (253)

Afternoon Mora and Morrice saw Caamano and found him more intransigent than ever. (254)

6:05 p GNR wires OAS to confirm Bonilla as Dominican Republic Ambassador. (255)

8:45 p Rebels violated cease-fire of lines in past 24 hours.

9:58 p Balaguer agrees to cooperate. (256)

Sunday, May 9, 1968

President spent the day at Camp David. No record of any contact with staff on Dominican Republic matters.

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- 2:34 a Bennett reported Wessin is anathema to all elements of Dominican Republic opinion. Must retire and depart. Wessin gave Bennett letter promising retirement if other generals Wessin listed retired also. (257)
- 11:00 a Bennett reported Nuncio and others think Caamano under domination of Aristz and hard core group. (258)
- 11:17 a Bennett reported Radio Santo Domingo -- still in rebel hands north of LOC -- is a major public relations problem and extremely damaging to our cause. (259)
- 1:30 p Bennett reported that five generals and Navy commodore which Wessin wanted to leave as condition to his departure are embarked on ship off shore. Now question is: will Wessin leave? (260)
- 2:00 p Generals and Commodore sailed for Puerto Rico. Imbert announced departure. (261)
- 2:26 p Bennett and Palmer submitted their views on organization of IAPF. (262)
- 5:00 p Bennett reported Radio Santo Domingo had been jammed affair. (263)
- 6:53 p Morri~~ie~~ left for US.
- 9:33 p Bennett reported he trying to prevent Imbert from attacking rebels. Rebel sniping continues. Rebels reportedly making trips into interior. Under Solomon's direction, medical aid and food distribution is being systematized. (265)
- midnight Martin submitted his views on future of GNR and what our policy should be. Advised against locked-in US policy toward Imbert because of fluid situation. Urged recognition if Caamano surrenders. Hoped US troops can leave in 6 months. (264)

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Monday, May 10, 1965

Morning Bunker continued consultation on OAS authority to develop a provisional government. Resistance to Betancourt "wise men" formula hardening. Attitude prevails that Mora's presence in Dominican Republic is sufficient. Prospect of holding an MFM in Rio later in month diminishing.

11:51 a President spoke with Mann byphone.

1:15 p Bennett reported Embassy still under rifle and mortar fire. Ask authority to move INZ line eastward. (266)

3:40 p Caamano tells Mora because MFM seated GNR representative and not his man, he will no longer deal with OAS. Caamano sent telegram to MFM along same vein. (267)

4:09 p President spoke with Mann by phone.

4:11 p President spoke with Mann by phone.

6:10 - 7:08 p President met with Rusk, McNamara, Mann and Bundy. (268)

6:24 p Bennett and Palmer saw Wessin. Wessin said he would resign but not leave, thereby not keeping his promise. (269)

Afternoon Bunker urges OAS to reestablish strong presence in the Dominican Republic. (270)

Bunker asked OAS Commission approval to extend INZ. (271)

MFM approved resolution sending OAS Commission back to Dominican Republic with added authority to set up IAPF. (272)

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10:22 p Mann commented on Martin's previous day policy recommendations. Tells him to work for coalition regime in which Caamano and other non-communists acceptable to Imbert could be included. (273)

Evening Stewart found Betancourt bitter over opposition wise men from democratic prima donnas (Chile, Mexico, Peru) and strong men (Paraguay, Honduras, Nicaragua). He, Figueres and Munoz leaving Washington. Stewart also saw Tomic who felt no OAS instrument needed to avoid unilateral intervention again, said Chile wouldn't help IAF, was interested in Colombia's Caldera as wise man.

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-36- Authority State Ltr. 5/15/78
By Huv, NARS, Date 7/20/78

CHRONOLOGY (CONTINUED)

Tuesday, May 11, 1965

- 7:30 a Bennett in stirep observed GNR has still not gained political initiative. Wessin welshing is big blow. Work continuing behind the scenes to bring Imbert and Caamano together. (274)
- 3:30 p Martin reported on morning conversation with Caamano. Got impression he was softening on meeting with Imbert. (275)
- 5:09 p Text of Balaguer statement. (276)
- 5:40 - 6:45 p President met with Munoz Marin and Pepe Figueres. (277)
- 6:30 p OAS Commission Chairman Colombo and Guatemalan Ambassador returned Dominican Republic. (278)
- 9:39 p Martin reported Caamano blew up during afternoon talks because Imbert troops had been allowed through rebel zone via our lines. (279)

Wednesday, May 12, 1965

- 1:20 a Bennett reports that Radio Santo Domingo has declared him and all staff members persona non grata. (280)
- 2:30 a Bennett reported on session with OAS Commission in which he discussed ways of stopping inflammatory broadcasts by RSD and obtained the Commission's approval to extend the INZ to include the French Embassy, subject prior notification Caamano and Imbert. (281)
- 4:05 President reviewed Dominican developments with Raborn.
- 4:45 p Bowdler reported OAS Commission had talked to Caamano on extending INZ area. He raised no objection. Line moved at 4:00 p.m. (282)

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- 5:35 p Martin reported his decision to let the OAS Commission try to bring Imbert and Caamano together. Assessed significance of reports that rebels are trying to carry the fight to the interior. (283)
- 6:23 p Bennett reported rebel attack against GNR military installation in Santo Domingo north of the LOC. (284)
- 7:15 p Bennett in sitrep reported military situation deteriorating and GNR increasingly under pressure for some kind of offensive action to match continuing attacks and infiltration by rebels. (285)
- 8:33 p State and DOD sent message to Bennett and Palmer outlining news on setting up of IAPF. (286)
- 8:45 p Bowdler described sad performance of OAS Commission and need to get effective OAS presence in Dominican Republic. (287)

Thursday, May 13, 1965

- 12:05 a President spoke by phone with Mann and Vaughn.
- 2:39 a Bennett reported on OAS Commission's still unsuccessful efforts to get Imbert and Caamano to talk. Caamano wants intermediaries to meet first; then sends word he will not because Colombian member has spoken of communism in Caamano camp. (287)
- 1:00 p President spoke by phone with Fortas in San Juan.
- 1:45 p Bunker relayed President's desire that OAS Commission makes sure that rebels respect power plant as coming within INZ. (288)
- 2:00 p GNR aircraft machine gunned and knocked out RSD. (289)
- 3:10 p President spoke by phone with Mann.

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- 4:43 p OAS Secretariat-Washington informed State that Costa Rica (20 men) and Honduras (250 men) had agreed to send contingents. (290)
- 5:10 - 6:40 p President met in Cabinet Room with McNamara, Ball, Raborn, Helms, Vance, Mann, Vaughn, Crockett, Bundy, Moyers and Bundy. (291)
- Afternoon Rebel Foreign Minister Jottin Cury cabled U Thant protesting shooting up of RSD and declaring OAS Commission's inability to handle the situation in Santo Domingo. (292)
- 7:20 p Bennett in evening sitrep described increased number of shooting incidents and "hysteria" in rebel headquarters. RSD propaganda continues to be troublesome. (293)
- 8:25 p Mann informed Bennett and Palmer of secret mission of 2 Dominican military officers close to Bosch coming to Dominican Republic to speak with Caamano about formation of a coalition government. (294)
- 11:00 p Bennett submitted his recommendations on mechanics for setting up IAPF. (295)

Friday, May 14, 1965

- Midnight Remaining members of OAS Commission arrive in Santo Domingo. (296)
- 2:20 a Bowdler reports Caamano continues to boycott OAS Commission. Commission not sure where it stands and is talking of returning to Washington. (297)
- 10:30 a UN Security Council met and unanimously approved a resolution (1) calling for a cease-fire and (2) inviting the SYG to send a representative to the Dominican Republic to observe and report on the situation. (298)
- 12:01 p President spoke with Mann by phone.

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12:51 p President spoke with Mann by phone.

2:45 p President spoke with Fortas by phone.

5:51 - 8:13 p President met in Cabinet Room with McNamara, Ball, Raborn, Vance, Vaughn, Helms, Crockett and Bundy. Decided to send Bundy, Mann, Vance and Vaughn (Bundy Mission) to Dominican Republic. (299)

7:13 p Bennett reported Nuncio dejected and uncertain what to do. He sees no purpose in OAS Commission or himself trying to deal with Caamano. (300)

7:29 p President spoke to Fortas by phone with Bundy and Moyers.

7:30 p Bennett in evening stirep reported a stalemated situation with deterioration on political and economic fronts. (301)

8:45 p President spoke to Fortas by phone.

9:13 p President spoke to Mann by phone.

8:02 p Bennett reported Fernandez and Herrera have returned to Puerto Rico with Guzman. He does not know results of talks with Caamano. (302)

9:51 President spoke to Fortas by phone.

10:10 p President spoke to Mann by phone.

Saturday, May 15, 1965

7:00 a Bundy mission left for Dominican Republic. (303)

Afternoon UN-SYG advance team arrives in Santo Domingo.

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May 15, 1965

Dominican GNR troops initiated cleanup operation of area north and west of the US-held line of communications. Nicaraguan rifle company of 166 men and Costa Rican military police unit of 21 men arrived.

UN SYG's advance team arrived in Santo Domingo; team included Milrep Maj. Gen. R. J. Rikhye.

President made statement pledging US economic assistance if OAS mission succeeded in setting up a democratic and stable government. (304)

May 17, 1965

GNR forces of 1,224 men and 12 tanks continued mop-up in northern part of Santo Domingo.

OAS held closed informal meeting -- political discussion.

May 18, 1965

UN SYG's personal representative, Jose Mayobre, arrived in Santo Domingo and issued preliminary statement.

OAS held Eighth Plenary Session, heard second report of Special Committee which, however, not completed. Continuation of political report.

Bunker informed MFM that "Bundy Mission" objective was to lend maximum assistance to OAS efforts.

May 19, 1965

UN Security Council heard Mayobre's first report and SYG's recommendations.

OAS held Ninth Plenary Session, again appealed for a cease-fire. (305)

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Special 5-Nation Committee submitted its second report, recommending that the UN Security Council suspend all action until regional procedures have been exhausted and that a representative of the MFM be appointed in the DR. Special Committee's mission was terminated. (306)

May 20, 1965

OAS held Tenth Plenary Session and considered second report and resolutions on appointment of Special Representative. (306)

OAS held Eleventh Plenary Session and adopted resolution empowering OAS Secretary General Mora (then in DR) as its Special Representative there to negotiate a cease-fire, offer his good offices to the parties in conflict and coordinate action with the UN Representative. (307)

May 21, 1965

GNR completed drive in northern part of Santo Domingo. Brazil approved sending 1,350-man contingent to the Dominican Republic.

Mayobre obtained Imbert's and Caamano's agreement to 24 hour cease-fire.

In UN, Ambassador Stevenson introduced US resolution urging OAS intensify efforts ensure observation of cease-fire and requesting Mayobre coordinate his efforts with Mora's.

In UN, Soviet resolution condemning US actions in DR and calling for immediate withdrawal of US forces overwhelmingly defeated in SC.

OAS held Twelfth Plenary Session and adopted resolution exhorting contending forces to convert truce into permanent cease-fire and requesting Mora communicate resolution to them. (308)

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May 22, 1965

OAS held Thirteenth Plenary Session and adopted resolution on IAF requesting Brazil designate IAF commander and US deputy commander; empowered Secretary General assume powers mentioned in May 6 resolution setting up IAF. Resolution also established committee on functioning and maintenance of IAF. (309)

In UN Soviets proposed amendments to Uruguayan resolution eliminating references to OAS and substituting language from earlier Soviet resolution. These amendments were defeated. Uruguayan resolution also defeated.

May 23, 1965

Act establishing an Inter-American armed force was signed at 6:45 p.m. Advance Brazilian party arrived. General Hugo Panasco Alvim designated Commander of the Inter-American Force. (309a)

May 24, 1965

Second Brazilian contingent arrived.

In UN, SC continued to debate DR situation.

With encouragement from Governor Stevenson, LA UN delegates prepared to present SC with joint letter supporting OAS action in DR.

May 25, 1965

UN SC briefly discussed DR situation; adjourned without formal action.

Brazilian C-54's landed with 181 troops.

May 26, 1965

950 men of the 3/6 BLT, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade embarked incidental to withdrawal from the Dominican Republic. The USAF tactical fighter squadron at Ramey AFB returned to home station. Additional Brazilian troops landed in ten USAF C-130's, bringing Latin American contingent up to 1,035 men.

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May 27, 1965

3/6 Marine BLT with 1,600 men completed withdrawal.

In the OAS informal meeting of heads of delegations to Foreign Minister Meeting; informal meetings continued next day and following.

May 28, 1965

Last of Brazilian contingent arrived.

Brazilian and Paraguayan Foreign Ministers attended MFM.

Informal discussions continued in OAS on establishment of new Ad Hoc Committee to carry on with OAS good offices to both sides.

Presidential speech at Baylor University cited achievements in DR (evacuation of 6500; establishment of cease-fire, International Zone of Refuge and safe corridor; relief activities; prevention of communist take-overs; efforts by Hemisphere leaders to achieve durable peace; establishment of Inter-American Force), announced US troops withdrawing gradually; discussed "new realities" highlighted by DR events (fading distinction between civil war and international war, need for new international machinery for quick and decisive action, Communism as danger to entire free American system); promised US assistance in reconstruction and toward economic progress. (310)

May 29, 1965

General Hugo Panasco Alvim arrived. Inter-American Force consisted of 1,662 men.

May 31, 1965

General Panasco Alvim sworn in as Commander of the Inter-American Force.

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June 1, 1965

GNR maintaining pressure on rebels by sizable troop movements near INZ and in northern sector SD. US army lieutenant and two EM captured by rebel forces when accidentally entered rebel zone. Caamano ordered them turned over to OAS representative.

JCS directed return to CONUS of one of two US Marine Battalion Landing Teams still ashore in Santo Domingo.

President made two statements (a) calling attention to the relief work done by US representatives in cooperation with the OAS and private charitable agencies (3) and (b) welcoming additional efforts by OAS and Secretary General Mora toward a peace settlement and announcing a further withdrawal of US troops. (311)

Imbert agreed to turn over to the OAS the decision to fix date and nature of elections and take charge of their preparations.

June 2, 1965

OAS held Fourteenth Plenary Session - MFM resolution appointed ad hoc committee (US, El Salvador, Brazil) to visit DR to continue Secretary General's work and provide IAF with appropriate directive. (312) Name of IAF altered to Inter-American Peace Force. (313)

Inter-American Human Rights Commission Chairman Bianchi arrived in DR.

Bunker reported to MFM (by letter) on US contributions to DR relief effort in response to May 3 MFM resolution.

Neutralization of National Palace completed. Elements of Brazilian contingent took up positions around palace.

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June 3, 1965

In speech in Chicago, President announced withdrawal of all remaining units of US Marines. (314)

New disturbances in interior at San Juan and Higuey. Police returned fire causing some casualties. Reembarkation of the 1/8 US Marine Battalion Landing Team completed.

OAS ad hoc committee arrived in Santo Domingo.

UN SC met at Soviet insistence to hear charges by "FONMIN" Cury of violation of human rights in DR. No formal action taken.

June 4, 1965

Latest Embassy estimates gave Caamano hard-core military and paramilitary organization of 2,000 and 2,200 with approximately 9-10,000 weapons. GNR forces in Santo Domingo numbered 3,200.

11 cease-fire violations with US forces returning fire in five instances. Some casualties in rebel sector from mortar or bazooka fire from southeastern bank of Onamo; GNR firing suspected.

June 5, 1965

Eight cease-fire violations. Largest pro-rebel rally (6-10,000) to date held in Santo Domingo.

June 6, 1965

Eighteen cease-fire violations; US returned fire in five instances. All Marine personnel reembarked as of 1300 EDT and departed SD area.

June 7, 1965

Elements of 82nd Airborne Division replaced by Latin American Brigade. 82nd Airborne Division relieved of requirement to provide security forces for foreign embassies.

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June 8, 1965

Rebels announced that Caamano will head a high-level commission to negotiate with the OAS, and that no other insurgent group authorized to hold meetings with representatives of any foreign government. Embassy had numerous reports, but no solid indications, that disturbances being planned in various towns on sixth anniversary of the 14th June Movement. Also had reports of continued infiltration into countryside of agitators and weapons. Rebels captured 1 US officer, 2 soldiers in a jeep who strayed into rebel zone.

June 9, 1965

Public position of rebels seeming to be becoming more defiant. Their propaganda taking on more anti-US tone. GNR taking precautions against possible rebel disorders on or before June 14.

Three US military personnel captured by rebels on June 8 released. C-130 over Santo Domingo fired on by rebels; no damage.

COAS adopted resolution establishing Special Fund to defray costs of emergency aid operation in DR. (315)

June 10, 1965

General Palmer reported that IAPF negotiations with Caamano on Electric plant broken down over matter of expansion of the security force around the facility. US troops retaining control of the area. Reported agreement getting closer on allowing tankers to discharge at the normal point on east bank of the river. Rebel attitude towards OAS and US continued to harden, possibly reflecting a more dominant role by Communist elements. GNR position weakened by report of atrocities committed by its personnel. Resupply operations moved from Fort Andres to Haina area. Unloading to start on June 11.

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June 11, 1965

Rebels seeking to capitalize on atrocity stories. Loyalists taking special security measures throughout interior in view of possible disorders in next few days. Reports continued that GNR forces intend to sweep rebel-held areas of capital soon.

West central portion of INZ turned over to Latin American Brigade.

U Thant replied to French inquiry as to adequacy UN staff and mandate to observe and report on DR situation, that staff adequate for present mandate but if it expanded more UN staff will be required.

June 12, 1965

Two OAS military police patrols harassed by GNR troops in northeastern SD for first time. No fire exchanged. IAPF subsequently reaffirmed to GNR representatives that IAPF forces will move anywhere in DOMREP required by their mission.

June 13, 1965

GNR's "Parade of Democratic Rededication" drew largest number of participants since Trujillo's day, possibly as many as 30,000.

June 14, 1965

SD quiet as small, controlled rebel rally held. No disturbances in interior. GNR forces on alert. Two pro-rebel ships, purportedly bringing food/medicine from San Juan to SD, will be escorted by GNR Navy to Haina for cargo inspection by OAS personnel.

Elements of rebel forces opened fire on a contingent of Brazilian security troops on perimeter of INZ about midnight. Sporadic exchange of small arms fire continued about half an hour. A rebel colonel later apologized to the Brazilians and promised that the instigators would be court-martialed. No casualties reported.

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June 15, 1965

Several incidents indicating greater rebel belligerency. At 0850 EDT a major firing incident using mortars, tanks, and bazookas directed against US checkpoint 2 occurred, and at noon they attacked Brazilian forces at checkpoint 5 and the National Palace. At 1015 EDT US troops of the IAPF engaged the rebels and moved two blocks to the west and four blocks to the south of the IOC to occupy dominant terrain in the vicinity of the power plant. As result of action IAPF troops have occupied approximately 30 blocks of SD formerly held by the rebels. Twenty-four US Army personnel and one Brazilian Marine lieutenant were wounded in the fighting.

June 16, 1965

Incidents of 15 June provide further evidence that extremists in Caamano camp making major decisions. Caamano admitted to Mayobre that he not sure his orders to stop shooting would be heeded. No response from interior to rebels' call for violence. Sporadic firing by rebels continued south of power plant. Rebels also fired on Brazilian and Honduran IAPF contingents. Over 300 personnel from rebel area have given up or been captured in the last two days. Rebels set fire to large warehouses along river on 15th. Total US casualties to date stand at 22 dead and 151 wounded.

June 17, 1965

Indications that some rank and file rebels wanted to defect, but none that hard-core commandoes were weakening or that the leaders ready to give up. Two of latter appealed again yesterday for members of GNR armed forces to join them. No disturbances in provinces.

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Statement by President concerning renewed unprovoked attacks on Inter-American Force in violation of the cease-fire and reiterating the US troops' policy of "soldierly restraint." (316)

June 18, 1965

Ad Hoc Committee presented to MFM proposed solution: (a) General elections in 6 to 9 months under supervision of OAS technical advisory election team and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; (b) IAPF reduced to minimum necessary to maintain peace for elections, (c) full amnesty to participants in rebellion, with armed forces returning to quarters, (d) provisional government representing all sectors to be established with OAS assistance and an authority of Institutional Act to be drafted by Dominican jurists, (e) Constitutional Assembly to be called within 6 months of assumption of office of elected government. (317)

MFM discussed June 15-16 IAPF return of fire against rebel attack and extension southward of LOC.

Situation in Santo Domingo generally quiet. Eight random incidents involving single rounds fired by rebel forces at US positions; no US return fire. US soldier wounded several hours after Caamano assured OAS of strict cease-fire.

June 19, 1965

Rebel radio broadcast labor group's call for 3-day general strike, starting 21st. GNR police ready for reported follow-up on armed uprisings in interior. J-2 COMDOMREP estimated that rebel morale fair to poor and growing worse, but reparable; arms in very short supply. US soldier wounded.

June 20, 1965

Bosch asked for visa to Venezuela but President Leoni trying to avoid. Sent emissary to San Juan to discuss.

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June 21, 1965	Strike fizzled. Rebels protested failure IAPF to withdraw from advanced positions they took June 15-16.
June 22, 1965	Caamano admitted dangerous for him to go to certain areas because people "shoot at anybody."
June 23, 1965	COMDOMREP concluded military threat confined to Santo Domingo; believed rebels lack capability/popular support in interior. Rebels accepted OAS peace proposals in principle but made stipulated additions.
June 25, 1965	Rebel group attacked police post and captured arms at San Francisco de Macoris. Rebels reportedly planning harassing attacks against US Embassy and US military personnel in Santo Domingo.
June 26-27, 1965	Rebels reportedly placing dynamite charges in public buildings in SD. Looting continued. Rebel discension over future tactics may account for near breakdown of order in their zone. GNR blaming OAS/US for preventing it from cleaning up "nucleus of infection." Paraguayan contingent of IAPF arrived 26th.
June 28, 1965	Balaguar arrived in Santo Domingo.
June 29, 1965	Three unprovoked rebel attacks made on US troops. Fire returned in one instance. No casualties.
June 30, 1965	Bosch gave up plan to leave Puerto Rico for present. Four instances of rebel firing at US soldiers; no return fire. Former Triumvirate President Donald Reid Cabral left country.
July 1, 1965	Several members of pro-Castro 14th of June group requested asylum in Colombian Embassy; one taken in. Possible sign of deterioration of morale/unity among some hitherto hard-core resisters.

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In unannounced radio speech, Imbert said would retire in favor of OAS-sponsored provisional government provided both the armed forces and democratic parties supported it.

Rebels attacked police station at Ramon Santana, 11 miles west of San Pedro de Macoris.

July 2, 1965

Shots from speeding car directed against Balaguer's residence in early morning hours. Police guards returned fire.

Presidential statement announces further withdrawal of US troops -- 2 battalions of 82nd Airborne Division, totalling 1400 persons. (318)

July 4-5, 1965

New obstacles placed in way of outlook for early political solution by Bosch who has urged his followers not to accept Garcia Godoy as president of provisional government. Military leaders of GNR have made it clear that their willingness to sacrifice Imbert did not extend to any other candidate being pushed by rebels.

OAS Commission notified Caamano that US MSTTS tanker will move up Ozama River to deliver fuel oil for power plant on July 5. Caamano held responsible for safety. OAS forces alerted.

July 6, 1965

Reports continued that rebels transporting arms to interior. Fairly heavy firing broke out along sector of rebel perimeter. Machine guns, rifles, and possibly one mortar or rocket launcher involved in outbreak in vicinity of Brazilian troop area.

Recent GNR moves believed intended to intensify the war of nerves and elicit a violent reaction from the rebels. They sailed a corvette into

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the Ozama River on July 5 and moved tanks/ howitzers from the fair grounds toward the edge of the ISZ. These were later withdrawn at the request of the IAPF.

Rebel defenses reacted alertly to a recent 82nd Abn Bn exercise along the LOC. They handled their communications well and apparently had a coordinated defense plan.

OAS Sec Gen Mora returned to Washington.

July 7, 1965

Stated intention of pro-Castro June 14th group to continue to fight even if Caamano recognizes a provisional government (PG) and gives up control of rebel zone in SD. Declaration made against background of recent defections from group and changes in its leadership. GNR's latest public commentary has assumed decided anti-OAS tone, reiterating that GNR is, in fact, the PG.

One US soldier captured but released. Decided that beginning on 9 July, combined US-Latin American patrols will penetrate interior of country for good-will purposes.

July 8, 1965

Rebel groups approved Garcia Godoy as provisional president.

Daily IAPF patrols to interior postponed.

Informal MFM hears oral report from Mora who supported IAPF actions, U.S. financial aid through PAU, other aspects OAS, against criticism from Colombian (Vazquez Carrizosa) and others who felt MFM had not fully participated in some decisions.

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July 9, 1965	Five mortar rounds fired from GNR area into LOC and rebel zone, wounding one Dominican civilian in LOC.
	Withdrawal of first US Army Paratroop Bn begun, to be completed July 11th. Second Paratroop Bn scheduled to start withdrawal July 12.
July 12, 1965	More than 20,000 attended rebel-sponsored rally in SD. Posters flaunted were anti-US and anti-GNR.
July 14, 1965	Pro-ChiCom Dominican Popular Movement and pro-Castro 14th of June group reportedly signed pact to continue the fight -- even without Caamano if necessary.
	Rebels have been beating and arresting civilians near IAPF positions. Action being taken to permit IAPF troops to intervene to prevent such mistreatment. Rebel fire was directed at IAPF troops including Hondurans, Brazilians, Paraguayans, and US. Fire returned by Latin Americans but not US.
July 15, 1965	Twenty-nine communications personnel airlifted to DOMREP bringing total of Paraguayans there to 212. Rebel protest led to withdrawal of joint IAPF/GNR police patrols.
July 16, 1965	White House announced return of Ambassador Bunker to Washington on July 15 and his consultation within USG. (319)
July 17, 1965	OAS Ad Hoc Committee (including Ambassador Bunker) reported to MFM on activities to date. (320)

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July 20, 1965

At 0300 22 mortar rounds were fired into rebel zone from the GNR-held area of SD, killing 1 civilian and wounding another.

Rebel attacks on US and OAS at UNSC meeting supported by Soviet representative. No UN action.

July 21-31, 1965

Almost daily occurrences of rebel fire against IAPF forces occurred. No serious incidents.

August 3, 1965

Armed forces leadership issued communique on Commission and reintegration of rebel military. Communists laid plans for future fighting. Security strengthened by IAPF command on western sector of the ISZ.

August 10, 1965

OAS presented "Act of Reconciliation" to contending factions. Imbert and Caamano expected to make counterproposals and to suggest changes.

August 12, 1965

Continued refusal by Caamano group to approve the Act of Reconciliation providing an opportunity for extremist elements on CNR side to try to change Imbert's decision to sign. Chief problems for rebels were integration of their zone with the INZ, and their fear that the clause re reintegration of rebel military officers into the armed forces implied continuation of the GNR military leadership.

August 13, 1965

Rebels appealed to UNSC claiming OAS "forcing" them to accept some repugnant proposals. They insisted that, before accepting PG, GNR military leaders must be dismissed.

August 15, 1965

In fluctuating situation, rebels' negotiating position on removal of four top GNR military leaders prior to formation of PG reported to be softening. GNR military accepted reintegration of dissident officers into armed forces. 14th of July Group and pro-Peiping Dominican Popular Movement still aggressively trying to frustrate settlement.

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August 18, 1965 The long delay in reaching agreement on the PG provoking increased hostility to the idea from both left and right.

August 20, 1965 GNR leaders continued to express concern over rebel dilatory tactics, suspecting rebel aiming to gain time for further training and organization. Imbert suggested that OAS present final proposal, and, if this rejected, to install interim administration.

August 22, 1965 Caamano and Bosch party overrode leftist hard liners and drew closer to acceptance of the "Act of Reconciliation."

August 25, 1965 Preliminary reaction of the GNR military to the amended "Act" unanimously negative. GNR service chiefs said to feel Garcia Godoy made commitments contrary to the interests of military and the Dominican Republic.

August 26, 1965 Rebel media discussing post-settlement matters. Continuing to tout Caamano as head of "popular front." GNR response to amended Act may not forthcoming for few days yet; Secretary of Armed Forces Rivera Caminero told American Embassy he understood reply would be negative. AmEmb said Rivera gave no indication that military would attempt change GNR decision, or that they would not consider selves bound by it. AmEmb also said no headway made with Imbert. GNR announced major public meeting August 29 to show that it is "ready to defend country against Communist menace."

August 27, 1965 Widespread rumors that the GNR will reject the revamped OAS proposals. The GNR making a major effort to have a large crowd at its "anti-Communist demonstration. Speakers may also attack the OAS, demand it settle crisis quickly or withdraw and let Dominicans resolve it themselves.

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August 29, 1965

The US Ambassador reported that a reliable source advised that General Imbert, following the GNR rally, has told military chiefs he intends to accept OAS Committee solution. Chiefs, polled one by one, all indicated personal acceptance. Imbert spoke of taking public action August 31. For 2nd consecutive night moderate to heavy firing took place in Santo Domingo, apparently between rebel and Latin American forces.

Presidential statement in support of OAS Committee's proposed changes in "Act of Reconciliation." (321)

August 30, 1965

Imbert government resigned. In bitter speech, Imbert implied his action forced by US pressure. Stated he would not sign Act of Reconciliation. Said GNR to remain as caretaker government pending formation of PG. Rivera indicated military would, if necessary, take over long enough to sign Act, provided they received previously arranged letter of clarification from Garcia Godoy. Caamano asked to sign today. Prior to Imbert's resignation, he had reiterated his agreement to do so. Rivera told Garcia Godoy that he suspected Wessin was responsible for mortar firing night of August 29.

August 31, 1965

Rebels signed Act of Reconciliation, claiming it a victory for their side. Rivera signed for the GNR, which requested its functionaries remain on job pending formation of a provisional government. Imbert reportedly said he intends to remain in DR, form anti-Communist political party. Communist leaders reported working to form front group in order to speed withdrawal of IAPF.

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September 1, 1965 President Johnson met with OAS Sec Gen Mora, publicly thanked him, OAS, and members of OAS Ad Hoc Committee for their work toward reaching agreement concerning new government in DR, and promised continued US cooperation with OAS in restoring peace and prosperity in DR. (322)

Presidential statement expressed gratification at agreement. (323)

September 3, 1965 Hector Garcia Godoy installed as Provisional President. Dominican Popular Movement chief said his group will not give up arms. President did not announce military appointments.

A rifle grenade fired from an unknown source killed a US Army soldier. Small arms fire was directed at a US unit command post. A total of 26 US military personnel have been killed and 155 wounded in the Dominican Republic.

President sends letters of thanks to OAS Sec Gen Mora, US Representative to COAS Bunker and US Ambassador to DR Bennett. (324)

September 4, 1965 White House publishes letters of reply from Bunker and Bennett. (325)

September 5, 1965 Decree published that the Armed Forces training Center (CEFA) would immediately be integrated into the National Armed Forces.

September 6, 1965 In a meeting of over 100 military officers, armed forces' leaders urged support of Garcia Godoy and the return to a professional, non-political role for the military. The president appeared and promised that a decree would be issued immediately naming Rivera Caminero Minister of Defense and confirming the service chiefs in their positions.

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- September 9, 1965 General Wessin y Wessin left country after Garcia Godoy requested the OAS assistance and Ambassador Bunker authorized the IAPF to take necessary measures to assure his departure.
- September 10, 1965 Garcia Godoy announced there would be no more military changes at this time and ordered all troops still deployed in and around city to return to their barracks.
- September 12, 1965 Rebels leaving SD for homes in provinces. Extremist leaders continue to insist that they cannot disband and disarm until top military leaders are ousted.
- September 15, 1965 Rivera Caminero distressed over Garcia Godoy's actions which he considers as leaning over too far to curry favor with the leftists. Rivera threatening drastic action if nothing done to stop leftist inroads. USDA TT said president signed decrees re appointing military incumbents, but has not published it.
- September 17, 1965 Rivera Caminero warned US military attaches that president intends to request their recall.
- Rivera, irritated by exit from former rebel zone of Caamano et al with arms and entourage of armed guards, issued orders that any rebels found outside zone with arms were to be shot. General Alvin directing IAPF not to permit persons with arms through checkpoints. Deadline for surrender of rebel arms not met.
- September 21, 1965 Caamano claimed all civilians in rebel zone disarmed. A few weapons were turned over to a committee of government, OAS, UN, and army representatives.

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- September 22, 1965 JCS authorized deployment of one tank company to DOMREP and return of one airborne infantry battalion (2/325) to Fort Bragg.
- September 23, 1965 Leftists installed a new rector and university council at University of Santo Domingo.
- September 24, 1965 OAS Ad Hoc Committee made second general report to the MFM covering actions leading to setting up of the Provisional Government. (326)
- September 25, 1965 Juan Bosch returned to Dominican Republic. In address to crowd he blamed US for directing the revolution and violating civil liberties in the country. ?
- The 2nd Bn, 325th Inf was redeployed to home station with air movement to be completed on 26th and surface move on 30th.
- September 26, 1965 President proposed to announce Rivera's replacement, to be followed by order to rebels to turn in arms and reintegrate officers. President dissuaded by US Ambassador.
- September 28-29, 1965 President's decree putting police under Ministry of Interior, naming commission to coordinate reintegration of rebel officers, and the promulgation of a reintegration decree, all without consultation with Minister of Defense precipitated crisis. At meeting of president and armed forces' leaders agreed police would remain under Interior but new commission to be named and reintegration formula changed.
- October 4, 1965 Time bomb exploded in a Santo Domingo bar, injuring 10 US soldiers and 4-5 Dominican civilians, none seriously. Perpetrators not known, but action is type which leftists and Communists have been threatening to take against US forces. Meanwhile, reintegration of rebel military has petered out, for time

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being at least. No definitive progress has been made on arms turn-in -- those collected and verified by OAS group earlier have not disappeared and presumably are again dispersed among rebels. No action yesterday by National Police to move to Conservatory of Music as initial step in Garcia Godoy plan re taking over of rebel zone. Reports of rightist plotting to round up Communists persist; Santiago, San Francisco de Macoris, and La Vega are focal points in these reports.

October 5, 1965

Dominican Air Force chief concerned that base commander at Santiago unable to get money or credit for food; Garcia Godoy says there is none available. President reported to be embarrassed when Caamano, in presence of Rivera, commented that "last 10,000 pesos you gave me are all gone." US AirAtt repeats that military chiefs unable to support Garcia Godoy much longer unless situation changes.

October 8, 1965

Caamano still insists that all rebel military (1,350 he claims) be given chance to re-enter Armed Forces. However, rebels still want Rivera, service chiefs, and police chief removed first. Meanwhile, Garcia Godoy seems now to favor a proposal for getting on with opening of the rebel zone without waiting for reintegration; plan calls for gradual removal of IAPF checkpoints, accompanied by gradual introduction of national police into rebel zone.

October 9, 1965

President Garcia Godoy approved a plan for the dissolution of the rebel zone in Santo Domingo. On 10 October, the police will move into the southwest corner of the zone, setting up their headquarters from where they will proceed to reintegrate rebel police elements. Allowing two days for this, the last action will begin on October 12 with the cessation of the search at check points by IAPF elements and their withdrawal from advanced positions. If action is

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finally taken to dissolve the rebel zone, it will be a step toward placating the Dominican military. Much will still remain to be done to allay its doubts about Garcia Godoy.

- October 11, 1965 Police made successful entry into rebel zone yesterday afternoon. No incidents. However, two recently integrated rebel officers badly beaten by angry soldiers yesterday morning in the Armed Forces Training Center.
- October 13, 1965 A medium tank company with 116 personnel and 17 M-48 A1 tanks departed for the Dominican Republic from Fort Stewart, Georgia. Unit to embark on LSTs USS CADDOPARISH and USS CHESTERFIELD COUNTY. ETA Port Jaina, Dominican Republic October 19.
- The rebel zone was demilitarized by the evacuation of 1,225 rebels to a military camp under IAPF supervision. No incidents.
- October 14, 1965 Rebel zone declared demilitarized and the IAPF was closing all checkpoints, removing barbed wire and barricades. IAPF to fall back from LOC to outskirts of city about October 25,
- October 17, 1965 Situation quiet but uneasy. Murder of rightist Cabral could lead to further Communist-instigated violence against rightists and to retaliation on their part. Radio Santo Domingo echoing Communist attacks on US, IAPF and Dominican military leaders.
- October 18, 1965 Another crisis may be building as result of stalemated military reintegration and failure of Garcia Godoy to authorize armed forces to enforce new arms collection law. Renewed violence (2 dead, several wounded at docks) and military moves into the capital (troops and tanks to Ozama fortress) are adding to

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fear and tension. Armed Forces Minister may instigate civilian uprising tomorrow to force Garcia Godoy to take stronger position against Communists.

- October 19, 1965 MFM adopted resolution wishing Dominican people well on return to institutional normality and asking inter-American agencies to cooperate with the Provisional Government. (327)
- October 22, 1965 After many postponements and false starts, arms collection began. Collection reported to be rather haphazard affair. Heavy firing heard the night before but died down with no important aftermath. Armed forces restless.
- October 24, 1965 Crisis provoked by firing and by attacks on PG by a clandestine radio. Pro-rebel government ministers claimed military coup imminent; Garcia Godoy called for and received IAPF protection. Subsequently, negotiations have resolved around root problem whether first priority should be given to removal of military chiefs or to completion of disarmament. President and all cabinet have demanded early removal of "insubordinate" chiefs; OAS committee is insisting disarmament (complete farce to this point) be finished first. In this impasse, President has evidenced interest in Balaguer formula to send 4 rebel leaders including Caamano and Montes Arache, out of country at same time as chiefs are replaced ; no decision made yet. Meanwhile, tension grown heavier with pro-rebels threatening general strike today, and with rightist activity reported in the Gibso area. Imbert also is reportedly maneuvering against PG, despite NAVATT efforts to dissuade him.

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- October 25, 1965 Garcia Godoy closed down Communist newspapers and Bosch has moved from the former rebel zone. Situation a little better; however, National Police have not yet entered zone in force as was expected due probably to poor police leadership. General Palmer and Alvin talked with Rivera Caminero about "proper role of armed forces." Strike did not come off. IAPF forces occupied former rebel zone with no incidents or casualties.
- October 26, 1965 IAPF in effective control of Santo Domingo; giving provisional government chance to get on with meaningful arms collection. Known results, however, are zero. Offices of Communist parties occupied by IAPF and their newspapers closed pursuant to PG order. National Police performing only perfunctory duties. Pressures still building to remove military chiefs soonest; threatening strike to this end by government employees. Imbert maintaining counterpressure on chiefs to move against PG. General Palmer reports that chiefs continue to cooperate by avoiding rash actions, and that they still confident US will not let them down. Chiefs have indicated they willing step aside once threat of Communist take-over quelled.
- October 28, 1965 Capital quiet, but two small-scale anti-US/OAS demonstrations may be sign hard-core elements preparing to beef up previously feeble protest against IAPF show of force in entering former rebel zone. Arms collection has turned up a few old shotguns and revolvers. COMDOMREP J-2 holds positive proof Caamano involved in clandestine radio broadcasts which said Rivera and present chiefs responsible for latest crisis. Garcia Godoy visited rebel camp with Caamano; on departure, President said he intended to ask OAS to lift restrictions which prevented anyone (except Caamano) from leaving camp.

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October 29, 1965

Situation still tense, with an increase in firing the night before. Joint IAPF and National Police patrol in downtown area underway. Garcia Godoy has had constructive talk with Rivera and chiefs, though specifics of command problem apparently not discussed. Chiefs have told President they willing to accept 300-plus rebel military for immediate reintegration under existing agreements.

October 31, 1965

Some improvement in relations between Garcia Godoy and his military leaders during the past few days. For the moment at least, Santo Domingo seems to be relatively calm. There is a report, however, that the government workers' union is to call a general strike on conjunction with anti-IAPF demonstrations by the Communist Dominican Popular Movement on 4 and 5 November.

Garcia Godoy, during trip to San Isidro air base, is reported to have "solemnly" assured officers there that he would make no changes in the armed forces "at this time."

November 7, 1965

Garcia Godoy apparently now trying to gain favor with moderates and conservatives, and does not intend to make changes in the high command soon. Search for arms in rebel zone completed -- unsuccessfully; Garcia Godoy plans new scheme of pay for weapons turned in. Several shooting incidents occurred in capital yesterday afternoon, otherwise city remains calm.

November 12, 1965

Saboteurs burned micro-wave telephone unit at the international airport, temporarily interrupting communications with the city. Air operations are not affected. Except for this incident, city continues to show signs of returning to normal.

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82nd Airborne began redeployment to Fort Bragg of 3rd Bn and 82nd Hq Group. Four infantry bns remain.

November 16, 1965 Garcia Godoy continues to make gradual progress toward stabilizing the country and now is beginning to work on basic economic and social development plans. Rumors of right-wing coup continue, but it is believed that the President's recent moves to regain confidence of moderates have reduced support for rightist-extremist action.

Phase VI redeployment from the Dominican Republic consisting of elements of Hqs, 82nd Abn Div, 3/325 Inf and division support units completed departure from the Dominican Republic this afternoon. A total of 944 personnel were redeployed to CONUS by surface and air transportation. US forces in the Dominican Republic now total 6,350.

November 19, 1965 President Garcia Godoy says he is very satisfied with Minister of Defense Rivera Caminero and may not replace him. Rivera Caminero believed to know of rightist coup plans but refused to join them. Scheme of paying bonus for arms turn-in has had little results. Santo Domingo orderly.

November 21, 1965 Rightist civilians in Santiago attempted to form a new government early this morning. The unexpected presence of LAPF forces near the city apparently caused sufficient last-minute confusion to defeat their efforts.

November 22, 1965 The Dominican military leadership fully supported Garcia Godoy prior to and during the abortive rightist coup of November 21-22.

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- November 23, 1965 Minister of Defense Rivera Caminero and navy chief Jimenez told Ambassador Bunker that they would resign unless changes were made in the government. They feel that they have lost support of the rightists because of their role in the Santiago coup attempt, and they are angered at Garcia Godoy's failure to sack leftist attorney general Morel Corda as he had promised.
- November 24, 1965 The belated announcement of the resignation of Morel Corda has eased the latest crisis in government.
- November 25, 1965 The rightist coup attempt appears to have sparked further Garcia Godoy initiatives against the left: a key law bans strike and political activity by government workers; new attorney general told to oust 5 extremist judges; judicial police to be abolished soon, etc. MoD Rivera Caminero has again told armed forces that continued military support of PG mandatory.
- November 28, 1965 Embassy reports increasingly cordial relations between Garcia Godoy and service chiefs. President satisfied with yesterday's talks on reintegration; chiefs, with progress to date on weapons' purchase program.
- December 1, 1965 Decree issued setting June 1, 1966 as election date.
- December 8, 1965 Strike called at Jaina sugar mill over issue of Christmas bonus.
- December 16, 1965 Widespread disorders in SD as leftist groups attempted to embarrass the government by exploiting issue of reduced Christmas bonuses. One US Army truck damaged when set afire by a rock-throwing mob.

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- December 16-17, 1965 US troops moved across Duarte Bridge and occupied high ground on western side to secure bridge and protect power plant. Also keeping LOC open. Composite military/police force ordered into city 17th to clear the streets and restore order.
- December 19, 1965 Caamano, Montes Arache, and group of rebels journeyed to Santiago to attend mass and lay wreath on tomb of "Constitutionalist" hero. Firing broke out and "Constitutionalists" took refuge in hotel where surrounded by armed forces. In subsequent fire fight number on both sides killed. IAPF finally intervened to restore order. Caamano and other "Constitutionalists" returned to SD by IAPF. Rioting broke out in SD when word of Santiago affair reached there.
- December 20, 1965 General strike called to demand ouster of armed forces' chiefs -- held responsible for Santiago affair by leftists -- was partially successful.
- General Alvim told he will be replaced. Left for Rio but expects to return January 4 until his replacement arrives.
- December 21, 1965 First lieutenant in Dominican Police fatally shot by unidentified assailant, reportedly MPD, in SD. Minister of Defense and 350-400 officers met and drew up a position paper to be presented to president if he asks for it. Includes statement that no regular military personnel will be removed from armed forces or country and there will be no integration until Caamano and Montes Arache leave country.
- December 31, 1965 -- Spate of rumors re moves by left or right
January 1, 1966 extremists continues. Garcia Godoy announced to press on 1st that he would speak to nation on January 3 re official report of December 19

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January 3, 1966 President Garcia Godoy announced that an "important group" of military officers, including both regular and rebel, would shortly depart the country for diplomatic assignments or tour/study trips.

January 6, 1966 President announced top rebel leaders and regular military officers including MoD Rivera Caminero and the army and air force chiefs were being sent abroad and named replacements for their positions. Navy chief Jimanez was named to replace Rivera.

January 7, 1966 Military leaders refused to obey president's decree removing them. OAS Committee in SD announced unequivocal support for the President. "Constitutionalist" leaders make no comment. President requested OAS committee to have IAPF seize radio station and communications center from armed forces which took them over. General Alvim refused to use IAPF against Dominican armed forces, said it was a political matter.

January 8, 1966 IAPF commander and deputy commander met with armed forces' chiefs and agreed on turn-over of radio and telecommunications facilities to IAPF on understanding that they will not be used for political purposes or attacks on armed forces. Rebel elements headed by Caamano and Aristy called for general strike beginning January 10 to force ouster of armed forces' leaders and prevent departure of "Constitutionalists."

January 10-11, 1966 Strike call relatively unsuccessful but riots and disorders erupted in SD in support of strike. Police and IAPF broke up mobs and demonstrations as they occurred. Strike called off evening of 11th. Six second-level "Constitutionalist" officers left for foreign assignments on 11th.

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January 13, 1966	MoD Rivera Caminero's home machine-gunned by leftists. No injuries. He and Jimenez told president plan to reintegrate rebels at 27th Feb camp as unit not workable and dangerous. President agreed to reconsider.
March 1, 1966	Political "truce" ends as three-month campaign for election opens.
March 6, 1966	UN observer Mayobre gave New York Times an interview in which he recognized success and merit of US action to assure the Dominican people free choice of their government. (328)
April 13, 1966	Ambassador Bennett leaves Santo Domingo; John Hugh Crimmins becomes Charge d'affaires.
May 11, 1966	MFIM adopted resolution authorizing OAS-SYG to send observers to the June 1, 1966 election.(329)
June 1, 1966	Elections held under ideal weather conditions. Turnout large. No significant disturbances. Forty-one OAS observers from 18 Western Hemisphere countries invited by Provisional Government through Sec Gen of OAS were present in different parts of the country. Joaquin Balaguer wins 57% of vote, defeating Juan Bosch for Presidency. Balaguer's party wins sizable majority in both houses of Congress, but Bosch's party controls Santo Domingo area.
June 24, 1966	MFIM directs withdrawal of IAPF to begin before July 1, 1966 and to be completed within 90 days from first withdrawals. (330)
June 28, 1966	Crimmins presents credentials as US Amb to DR. IAPF begins withdrawal.

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July 1, 1966 Balaguer government takes office.

September 21, 1966 IAPF completes withdrawal.

Ad Hoc Committee report on the withdrawal. (331)

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MARTIN'S REPORT ON BOSCH FOLLOWS:

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FOLLOWING APPROPRIATE CONSULTATION, I WENT TO SAN JUAN AND
TALKED TO HIM ABOUT TEN HOURS MAY 2 AND 3. EXPLAINED OUR PURPOSES
AND DESCRIBED TRUE SITUATION IN DOMREP.

BOSCH SCARCELY ABLE TO UNDERSTAND EVEN PHYSICAL DEVASTATION
AND QUASE-WARTIME CONDITIONS. IS COMPLETELY UNABLE BELIEVE
THAT WHAT
BEGAN AS A PRD REBELLION HAS BEEN TAKEN OVER BY CASTRO/
COMMUNISTS, UNSCRUPULOUS MILITARY MEN, AND ADVENTURERS ALL

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Authority State Ltr 3/1/76

By hmg, NARS, Date 8/30/77

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MERGED INTO VIOLENT EXTREMIST LEADERSHIP. IS COMPLETELY OUT OF TOUCH
WITH REALITY.

FOR EXAMPLE, SAID CONGRESS (ELECTED WITH HIM IN 1962) IS MEETING
TODAY TO ENACT REFORM LEGISLATION; PROPOSED CAAMANO AND HIS
TROOPS INSTALL MOLINA URENA IN PALACE AS CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT.
(THIS WOULD INVOLVE CROSSING MARINE-HELD PERIMETER OF INTER-
NATIONAL ZONE, TAKING MOLINA URENA OUT OF ASYLUM IN COLOMBIAN
EMBASSY, TAKING HIM BACK THROUGH PERIMETER, AND SEIZING PALACE,
WHICH REPORTED GUARDED BY LOYALIST POLICE AND FULL COUNTER-
INSURGENCY TRAINED COMPANY.) SAID
CONGRESS MIGHT ELECT A DIFFERENT PRESIDENT AND BOSCH HAD TOLD
CAAMANO THAT BOSCH'S CANDIDATES WERE EITHER CAAMANO HIMSELF
OR COL. FERNANDEZ DOMINGUEZ, NOW IN EXILE. SAID CAAMANO
DECLINED PRESIDENCY.

FOREGOING INDICATES BOSCH'S STATE OF MIND. IT RESULTS, I THINK,
FROM HIS NATURAL INABILITY TO FACE REALITY, PLUS WHAT MAY BE
CAAMANO'S DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF FACTS TO BOSCH.
(THEY TALK BY TELEPHONE SEVERAL TIMES A DAY.)

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1330, MAY 3, FROM SANTO DOMINGO

BOSCH FIRST DECLARED ONLY SOLUTION TO U.S. MARINE OCCUPATION "FOR MANY YEARS. THEN PROPOSED MOLINA URENA BE INSTALLED IN PALACE BYCAAMANO. THEN PROPOSED MOLINA URENA BE INSTALLED THERE BY U.S. MARINES WITH MARINES PRESENT FOR POSSIBLY SIX MONTHS, THEN SAID HE WOULD RELUCTANTLY REASSUME PRESIDENCY AS DUTY

PAGE THREE RUESSD 0575 ~~SECRET~~
(THOUGH SAID, "IT IS NOT POSSIBLE. I AM 'BURNED.'" THIS IS THE CHARACTERISTIC GLIMMER OF REALITY ALWAYS FOUND IN BOSCH'S DREAMS.)

WHEN I SUGGESTED HE MAKE HELPFUL STATEMENT ALONG LINES DEVELOPED IN CONSULTATION HE SAID: (1) HE CATEGORICALLY WILL NOT RECOGNIZE THE DANGER OF A CASTRO/COMMUNIST TAKEOVER; (2) WILL CALL FOR CEASEFIRE; (3) CATEGORICALLY WILL NOT CALL ON U.S. FORCES TO KEEP ORDER FOR MINIMUM PERIOD (NOR EVEN "ACCEPT" U.S. FORCES' PRESENCE); (4) MIGHT SAY SOMETHING ABOUT OAS; (5) WILL CALL FOR RESUMPTION CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT BY DOMINICANS BUT WILL NOT CALL FOR ELECTIONS (SINCE IN HIS VIEW HE IS IN FACT THE ELECTED PRESIDENT UNTIL FEBRUARY 27, 1966, WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, HE SAYS PRECLUDES HIS RETURN TO DOMREP AS PRIVATE CITIZEN BEFORE THAT DATE). INSTEAD, HE DRAFTED OWN STATEMENT WHICH DID RECEDE SOMEWHAT FROM PREVIOUS PUBLIC UTTERANCES IN THAT IT INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO BE HELPFUL RATHER THAN SIMPLY SAYING "IT'S OUR PROBLEM AND DID INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT OAS PRESENCE. (VERBATIM TEXT FOLLOWS) IN SEPARATE TEL. HOWEVER, HIS STATEMENT CONTAINED SO MUCH THAT WAS DAMAGING THAT I SPENT MUCH OF TIME NEGOTIATING FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL. (HAVING WRITTEN IT, HE DECIDED TO ISSUE IT BUT I DISSUADED HIM.)

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 0578 ~~SECRET~~
WE FINALLY ENDED WITH THIS SCENARIO: FIRST, I MUST TELL HIM WE WILL ACCEPT MOLINA URENA AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT (MOLINA IS THE LAST IN PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION LINE UNDER BOSCH CONSTITUTION OF 1963); THEN BOSCH WOULD ISSUE HIS STATEMENT; THEN USA WOULD ANNOUNCE ITS MARINES ARE IN DOMREP TO RESTORE LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AS IT EXISTED 26 APRIL 1965 (WHEN MOLINA URENA BRIEFLY ANNOUNCED HE WAS PRESIDENT) AND ANNOUNCE MOLINA URENA WOULD BE PRESIDENT; THEN BOSCH WOULD GREET THIS NEWS WITH CHEERS AND TELL THE DOMINICAN PEOPLE TO SUPPORT THE MOLINA GOVERNMENT AND SURRENDER THEIR ARMS. MOLINA WOULD THEN NEGOTIATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE U.S. MARINES

~~SECRET~~

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-3- 1330, MAY 3, FROM SANTO DOMINGO

AND MOLINA URENA WOULD SERVE OUT REMAINDER OF BOSCH'S TERM, WITH ELECTIONS ON DECEMBER 20, 1966 AS SCHEDULED UNDER BOSCH 1963 CONSTITUTION. (BOSCH DID NOT SAY SO, BUT OBVIOUSLY HE WOULD EXPECT TO RUN.) HOW OAS GETS WRAPPED INTO ALL THIS IS NOT CLEAR.

WE AGREED TO ISSUE NO STATEMENTS AT ALL NOW BUT IF ASKED BY PRESS TO SAY WE HAD MET AND EXPLORED AVENUES AND HAD FRIENDLY TALK.

BOSCH MISCELLANY: HE OFFERED NO REPEAT NO OBJECTION TO THE OPENING OF THE CORRIDOR. HE SAID CAMMANO IS DRAFTING PROCLAMATION EXPLAINING REASONS FOR REBELLION, DENYING IT COMMUNIST-LED, AND INDICATING WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE.

COMMENT: I ACHIEVED NOTHING BUT A FEW DAYS' CEASEFIRE WITH BOSCH. THIS, HOWEVER, IS SOMETHING SINCE HE HAS BEEN TURNING ANTI-AMERICAN, ESPECIALLY SINCE I PUBLICLY LABELED HIS MOVEMENT COMMUNIST-DOMINATED. I ALSO KEPT CHANNEL TO HIM OPEN. MOLINA URENA SCENARIO AND NEARLY EVERYTHING ELSE HE SAID SEEMS TO ME HIGHLY IMPRACTICAL. BUT HE MAY WANT MOLINA URENA FOR SOME PURPOSE IN FUTURE. FURTHERMORE, WE SHOULD, I BELIEVE, EXPLORE ALL AVENUES WITH BOSCH. END OF MARTIN. BENNETT

67-2
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-C AT 3:07 A.M. MAY 4, 1965

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, CINCLANT AT
3:50 A.M. - 5/4/65

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

211a

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1965 MAY 4 AM 4:45

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LIMDIS

Authority

State Ltr 3/1/76

By rmg

NAKs, Date

8/30/77

REF: DEPTTEL (7TY)

1. FULLY AGREE THAT JUNTA AS CONSTITUTED HOLDS LITTLE PROSPECT FOR RALLYING POPULAR SUPPORT. BROADER BASE NEEDED AND THIS BEST ACHIEVED BY ADDING CIVILIANS. WOULD PROBABLY BE MOST FEASIBLE ADD ONLY TWO AS FIRST STEP. I THEREFORE PROPOSE PROCEED AS FOLLOWS ON RECEIPT DEPARTMENT'S AUTHORIZATION:

(A) INFORM JUNTA USG CONSIDERS IT WOULD BE USEFUL ADD TWO CIVILIANS AND DISCUSS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES WITH THEM.

(B) IF JUNTA AGREEABLE, OFFER OUR GOOD OFFICES IN HELPING PERSUADE THE TWO THEY CHOOSE FROM THIS LIST, OR ANY OTHER ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATES THEY MIGHT PREFER, TO JOIN GOVERNMENT.

PAGE TWO RUESSD 066S ~~SECRET~~

(C) URGE JUNTA TO APPOINT CABINET OF NON-PARTISAN TECHNICIANS AND OFFER TO WORK WITH JUNTA IN SELECTION PROCESS.

EMBASSY APPRECIATES OFFER SEND SOMEONE FROM WASHINGTON TO HELP IN BRINGING ABOUT ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN NEW GOVERNMENT OF APOLITICAL SANTIAGUEROS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE COUNTRY TEAM HAS SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SANTIAGO GROUP TO ENSURE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EFFORT THIS DIRECTION SHOULD THOSE WHO MIGHT BE SELECTED PROVE RELUCTANT.

2. WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN AFFORD BE OVERLY SOLICITOUS OF JUNTA'S SENSITIVITIES ON POINT OF COMPOSITION OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP.

OLD GUARD GENERALS ARE WELL KNOWN TO BE LARGELY CORRUPT, INEFFECTIVE (THEY CERTAINLY PROVED THIS DURING PAST WEEK), AND INTENSELY DISLIKED BY POPULACE AND BY LARGE NUMBERS OF OWN W/COF. MAIN EFFORT OF SOME HAS BEEN CLEARLY DIRECTED IN PAST

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CONTROL NO. 2379

CORRECTION ISSUED:
5/4/65, 1:55 p.m.
hmr

-2- 1337, MAY 4, FROM SANTO DOMINGO - CORRECTED PAGE -2-

WEEK TO CONFIRMING THEIR PRIVILEGED POSITIONS BEHIND SCREEN OF US MILITARY PRESENCE. IF WE ALLOW THIS TO OCCUR WE WILL BE DOING GREAT DISSERVICE TO DOMINICANS AND TO OUR OWN PUBLIC IMAGE HERE.

MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM INVOLVES WESSIN'S FUTURE. ONCE REBEL RESISTANCE HAS ENDED, HIS RETIREMENT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. THIS MAY NOT BE IMMEDIATELY POSSIBLE, BUT, IN ANY EVENT, ANOMALY OF FOURTH MILITARY ARM WHICH HE NOW CONTROLS SHOULD BE ENDED. TANKS SHOULD GO TO THE ARMY AND MILITARY ACADEMY CLEARLY SERVING NEEDS OF ALL SERVICES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED. OTHERS WHO COULD WELL BE PLACED ON RETIREMENT LIST ARE VINAS, HERMIDA, HUNGRIA, GARCIA, MONTAS, LUNA, RIB, BETANCES.

WE BELIEVE RIVERA CUESTA SHOULD STAY ON AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF ARMY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO THINK OF AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE. MOREOVER, HIS ENTHUSIASM FOR CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM MAKES HIM PARTICULARLY RELIABLE LEADER FOR PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION WHICH IS NOW BEGINNING.

DE LOS SANTOS ALSO ADAPTABLE IN PRESENT POSITION. HE HAS DONE MUCH TO REORGANIZE AIR FORCE ALONG LINES RECOMMENDED BY U S A F AND ELIMINATE GRAFT AND MOREOVER, HIS SERVICE WAS

PAGE THREE RUESSD 066S ~~SECRET~~
ONLY ONE WHICH HELD TOGETHER AND, WHATEVER ONE MAY THINK OF THE MISSION IT CARRIED OUT, PERFORMED LIKE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION DURING THE PERIOD OF HOSTILITIES.

WE ALL AGREE RIVERA CAMINERO WOULD MAKE BEST SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMED FORCES AND WE BELIEVE JUNTA SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO APPOINT HIM TO THIS POSITION. HE STANDS OUT AS WELL ROUNDED PERSONALITY WITH REPUTATION FOR INTEGRITY AND PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE. THERE ARE SEVERAL QUALIFIED PERSONS WHO COULD TAKE HIS PLACE AS NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF, INCLUDING JIMENEZ AND AMIANA.

THESE SHIFTS IN COMMAND ECHELON SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A CONCERTED EFFORT ON OUR PART TO BRING UTO AND ES OF MILITARY SERVICES TO LEVELS CONFORMING TO JCS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. TUE

3. POTENTIALLY RISKY POLITICAL SITUATION IN PROVINCES AND NEED FOR RAPID ACTION TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE AND FRIENDLY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THERE FULLY APPRECIATED BY COUNTRY TEAM. AS DEPT. AWARE PROGRAM OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION NOW UNDERWAY. IF WE FIND, AS MAY

NOTE: CORRECTION PASSED S/S-O, WH, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, CONCLAVE AT 10:00 5/4/65

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1337, MAY 4, FROM SANTO DOMINGO

WELL BE CASE, THAT LOCAL GOVERNMENT APPARATI STILL LARGELY IN
SAFE HANDS, WE CAN RAPIDLY STRENGTHEN THESE ELEMENTS THROUGH
APPROPRIATE CHANNELING OF RELIEF SUPPLIES. FUNDS SHOULD ALSO
BE MADE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY TO ORGANIZE EMERGENCY WORK PROGRAMS
UNDER MUNICIPAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT DIRECTION OR THROUGH
EXISTING LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATIONS OF WHICH THERE ARE

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 0665 ~~SECRET~~
SURPRISINGLY LARGE NUMBER. LARGE-SCALE WORK ON ROADS AND OTHER
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES WOULD SOAK UP REEMPLOYMENT AND
HELP STABILIZE SITUATION IN OUR FAVOR. WE WILL NEED MORE
PERSONNEL TO PURSUE THIS LINE AND HOPE AID/W CAN BEGIN
NECESSARY RECRUITMENT ASAP.

THIS REGARD, WE BELIEVE MOST EFFECTIVE FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO
PAY BACK WAGES PRESENTLY DUE TO LARGE NUMBER IN PROVINCES WHO
WERE EMPLOYED IN PROJECTS OF DEPARTMENT PUBLIC WORKS. AT TIME
OF COUP WORKERS IN NUMBER OF AREAS HAD REPORTEDLY GONE WITHOUT
PAY FOR AS LONG AS 10 WEEKS. WE COULD PROVIDE LOCAL PUBLIC
WORKS' PAYMASTERS WITH SUFFICIENT FUNDS MEET THESE OBLIGATIONS,
SUPERVISING PROCESS TO PREVENT ABUSES AS AVAILABILITY OF PERSONNEL
PERMITTED.

DEPARTMENT'S SUGGESTIONS RE ORGANIZATION OF TEMPORARY PROVINCIAL
COUNCILS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE UNDOUBTED MERIT.
HOWEVER, C. T. BELIEVES WE NEED MORE INFORMATION BEFORE ATTEMPTING
SUCH A DELICATE AND COMPLICATED TASK. WE WOULD PREFER WITHOLD
JUDGMENT ON POSSIBILITIES THIS REGARD UNTIL WE HAVE NECESSARY
INTELLIGENCE.

PAGE FIVE RUESSD 0665 ~~SECRET~~
4. QUESTION OF FOREIGN ROLL IN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IS TICKLISH
ONE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF DOMINICAN SENSITIVITIES MENTIONED
IN DEPTTEL BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF NECESSITY OF WORKING WITH OAS
COMMISSION. WE AGREE THAT RESPECTED LIBERAL LATIN AMERICAN
FIGURE NOT TOO CLOSELY TIED TO BOSCH COULD PLAY
USEFUL ROLE AS ADVISER AND TAKE FOCUS SOMEWHAT OFF OUR ROLE.
WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO HAVE DEPARTMENT MAKE SOUNDINGS.
IF SUCH AID TO LIBERAL CHANGES WOULD BE BETTER CHOICE THAN
FIGURES ON DEPTACOURT, WE WOULD BE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED
WITH BOSCH IN THIS COUNTRY.

~~SECRET~~

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-4. 1337, MAY 4, FROM SANTO DOMINGO

AT THIS POINT WE DO NOT THINK U.S. TRUSTESHIP IS VIABLE OR NECESSARY. IF WE CAN GET TO WORK FAST BOTH ON INTERIM REGIME AND IN COUNTRYSIDE ELECTIONS IN SEVERAL MONTHS MIGHT PROVE BE BEST SOLUTION. SINCE ONLY TIME WILL TELL. HOWEVER, OAS PRESENCE AND SOME US MILITARY PRESENCE SHOULD BE RETAINED FOR WEEKS AT LEAST, UNTIL PICTURE BECOME CLEARER.

FOREGOING REFLECTS COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDATIONS ON MEASURES TO GET INTERIM GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED AND OPERATING AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FLUID CONDITIONS AND U.S. POWER POSITION TO EFFECT SOME REFORMS, PARTICULARLY IN MILITARY, WHICH WILL BRING PERMANENT BENEFITS TO COUNTRY.

AMBASSADOR MARTIN'S VIEWS WILL BE SUBMITTED SEPARATELY.

WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS. BENNETT

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:50 AM 5/4/65
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 5:36 AM 5/4/65
PASSED CINCSO, CINCLANT AT 5:20 AM 5/4/65

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.
*AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 4

PASS WHITE HOUSE

FROM AMBASSADOR AND BOWDLER

WE HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM LONG SESSION WITH OAS COMMISSION. SHIFT IN ATTITUDE WHICH WE FEARED MIGHT TAKE PLACE AFTER THEY TALKED TO CAAMANO (EMBTTEL 1303) HAS SET IN. LAST NIGHT (MAY 2) THEY WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO A MOST URGENT SITUATION. TODAY (MAY 3) THEY HAVE FASTENED ON IDEA OF DRAFTING NEW CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT DRAWN UP IN GREAT DETAIL AS TO DELINEATION OF ZONES OCCUPIED BY VARIOUS FORCES (SAN ISIDRO, CAAMANO, US FORCES) AND OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY PARTIES NOT TO ALTER ZONES WITHOUT OAS COMMISSION CONCURRENCE.

PAGE TWO RUESSD 067S ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
IT WOULD TIE U.S. HANDS. ARGENTINA AND COLOMBIA APPEAR TO BE PUSHERS THIS EFFORT AND MADE VERY CLEAR THEY EXPECTED US MILITARY TO BE PARTY TO AGREEMENT OTHERWISE AGREEMENT MADE NO SENSE. GUATEMALA AND BRAZIL MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS IN VOICING NEED FOR US BEING PARTY TO SUCH AGREEMENT. PANAMA COMMENTED MEMBERS WASTING THEIR TIME ON MARGINAL MATTERS INSTEAD OF GOING TO HEART OF SITUATION WHICH IS DECIDING HOW TO FIND POLITICAL SOLUTION AND DEAL WITH REBEL MOVEMENT DOMINATED BY COMMUNISTS.

DURING COURSE OF DAY BOWDLER SPOKE TO MEMBERS INDIVIDUALLY OF IMPORTANCE COMMISSION FINDING TO MFN RECOMMENDATION THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS BE URGED TO FURNISH FORCES. IN THESE CONVERSATIONS, EXCEPT FOR PANAMA, SHIFT IN MOOD BECAME APPARENT. THEY INDICATED SUCH RECOMMENDATION VERY SERIOUS STEP WHICH NEEDS TO BE EXAMINED MOST CAREFULLY, PERHAPS AFTER COMMISSION RETURNED TO WASHINGTON TO MAKE REPORT.

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1965 MAY 4 AM 4 53

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Authority State Sec 3/1/76
By RMG, NARS, Date 8/30/77

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1338, MAY 4, FROM SANTO DOMINGO

IN MEETING TONIGHT (MAY 3) COMMISSION MEMBERS DESCRIBED VISIT TO CAAMANO HEADQUARTERS. THEY REVIEWED LONG LIST OF COMPLAINTS WHICH CAAMANO MADE AGAINST US, INCLUDING SETTING UP LOC WITHOUT CONSULTATION CHARGED WE ALLOWING WEISSIN FORCES AND SNIPERS MOVE IN BEHIND OURS, CONDUCTING AERIAL BROADCASTING

PAGE THREE RUESSD 8675 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OVER AREAS CONTROLLED BY THEM, AND PHOTOGRAPHING FOOD DISTRIBUTION. THEY PROMISED BE COOPERATIVE ON EVACUATION OF ASYLEES; SHOWED SPECIAL INTEREST IN NEW CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, PROVIDED SAN ISIDRO GENERALS ARE NOT PARTIES; WANTED TO PATROL CORRIDOR JOINTLY WITH OUR FORCES; AND EXPRESSED DESIRE RED CROSS HANDLE ALL FOOD DISTRIBUTION WITH NO U.S. LABELS PERMITTED.

AMBASSADOR REBUTTED CAAMANO CHARGES, THEN MADE DETAILED EXPOSITION OF HOW REVOLT UNFOLDED AND HOW COMMUNISTS AND OTHER EXTREMIST ELEMENTS HAD MOVED IN TO DOMINATE MOVEMENT. HE TWICE STRESSED URGENCY OF COMMISSION REACHING DECISION ON ADVICE TO BE GIVEN MFM ON NEED FOR FORCES FROM OTHER OAS COUNTRIES, AND URGED THEM RECOMMEND IT.

MORA DID HIS BEST TOO ON THIS LINE. CHAIRMAN INDICATED COMMISSION WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER MATTER.

CHAIRMAN THEN DESCRIBED WHAT COMMISSION HAD IN MIND IN WAY OF NEW CEASE-FIRE. COLOMBO AND VAZQUEZ CARIZOSA AT THIS JUNCTURE EXPRESSED DEEP PREOCCUPATION OVER FACT THAT WHILE COMMISSION GOING DOWN TRACK OF CEASE-FIRE, USG SEEMED TO BE FOCUSING ON AGUMENTATION OF MILITARY FORCES.

AMBASSADOR PRESENTED ALL POINTS IN DEPTTEL 752 BUT COMMISSION ON SUCH LEGALISTIC JAG RE CEASE-FIRE THAT MEETING NEVER GOT BEYOND POINT ONE.

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 8675 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COMMENT: WE DO NOT SEE ANY PROSPECTS THAT COMMISSION WILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

--3- 1338, APRIL 4, FROM SANTO DOMINGO

MAKE RECOMMENDATION FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES IN TIME FOR MFM SESSION MAY 4 (DEPTEL 733). THE MEMBERS SEEM TO DRAW ALL THE RIGHT CONCLUSIONS ABOUT NATURE OF SITUATION HERE BUT ARE INCAPABLE OF ACTING IN LINE WITH LOGICAL CONCLUSIONS (PRIVATELY THEY HAVE ALL SAID COMMUNISTS WOULD HAVE TAKEN OVER HERE HAD NOT US ARRIVED IN NICK OF TIME). THEY FAIL TO SEE HOW DETAILED CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT PLAYS INTO HANDS OF CAAMANO FORCES. BEHIND IT WE SUSPECT IS UNWILLINGNESS ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATION THAT IN EFFECT WOULD BE ENDORSEMENT OF OUR MILITARY INTERVENTION. AS VAZQUEZ CARIZOSA TOLD AMBASSADOR, WE RECOGNIZE IMPERATIVE NEED FOR WHAT YOU HAVE DONE, BUT AS LATIN AMERICANS IT MAKES US VERY UNHAPPY.

GP-3. BENNETT
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 5-4-65, 4:56 A.M.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 5-4-65, 5:10 A.M.
PASSED CINCSO, CINCLANT, 5-4-65, 5:14 A.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 4, 1965

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT

TO THE

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE
APPROPRIATIONS, FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES

IN THE EAST ROOM

(10:10 AM EDT)

Ladies and gentlemen of the Congress, I appreciate very much your responding so promptly in coming here this morning.

Late yesterday afternoon after a series of meetings I concluded that it was indicated it would be desirable to meet with the six most important committees in the Congress dealing with our relations with other nations and the security of the country.

I am prepared to submit to the Congress very shortly recommendations. Before I do that, however, I want to review with you some of my thoughts and get your judgment and your counsel and I trust, your cooperation.

Under existing law we have transfer authority where we can use monies already authorized and appropriated to meet any unusual needs of the services that we might have. I think I need not tell you the developments of the last few days, that we do have unusual and unanticipated needs in both the Viet Nam theater and the Dominican Republic. We have been called upon to use men and materials at substantial costs that were not reflected in the budget when it was originally presented to the Congress. Therefore, I am giving serious consideration to asking the Congress to appropriate at an early date an additional \$700 million to meet the mounting military needs primarily in Viet Nam and such expenses as we have had in the Dominican Republic and that we may have in the days to come.

This is in no way a routine appropriation. For each member of Congress who supports this request is voting to continue our efforts to try to halt Communist aggression. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Viet Nam shall be preserved and that Communist conquest shall not succeed.

In Fiscal 1965 we spent about a billion five hundred million dollars to fulfill our then commitments in Southeast Asia. The pace of activity, however, has been steadily rising because the aggression has been rising and they have stepped up their tempo. The additional funds are needed to make sure that our American boys have not only the best but the most modern supplies and equipment in adequate quantities. They are needed to keep an abundant inventory of ammunition and other expendables. They are needed to build facilities to house and to protect our men and our supplies. I would contemplate that the entire \$700 million would be used in the present fiscal year between now and June 30. Nor can I guarantee to you this will be the last request as things are now developing. If the need expands, I will of course immediately again turn to the Congress for help. We must do whatever must be done to insure our success. This is the firm and the irrevocable commitment of our people and our nation, whatever the risk and whatever the cost.

I have reviewed the situation in Viet Nam many times with the Congress. I have reviewed it many times with the American people, with the diplomats of the world and in broadcasts which were reproduced throughout the world. South Viet Nam has been attacked by North Viet Nam. It has asked our help. We are giving that help, we are giving it because of our commitments,

MORE

(OVER)

because of our principles and because we believe that our national interest demands it.

This is not the same kind of aggression which the world has long been used to. Instead of the sweep of invading armies there is the steady and the deadly attack in the night by guerrilla bands that come without warning, that kill people while they sleep.

In Viet Nam we pursue that same principle which has infused American action in the Far East for a quarter of a century. There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The answer, I think, is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our power alone in the final test can stand between expanding Communism and independent Asian nations.

Thus when India was attacked it looked to us for help and we gave it immediately. We believe that Asia should be directed by Asians, but that means that each Asian peoples must have the right to find its own way, not that one group or one nation should overrun all the others.

Now make no mistake about it, the aim in Viet Nam is not simply the common quest of the south, tragic as that would be. It is to show that American commitment is worthless and they would like very much to do that, and once they succeed in doing that, the gates are down and the road is open to expansion and to endless conquest. Moreover, we are directly committed to the defense of South Viet Nam beyond any question.

In 1954 we signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and that treaty committed us to act to meet aggression against South Viet Nam. The United States Senate was called upon to act upon that treaty. It ratified that treaty and that obligation by rollcall vote of 82 - 1. Less than a year ago, the Congress, by an almost unanimous vote, a vote of 562 - 2 said that the United States was ready to take all necessary steps to meet its obligations under that treaty. That resolution in the Congress expressed support for the policy of three successive American Presidents to help the people of South Viet Nam against attack. Thus, we cannot and we will not and we must not withdraw or be defeated. The stakes are too high, the commitment too deep, the lessons of history too plain.

We will not use our great power in any reckless or casual manner. We have no desire whatever to expand that conflict. We will do though what must be done and we will do only what must be done. For in the long run there can be no military solution to the problems of Viet Nam and we all realize that. We know that we must find some way, somehow, a path to peaceful settlement, and all the resources and brains of our government are relentlessly pursuing every possible alternative.

Time and time and time again we have worked to open that path. As I talk to you this morning our allies are cooperating with us in attempting to open that path and find that solution. As I have said to you so many times and to the American people likewise, we are ready to talk any time, anywhere, with any government without conditions. We will go anywhere. We will discuss any subject. We will listen courteously and patiently to any point of view that may offer possibilities of a peaceful solution.

You don't know how much I regret the necessity for ever issuing an order to bomb anything, particularly North Viet Nam. But we began those bombings after I had been in the Presidency some 14 months and only when patience had been transformed from a virtue into a blunder. Time and time and time again, men, women and children -- Americans and Vietnamese alike -- were bombed in their villages and their homes while our forces made no reply. There was, last November, an attack on the Dong Hoi airfield. There was the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon. There was the February attack at 2 o'clock in the morning while our American soldiers slept at Pleiku, where 14 Americans were killed and 269 seriously wounded.

MORE

These are just a few examples of their campaign of terror and attack. We then decided that it was no longer advisable to stand by with our arms folded and see men and women and children murdered and crippled while the bases of these aggressors were immune from reply. But we have no desire to destroy human life. Our attacks have all be aimed primarily at strictly military targets, not hotels, not movie theaters, not American compounds, not embassy buildings. We destroy bridges that are made up of steel and concrete and bleed little blood, so it is harder for our adversaries to convey their instruments of war from the north to the south. When they get to a bridge that is blown up they must unload everything they have and if possible in crossing a swift stream, take their ferries, and load it on a ferry, and try to get it across and unload it and load it back again, taking increased time and increased effort and slowing down their aggression. We destroy radar stations --some ten of them-- in order to keep them from spotting our planes and shooting down our American pilots. We destroy central depots for the infiltration of men and arms to the south, depots that furnish the manpower that attacked Pleiku. We patrol trails in an attempt to halt the invaders. We destroy the ammunition dumps to prevent the use of explosives against our men and our allies.

Who among us can feel confident that we should allow our soldiers to be killed while the aggressor sits secure in his sanctuary protected by a border which he himself has violated a thousand times or more? Well, I do not believe that is the view of the American people and I hope that is not the view of the American Congress.

The bombing is not an end in itself as we all know. Its purpose is to bring us closer to the final day of peace and whenever it will serve the interests of peace to do so, we will immediately end it. But let us remember when we began the bombings there was no talk of negotiations. There were few worldwide cries for peace. Some who now speak loudly were content to permit the Americans and the Vietnamese to continue to die and to suffer at the hands of terror without protest.

Our firmness and the actions we have taken in the last few weeks may well have already brought us much closer to peace.

The conclusion is plain. We will not surrender. We do not wish to engage in a larger conflict. We desire peaceful settlement and reasonable talks. Yet the aggression continues, although we have sent the adversaries messages of our views day after day. Therefore, I see no choice but to continue the course that we are on, filled as it is with peril and uncertainty and cost in both money and men. I believe the American people support that course. I believe they have learned a great lesson of this generation. Wherever we have stood firm aggression has ultimately been halted. Peace has ultimately been restored and liberty has been maintained. That was true in Iran; that was true in Greece; that was true in Turkey; it was true in the Formosa Straits; that was true in Lebanon and it was true in Korea. It was true in the Cuban missile crisis and it will be true again in Southeast Asia.

Our people do not flinch from sacrifice or risk when the cause of freedom demands it, and they have the deep and abiding and true instinct of the American people. When our nation is challenged it must respond. When freedom is in danger we must face up and stand up to that danger. When we are attacked we must not turn tail and run, we must stand and fight.

I know that the Congress shares these beliefs and I believe the people they represent do likewise.

I do not ask complete approval of every phase and every action of your government. I do ask for the support of our basic course. What is that? That is resistance to aggression. That is moderation in the use of power. That is a constant search for peace. Nothing will do more to strengthen your country in the eyes of the world than the proof of such national unity which an overwhelming vote for this appropriation would clearly show.

I asked the Armed Services Committee of both Houses, the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committee and the Appropriations Committee to come here. As I said earlier, we can use transfer authority and supply us temporarily for these funds. We need them now, we need them tomorrow, we need them in the days ahead. If there is a genuine unanimity and willingness to provide them I should like to submit forthwith a message to Congress asking that those learned in our relations with other nations give careful consideration to our recommendation and Appropriation Committees meet and act promptly, if that can be done. If it cannot, then we will try to proceed under the authority we have.

I dislike very much to disrupt your schedule and target dates that you have for various bills but I know of nothing that is needed more just now. Although the volume of money is not excessive in terms of total military appropriations, the volume of information that it will convey is quite important and therefore, unless there is serious objection with the approval of the Leadership, I shall seriously consider transmitting to the Congress before the day is over, the specifics of an appropriation for \$700 million and ask the House to go into immediate session if it can, and its committees, and try to report that situation as early as possible.

I have been President now for about 17 months. We have suffered losses that can never be replaced. But our allies have suffered losses too. In South Viet Nam, that little country of 14 million people has lost more than 10,000. During that same time they have killed 25,900 Viet Cong. In the last few days it is apparent something is taking place there we cannot speak of with certainty, but the incidents that the Viet Cong initiate have diminished. The losses they have suffered have substantially increased. The arrogance and adventure they once displayed has to some degree been curbed.

I have considered every alternative that I know to consider. I have listened to every voice that sought to give me information. There are those who feel that we should take our strategic forces and try to ~~isolate~~ ^{isolate} the enemy and destroy his cities and wipe out his population. We have hoped to avoid that. There are some who sincerely and genuinely feel we ought to be out of Southeast Asia altogether and retire to our own shores, that we really have no great interest there, and that we ought to pull out.

That argument would have had much more force if we had not concluded otherwise as a policy of the Congress and had not entered into treaties that bound us there. But if our word and our treaties in Southeast Asia is no good, it is no good in Berlin, and it is no good with all the other dozens of nations that we have made commitments to and that we are bound to with treaty.

There are those who frequently talk of negotiations and political settlement and that they believe this is the course we should pursue, and so do I. When they talk that way I say, welcome to the club. I want to negotiate. I would much rather talk than fight and I think everyone would. Bring in who you want us to negotiate with. I have searched high and wide and I am a reasonably good cowboy and I can't even rope anybody and bring them in who is willing to talk and settle this by negotiation. We send them messages through allies -- one country, two countries, three countries, four or five countries -- all have tried to be helpful. The distinguished British citizen, Mr. Walker, has been out there and they say we won't even talk to you. All our intelligence is unanimous in this one point, that they see no need for negotiation. They think they are winning and they have won and why should they sit down and give us something and settle with us.

So we can't go north and we shouldn't go south and we can't negotiate. So what do we do? Well, this is the situation that I inherited. It is the policy we decreed in 1954. So with the problem confronting me, they are the facts as I see them. I have tried to provide the maximum amount of deterrence to aggression with the minimum loss of life to ourselves and to our allies. That we will continue to do until ~~some~~ ^{some} way, somehow, we find a civilized solution and a readiness to exchange views across the conference table.

MORE

Now the expenditure is not great in the Dominican Republic, but we do have many thousand men there. We do have 5000 people yet to evacuate.

We were sitting quietly in my little office last Thursday afternoon, I believe --Wednesday afternoon maybe-- discussing the logistics involved in the Viet Nam situation with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara and a cable came from our ambassador who is an experienced man in the Foreign Service for 20 years, an expert on the Dominican Republic and because he had been there before and had tours of duty there we sent him back. He said that he had been notified by the governmental authorities and by the police authorities, including the chief of police, that American lives were in danger, that they could not give them any more protection, that we were on our own and we should immediately take measures to protect them.

The Ambassador said this concerns me but I am not prepared at this moment to recommend that you take this action, but I do want to alert you and see that you have a contingency plan ready.

We had anticipated difficulty there. The intelligence reports each morning indicate difficulties in dozens of spots throughout the world. We were due at least one revolution in another country yesterday. It didn't come through but the intelligence reports had indicated it might. Because we had that information and because we knew the difficulty and we knew the unsettled political condition we asked Ambassador Bennett to come back to the United States and he was here when the government was overthrown. We immediately rushed him back. This was his cable informing us that he had had official notification that they could no longer guarantee the safety of our people.

We immediately alerted the forces who had had previous plans and some of them had been working on building them up and carrying them out, and continued our discussions when another wire came in at 5:16, almost two hours later, and said there is firing in the streets, there is great danger to all personnel in this area, land the troops immediately to protect our people. It was a rather strong and compelling and almost distressed message. Thanks to the expert management of Secretary McNamara and the forces under his command we passed out an order immediately to land our troops.

I had to attend a Balance of Payments meeting with some bankers who were in town but I asked while I was attending they call the leadership of the Congress and they did, and they came to the White House around 7 o'clock. While we were talking to them I had a report that our troops had already landed, showing the speed and efficiency of that group.

Since that time we have evacuated approximately 3000 persons. It has been necessary for a few Marines to go out and take an old lady and her little belongings and with a crippled hip, carry her down through the streets where the firing is taking place, but we carried 3000 that way without the loss of a single civilian up to now.

There remain 5000 others -1500 Americans and some 3500 other nationals. Six or eight of the embassies have been torn up. There has been almost constant firing on our American Embassy. As we talked to Ambassador Bennett, he said to apparently one of the girls who brought him a cable, he said, please get away from the window, that glass is going to cut your head, because the glass had been shattered, and we heard the bullets coming through the office where he was sitting while talking to us.

We have sufficient manpower to continue that evacuation and some 200 are coming out today that we have gathered. We will continue until all who will come, will be evacuated.

In our first meeting that night from 3 o'clock when we got our cable, until 7 o'clock when we met with the Congressional Leaders, our intelligence indicated that two of the prime leaders in the rebel forces were men with a

MORE

(OVER)

long history of Communist association and insurrections. One had fought in the Spanish Civil War and both had been given detailed lengthy training in operations of this type.

As reports came in as they do every few minutes, it developed there were 8 of those who were in the movement that had been trained by Communist forces. Alerts were set up and our men continued to ferret out and study the organization. Up to yesterday they had the names and addresses and experience and numbers and backgrounds of some 58. As those 58 came forward and cream began to rise on that crock of milk, they came to the surface and took increased leadership in the movement and the leaders and friends of ex-President Bosch were more or less shoved in the background and stepped aside. Our military people outlined a plan and that plan has been consummated.

It is our hope that the OAS will, after a visit on the grounds, come up with recommendations as to an interim government that will not involve either Communism or dictatorship until we can have free elections and self determination.

On Saturday when the revolution took place, we asked for a ceasefire. On the following Tuesday our Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American Affairs, Mr. Vaughn, met with the Peace Committee of the OAS and explained the gravity of that situation. On Wednesday morning, before our intervention Wednesday afternoon, the OAS met and discussed the matter thoroughly and in some detail but then adjourned without taking any action. Wednesday afternoon after getting the 3 o'clock wire and 5 o'clock wire I had no choice but to take action or to sacrifice American lives.

I took the action and simultaneously notified the OAS again and asked them to act. They met. They discussed the matter and then they adjourned over an extra day. When I found that out the next morning I asked Secretary Rusk and our very able diplomat, Mr. Bunker, to give them an urgent appeal not to stay out of session today but to come back and immediately send some delegation there to view the situation. They had agreed to send Secretary General Moro and he went that night and they met the next day and debated it that day and sent the delegation down there and it is there now.

We want very much to work and cooperate with them and as soon as they have outlined a program for a stable and peaceful interim government we would hope that we could embrace their suggestions and contribute what we need to contribute along with other nations.

We have sent able emissaries to explain all that I have said to you to other countries because a man's judgment is no better than his information and there hasn't been full information on this subject. We have indications that some of the Latin American countries might perhaps, maybe be willing to supply some of their forces to engage in the protection during this period. We would certainly hope that is true.

Now that is where we stand. The primary reason for asking you to come here this morning is to let you know that the situations that confront us had not been planned when we submitted our budget to you, that our armed forces now are in need of 700 million dollars. We are prepared to testify on it this afternoon or any time that may meet your pleasure. We would hope that you could thoroughly and carefully consider it and with a minimum of difficulty and discord say to the rest of the world that we are going to spend every dollar, we are going to take every action, we are going to walk the last mile in order to see that peace is restored, that the people of not only the Dominican Republic but South Viet Nam have the right of self determination and that they cannot be gobbled up in the 20th Century and swallowed just because they happen to be smaller than some of those whose boundaries adjoin them.

MORE

I think it is well to remember that there are a hundred other little nations sitting here this moment watching what happens and what the outcome is in South Viet Nam and if South Viet Nam can be gobbled up the same thing may happen to them.

Secretary Rusk is here to give you any details on the political developments. Secretary McNamara is here to give you any of the details on the posture of our troops, the missions they are performing.

I think there is one point I'd like to make before I close. We are not the aggressor in the Dominican Republic. Forces came in there and overthrew that government and became aligned with evil persons who had been trained in overthrowing governments and in seizing governments and establishing Communist control and we have resisted that control and we have sought to protect our citizens against what would have taken place.

Our Ambassador reported that they were marching a former policeman down the streets and had threatened to line a hundred up to a wall and turn a machine gun loose on them. With reports of that kind, no President can stand by. So we resisted their aggression to the extent that, (a) we protected our own people, and (b) we hoped that we have exposed what leadership attempted to seize that little land. We have a good many people there. We are trying to feed all the people. I notice this morning they demanded none of the labels have American food on them but some of the people haven't eaten in four days.

We have from a 1000 to 1500 bodies that are dead in the street and possibilities of a serious epidemic breaking out. We are trying to avoid that. We have our mobile hospital units that are trying to give treatment to the wounded and the casualties who have not yet died.

We are doing what we can do preserve order yet the sniping is still taking place. There are men still standing on rooftops that are shooting at not only our own embassy but other people and just fortunately none of our civilians yet have been killed. But we do have 5000 yet there that must be moved individually, one by one, to our ships.

While we are doing that we optimistically hope and pray that the OAS and this Inter-American group can make some satisfactory suggestions.

If it is agreeable, the Press will excuse themselves now, I would like for Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to go into details with some of you.

E N D

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 4, 1965

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF CONGRESSMEN RIVERS AND MAHON
AT THE
CONCLUSION OF 'THE PRESIDENT' REMARKS
TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE APPROPRIATIONS,
FOREIGN RELATIONS AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES
IN THE EAST ROOM

CONGRESSMAN RIVERS: We will be calling an immediate session. Let us know what you want. We will respond as we have in the past, and you can depend on this. Whatever you want let us know.

CONGRESSMAN MAHON: I would like to advise that the Appropriations Committee will meet at 1 o'clock with the hope that the Secretary of Defense and others may present the request, and we feel that we can take action today or tomorrow and dispose of the matter expeditiously. I want you to know that in my opinion we are 100% behind the President.

E N D

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Authority State Dec 31/76

By mmg, NARS, Date 8/30/77 023

REBELS HAVE TAKEN POLITICAL INITIATIVE BY ANNOUNCING PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HEADED BY CAAMANO. WE BELIEVE FAST ACTION ESSENTIAL TO COUNTER. WE HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED SUGGEST FORMATION BROAD-BASED JUNTA INCLUDING RESPONSIBLE CIVILIANS REPRESENTING IMPORTANT SECTORS. JUNTA WOULD BE HEADED BY ANTONIO IMBERT WHO APPEARS TO US AS ONLY MAN ON SCENE WITH QUALITIES NECESSARY ESTABLISH AUTHORITY OF NEW GOVERNMENT. BENOIT WOULD REMAIN AS MILITARY REP. OTHERS WOULD BE ANTONIO GUZMAN (BOSCH'S SEC. OF AGRICULTURE); ANSELMO BRACHE (PROMINENT MEMBER BALAGUER'S MOVEMENT WHO HAS IMBERT'S CONFIDENCE); AND ALFONSO MORENO OF PRSC AS RESPECTED NON-COMMIE LEFTIST.

PAGE TWO RUESSD 099S ~~SECRET~~

WE HAVE REASON BELIEVE THESE MEN WOULD, IF WILLING JOIN JUNTA, BE PREPARED RESIGN FORMAL PARTY AFFILIATIONS.

WE ARE IMMEDIATELY UNDERTAKING CONVERSATIONS SEEKING SOLUTION ALONG THESE LINES.

MARTIN CONCURS.

GP-3.
BENNETT
BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 2:00 p.m. 5/4/65
Passed to White House, DOD & CIA at 2:15 p.m. 5/4/65
Passed to CINCSO & CINCLANT at 2:15 p.m. 5/4/65

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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FM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FROM MR MCAFFERTY ATTN S.S. AND S.S.O.

1965 MAY 4 PM 2 27

(comes in order

between S Domingo

1348 and 1349

TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM BOWDLER IN SANTO DOMINGO:
MAY 4, 1965

THE COMMISSION MET THIS MORNING AND COMPLETED THEIR REPORT
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MFM. PART OF THIS REPORT READS AS
FOLLOWS:

"WE CONSIDER IT USEFUL TO ASSIST IN NORMALIZATION OF THE
DOMINICAN SITUATION THAT THE MEMBER STATES IN A POSITION
TO DO SO ESTABLISH A COMBINED INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY

PAGE TWO RUEPWW 570D ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FORCE TO BE AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE SET BY THE MEETING OF
CONSULTATION."

TRANSMITTED BY THE COMMISSION TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY-
GENERAL OF THE OAS, SANDERS.

"PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY TO THE APPROPRIATE PEOPLE IN STATE.
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 5/4/65 2:30 P.M.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Va 3/1/76

By rmq, NARS, Date 8/30/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM AMEMBASSY SANTODOMINGO

TO DECSATE WASHDC FLASH 0000

STATE GRNC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 4

WE HAVE GOT OAS COMMISSION TO ACT ON MULTI-
LATERALIZATION OF FORCES HERE. PERTINENT SENTENCE THEIR
COMMUNICATION IS AS
FOLLOWS:

"WE CONSIDER USEFUL TO ASSIST IN NORMALIZATION OF
DOMINICAN SITUATION THAT THE
MEMBER STATES IN A POSITION TO DO SO
ESTABLISH A COMBINED INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY
FORCE TO BE AT DISPOSAL OF THE OAS TO ACHIEVE THE
OBJECTIVE SET BY THE MTG OF CONSULTATION."

HOPE THIS WILL BE HELPFUL AT 3P.M. MTG.

GP-3.
BENNETT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 2:32 PM 5/4/65
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, CINCLANT
AT 2:45 PM 5/4/65

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dep. 3/1/76

By MMG, NARS, Date 8/30/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO AMEMBASSY WASHINGTON
INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS (100-1001)

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BUENOS AIRES

1000000/CTF 120

RUENEN/CONCARIDSEAFRON

DUCHAC/CHICLANT

REF ID: A66500

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 4

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MSG

IN VIEW DETERIORATING SITUATION OAS COMM THIS MORN HAS SENT
HE LTR REQUESTING THE "THE ZONE OF SECURITY BE EXTENDED IN
ADEQUATE FORM TO PROTECT ALL EMBASSIES ACCREDITED IN THIS CITY.
THIS REQUEST IS MADE BY THE COMM IN VIEW OF THE FAVORABLE
RECEPTION MANIFESTED BY THE DOMINICAN MILITARY COMMANDS OF
BOTH PARTIES. THE COMM WILL PUT ITSELF IN CONTACT WITHOUT DELAY
WITH BOTH COMMANDS TO INFORM THEM OF THIS DECISION WHICH
CORRESPONDS TO THAT ALREADY AGREED WITH THEM."

GEN PALMER PROPOSES MOVE IMMEDIATELY EXTEND ZONE TO EAST
ALONG AVENIDA BOLIVAR TO AVENIDA PASTEUR AND THENCE TO SEA.

PAGE TWO RUSSSD 100. ~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THIS WILL INCLUDE ECUADORIAN AND SALVADORIAN EMBASSIES, BOTH
OF WHICH ALREADY HAVE BEEN VIOLATED AND WHOSE SITUATION PARTI-
CULARLY FOR ECUADORIAN CRITICAL TODAY. ECUADORIAN HAS TWICE
THIS MORNING ASKED FOR EXTENSION TO PROTECT HIS EMB AND ITS
ASYLEES.

SEP 3
1964
31

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 3:02 p.m. 5/4/65
Passed to White House & CIA at 3:15 p.m. 5/4/65

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Authority State Ltr. 12/21/76

By rmg, NARS, Date 8/30/77

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ACTION: Amembassy SANTO DOMINGO 796

RefEmbtel 1348

You should immediately discuss plan with OAS Commission explaining US does not believe either side as now constituted capable of running country and pointing out need for formation broadly based group solely for purposes of re-establishing and maintaining law and order and getting normal government functions underway.

Make best effort to convince OAS Commission desirability of this action and attempt get their concurrence. You should tell them we much prefer that the OAS assume this responsibility for getting country started again but that seriousness of situation requires that this be done soonest/and if OAS unwilling assume this responsibility at once.

Department agrees names you suggest for restructuring junta. However suggest you consider desirability of not suggesting Imbert as leader of group leaving all junta members equal in rank. CP-2 END

Drafted by:

M:JD/John/ps 5/4/65

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: M - Thomas C. Mann

RUSS

ALL - Mr. Vaughn

ALL - Mr. Crockett

S/S - Mr. Mulliken

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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DE RUESSD 125S 05/03,0Z

1965 MAY 4 PM 11 58

Info

FM AMEMBASSY (SANTO DOMINGO)

SS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1359

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INFO ZEN/CJTF 122

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 4

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FROM AMBASSADOR AND BOWDLER

Authority State La 3/1/74

TO

By mmg, NARS, Date 8/30/77

P

PASS TO WHITE HOUSE

USIA

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RMR

WE MET AGAIN WITH COMMISSION THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS
EXTENSION OF NEUTRAL ZONE (EMBTET 1351) AND TO MAKE ANOTHER EFFORT
TO OBTAIN RECOMMENDATION THAT OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS CONTRIBUTE
UNITS THEIR ARMED FORCES. ON ARRIVAL WE FOUND THAT, AFTER WE
HAD LEFT COMMISSION AT MIDNIGHT THEY HAD WORKED EARLY INTO MORNING
OURS PREPARING REPORT TO MEETING OF CONSULTATION AND DRAFTING
DOCUMENTS FOR NEW CEASE FIRE (EMBTET 1338). IN PREVIOUS CABLE
WE HAVE REPORTED THAT COMMISSION DID INCLUDE RECOMMENDATION
ON ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBINED INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY FORCE.

PAGE TWO RUESSD 125S ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(EMBTET 1350). APPARENTLY STRONG PITCH WHICH WE HAD MADE DURING
COURSE OF YESTERDAY HAD CARRIED MORE IMPACT THAN WHAT WE THOUGHT
WHEN WE LEFT GROUP AT MIDNIGHT AND DRAFTED OUR 1338.

ON CEASE FIRE, COMMISSION HAD DRAFTED TWO DOCUMENTS, INFORMAL
TRANSLATIONS OF WHICH ARE BEING SENT IN SEPARATE MESSAGES.
FORMULA WHICH THEY WORKED OUT WAS A CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT (CALLED
"ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO") TO WHICH ONLY BENOIT AND CAAMANO FORCES
WOULD BE PARTIES AND A MEMORANDUM SETTING FORTH CONCLUSIONS OF
THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH THEY ASK WHETHER "THE MILITARY FORCES
OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC COULD BE GIVEN
PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS TO COOPERATE IN THE EXECUTION OF THAT
WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED". THE COMMISSION INDICATED THAT WHAT
THEY WOULD LIKE FROM THE US IS A NOTE SAYING THAT THE US WILL
COOPERATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING THE "ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO"
AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT AND REAFFIRM THAT PORTION OF THE MAY 1
RESOLUTION CALLING UPON ALL MEMBER STATES TO GIVE FULL COOPERATION
TO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1359, MAY 4, FROM SANTO DOMINGO

IN ACCEPTING DRAFTS, AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT HE NOT IN POSITION TO COMMENT AND WOULD HAVE TO REFER THEM TO WASHINGTON.

PAGE THREE RUESSD 1255 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
RECOMMENDATION: WE DO NOT CONSIDER NEW CEASE FIRE NECESSARY AND ARE CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD TIE OUR HANDS YET WE CANNOT PUT OURSELVES IN POSITION OF REFUSING COMMISSION'S REQUEST. WE RECOMMEND AMBASSADOR BE AUTHORIZED GIVE COMMISSION NOTE REFERRING TO COMMISSION'S REQUEST FOR COOPERATION IN MAINTAINING CEASE FIRE, REITERATING HOW WE HAVE BEEN COOPERATING UNDER APRIL 30 CEASE FIRE AND INDICATING THAT UNDER PARAGRAPH 4 OF MAY 1 MCM RESOLUTION WE WILL CONTINUE LEAD OUR FULL COOPERATION TO WORK OF COMMISSION. GENERAL PALMER CONCURS THIS RECOMMENDATION. REQUEST REPLY BY COB MAY 5.

GP-3: BENNETT

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:12 A.M. MAY 5, 1965

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, BOB, CIA, CINCSO, CINCLANT, AT
1:02 A.M. - MAY 5, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SP ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 4

1965 MAY 4 PM 11 52

IMMEDIATE

SAH FROM AMBASSADOR AND BOWDLER
L PASS TO WHITE HOUSE
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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dep 3/1/76
By mmg, NARS, Date 8/30/77

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FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF "ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO":
QUOTE

1. THE PARTIES WHO SUBSCRIBE TO THIS ACT RATIFY THE THE CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT SIGNED ON APRIL 30.

2. THE PARTIES ACCEPT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY ZONE IN THE CITY OF SANTO DOMINGO, COMPRISED WITHIN THE LIMITS INDICATED ON THE MAP ATTACHED TO THIS DOCUMENT AND SIGNED BY THE SAME PARTIES WHICH SIGN THIS ACT. (COMMENT: LIMITS HAVE YET TO BE WORKED OUT BUT COMMISSION'S THINKING OF SUBSTANTIAL EXTENSION.)

3. THE PARTIES ASSUME THE OBLIGATION OF ESPECIALLY RESPECTING THIS SECURITY ZONE WITHIN WHICH THERE IS GUARANTEED, IN THE FORM IN WHICH THE OAS CONSIDERS CONVENIENT, ADEQUATE PROTECTION AND SECURITY FOR ALL PERSONS WHO FIND THEMSELVES IN THAT ZONE OF REFUGE.

4. THE PARTIES ASSUME THE OBLIGATION OF GIVING ALL THE NECESSARY FACILITIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS OR THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCY WHICH THE OAS DESIGNATES IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT IN ANY PART OF THE CITY OF SANTO DOMINGO OR IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD, MEDICINE AND MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EQUIPMENT, WHICH IS SENT AS A RESULT OF OF THE APPEAL WHICH THE OAS HAS MADE. THEY ALSO ASSUME THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE ALL FACILITIES WHICH THE OAS MIGHT REQUEST SO THAT THE MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL WHICH THE GOVERNMENTS SEND CAN GO TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1300 MAY 4 FROM SANTI DOMINGO

ANY PART OF THE CITY OF SANTI DOMINGO OR
OF DOMINICAN TERRITORY TO RENDER THEIR SERVICES.

5. THE PARTIES ASSUME THE OBLIGATION OF GIVING ALL THE
NECESSARY GUARANTEES FOR THE EVACUATION OF THOSE
ASYLEES FROM THE EMBASSIES OR DIPLOMATIC
MISSIONS WHICH ARE REQUESTED.

6. THE PARTIES ASSUME THE OBLIGATION OF RESPECTING
THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND GIVING
ALL THE NECESSARY COOPERATION TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY
OF ALL THE PERSONNEL IN THOSE MISSIONS AND THE
PERSONS WHO HAVE ASYLUM OR REFUGE IN THEM.

7. THE PARTIES DECLARE TO ACCEPT AND RECOGNIZE THE
FULL COMPETENCE OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION APPOINTED
BY THE 10TH NFM FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE
FAITHFUL FULFILLMENT OF WHAT
IS AGREED TO IN THIS DOCUMENT. END QUOTE
BENNETT
GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 12:27 A.M. MAY 5
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 1:13 A.M. MAY 5
PASSED CINCSO, CINCLANT, 1:13 A.M. MAY 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Action

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00 RUEHCR

DE RUESSD 127S 05/0530Z

O 050315Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ZEN/CJTF 122

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 4

PASS TO WHITE HOUSE

FROM AMBASSADOR AND BOWDLER

RE EMBTEL 1359

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MEMORANDUM: QUOTE

AS A RESULT OF THE SESSION HELD ON THE NIGHT OF MAY 3, 1965, THE COMMISSION OF THE 10TH MFM HAS THE HONOR TO PRESENT TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE COMMISSION HAS THE UNYIELDING PURPOSE (PROPOSITO INDECLINABLE) OF ACHIEVING THE CONFIRMATION AND EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT ALREADY REACHED ON A CEASE FIRE;

PAGE TWO RUESSD 127S ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. TO ACHIEVE THIS PURPOSE THE COMMISSION HAS CARRIED OUT TODAY LONG CONVERSATIONS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE COMMAND OF COL. CAAMANO AND THE MILITARY JUNTA OVER WHICH COL. BENOIT PRESIDES. BOTH HAVE GIVEN THEIR CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE, TOGETHER WITH THE COMMISSION, IN FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING UP AN AGREEMENT WHICH COMPLEMENTS AND AMPLIFIES THE CEASE FIRE, WHICH THE COMMISSION CONSIDERS INDISPENSABLE AND WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AMONG ITS PRINCIPAL PARAGRAPHS, AMONG OTHERS, THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE DEMARCATION AND AMPLIFICATION OF THE ZONE OF SECURITY TO INCLUDE THE EMBASSIES WHICH AT THE PRESENT TIME FIND THEMSELVES OUTSIDE THAT ZONE;

B. THE COOPERATION OF BOTH PARTIES WITH A COMMISSION OF THE 10TH MFM TO SUPERVISE AND APPLY THE CEASE FIRE;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Sec 8/3/76
By PMG, NARS, Date 8/30/77

1965 MAY 5 AM 12 04

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1361, May 4, from Santo Domingo

C. THE COOPERATION FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE;

D. THE DEPARTURE FROM THE COUNTRY OF DOMINICAN REFUGEES AND ASYLEES IN THE EMBASSIES WHO DESIRE TO LEAVE.

3. THE COMMISSION DESIRES TO KNOW, IN THE EVENT THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO SIGN A COMPLIMENTARY AND AMPLIFYING AGREEMENT OF THAT NATURE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, IF THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC COULD BE GIVEN PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS TO COOPERATE IN THE EXECUTION OF THAT WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED.

PAGE THREE RUESSD 1275 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. THE COMMISSION CONSIDERS THAT WITHOUT THE INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES EVEN THE PREVIOUS CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE PUT INTO EFFECT.

5. THE COMMISSION IS OF THE VIEW THAT THE FOREGOING CORRESPONDS TO THE TERMS OF ITS MANDATE CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTION OF APRIL 30, 1965 OF THE MFM, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 2, SUB-PARAGRAPH A, CONCERNING THE CEASE FIRE, AND PARAGRAPH 4 WHICH READS:

INNERQUOTE REQUESTS THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OAS TO LEND FULL ASSISTANCE TO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION. END INNERQUOTE AND QUOTE

UP S. BENNETT
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 12:35 a.m., May 5.

Passed White House, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, CINCLANT 1:31 a.m.,

May 5.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Info

AMEMBASSY SANTODOMINGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1372

1965 MAY 5 AM 3 50

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 5

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PASS WHITE HOUSE

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FROM BOWDLER

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State Dec 8/5/76

By

mmg, NARS, Date *8/30/77*

CAS COMMISSION TODAY DEVOTED ALMOST ALL DAY TO TRYING TO OBTAIN CONCURRENCE OF CAAMANO AND BENOIT COMMANDS TO "ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO" M

AFTER MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR AND BOWDLER (EMBTTEL 1359) COMMISSION WENT TO CAAMANO'S HEADQUARTERS AND OBTAINED HIS CONCURRENCE TO ACT SUBJECT NOTIFICATION WHO WOULD SIGN FOR OTHER SIDE. CAAMANO AGREEABLE SIGN WITH BENOIT AND FELLOW JUNTA MEMBERS BUT NOT WITH CERTAIN GENERALS AT SAN ISIDRO. COMMISSION UNABLE ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH JUNTA DURING AFTERNOON.

THIS EVENING IN RESPONSE COMPLAINTS BY CAAMANO GROUP TO COMMISSION ABOUT US ACTIONS AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL PALMER VISITED COMMITTEE. COMPLAINTS CONSISTED ALLEGED HEAVY FIRING BY US FORCES AS LARGE CONVOY PASSED THROUGH LOC AND DROPPING OF LEAFLETS OVER PART OF CITY UNDER THEIR CONTROL. AMB POINTED OUT THIS RUMOR TYPICAL OF FALSE CHARGE PUT OUT DAILY BY CAAMANO'S GROUP. GENERAL PALMER INFORMED COMMITTEE THINGS UNUSUALLY QUIET ALONG CORRIDOR TODAY. PALMER ALSO TOOK OPPORTUNITY DESCRIBE FREE TRANSIT THROUGH CORRIDOR FOR UNARMED PEOPLE AND STRONGLY FAVORABLE REACTION POPULATION ALONG ROUTE TO FURNISHING OF FOOD AND MEDICINES.

THE UNITED MILITARY ADVISER VISIT HIS HEADQUARTER MAY 5 AND MAKE TOUR MILITARY INSTALLATION SECURITY ZONE. ALSO REVIEWED SITUATION GUATEMALAN EMBASSY WHICH OUTSIDE OF ZONE AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO OFFER PROTECTION. GENERAL PALMER INDICATED HE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TROOPS TO EXTEND ZONE TO INCLUDE EMBASSY BUT COULD POST GUARDS AND SEND ROVING PATROL ON REGULAR BASIS. AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT IF OTHER GOVERNMENTS CONTRIBUTE FORCES, THIS COULD HELP IN EXTENDING ZONE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1372, MAY 15, FROM SANTO DOMINGO

COMMITTEE PLANNING RETURN WASHINGTON AS SOON AS ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO
SIGNED. THEY PRESSED ME TODAY FOR DATA ON COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
IN CAAPANO GROUP. HAS DEPARTMENT COMPLETED NEW DRAFT OF PAPER
MENTIONED DEPTTEL 739?
WHEN CAN I EXPECT IT? BENNETT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 3:55 A.M., 5/5/65
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, CINCLANT, 4:12 A.M.
5/5/65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

222b

~~SECRET~~

Action

SSD 132S 050500Z

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AKA U 050513Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (SANTODOMINGO)
Info TO RUEKCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
SS INFO ZEN/CJTF ONE TWO TWO
G ZEN/CTF ONE TWO ZERO
SP RUEKDA/OFD
SAH RUEKDA/JCS
L RUCKHC/CINCLANT
H RUCKHC/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 31
IO RUEKRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 44
P RUEKSLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA 16
USIA STATE GRNC
NSC BT

IMMEDIATE 1364

03586

1955 MAY 5 AM 3 18

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State la 8/5/74
By hmq, NARS, Date 8/30/77

~~SECRET~~ MAY 4 (SETWO OF TWO)

WELL OUTSIDE INTERNATIONAL ZONE. THIS ALSO PROVED
UNTRUE. WE ARE KNOCKING DOWN PROMPTLY EVERY FALSE
RUMOR THAT CAAMANO SPREADS AND WHICH THE
SUSCEPTIBLE COMMISSION ALL TOO READILY ACCEPTS.

ALL SANTO DOMINGO TELEPHONE EXCHANGES NOW WORKING
BUT NETWORK NOT ENTIRELY REPAIRED. LIGHT
AND POWER ON IN MOST OF ISZ
AND OTHER SECTIONS OF CITY.

AMCONSUL SANTIAGO REPORTED CITY RETURNED TO NORMAL
TODAY WITH EVERYBODY WORKING
AND MORALE OF TROOPS AND POLICE (WHO REMAIN
STEADY AND LOYAL) UPLIFTED BY OCCASIONAL

PAGE TWO RUESSD 132S ~~SECRET~~
FLYPASTS OF U S AIRCRAFT. SOME TENSENESS HAS BEEN EVIDENT
AMONG POPULACE BUT IT ACCEPTING SITUATION QUIETLY
AND NO DANGER SEEN IN RURAL AREAS.
VOA BROADCASTS HEARD CLEARLY AND OUR
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORTS FURTHER HELPED BY LA INFORMACION
WHICH PUBLISHED TODAY FOR FIRST TIME IN WEEK.
AM CONSUL RECOMMENDS EARLIEST POSSIBLE RESUMPTION
OF CARE AND CARITAS FOOD MOVEMENT TO AND IN CIBAO
REGION. HE REPORTS RECENT RAINFALL HAS HAD
BENEFICIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT AND HAS ALSO EXTINGUISHED
MOST OR ALL FOREST FIRES IN AREA.

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1200, MAY 4, (SECTION II OF II) FROM SANTO DOMINGO

MILITARY

ACTIVITY ALONG LOC AND ALONG EASTERN PERIMETER OF ISZ CONTINUED TO BE QUIET AS SECURITY OF LOC AND ZONE WAS IMPROVED. IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN CAS COMMISSION AND REBEL AND JUNTA LEADERS, SOUTHEASTERN SECTOR OF ISZ WAS EXTENDED TO EAST FOUR BLOCKS AND TO NORTH TWO BLOCKS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO EMBASSIES OF ECUADOR AND EL SALVADOR. THIS ESSENTIALLY BRINGS ALL EMBASSIES UNDER PROTECTION OF ISZ WITH EXCEPTION OF GUATEMALAN EMBASSY. PLANS ARE BEING MADE TO PLACE GUARD ON GUATEMALAN EMBASSY AND TO PERIODICALLY PATROL AREA BY VEHICLE.

CASUALTIES TO DATE: 82D ABN DIV - 3 KIA/30WIA
US MARINES - 3 KIA/22 WIA

PAGE THREE RUESSD 0132S ~~SECRET~~
PSYCHOLOGICAL

EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN US ROLE IN CRISIS TO DOM PEOPLE CONTINUED TO BUILD UP DURING DAY, WITH CONTINUED LEAFLET AND LOUDSPEAKER OPERATIONS OVER CITY (SOME GROUND FIRE, NO CASUALTIES), WITH USE JEEP-MOUNTED LOUDSPEAKERS TO ANNOUNCE FOOD DISTRIBUTION POINTS, AND CONTINUED ROUND-THE-CLOCK VOA REBROADCAST. DISTRIBUTION OF LEAFLETS WILL BE EXTENDED TO INTERIOR TOMORROW, CONDITIONS PERMITTING. INSTALLATION OTHER RADIO TRANSMITTERS CONTINUES. TRANSMITTER WHICH WILL BROADCAST LOCAL MATERIAL SHOULD GO ON AIR TONIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING.

RELIEF

PACE OF PL 480 FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN US MILITARY CORRIDOR WAS STEPPED UP TODAY, DISTRIBUTION BEING MADE FROM 10 POINTS AND CONSISTING OF RICE BROUGHT IN FROM NORTH BY CIVILIAN TRANSPORT AS WELL AS BEANS AND MILK. DISTRIBUTION WAS MADE FOR FIRST TIME IN HEART OF REBEL AREA UNDER ARRANGEMENTS WITH PROTESTANT PASTORS AND DOMINICAN RED CROSS. THIS WILL BE WATCHED CAREFULLY TO SEE THAT US GETS BENEFIT. FOOD DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE REBEL AREA STEADILY IMPROVING WITH LOUDSPEAKER TRUCKS CALLING PEOPLE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1364, MAY 4, (SECTION II OF II) FROM SANTO DOMINGO

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 1325 ~~SECRET~~
TO COME WITH THEIR OWN CONTAINERS TO
NEAREST DISTRIBUTION POINT. STOCKS IN SANTO DOMINGO
VIRTUALLY EXHAUSTED BY END OF DAY BUT
BEING REPLENISHED TONIGHT BY CIVILIAN
TRUCKS MOBILIZED TO BRING CARGO FROM S. S. ALCOA
RANGER AND RICE FOOD DISTRIBUTION ALONG LOC HAS
BEEN HAMPERED IN SOME CASES FROM NORTH OF ISLAND BY REBEL
EFFORTS TO DENY PUBLIC ACCESS TO DISTRIBUTION CENTERS. WE
ARE EXPLORING POSSIBILITY OF PUBLICIZING THIS AS
MEANS OF HELPING DISCREDIT REBEL LEADERSHIP IN PUBLIC
EYES.

CONTINUED LULL IN FIGHTING AND GRADUAL TREND TOWARD
NORMALITY IN CAPITAL HAVE KEPT TWO FIELD
HOSPITALS PROVIDED BY US FOR DOMINICANS
OPERATING AT CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN TOTAL CAPACITY;
HOWEVER, THESE WILL BE NEEDED SHOULD VIOLENCE PICK
UP. THERE ARE SUFFICIENT DOCTORS AVAILABLE,
AND NEEDED MEDICINES AND NURSES HAVE BEEN REQUESTED.
AMBULANCES HAVE BEEN ABLE CROSS INTO REBEL TERRITORY
DURING DAYLIGHT. CATHOLIC PRIESTS ALONG LOC
REPORT WOUNDED PERSONS IN AREAS BORDERING ON LOC
RELUCTANT SEEK MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FROM U S MILITARY,
POSSIBLY OUT OF FEAR OF REPRISALS. WE
WILL SEEK TO DISPEL SUCH UNFOUNDED FEARS AS PART OF
OF OVERALL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT.

EVACUATION

ONE HUNDRED EVACUEES LEFT SAN ISIDRO AIR BASE
THIS AFTERNOON (FIRST TO TRAVEL
THROUGH CORRIDOR) WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. ANOTHER 150
REGISTERED TODAY AND MORE EXPECTED
TOMORROW. WE HOPE REDUCE BACKLOG GRADUALLY BY
ADDITIONAL EVACUATION BY SHIP TOMORROW AND
THEREAFTER BY BOTH SHIP AND AIR. BENNETT
CP-2
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-C AT 3:30 A.M. MAY 5, 1965

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, OSD, CIA, CINCSO, CINCLANT, AT
3:47 AM - MAY 5, 1965

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

019075
DA

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43
Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SANTO DOMINGO 810

FLASH

MAY 5 10 30 AM '65

ARA
Info

DECLASSIFIED

Ref Deptel 796; Embtel 1364.

Authority State Ltr. 12/21/76

By RMG, NAK, Date 8/30/77

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DOD

Requirement that you should discuss plans for enlarging
and restructuring Junta with OAS Commission are rescinded
(Deptel 796).

322

FYI In continuing your efforts you should bear in mind
that even enlarged and restructured Junta will probably be only
an interim grouping as it seems unlikely ~~that~~ anything which
could be put together now would be very permanent in any event.
As events are developing here, it seems probable that OAS
Commission will be enlarged and greatly strengthened. Re-
structured OAS Commission will undoubtedly have strong views
and considerable influence on final composition of group which
will eventually be formed to govern Dominican Republic until
elections can be held. END FYI

END

GP-3

RUISK

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

ARA-CAR/KCrockett 5/5/65

classification approved by: M

Thomas C. Mann

Clearances:

ARA - Mr. Vaughn

~~SECRET~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin

ACTION:

Amembassy SANTO DOMINGO

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IMMEDIATE

May 5 6 01 PM '65

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Arriving tonight by Air Force plane are John Stempler (DOD) John Wolf and Allen Raywid (Justice), Lt. Col. Del Vitto, and George Lister (STATE, ARA). Stempler and team going there for only few days to help Embassy, military, USIA, CAS, others working on intelligence collection regarding communist activities, identification of communists, photographic and radio taping coverage, all other data needed urgently here to document communist penetration and takeover of rebel movement.

We are doing all we can here to assemble data and appreciate contributions all agencies now in Santo Domingo. Essential, however, that all fully appreciate importance attached to this task by highest U.S. officials and need to have documented case as soon as possible on communist penetration and takeover. Stempler will explain urgency and our need for all facts possible, including signed eye-witness and other statements, in order assemble evidence and then prepare carefully documented report soonest for public release. We will appreciate

Drafted by:

IS-2000:blr

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

ARAX-M - Robert W. Adams

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Hoffacker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FORM 33 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 12/21/76

By pmg, NARS, Date 8/30/77

2

of telegram to

Santo Domingo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

extension of all possible assistance to Stempler.

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CC RUEHCR
DE RUESSD 164S 060250Z
O 060245Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1386
INFO ZEN/CJTF ONE TWO TWO
STATE GRNC

1965 MAY 6 04 47 9 AM '65

IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

NARS, Date

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 5

REF: EMBTEL 1359

FROM AMBASSADOR AND BOWDLER

OAS COMMISSION TODAY GOT BOTH SIDES TO SIGN "ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO"
BODY OF DOCUMENT UNCHANGED FROM THAT CONTAINED REFTEL. PREAMBLE
HAS BEEN ADDED, HOWEVER, WHICH REFERS TO CAMAANO GROUP AS
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE BENOIT GROUP AS MILITARY
JUNTA OF GOVERNMENT. COMMISSION PUT REFERENCE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN QUOTES SO AS TO INDICATE
THAT THIS IS WHAT CAMAANO GROUP CALLS ITSELF.

WE CONSIDER REFERENCE TO "CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT" IN THIS
DOCUMENT AS GIVING UNWARRANTED STATUS TO CAMAANO GROUP. IT
ALSO IN OUR JUDGMENT CONSTITUTES A SUBSTANTIVE MODIFICATION

PAGE TWO RUESSD 164S ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
IN TEXT SENT DEPARTMENT. IN DEFINING POSITION WHICH WE SHOULD
TAKE WITH REGARD OUR RESPONSE TO JUNTA, DEPARTMENT WILL WISH
TO TAKE THIS FACTOR INTO CONSIDERATION.

MAJORITY OF COMMISSION MEMBERS LEAVING TONIGHT FOR WASHINGTON.
AMBASSADOR COLOMBO HAS ASKED THAT USG RESPONSE TO COMMISSION'S
REQUEST FOR OUR VIEWS ON ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO BE GIVEN TO HIM
THERE. BENNETT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-C 2:10 A.M., MAY 6, 1965, PASSED TO
WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, C NMO AND CINCLANT 2:12 A.M., MAY
6, 1965.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OO RUEHCR
DE RUESSD 182S 06/0920Z
O 060918Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY/SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE (1396)
ZEN/CJTF 122 IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

5023
1965 MAY 6 AM 6 42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 6

PASS TO WHITE HOUSE
FROM BOWDLER

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State Dec 8/5/76*
By *rmg*, NARS, Date *8/30/77*

OAS COMMISSION TRAVELED TO SAN ISIDRO 2:00 AM, MAY 5 TO
OBTAIN APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE OF "ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO".
THE JUNTA READILY SIGNED DOCUMENT WITHOUT INCLUSION NAMES
OF GENERALS OBJECTIONABLE TO CAAMANO GROUP. DURING
MORNING OF MAY 5, COMMISSION WENT TO CAAMANO HEADQUARTERS
TO OBTAIN THEIR SIGNATURES. SECRETARIAT MEMBER TOLD ME
THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE ARGUMENT OVER WORDING OF PREAMBLE

PAGE 2 RUESSD 182S ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO ACT IN WHICH FRENCH MEMBER CAAMANO STAFFN RIVIERE, PLAYED
PROMINENT COACHING ROLE. COMMISSION RELEASED TEXT OF ACT TO
PRESS SHORTLY AFTER NOON. COMMISSION MEMBERS OBVIOUSLY ELATED
THEIR SUCCESS IN OBTAINING THIS DOCUMENT WHICH THEY CONSIDER
TO BE MAJOR VICTORY. SUCCESS EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF
BOTH SIDES ACCEPTING OAS SUPERVISION OF CEASE FIRE WHICH NOT
CASE APRIL 30 AGREEMENT.

FOLLOWING RETURN FROM CAAMANO HEADQUARTERS, COMMISSION AGAIN
MET WITH LATIN AMERICAN AMBASSADORS ACCREDITED SANTO DOMINGO
DURING WHICH SEVERAL AMBASSADORS PRESENTED, IN WRITING,
THEIR VIEWS ON ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION CRISIS. SECRETARIAT
OFFICER DESCRIBED THESE NOTES AS "HELPFUL" FROM US STANDPOINT.
COMMISSION ALSO RECEIVED DELEGATION WHICH CLAIMED SPEAK FOR
MORE THAN 2,000 DOMINICAN PROFESSIONALS. THIS IS GROUP LEFT
MANIFESTO WITH COMMISSION IN WHICH IT STRONGLY ENDORSED BOSCH
AND CRITICIZED US FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION. GOVERNORS OF
NORTHERN PROVINCES CALLED ON COMMISSION TO MAKE PLAIN THEY DO
NOT "RECOGNIZE" CAAMANO GROUP AND TO EXPRESS THEIR HOPE THAT
COMMISSION WOULD WORK TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT MADE UP OF RESPECTABLE, POLITICAL LEADERS.
AMBASSADOR BENNETT MET BRIEFLY WITH AMBASSADORS TO DELIVER NOT
ON HANDLING OF ASYLEES.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1396, MAY 6, FROM SANTO DOMINGO

PAGE 3 RUESSD 182S ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ADMIRAL MASTERSON GAVE LUNCHEON ON BOARD HIS FLAGSHIP NEW-
PORT NEWS FOR COMMISSION AND CHIEFS OF MISSIONS OTHER OAS
REPUBLICS. IN BRIEF STATEMENT FOLLOWING MEAL, ADMIRAL COMMENTED
ON HISTORIC ROLE OF COMMISSION IN DEALING WITH THIS CRISIS.
HE EMPHASIZED GREAT CHALLENGE AND RESPONSIBILITY PLACED ON
COMMISSION IN BLAZING NEWTRAILS OF INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATION.
LUNCHEON WAS GREAT SUCCESS AND VERY MUCH APPRECIATED.

AMBASSADOR MET WITH COMMISSION AGAIN ON EVENING MAY 5,
TAKING WITH HOM SOLOMON TO EXPLAIN RELIEF PROGRAMS WHICH WE
ARE CONDUCTING. AT THIS SESSION, COLOMBO POINTED OUT NEED TO
WORK OUT PROCEDURES FOR LANDING AND UNLOADING AT SAN ISIDRO
OF

AIRCRAFT FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES BRINGING IN RELIEF SUPPLIES.
THESE WILL BE WORKED OUT MORNING MAY 6. COLOMBO ALSO NOTED THAT
DURING COURSE OF AFTERNOON RADIO SANTO DOMINGO BEGAN BROADCASTING
AGAIN. HE INDICATED THAT COMMITTEE CONCERNED THESE BROADCASTS
MIGHT STIR UP OTHERWISE QUIET SITUATION. HE SAID COMMITTEE
HAD CONSIDERED AS A CONTROL MEASURE AGAINST INFLAMMATORY BROADCAST
OVER RADIO SANTO DOMINGO PLACING THIS STATION, AS WELL AS
RADIO SAN ISIDRO, UNDER SUPERVISION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN PEACE
COMMITTEE. THIS SUGGESTION WAS NOT PURSUED FURTHER DURING
COURSE OF DISCUSSION. THIRD POINT BROUGHT UP BY COLOMBO

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 182S ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WAS DESIRE OF CAAMANO GROUP TO HAVE DESIGNATED AREA WHERE
THERE COULD TRANSIT FREELY ACROSS LOC. AMBASSADOR AGAIN POINTED
OUT THAT ACCESS ACROSS LOC IS UNRESTRICTED PROVIDED WEAPONS
ARE NOT CARRIED. HE INFORMED COMMISSION THAT RED CROSS TRUCK
LOADED WITH REBEL ARMS HAD BEEN DISCOVERED MAY 5 AS IT TRIED
TO CROSS CORRIDOR. AMBASSADOR ALSO INFORMED COMMITTEE THAT WE
HAD TAPED BROADCAST MADE THIS MORNING BY REBEL RADIO WHICH WAS
STRONGLY ANTI-AMERICAN AND URGED SHOOTING OF AMERICANS OUTSIDE
OF NEUTRAL ZONE. AMBASSADOR LEFT COPY OF TAPE FOR COMMITTEE
RECORDS.

JUS. BEFORE COMMITTEE DEPARTED FOR WASHINGTON IT MET WITH COLONEL
BENOIT, PAPAL NUNCIO AND AMBASSADOR BENNETT. MEETING WAS CALLED
AT REQUEST OF SAN ISIDRO JUNTA WHICH WANTED TO BRING TO THE
ATTENTION OF COMMISSION INFLAMMATORY NATURE OF BROADCAST MADE
BY REBELS OVER RADIO SANTO DOMINGO THIS AFTERNOON. DISCUSSION
LED COMMISSION TO ASK BOTH COMMANDS TO GIVE TIME ON RESPECTIVE
RADIO STATIONS TO BROADCAST OAS MESSAGE EXPLAINING WHY IT WAS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1396, MAY 6, FROM SANTO DOMINGO
HERE AND NATURE OF ITS ACTIVITIES. BOTH CONSENTED AND MORA, MORRICE
AND NUNCIO SCHEDULED DO THIS NOON MAY 6. COMMISSION ALSO
AGREED EXPLORE ESTABLISHMENT OF OAS MONITORING OF PROGRAMS
OF TWO STATIONS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY BROADCASTING
INFLAMMATORY PROPAGANDA, INCONSISTENT WITH TERMS OF "ACT OF
SANTO DOMINGO".

PAGE FIVE RUESSD 182S ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COMMITTEE DECIDED TO LEAVE AMBASSADOR MORRICE (PANAMA) AT
HEAD OF COMMISSION WHILE OTHER FOUR MEMBERS TRAVELED TO WASHINGTON
TO GIVE FIRST HAND REPORT TO MEETING OF CONSULTATION. HALF OF
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ADVISERS REMAINED BEHIND. DR. MORA ALSO
DECIDED TO STAY IN ORDER TO BUTTRESS U.S. PRESENCE.

COMMISSION DEPARTED SANTO DOMINGO APPROXIMATELY MIDNIGHT...
MAY 5.

GP 3. BENNETT
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 5/6/65 7:00 A.M.

PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, CINCLANT 5/6/65 7:25 A.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INTER-AMERICAN FORCE^{1/}

WHEREAS:

This Tenth Meeting of Consultation at its session on May 1, 1965, established a Special Committee composed of five of its members to go to the Dominican Republic to seek the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions in the territory of that republic;

The abovementioned resolution requests the governments of the member states and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation to facilitate the work of the Special Committee;

The formation of an inter-American force will signify ipso facto the transformation of the forces presently in Dominican territory into another force that would not be that of one state or of a group of states but that of the Organization of American States, an interstatal organization, which Organization is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the democratic will of its members;

The American states being under the obligation to provide reciprocal assistance to each other, the Organization is under even greater obligation to safeguard the principles of the Charter and to do everything possible so that in situations such as that prevailing in the Dominican Republic appropriate measures may be taken leading to the re-establishment of peace and normal democratic conditions;

The Organization of American States being competent to assist the member states in the preservation of peace and the re-establishment of normal democratic conditions, undoubtedly it is also competent to provide the means that reality and circumstances require and that prudence counsels as adequate for the accomplishment of such purposes; and

The Special Committee that went to the Dominican Republic, in its second message to this Meeting of Consultation, advises the formation of an inter-American force to achieve the objectives determined by the Meeting,

1. Registered as Doc. 39 Rev. 2 of the Meeting.

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES:

1. To request governments of member states that are willing and capable of doing so to make contingents of their land, naval, air or police forces available to the Organization of American States, within their capabilities and to the extent they can do so, to form an inter-American force that will operate under the authority of this Tenth Meeting of Consultation.

2. That this Force will have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.

3. To request the commanders of the military contingents that make up this Force to work out directly among themselves and with a committee of this Meeting the technical measures necessary to establish a Unified Command of the Organization of American States for the coordinated and effective action of the Inter-American Force. In the composition of this Force, an effort will be made to see that the national contingents shall be progressively equalized.

4. That at such time as the Unified Command of the Organization of American States shall have determined that the Inter-American Force is adequate for carrying out the purposes set forth in the resolution adopted by this Meeting on May 1, 1965, the full responsibility of fulfilling these purposes shall be assumed by that Force.

5. That the withdrawal of the Inter-American Force from the Dominican Republic shall be determined by this Meeting of Consultation.

6. To continue in session in order to keep the situation under review, to receive the report and recommendations of the Special Committee, and in the light thereof to take the necessary steps to facilitate the prompt restoration of democratic order in the Dominican Republic.

7. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the text of this resolution.

(Adopted at the third plenary session, held on May 6, 1965)

TELEGRAM Department of State

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RUCKHC/CINCLANT IMMEDIATE

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RUCKHC/CINCLANTFLT IMMEDIATE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 6

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

RMR

REF: DEPTTEL 819

WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE JUNTA HEADQUARTERS SHOULD BE LOCATED IN CONGRESS BUILDING IN FAIRGROUNDS. AS POINTED OUT IN EMBTEL 1336, FAIRGROUNDS IS NOT, REPEAT NOT, INCLUDED IN SAFETY ZONE.

WHILE WE ACKNOWLEDGE POSSIBILITY THAT REBELS TO NORTH OF LOC MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE ABLE TO MOUNT ATTACK ON FAIRGROUNDS AREA, THEY WOULD HAVE TO INFILTRATE TO

PAGE 2 RUESSD 1736 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WEST OF EMBAJADOR HOTEL, CIRCLING SOUTH AND EAST THROUGH TERRITORY HELD BY JUNTA FORCES. MOREOVER, IF THEY ATTACKED, RETREAT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE ENCIRCLED ON NORTH AND EAST BY ZONE BOUNDARY AND ON SOUTH BY SEA.

FERIA AREA IS SECURED BY NAVY GUARD TROOPS LOYAL TO JUNTA AND PRESUMABLY LATTER WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SECURITY FORCES TO PROTECT SEAT OF GOVERNMENT.

CEASE FIRE IS IN EFFECT AND IF REBELS WERE TO ATTACK, THEY WOULD BE IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF FORMAL ACTA DE SANTO DOMINGO NEGOTIATED BY OAS COMMISSION AND SUBSCRIBED TO BY BOTH SIDES.

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-2- 1394, May 6, from Santo Domingo

EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL REBELS WOULD SO BLATANTLY DEFY CEASE FIRE ORDERS, SINCE IT WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO OAS AGAINST THEM THAT THEY WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF OBTAINING FAVORABLE SETTLEMENT UNDER OAS AUSPICES. FOR FOREGOING REASONS, CONCURRED IN BY CJTF 122, WE RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT RECONSIDER POSITION SET FORTH DEPTTEL 719 AND AUTHORIZE EMBASSY SOONEST NOT TO OPPOSE LOCATION JUNTA SEAT OF GOVERNMENT AT FAIR- GROUND S.

RE QUESTION IN LAST PARA DEPTTEL 819, NATIONAL PALACE REPORTED

PAGE 3 RUESSD 178S ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO BE BADLY DAMAGED AND UNSUITABLE FOR OCCUPANCY UNTIL REPAIRED. ADDITIONALLY, PALACE CONSIDERABLY MORE VULNERABLE TO REBEL ATTACK THAN CONGRESS BUILDING IN FAIRGROUNDS. PROBABLY BOTH THESE CONSIDERATIONS MOTIVATED JUNTA TO PREFER LATTER SITE.
SCP-3. BENNETT
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 5:50 a.m., May 6.

Passed White House, CIA, 5:59 a.m., May 6.

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232

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Authority State 4-19-78, NSC 12-11-78
By ing, NARS, Date 8-31-79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Reduction of U.S. Forces in
Dominican Republic

1. Attached is a MemCon from Jack Vaughn about a Presidential meeting on May 6. At the meeting, the President reportedly indicated that while he saw dangers in a reduction of U.S. forces, he would go along with a token withdrawal of troops if Bunker felt it would help his OAS case.
2. Bunker does feel strongly about the matter. Furthermore, he feels that the best time for the announcement should be this evening, after the OAS meeting.
3. Jack said that he will be sending over, by noon, a proposed announcement that the President (or, presumably, someone else) could make sometime while the OAS is meeting tonight (OAS is scheduled to meet at about 5:00 P.M. and it may last until very late).

6C
Gordon Chase

P.S. Regarding the troop withdrawal, Bromley makes the point that the President should not make this decision until he hears from General Wheeler -- even if he overrides the General's recommendations (this is for the President's own protection).
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Do you know if the President has heard Wheeler's views?



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 6, 1965

TO: Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Mann
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Wilson, USIA
Mr. Fitzgerald
Mr. Crockett

FROM: Jack H. Vaughn

SUBJECT: White House Meeting of May 6 - 3:00 p.m.

1. Reduction of U.S. Military Strength in the Dominican Republic.

Although the President did not feel strongly on this issue, he saw a danger in reducing U.S. forces at this time because such a move might give the impression the U.S. had sent too many troops and that such a move might encourage the rebels to renew military operations.

It was agreed to refer this issue to Ambassador Bunker to determine whether a token reduction at this point would help his case in the OAS. (In checking this matter with Ambassador Bunker, he stated that the withdrawal of a battalion would be a decided help and he suggested that the most appropriate time for the announcement would be subsequent to the OAS meeting now scheduled for Friday evening, May 7.)

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By inf, NARS, Date 8-20-79

2. The President

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-2-

2. The President felt that he should not speak to the recently returned OAS Commission unless the members take the initiative in seeking an appointment. (Ambassador Bunker concurs strongly in this position.)

3. The President stated he would be pleased to see Figueres, if the latter insists on seeing him.

4. The President reiterated his request to have the chronology of events subsequent to his decision to send troops fleshed out so as to be able to demonstrate conclusively that the U.S. was aggressive in seeking to involve the OAS actively in resolving the Dominican crisis.

5. The possible postponement of the Rio meeting scheduled for May 20 was discussed. The consensus favored postponement with the understanding that if the host country, Brazil, wished to stay with the original schedule, its wishes should be honored. (Ambassador Bunker has discussed this matter with several OAS Ambassadors. He said Sevilla Sacasa felt strongly the meeting should be postponed. The Ambassadors from Costa Rica and Venezuela shared Sevilla's view. It was agreed that Ambassador Bunker would sound out the Brazilian representative before any further discussions on this matter.)

6. Mr. McNamara will undertake to have a political background check done on General Briceno of Venezuela, who is a candidate for the Commanding General position for the peace keeping force in the Dominican Republic.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy SANTO DOMINGO - ~~IMMEDIATE~~ FLASH 842
INFO: ~~ZEN~~/JCTF-122 - IMMEDIATE
~~ZEN~~/CTF-128 - IMMEDIATE
RULPAL/CINCSO - IMMEDIATE
RUCKHC/CINCLANT - IMMEDIATE
RULGN/CONCARIBSEAFRON - IMMEDIATE
RUEKDA/JCS - IMMEDIATE
RUEKDA/ODS - IMMEDIATE
RUCKMC/CINCLANTFLT - IMMEDIATE

MAY 6 3 25 PM '65

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Ltr. 12/21/70
By rmq, NARS, Date 8/30/77

REF: Embtel 1394

We have our doubts but in any case
~~we~~/accept estimate of Ambassador and JCTF 122 that move by
junta from San Isidro to Fair Grounds could be accomplished
without running risk of rebels capturing new junta headquarters
and/or junta itself. Guidance provided Deptel 719 recinded.

It seems likely to us that at least Caamano forces and
perhaps OAS Commission would consider move as violation of
cease fire. Junta should be urged to consult with OAS
Commission if it is determined to go ahead with transfer of its
headquarters. GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by: ARA/Crocketts:cb 5/6/65 Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: ARA - Mr. Vaughn *W*

Clearance: ~~SECRET~~
M - Mr. Mann *W*

DOD: Mr. Vance (substance) *W*

RPA:
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ACTION: Ambassador, SANTO DOMINGO
JCTF-122 IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE 856

MAY 6 8 54 PM '65

INFO: WHITE HOUSE CINCLANT)
OSD CINCSO) IMMEDIATE
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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

Authority

By 11/19, NARS, Date 8/30/77

Resolution No. 3, adopted during May 5-6 Meeting of Con-

sultation, contains a request that QUOTE the Commanders of the contingents of forces available from the Inter-American Armed Force work out directly among themselves and with a Committee of this Meeting the technical measures necessary to establish a Unified Command of the OAS for the coordinated and effective action of the Inter-American Armed Force UNQUOTE

Ambassador Bennett is designated Coordinator of U.S. group which will work out arrangements with force commanders of other countries' contingents in implementation of OAS request. He and General Palmer may call upon Mr. Benjamin Forman, Assistant General Counsel DOD, and Col Edward Maughney, Army JAG, who will arrive in Santo Domingo shortly. ETA 7:30 a.m., May 7.

Drafted by

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by

5/6/75

11/9 Mr. Mann

Clearances:

IRB - Mr. Vance (in draft) WH - Mr. Bundy (in draft) ARA - Mr. Vaughn
OAS - Mr. Jackson (in draft) L/ARA - Mr. Silber (in draft)

S/S - [unclear]

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Request Ambassador and General Palmer prepare recommendations as to structure and functioning of Unified Command and submit these to Washington for approval before commencing discussions with LA Force Commanders or OAS Committee. For your guidance, Defense and State are prepared to accept arrangement under which there is single LA Commander (perhaps Brazilian or Venezuelan) for Inter-American Armed Force provided Deputy Commander is United States Officer.

END

GP-3

RUSK

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May 6, 1965

Midnight

OAS Commission except Panama's Morrice, departed after meeting with Bennett, Nuncio, Benoit and LA Ambassadors, whose views helpful to U.S.

12:30 am

Dept. Bunker aide talked with Venezuelan Rep. Raul Nass, urging support of agreed modified resolution without insistence on "withdrawal of national forces." Their instructions were flat and unyielding. Cables on subject shown. Also talked to Magnet of Chile, Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Argentina, Costa Rica, on whether to proceed on Rio Treaty or Article 39. Consensus was latter.

2:15 am

Dept. OAS approved U. S. resolution as amended for inter-american force, 14-5- (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay) -1- (Venezuela).

3:15 am

Martin trying with difficulty to establish provisional government. Not happy with possibilities but feels must be established ASAP. OAS will play prime role political settlement. Caamano still ahead politically.

5:37 am

Embassy believes rebels cannot afford violate ceasefire.

8:35 am

Rebel broadcasts calls for people to fire on Yankee invaders outside neutral zone.

9:22 am

Caamano has asked recognition from other countries.

10:00 am

Dept. Ambassador Stewart was told by Figueres that the latter was trying locate Mrs. Juan Bosch to try induce her depart for Puerto Rico carrying Figueres' plea to Bosch to support caretaker government plan. Figueres reported Bosch earlier (before Caamano named provisional president) seemed adamant desire set up government in DR.

- 2 -

12:54 pm.	<u>Dept.</u>	Need deny Radio SD to rebels.
12:56 pm.	<u>Dept.</u>	PAU receives Caamona designation Rosario as OAS Rep. Dept. asks for Benoit or Junta confirmation Bonilla.

May 6, 1965

-3-

1:28 pm Due mistake, Marines strayed ISZ and LOC. Two killed, two wounded, two taken prisoners.

1:48 pm Evacuees still backlogged.

1:54 pm Ambassador reports OAS was aware rebel radio statements but said they occurred before Act of SD. (Bennett reminded, "but after ceasefire.")

2:00 pm Dept. El Salvador Ambassador told El Salvador desk officer they couldn't send troops due to earthquake.

3:00 pm Dept. Central American desk officer discussed with Honduran Ambassador their proposal Central American regional force, suggesting Honduran action if Central American force took too long to form.

3:30 pm Dept. Bunker and Sevilla-Sacassa met re new resolution.

4:52 pm Of 1300 Americans still in DR, about 200 will desire evacuation if situation same. These Puerto Ricans. Possibly 1000 alien evacuees.

4:53 pm Benoit confirms Bonilla as OAS Ambassador in cable to PAU.

4:00 - 6:00 pm Dept. Desk Officers delivered to all LA Ambassadors to OAS and U.S. document re constitutionality Caamano government. Panama's Calamari said Chileans had privately advocated recognition but Calamari had disagreed. Bolivia's Sanjines and Burr reiterated opposition recognition. Ecuador's Larrea concerned re communist infiltration Caamano forces. Ecuador's Jacome disagreed, dislikes intervention. Colombia's Uribe reported Chile's desire recognize and Venezuela's intention contribute troops but said Colombia needed her troops at home and also couldn't financially afford

May 6, 1965

-4-

send men. Argentina's Barrenechea said U.S. did what it had to do although he disagreed with it legally. Venezuela's Nass reported Venezuela sent a former Ambassador to the DR to help Venezuela decide on recognition Caamano government.

5:00 pm	<u>Dept.</u>	<u>Bunker and Brazil met re Commission's report, Rio Conference, and new resolution.</u>
5:15 pm	<u>Dept.</u>	Mr. Mann talked to Betancourt.
5:55 pm	<u>Dept.</u>	Brazil's Malgalhoes called to state he'd spoken on TV of Brazil's vigorous support for U.S. actions.
6:00 pm	<u>Dept.</u>	<u>Bunker met with Argentina re new resolution.</u>
6:20 pm.		Aristy gaining control over Caamano, but supporting him for President fill expired term Bosch. Caamano forces dispersing but difficult hard core estimated 1000 remains. Problem is forming acceptable junta to oppose Caamano.
6:56 pm	<u>Dept.</u>	Discussion medical personnel coming from other countries.
7:53 pm.		Panama's Morrice criticized by own government for remaining DR. Praised by Bennett.
8:57 pm.	<u>Dept.</u>	Bennett named coordinator U.S. group to work on other countries' contribution OAS force. U.S. will accept Latin American chief of forces if Deputy is from U.S.
11:41 pm.		Junta progressing but problem enlarging, revamping it due reluctance civilians serve despite Embassy efforts. Belief again expressed that Marines being purposely directed into rebel zones More dead, wounded. Newsmen hurt. Palace, U.S. and Guatemalan Embassies hit by snipers. Sitrep on economic, medical situation.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1421
INFO RUFJCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 16
RUFKCR/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 5
RUDSCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6
RUFJAB/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 12
STATE GRNC

Authority

By

NAKs, Date

006087

1965 MAY 7 AM 12 32

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 6

ON HEARING REPORT THAT GEN. DE GAULLE HAD ANNOUNCED FRENCH
RECOGNITION CAAMANO GROUP, I INQUIRED OF FRENCH AMBASSADOR
AS TO FACTS. HE SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION AND THAT DECISION
WOULD OF COURSE BE UP TO PARIS, BUT COMMENTED THAT IF PARIS DID
RECOGNIZE, IT WOULD NOT BE ON THE BASIS HIS REPORTS. HE CONSIDERS
LOCAL EVENTS FOLLOWING CLASSIC COMMUNIST PATTERN. HE SEEMED TO
BE HAVING SAME TROUBLE WITH HIS PRESS THAT WE ARE AND SAID THAT
UNFORTUNATELY PRESS WIRES SEEMED TO TRAVEL FASTER THAN EMBASSY
TELEGRAMS.

FOUCHET, WHO IS GOOD PERSONAL FRIEND, SAID THAT HE HAD HAD
MEETING TODAY WITH HEADS OTHER EUROPEAN MISSIONS HERE INCLUDING
BRITISH, GERMAN AND ITALIAN. THEY HOLD COMMON VIEW REGARDING

PAGE TWO RUESSD 2085 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EXTREMIST NATURE CAAMANO GROUP AND COMMUNIST DIRECTION AT ITS
BASE. THESE VIEWS PARALLEL THOSE OF LATIN AMERICAN AMBASSADORS.
FOUCHET SAID ALL AT TODAY'S MEETING AGREED THAT LOCAL SITUATION
EXTREMELY COMPLICATED AND WERE THANKFUL THEY WERE NOT CALLED
ON TO BE "ADVISERS TO THE AMERICANS."

GP-3. BENNETT
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:55 A.M. MAY 7, 1965

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, EOD, CIA, CINCSO, CINCLANT, AT
1:27 A.M. - MAY 7, 1965

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Action

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SS FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
G TO SECSTATE WASHDC **PRIORITY 1428**
SP STATE GRNC
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L UNCLAS. MAY 7

H DEPT WILL PERHAPS HAVE NOTED CAAMANOS COMMENTS RE ARMS DISTRIBUTION
IO TO PUBLIC HERE AS QUOTED IN LOUIS UCHITELLES AP
P STORY UNDER SANTO DOMINGO DATELINE. PERTINENT
USIA SECTION OF ARTICLE FOLLOWS:

NSC "CAAMANO SAID ARMS WERE DISTRIBUTED TO THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS
INR BECAUSE POPULAR SUPPORT WAS NEEDED.
NSA
AID "WE WERE VERY FEW AT FIRST, HE SAID. WE STARTED GIVING THE ARMS
PC TO VETERANS GROUPS AND THEN TO THE PEOPLE.
RMR WE SIMPLY ANNOUNCED ON THE RADIO THAT THE ARMS WERE AVAILABLE
BT IN CERTAIN PLACES FOR ANYONE WHO WANTED THEM." BENNETT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 5-7-65, 2:20 A.M.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, CINCLANT,
5-7-65, 2:54 A.M.


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ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Pan American Union, Washington, D.C.

1965



241a
Doc. 47 (English) Rev.
2 June 1965
Original: Spanish

FIRST REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
OF THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF
MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Submitted at the Fourth Plenary Session,
held on May 7 and 8, 1965

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*

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FIRST REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
OF THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF
MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 1, 1965, the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted a resolution establishing a special committee, composed of representatives of five member states: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama, for the purpose and with the powers set forth by the resolution in the following terms: The Tenth Meeting of Consultation

2. Instructs the Committee to go immediately to the city of Santo Domingo, to do everything possible to obtain the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions, and to give priority to the following two functions:

a. To offer its good offices to the Dominican armed groups and political groups and to diplomatic representatives for the purpose of obtaining urgently:

i. A cease-fire; and

ii. The orderly evacuation of the persons who have taken asylum in the embassies and of all foreign citizens who desire to leave the Dominican Republic; and

b. To carry out an investigation of all aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic that led to the convocation of this Meeting;

3. Requests the Committee to submit a report to the Meeting on the progress of its work, including the conclusions and recommendations that it may consider appropriate, in the shortest time possible;

4. Requests the American governments and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee; . . .

The Special Committee referred to in the resolution of May 1, 1965, quoted in part above, was made up as follows:

Members

Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, Representative of Argentina
Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho, Representative of Brazil
Ambassador Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, Representative of Colombia
Ambassador Carlos García Bauer, Representative of Guatemala
Ambassador Frank Morrice, Jr., Representative of Panama

Civilian Advisers

Doctor Federico Carlos Barttfeld, Argentina
Mr. Regis Novaes de Oliveira, Brazil
Mr. Julio Mérida, Guatemala
Mr. Miguel Corro, Panama

Military Advisers

Colonel Juan Giró Tapper, Argentina
Colonel Lannes de Souza Caminha, Brazil
Major General César A. Cabrera, Colombia
Major Federico bundio Maldonado, Guatemala
Colonel Francisco Aued, Panama

Secretariat

Doctor Roberto E. Quirós, Adviser of the
Secretary General of the Organization of
American States

Mr. Miguel Aranguren, Director,
Department of Public Information

Mr. Modesto Lucero, Secretary

Mr. Jorge Zamorano, Assistant

Mr. Orlando García, Assistant

In accordance with the aforementioned resolution of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and in view of the urgency of the situation in Santo Domingo, the Special Committee decided to install itself immediately and unanimously elected as its Chairman Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, Representative of Argentina. The Committee also decided to depart for the capital of the Dominican Republic that same night, in order to lose no time in beginning its difficult work. It therefore left Washington, D.C. at 5 A.M. on Sunday, May 2.

II. THE SITUATION IN SANTO DOMINGO

From the moment it arrived in Santo Domingo, the Special Committee was deeply moved and saddened at the sight of this city on a war footing. The streets were devoid of traffic; all businesses and stores were closed, including those selling foods of prime necessity. Also closed were banks and government offices, and, in general, the city's entire normal activity had come to a halt. Many refugees and other persons were in asylum in the

embassies of the various American countries, and the chiefs of mission of these countries personally told us that they were concerned that there were no guarantees for the premises of their respective missions. Consequently, there was an evident lack of security and of authorities having effective control of the situation. Public services were nonexistent, including the most essential ones of water, electricity, and telephones. The atmosphere was one of tragedy, mourning, and real human anguish. Rumors and other unverifiable reports were circulated regarding bloody incidents in various parts of the city.

The Special Committee set up its center of activities and its secretariat in the Hotel Embajador, and early Sunday afternoon, May 2, it began to make contact with the diplomatic corps and the various authorities and military commands existing in the capital, in order to obtain more precise information on what had happened and to achieve a cease-fire.

III. A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE

The Special Committee unanimously decided to lose no time in taking steps to obtain a cease-fire and to comply with the objectives of its mission set forth in the resolution of May 1, 1965.

According to telephone conversations between the Secretary General of the Organization and the Pan American Union, as reported in document OEA/Ser.G/V/ C-d-1312 (English) of April 30, 1965, the Papal Nuncio, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo, Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, was in contact with many leaders of all factions. He had spoken to Colonel Benoit of the Dominican armed forces, headquartered in San Isidro, and with Colonel Caamaño, chief of the "Comando Militar Constitucionalista"; with other groups in the New City, with Mr. José Rafael Molina Urueña, and with Mr. Juan Bosch, the latter in Puerto Rico.

The Dean of the Diplomatic Corps acted promptly on the anxious request of the Council of the Organization, contained in its cable of April 29, 1965 [OEA/Ser.G/VI/C/INF-571 (English)], which read:

To His Excellency Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, Papal Nuncio,
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Santo Domingo.

Deeply disturbed by the intense struggle that has desolated the sister Dominican Republic and desirous of preventing a further shedding of blood, the Council of the Organization has instructed me to convey to you, as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in that capital, and through you to the diplomatic representatives of the American republics, to the Dominican authorities, to the political parties of whatever tendency, and to the Dominican people, its strong desire that all armed action or hostilities be suspended.

The Council has requested me to make this humanitarian message known, in the assurance that it will be possible for the Dominican people to decide their national destinies in peace and with the protection of the institutions of the Inter-American System. I request that, in view of the urgent circumstances, you advise me as soon as possible regarding the situation in the country and the prospects for achieving an immediate cease-fire, for the purpose of informing the Council of the Organization, which remains attentive to the development of events.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Dr. José A. Mora, Secretary General
of the Organization of American States

On April 30, a preliminary cease-fire agreement between the two conflicting factions was negotiated by the Papal Nuncio, dean of the diplomatic corps, on the following terms:

1. That assurance is given to save the lives of all persons, regardless of their ideology or of the faction they are defending, including prisoners and asylees.
2. That an Organization of American States commission shall agree to serve as arbitrator in the conflict. [OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1312 (English)]

Nevertheless, in spite of this preliminary agreement signed by the two conflicting factions, the situation on the afternoon of May 2 continued very serious in the Dominican capital.

This was the judgment of the Special Committee, and it was shared by the dean of the diplomatic corps and by the Ambassadors and Chargés d'Affaires of the American states in Santo Domingo. No one in that tortured city had any doubt whatsoever that it was essential to conclude another agreement, more comprehensive than the earlier cease-fire agreement. The action of the Special Committee was hopefully anticipated and willingly accepted by all who had been awaiting our arrival.

The Special Committee thus lost no time in making contact with the two conflicting factions, the one in the New City and the one headquartered in San Isidro. This was extremely difficult because of the complete lack of communications in the city and because the Committee had no guarantee of safety in its travel through the streets. Consequently, it had to use a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter to go to San Isidro and then ask the dean of the diplomatic corps to take the Committee in his car to the New City, where it met with the command then headed by Colonel Francisco Caamaño. These interviews took place on Monday, May 3; it was physically impossible to hold them on Sunday night, because in addition to the lack of transportation, the capital city had no telephone service, and the interviews had to be conducted by emissaries of each of the factions of the strife-ridden city.

IV. CONFERENCES WITH BOTH SIDES

On Monday morning, May 3, the members of the Special Committee went with the dean of the diplomatic corps in his car to the general headquarters of the forces under the command of Colonel Francisco Caamaño in the New City.

All the committee members and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States attended the conference. Attending for the command were Colonel Francisco Caamaño, Doctor Héctor Aristy, Lieutenant Colonel R. Augusto Giménez Herrera, and other individuals, who, with the ones named, claimed to represent the "Comando Militar Constitucionalista." The conference began at 11 A.M. and was held in the place designated by that command. The meeting was held in a tense atmosphere, and continual firing could be heard through the windows.

The Special Committee explained its terms of reference as set forth in the resolution of May 1, 1965, adopted by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and, manifesting intense concern for the Dominican people, it said that it was absolutely necessary to reaffirm the initial cease-fire, which had been agreed to but only incompletely carried out.

Doctor Héctor Aristy explained the position of the command, making the following principal points:

- a) The command headed by Colonel Francisco Caamaño complained that it had not been consulted regarding the establishment in the city of Santo Domingo of a zone guarded by the armed forces of the United States.
- b) This command believed that the armed forces of the United States were constantly expanding this zone and penetrating the city further and further.
- c) The command believed, according to Doctor Héctor Aristy's own words, that "General Wessin's troops and those of the C.E.F.A." (Training Center of the Dominican Armed Forces) "are entering the city close behind the American troops."
- d) The command attributed the incidents that had occurred in the last few days to snipers of General Wessin's forces.
- e) Above all, the command wanted a clarification and a guaranty regarding the zone occupied by the armed forces of the United States.

The Special Committee immediately made the following explanation to Colonel Caamaño and to his spokesman:

- a) The zone guarded by the armed forces of the United States was the same as the one referred to in the resolution adopted by the Council of the Organization on April 30, 1965 [OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1310 (English)], and had the purpose defined in paragraph 2 thereof, which reads as follows:

To make an urgent appeal to the same authorities, political groupings, and forces on both sides to permit the immediate establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge, encompassing the geographic area of the city of Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the embassies of foreign governments, the inviolability of which will be respected by all opposing forces and within which nationals of all countries will be given safehaven.

b) The aim of the Special Committee was to come to agree with the interested parties on a precise demarcation of the zone, including therein all the diplomatic missions, in order to prevent incidents due to ignorance of its boundaries.

As spokesman for Colonel Francisco Caamaño and his command, Doctor Héctor Aristy raised the question of the establishment of an access or communications corridor between the zone and the San Isidro sector, which cut the command's forces into two parts. Indeed, on the night of May 2, the armed forces of the United States had felt it necessary to establish a communications route, using San Juan and Teniente Amado García Streets up to the right bridgehead of Juan Pablo Duarte bridge, for the purpose, they said, of transporting food, medicine, and provisions from the base at San Isidro to the center of the city.

The Special Committee explained to Doctor Héctor Aristy the reasons that, in their understanding, existed for the establishment of that communications route. Doctor Héctor Aristy said that the command he represented wanted that corridor or communications route, if maintained, to be under the supervision of a military police guard made up of men from its own forces and from United States forces. On behalf of the command, he expressed the wish that if this proposal were not accepted, then the U.S. armed forces should place no personnel other than military police there.

This request regarding supervision of the corridor or access route was also transmitted by the Special Committee to the Ambassador of the United States.

Finally, during the course of this conference on the morning of May 3, Doctor Héctor Aristy, as spokesman for the command headed by Colonel Francisco Caamaño, made a specific request: That in no event should the new cease-fire agreement or any other agreement sponsored by the Special Committee be signed on behalf of the Military Junta led by Colonel Benoit with headquarters at San Isidro by any of the following seven generals:

1. General Elías Wessin y Wessin
2. General de los Santos Céspedes
3. General Belisario Peguero Guerrero
4. General Salvador Augusto Montez Guerrero
5. General Atila Luna
6. General Marco Aníbal Rivera Cuesta
7. Comodoro Rivera Caminero

The command headed by Colonel Francisco Caamaño emphatically and specifically excluded General Wessin y Wessin from any understanding whatsoever.

In the course of the interview Colonel Francisco Caamaño and his companions furnished additional information. The forces of this command had taken 500 prisoners of the combat forces of General Wessin y Wessin. These prisoners were mainly soldiers and police agents, some of whom, according to Colonel Caamaño, wanted to fight in his own units. He had opposed this in order that it might not be said that it was on his orders, adding that if the Organization of American States wished to take charge of those prisoners he would accede to that. He also reported that the same units had captured 21 tanks during the course of the fighting in the city of Santo Domingo that occurred on the preceding days.

Three additional questions were cleared up during this interview with Colonel Caamaño: the acceptance by that command of complete protection to the embassies, with enlargement of the safety zone sufficiently to include the premises of the diplomatic missions in the city of Santo Domingo; similar acceptance of the departure of the asylees or refugees in the various embassies of that city who wished to leave by their own decision, and of the facilities of every kind that should be agreed upon for the Special Committee and the International Red Cross for the distribution of food, and medicine and the installation of hospital equipment, for the Dominican people without distinction of any kind.

The Special Committee was witness during that interview with the so-called "Constitutional Military Command" to one detail that could not pass unnoticed. This was the presence of a uniformed person carrying arms, who said he was part of the command and who spoke Spanish with a pronounced foreign accent. The Secretary General of the Organization of American States interrogated him in a loud voice before everyone, asking him: "Who are you? What are you doing here? The person replied: "I am André Rivière, my nationality is French, I fought in the French army in Indochina, and I am working in Santo Domingo. I have joined this command." While he took no part in the conversations, Rivière was in the discussion room during the time of the interview, and the authority with which he gave orders to the guards posted at the windows and the door where we were was quite obvious. Some information obtained later regarding this soldier was to the effect that he was an instructor of frogmen who had arrived in Santo Domingo during the Trujillo regime.

The interview ended with the promise by Colonel Francisco Caamaño and his companions to accept the mediation of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and by the Committee that it would maintain the contacts to reach a specific cease-fire agreement after learning the conditions and reasons of the Military Junta of Colonel Benoit.

Meanwhile the situation in the capital was becoming more acute and threatening as the afternoon wore on. From both parties reports reached the Committee regarding incidents that each attributed to its adversary,

and the Chiefs of Mission of the Embassies accredited in Santo Domingo were becoming anxious for prompt ratification of the cease-fire. All of this gave a decisive character to these conversations.

The Special Committee, for physical reasons of communication with the San Isidro base, was unable to get as far as the headquarters of the Military Junta headed by Colonel Pedro Bartolomé Benoit until the night of Monday, May 3. That night the Special Committee and the Military Junta held a conference attended, on the part of the Junta, by its members: Colonel Pedro Bartolomé Benoit, President of the Junta, Colonel Enrique A. Casado Saladin, and Navy Captain Olgo M. Santana Carrasco. During the last part of the interview, General Wessin y Wessin was present, at the request of the Committee.

The Special Committee, in the presence of the dean of the diplomatic corps and of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, opened the interview in the same way and in the same terms as those used with the command of Colonel Caamaño, that is, by reference to the resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation and to the concern caused to it by the state of the strife in Santo Domingo.

The Military Junta directed by Colonel Benoit is installed at the base of San Isidro, where at the time of our interview a considerable part of the United States military force also was located.

Throughout the interview its President, Colonel Benoit, spoke on behalf of the Military Junta, while his two companions remained silent. No other officer or person except the members of the Junta was present.

Colonel Benoit spoke at length of the happenings that befell the Junta of Government presided over by Mr. Donald Reid Cabral, and told how the insurrection of April 24 had been suddenly shifted from its initial objectives to degenerate into the most complete anarchy. The initial authors of the military coup against Mr. Reid Cabral lost control of the movement and were without authority and without power of any kind. Therefore, Colonel Benoit stated, the movement that was aimed at restoring former President Bosch or, failing this, Dr. Rafael Molina Ureña to power had failed, but that what remained was a situation fraught with danger and that demanded a prompt solution.

Colonel Benoit likewise said he had not wished to order an attack on the city of Santo Domingo, where the forces commanded by Colonel Caamaño were located, out of respect for the lives of innumerable persons, but that he had enough forces to do so. In the same manner, he stated that the junta he headed accepted the security zone, with expansion of it so as to include all the diplomatic missions; the measures essential for the protection of those missions in Santo Domingo with the extension of that zone; and, likewise, cooperation in the distribution of food and medicine and the establishment of health teams.

The Special Committee endeavored to ascertain whether it was true that the action of United States military forces in Dominican territory had been requested. To this end, during the interview held on the night of Monday, May 3, it requested any information on the matter that Colonel Benoit or the members of the Junta that he headed could supply.

Colonel Benoit explained that the deterioration of public order in the city of Santo Domingo, which started on the day that the movement against Mr. Reid Cabral began, and the conditions of anarchy and complete disorder that prevailed in the capital of the country had led him to request the aid of United States armed forces in order to give protection to the diplomatic missions and foreign persons and entities in general. Colonel Benoit added that he had received an urgent request from the diplomatic missions for protection that he was not able to provide.

Colonel Benoit also stated that the request had been made to the United States in a note, a copy of which was transmitted later to the Special Committee, which read literally and in full, as follows:

Seal of the Dominican Republic
Dominican Republic
Dominican Air Force
Office of the Chief of Staff
Base Aérea "19 de Noviembre"
San Isidro, Distrito Nacional

- - - - -

April 28, 1965

The Ambassador of the United States
United States Embassy
Santo Domingo

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Regarding my earlier request I wish to add that American lives are in danger and conditions of public disorder make it impossible to provide adequate protection, I therefore ask you for temporary intervention and assistance in restoring order in this country.

Truly yours,

PEDRO BARTOLOME BENOIT
Colonel
Presidente de la Junta Militar del
Gobierno de la República Dominicana

The result of this interview was a promise made by the Military Junta, composed of Colonel Benoit, Colonel Casado Saladin and Navy Captain Santana Carrasco, to accept the authority of the Special Committee, primarily for the essential and undelayable purpose of obtaining a cease-fire.

The Special Committee informed Colonel Benoit and the persons accompanying him of the decision of the other side, that is, Colonel Caamaño's command, not to enter into any agreement in which the seven generals mentioned earlier in this report participated in any manner whatsoever.

V. RATIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF THE CEASE-FIRE

In accordance with the resolution adopted on May 1, 1965, by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, and on the basis of conversations held with the two factions involved in the conflict, the Special Committee made a careful study of the conditions under which a new agreement supplementary to that of April 3, might be reached, for ratifying and expanding the cease-fire.

To this end, it convoked the authorized representatives of the two conflicting factions for the purpose of informing them of a draft agreement prepared by the Committee, whose principal points were as follows:

- a) Acceptance of an Act that would expressly ratify the cease-fire agreement signed on April 30, 1965.
- b) Acceptance of a safety zone marked off within the limits that would be indicated in a map officially agreed to by both parties and appended to that Act.
- c) Respect for the safety zone and a guaranty of adequate protection for any persons within that zone.
- d) Facilities needed by the International Red Cross, or the international agency designated by the Organization of American States, for the distribution of food, medicine, and medical and hospital equipment for the Dominican people.
- e) Guaranties for the evacuation of asylees in the foreign embassies or diplomatic missions in Santo Domingo.
- f) Respect for the diplomatic missions, their staffs, and for any persons who have taken refuge or asylum in those missions.
- g) Full and explicit recognition of the competence of the Special Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

In order to prepare the fulfilment of the agreement--as soon as the conflicting parties consented thereto--the Special Committee, through the dean of the diplomatic corps, convoked the chiefs of missions for the purpose of asking them which of them were interested in obtaining the evacuation of asylees or refugees. This meeting took place in the Papal Nunciature on Tuesday, May 4, around noon. The Special Committee received an oral report from the chiefs of missions on this matter. The Committee informed the members of the diplomatic corps of the conversations held with the two parties on this matter, and of the mandate it had received from the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and requested them to provide a list of their asylees and refugees in order to help solve the problem of the evacuees. As a result of the action of the Special Committee, several embassies began to make arrangements for the departure of refugees and asylees who wished to leave under the guaranty of the Organization of American States. At the same time, the Special Committee was informed of the imminent arrival of hospital teams, medicine, and food supplies that had been requested, as an aircraft had arrived from Colombia on May 5. We understand that many asylees and refugees who were at the Colombian Embassy in Santo Domingo left for that country on the same aircraft.

Moreover, the Special Committee requested the military advisers of each of its members to make a reconnaissance visit to the safety zone and to arrange with the military authorities of the United States in Santo Domingo the details of the expansion of that zone to include all the embassies. This task was completed and the military advisers immediately began to prepare and draw up an official map.

Likewise, in order to prepare all the measures for the application of the cease-fire, the Special Committee informed the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the urgent need for obtaining a shipment of food, medicine, and medical personnel immediately. The following cable was sent for the same purpose:

Santo Domingo, May 3, 1965

Ambassador Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa
President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation
Washington, D.C.

Number One

The Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation wishes to extend emphatically, through you, to the Tenth Meeting and to each of the member states, a most urgent appeal that cognizance be taken of the dramatic situation existing in this country because of the armed strife, and to emphasize the urgent necessity for them, within the spirit of fraternity and solidarity with the Dominican people, immediately to send foodstuffs, medicine, and medical personnel.

The Committee is convinced that this is the most urgent of the serious problems being faced, in order to prevent the possibility of epidemics and other calamities that could make the situation of the Dominican people even more difficult.

Ambassador Colombo. Chairman of the Committee

We have learned that the Meeting of Consultation approved a resolution on this matter, based on the humanitarian gesture of the Special Committee.

VI. REPORTS TO THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION

On May 4, 1965, the Special Committee reported to the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation concerning the status of negotiations for agreeing upon the cease-fire and replied to a telephone message from the General Secretariat in Washington concerning various aspects of its labors.

The cablegram from the Special Committee to the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation mentioned above reads:

Santo Domingo, 4 May 1965
Ambassador Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa
President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation
Washington, D.C.

Number Two

Replying telephone communications received today, I wish to report the following:

First: All contacts have been made with groups represented by the following persons: Constitutional Military Command: Colonel Francisco Caamaño, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Montes Arache, Major Héctor E. Lachapelle Díaz, Mr. Héctor Aristy, Major Fabio C. Restano, Lieutenant Colonel Augusto Jiménez, and Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Alvarez Olguín. Members of the Military Junta: Colonel Pedro Bartolomé Benoit, President; Colonel Enrique A. Casado; Navy Captain Olgo Manuel Santana Carrasco, and General Elías M. Wessin y Wessin, Director of the Armed Forces Training Center. Likewise, with members of the diplomatic corps, especially all those of Latin America, the Papal Nuncio, and the Ambassador of the United States.

Second: Committee, in addition to interviews mentioned above, has been in constant touch with the aforesaid groups, and at present, the Committee is awaiting the formalization of the points that have already been accepted by both parties, which are: Confirmation cease-fire, demarcation and enlargement of security zone to include all embassies, evacuation of asylees and refugees, and distribution of food, medicine, and medical equipment to all sectors of the population without regard to parties. We have thus far encountered a good attitude on the part of both parties.

Third: Committee will return as soon as it obtains the results of the negotiations it is conducting. Possibly tomorrow.

Fourth: Both parties have accepted the enlargement of the security zone to include all Latin American embassies and we are working to fix a boundary for it. United States forces established an access corridor between San Isidro and the security zone.

Fifth: We consider that it would be useful, in order to aid in bringing a return of the Dominican situation to normality, for the member states that are in a position to do so to establish a combined inter-american military force under the Organization of American States to achieve the objectives that are set by the Meeting of Consultation.

Sixth: With reference to the question by the Ambassador of Colombia, the only airport capable of receiving planes is the one at the San Isidro air base, which is under the authority of the Military Junta presided over by Colonel Benoit.

Ambassador Colombo
Chairman of the Committee

VII. ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO

As a result of the conversations held by the Committee with the parties an agreement was finally reached referring to the points covered in this report.

The text of the document known as the "Act of Santo Domingo," signed on May 5, 1965, is as follows:

ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO

The Parties signing below who declare that they represent, in the capacities mentioned, respectively, the Military Junta of Government and the "Constitutional Government" hereby place on record that they have reached the following agreement as a result of the discussions held with the two Parties by the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, whose members also sign the present Act as a guaranty of its compliance and execution, functions that both Parties agree the Committee may carry out.

1. The Parties who sign the present Act ratify the cease-fire agreement signed on April 30 last.
2. The Parties accept the establishment of a safety zone in the city of Santo Domingo, demarcated within the boundaries indicated on the map attached to this document and signed by the same Parties who sign the present Act.
3. The Parties bind themselves especially to respect this safety zone, within which there is guaranteed, in the manner that the Organization of American States may deem appropriate, adequate protection and safety for all persons found within that zone of refuge.
4. The Parties undertake to give all necessary facilities to the International Red Cross or to the international agency that the Organization of American States may designate to carry out in any part of the city of Santo Domingo or of the Dominican Republic the distribution of food, medicine, and medical and hospital equipment that are being sent as a result of the appeal made by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. They also undertake to provide all facilities required by the Organization of American States so that medical and sanitary personnel sent by the governments can be transported to any point in the city of Santo Domingo or Dominican territory, to perform their services.
5. The Parties undertake to provide all necessary safety measures for the evacuation of asylees in foreign embassies or diplomatic missions who so request of them.
6. The Parties undertake to respect the diplomatic missions and to offer all cooperation necessary to guarantee the safety of all personnel of those missions and of asylees or refugees therein.
7. The Parties declare that they accept and recognize the full competence of the Special Committee appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for purposes of the faithful observance of what is agreed to in this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the present document, which shall be known as the Act of Santo Domingo, is signed in four original copies, of which one shall be deposited in the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, one shall be for each of the Parties, and one shall be for the files of the Committee.

The Secretary General of the Organization of American States shall transmit certified copies to each of the member states.

May 5, 1965

For the Military Junta of Government:

Colonel Pedro Bartolomé Benoit
Dominican Armed Forces

Colonel Enrique A. Casado Saladín
National Army

Captain Olgo N. Santana Carrasco
Navy

For the Constitutional Government:

Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deñó
Constitutional President

Lieutenant Colonel Dr. R. Augusto Jiménez Herrera

Colonel Ramón Manuel Montes

Major Héctor Achapell

Dr. Héctor Aristy
Minister of the Presidency

For the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States:

Ambassador Ricardo Colombo
Representative of Argentina
Chairman of the Committee

Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho
Representative of Brazil

Ambassador Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa
Representative of Colombia

Ambassador Carlos García Bauer
Representative of Guatemala

Ambassador Frank Norrice, Jr.
Representative of Panama

VIII. EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH THE UNITED STATES

Before reaching an agreement with the conflicting parties concerning the ratification and expansion of the cease-fire, the Special Committee studied the question relating to the cooperation of the armed forces of the United States in the Dominican Republic with the Committee within the objectives indicated by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation in the resolution of May 1, 1965.

On the night of May 3 the Special Committee had an interview with the Honorable W. Tapley Bennett, Ambassador of the United States to the Dominican Republic. The results of this interview and the precise opinion of the Special Committee were set forth in a memorandum delivered personally to that diplomatic representative, which read as follows:

MEMORANDUM

As a result of the meeting that was held on the night of May 3, 1965, the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics, has the honor to state the following to the Ambassador of the United States to the Dominican Republic:

1. The Committee has had the steadfast purpose of attaining the the confirmation and effectiveness of the cease-fire agreement already agreed upon.
2. To achieve this end, the Committee has today held long conversations with the commanders of the Command headed by Colonel Caamaño and of the Military Junta headed by Colonel Benoit. Both have given their consent to participate jointly with the Committee in formal negotiations, for the purpose of arriving at a supplementary and amplifying agreement on the cease-fire, which the Committee believes indispensable and which should include among its principal clauses, in addition to others:
 - a. The demarcation and enlargement of the safety zone to include the embassies that are at present outside this zone.
 - b. The cooperation of both parties with a Committee of the Organization of American States for supervising and applying the cease-fire.
 - c. Cooperation for humanitarian aid.
 - d. Departure from the country of Dominican refugees or asylees in the embassies who wish to leave.

3. The Committee would like to know whether, in the event that a supplementary and amplifying agreement of this nature can be signed by both parties, the United States military forces in the Dominican Republic could receive precise instructions for cooperating in carrying out the agreement.
4. The Committee feels that without the essential cooperation of the United States, the aforementioned agreement could not be carried out.
5. The Committee believes that the foregoing corresponds to the terms of its instructions contained in the resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Meeting of Consultation, especially with what is stated in paragraph 2.a, concerning the cease-fire, and the content of paragraph 4, which states:

[The Tenth Meeting of Consultation:]

"requests the American governments and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee."

After the Act of Santo Domingo was signed, by which the cease-fire of April 30, 1965, was ratified and amplified, the Special Committee sent to the Ambassador of the United States in the Dominican Republic a note in which it expressly requested the cooperation of the government of that country in applying the stipulations of that document. The note from the Special Committee and the reply from the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, are transcribed below:

Santo Domingo, May 5, 1965

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit to you, Sir, under instructions of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, a certified copy of the Act of Santo Domingo signed today by the parties who entitle themselves, respectively, "Military Junta of Government" and "Constitutional Government."

As item 4 of the Resolution of May 1, 1965, of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation "requests the American governments to extend their full cooperation in order to facilitate the work of the Committee," this Committee hopes that your government will cooperate with it in observing the stipulations of the Act of Santo Domingo.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Ricardo M. Colombo
Representative of Argentina
Chairman of the Committee

The Honorable
W. Tapley Bennett
Ambassador of the United States
of America to the Dominican Republic
Santo Domingo de Guzmán,
Dominican Republic

- - o - -

The Secretary of State

Washington

May 7, 1965

Excellency:

I have been advised by the United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic of Your Excellency's communication to him of May 5, transmitting a certified copy of the "Act of Santo Domingo" and expressing the hope that the United States Government will cooperate in its observance. Since the Commission has now returned to Washington, I am taking the liberty of replying directly to you.

I have the honor to express my government's gratitude for and support of the work of the Commission in Santo Domingo. The United States will cooperate fully in the observance of the provisions of the Act of Santo Domingo. I do not have before me the map attached to the Act of Santo Domingo, but I assume that the boundaries of the International Safety Zone coincide with those that now exist and that the line of communication crossing the Duarte Bridge as it now exists is shown on the map.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

Dean Rusk

His Excellency
Dr. Ricardo M. Colombo,
Representative of Argentina on
The Council of the Organization
of American States.

IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In presenting this report to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Special Committee has desired only to give an account of its activities from May 1 to 5, 1965, that is, during the visit to the city of Santo Domingo.

The Special Committee achieved, under truly dramatic circumstances, the main objectives set forth in the previously mentioned resolution with respect to cease-fire, the orderly evacuation of persons who have taken asylum or refuge, and humanitarian assistance to the Dominican people without any distinction as to parties or conflicting factions. The Special Committee also achieved the demarcation of a safety zone in the city of Santo Domingo in accordance with the map officially drawn up by its military advisors. This map was transmitted to both parties, and the original is at the disposal of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation.

As the representatives will note, the Act of Santo Domingo and the results thus far obtained by the Special Committee constitute the first stage of a process of restoring peace and normality in the Dominican Republic, which requires the Inter-American System to take several steps toward consolidation.

Among the measures we believe could be adopted at once by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, we suggest the following:

1. Designation of a permanent technical military group in the city of Santo Domingo to supervise the cease-fire and other measures agreed upon by the parties in the Act of Santo Domingo.
2. Designation of another qualified group to organize humanitarian aid to the Dominican people and evaluation of the most urgent needs with regard to food, medicine, and hospital equipment.
3. Study and planning of the Inter-American Force created by the Resolution of May 6, 1965 of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, in order to assure it the best conditions of operation and efficiency.
4. To empower the Special Commission to establish coordination among all these elements and activities in the Dominican Republic in order to attain the goals set forth in the resolutions approved by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation.

Washington, D.C., May 7, 1965

Ricardo M. Colombo
Ambassador, Representative
of Argentina
Chairman

Ilmar Penna Marinho
Ambassador, Representative of Brazil

Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa
Ambassador, Representative of Colombia

Carlos García Bauer
Ambassador, Representative of Guatemala

Frank Morrice, Jr.
Ambassador, Representative of Panama

STATEMENT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
OF THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION

The members of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation make known that in the performance of the functions that were assigned to them by the Resolution of May 1, 1965, "to do everything possible to obtain the reestablishment of peace and normal conditions" in the Dominican Republic, they offered their good offices, which culminated in the signing of the "Act of Santo Domingo" on May 5, 1965, in the text of which the "Military Junta of Government" and the "Constitutional Government" appear as parties. In this connection, the members of the Special Committee wish to state that the Act is limited to mentioning the parties with the titles mentioned by the two, but that this does not signify a recognition of those titles by either the Committee or its members, as the Committee expressly stated to the parties signatory to the "Act of Santo Domingo."

Santo Domingo de Guzmán,
Dominican Republic, May 5, 1965

Ricardo M. Colombo
Ambassador, Representative of Argentina
Chairman of the Committee

Ilmar Penna Marinho
Ambassador, Representative of Brazil


Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa
Ambassador, Representative of Colombia

Carlos García Bauer
Ambassador, Representative of Guatemala

Frank Morrice, Jr.,
Ambassador, Representative of Panama

SECURITY ZONE - ACT OF SANTO DOMINGO

APPENDIX II




DC/837

ORGANIZACION DE LOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS
DECIMA REUNION DE CONSULTA DE MINISTROS DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

Unión Panamericana, Washington, D.C.

1965



Doc. 46 Rev. Corr.
30 junio 1965
Textualmente

ACTA DE LA CUARTA SESION PLENARIA^{1/}

(Aprobada en la décima sesión plenaria celebrada
el 20 de mayo de 1965)

Fecha: 7-8 de mayo de 1965
Hora: 10:30 p.m.
Lugar: Salón de Sesiones del Consejo
Unión Panamericana, Washington, D.C.

Presidente: Excelentísimo señor Embajador Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa,
Delegado Especial de Nicaragua

Secretario General de la Reunión: Señor William Sanders

Presentes: Excelentísimos señores:

Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa (Colombia)
Roque J. Yódice (Paraguay)
Alejandro Magnet (Chile)
Ramón de Clairmont Dueñas (El Salvador)
Rodrigo Jácome M. (Ecuador)
Juan Bautista de Laval (Perú)
Ricardo A. Midence (Honduras)
Enrique Tejera París (Venezuela)
José Antonio Bonilla Atilas (República Dominicana)
Humberto Calamari G. (Panamá)
Raúl Díez de Medina (Bolivia)
Ricardo M. Colombo (Argentina)
Carlos García Bauer (Guatemala)
Rafael de la Colina (México)
Gonzalo J. Facio (Costa Rica)
Emilio N. Oribe (Uruguay)
Ellsworth Bunker (Estados Unidos de América)
Fern D. Baguidy (Haití)
Ilmar Penna Marinho (Brasil)

1. La presente versión aprobada se publica con las correcciones recibidas por la Secretaría General hasta la fecha. La versión final se incorporará en el volumen "Documentos de la Conferencia", que será publicado posteriormente.

Asistió también a la sesión el señor Santiago Ortiz, Secretario General Adjunto de la Décima Reunión de Consulta.

Secretario de Actas: Señor José F. Martínez

Asuntos

1. Presentación del Primer Informe, de carácter confidencial, de la Comisión Especial que viajó a la República Dominicana
 2. Período de preguntas y respuestas con referencia al Informe presentado por la Comisión Especial
-
1. Presentación del Primer Informe, de carácter confidencial, de la Comisión Especial que viajó a la República Dominicana

El PRESIDENTE: Excelencias, me honro abriendo esta cuarta sesión plenaria de la Décima Reunión de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, que ha sido convocada con el objeto principal de recibir un informe confidencial de Su Excelencia el Embajador Ricardo M. Colombo, Representante de Argentina y Presidente de la Comisión Especial que viajó a la República Dominicana y que ha preparado este informe de carácter confidencial. El señor Embajador Colombo me dirigió la siguiente nota tratada en este día:

Excelentísimo señor:

Tengo el honor de remitir a Vuestra Excelencia el primer informe de la Comisión Especial de la Décima Reunión de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de los Estados miembros de la Organización. Ruego a Vuestra Excelencia ordenar la distribución de este informe a los Excelentísimos señores Delegados Especiales a esta Reunión de Consulta. Me suscribo, señor Presidente, con las seguridades de mi más alta consideración.

Ricardo M. Colombo
Embajador de la República Argentina
Presidente de la Comisión Especial

Mis primeras palabras deben ser para expresarle a Su Excelencia el Embajador Ricardo M. Colombo y a sus ilustres compañeros de Comisión, Sus Excelencias el Embajador Ilmar Penna Marinho, de la República del Brasil, el Embajador Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, de la República de Colombia, el Embajador Carlos García Bauer, de la República de Guatemala, y el Embajador Frank Morrice, de la República de Panamá, el profundo agradecimiento de la Reunión, y en particular de todos sus colegas, por las magníficas y eficientes labores que han realizado en cumplimiento del delicado encargo que les confió la Reunión. Hemos seguido con mucha atención e interés sus labores y nos sentimos muy orgullosos de la designación que hicimos en ellos; y estamos ciertos de que América, nuestros pueblos y nuestros gobiernos aplauden esa labor, y esta Reunión la agradece y la encomia. De acuerdo con el Reglamento,

las sesiones plenarias tienen carácter público. Al conversar esta mañana con el colega Presidente de la Comisión, Embajador Colombo, nos pareció adecuado que esta reunión tenga carácter privado, precisamente, porque el informe que presentará el señor Embajador Colombo, en nombre de la Comisión que preside, tiene, precisamente, carácter confidencial. Esta decisión de la Presidencia, de que esta reunión tenga carácter privado, me imagino que no tendrá objeción de parte de los Excelentísimos señores Representantes. Me siento muy complacido de que todos estén de acuerdo con que esta reunión debe tener carácter privado. Así se hará consignar en el Acta. Concedo la palabra al señor Embajador de la República Argentina, Su Excelencia don Ricardo Colombo, Presidente de la Comisión Especial, para que tenga a bien presentar el informe a que se ha referido la nota que tuve el honor de recibir esta mañana. Tiene la palabra el señor Embajador.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Muchas gracias, señor Presidente. Quiero aclarar, previamente a la lectura que haré del informe, que el mismo comienza refiriéndose al momento mismo de nuestra llegada, o más bien, a nuestra partida desde Washington, razón por la cual no consignamos aquí el hecho, que sí queremos destacar, de que a nuestra llegada, y en cumplimiento de una resolución del Sistema, el Secretario General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, doctor Mora, ya se encontraba allí desempeñando sus funciones, de las cuales hará él por su parte el correspondiente informe.

/Lee el Primer Informe de la Comisión Especial./ 1/

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Tenga la Conferencia por presentado el informe en nombre de la Comisión designada oportunamente. Muchas gracias, señor Presidente, muchas gracias, señores Embajadores.

EL PRESIDENTE: Tomo nota de lo que acaba de expresar el señor Embajador Colombo y, claro está, que hemos recibido sumamente complacidos el informe. Sus Excelencias habrán notado el magnífico documento.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): Si me permite señor Presidente, quisiera recomendar a todos los señores Delegados, tomar la siguiente nota respecto al documento que contiene el informe de la Comisión que acaba de ser leído y de ser distribuido también, perdón. En la página 9, hay ciertos errores al pasarlo al "stencil". En la última línea de la página, donde dice "guardia de policía militar" hay que agregar la palabra "mixta", de manera que diga, "una guardia de policía militar mixta". En la página 12, en la antepenúltima línea, contando de abajo arriba, donde dice "y de que ésta mantendría", debe decir "y de ésta de que mantendría los contactos". En la página 13, al final del segundo párrafo, hay que agregar "en la última parte de la entrevista estuvo presente el General Wessin y Wessin a solicitud de la Comisión", al fin de párrafo. Y en la página 26,

1. El Primer Informe de la Comisión Especial, con las correcciones indicadas a continuación por el señor Delegado Especial de Guatemala y aceptadas por los demás miembros de la Comisión, se publica como Documento 47 de la Reunión.

en el segundo párrafo donde dice "la resolución del 30 de abril" es "Resolución del 1.º de mayo".

EL PRESIDENTE: La Presidencia pregunta a los ilustrados miembros de la Comisión si aceptan y tienen por incorporadas en el texto de su valioso informe las observaciones a que se ha referido Su Excelencia el señor Embajador de Guatemala, Presidente de la Comisión.

EL PRESIDENTE DE LA COMISION: Las acepta plenamente, señor Presidente.

EL PRESIDENTE: De este informe, seguramente, obtendremos una segunda edición en la que figurarán precisamente esas enmiendas ya aceptadas por el Presidente de la Comisión.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): Señor Presidente, no son cosas de aceptar, sino que en el informe de la Comisión se omitieron estos puntos.

EL PRESIDENTE: A eso me refería exactamente, que la Presidencia de la Comisión, precisamente ha aceptado el incorporar esas omisiones, el aclararlo; ha aceptado incorporar, como Presidente de la Comisión, en nombre de todos, para que figuren las observaciones en la nueva edición que se va a hacer del informe. Vale decir, correcciones de forma.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): No, señor Presidente, esas no son correcciones de forma, son omisiones al copiar el informe de la Comisión.

EL PRESIDENTE, Exacto, la Presidencia estaba equivocada, son omisiones de forma, exactamente. El informe, señores de la Honorable Comisión Especial, que acaba de dar lectura su ilustrado Presidente, el Embajador Ricardo M. Colombo, de la República Argentina, enseña una labor que la Presidencia califica de extraordinaria, muy digna del sentido de responsabilidad y de las capacidades personales que distinguen a los ilustrados Embajadores que integran esta Comisión histórica del Sistema Interamericano. Por ser extraordinaria, es una labor digna de nuestro reconocimiento, del reconocimiento de la Reunión de Consulta y del reconocimiento de quienes nos honramos en llamarnos colegas de los embajadores que integran la Comisión Especial. Al expresar esto, me complazco y me honro en confirmarles lo que le expresé a Su Excelencia el Embajador Ricardo Colombo en el mensaje que tuve el honor de dirigirle con fecha de hoy y que dice:

Excelentísimo señor Ricardo M. Colombo, Presidente de la Comisión de la Décima Reunión de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores: Hónrome en expresar a Vuestra Excelencia y sus ilustrados compañeros que integran la Comisión de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, creada por la Décima Reunión de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, el agradecimiento de la Reunión

por las prontas e interesantes informaciones suministradas en sus dos mensajes recibidos el 3 y 4 de mayo en curso. La Reunión ha tomado nota de ellas y hace votos porque las importantes labores que con tanta dedicación y eficiencia está realizando la Comisión sean culminadas muy pronto con el más completo éxito. Aprovecho la oportunidad para reiterar a Vuestra Excelencia las seguridades de mi más alta y distinguida consideración. Sevilla Sacasa, Presidente de la Décima Reunión.

Cúmpleme la satisfacción de informaros acerca de una comunicación que la Presidencia ha recibido de su Excelencia Emmanuel Clarizio, Nuncio Apostólico, Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático acreditado ante el Gobierno de la República Dominicana. Dice:

Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, Presidente de la Décima Reunión de Consulta y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores --datada esta comunicación el 5 de mayo-- "Agradezco con profunda emoción mensaje que Vuestra Excelencia se complace enviarme nombre Décima Reunión de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, formulo sincero augurio que providencial asistencia Organización Estados Americanos, rápidamente iniciada en Santo Domingo por Secretario General Mora, e inmediata y felizmente asumida por Comisión Especial que integran tan dignos miembros presididos Excelentísimo Embajador Colombo, logre pronto para la tan querida nación dominicana, los humanitarios ideales de paz y bienestar que inspiran esa alta y noble Institución." Lo firma Emmanuel Clarizio, Nuncio Apostólico de Su Santidad.

Dijimos al principio que, naturalmente, esta reunión tiene carácter privado, lo cual advierte que, en su oportunidad, habrá una plenaria de carácter público, para que públicamente se conozca de nuevo la letra del informe y las opiniones que acerca de él se emitan. Parece lógico que el primer trámite será obtener la segunda edición, como yo le llamo, de este informe, en el que van a aparecer las omisiones a que se refería acertadamente el colega de Guatemala: a los efectos de que la Comisión General de la Reunión de Consulta conozca el informe y luego eleve su decisión sobre él a la Plenaria. Esto es por de pronto lo que la Presidencia tiene que informar al respecto, pero, naturalmente, desearíamos en esta reunión privada, en el ámbito privado en que estamos, conocer alguna expresión de algún ilustrado Representante sobre la letra del informe cuya lectura estuvo a cargo del ilustrado Presidente de la Comisión General. Me ha solicitado la palabra el señor Representante de México, el señor Embajador de la Colina, se la ofrezco.

2. Período de preguntas y respuestas con referencia al informe presentado por la Comisión Especial

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE MEXICO (Sr. de la Colina): Primero que nada deseo expresar o mejor dicho sumarme a las expresiones que usted, señor Presidente, ha manifestado, de agradecimiento, de hondo reconocimiento a los ilustrados miembros de la Comisión que nos permitimos nombrar, no sólo por este magnífico informe que nos han presentado, sino por los esfuerzos que indudablemente han realizado en condiciones bien difíciles y que han llevado a cabo con tanta eficacia y con tanta dignidad. Ahora yo desearía saber, señor Presidente, si sería posible hacer algunas preguntas, sobre todo que estamos ya en sesión privada, porque, claro, nuestros gobiernos seguramente van a querer conocer la muy ilustrada opinión de nuestros distinguidos representantes sobre algunos aspectos que no se tocan más que incidentalmente en este interesantísimo informe, a reserva naturalmente de que quizás en una sesión posterior, también privada, pudiéramos elaborar algunos otros aspectos que por el momento se nos escapan. ¿Sería posible, señor Presidente?

El PRESIDENTE: Yo creo que es muy importante la pregunta. La Presidencia califica de muy importante la pregunta que ha formulado el señor Embajador de la República de México acerca de que aprovechemos esta reunión privada para formularle a la ilustrada Comisión algunas preguntas.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Solicito la venia del señor Presidente.

El PRESIDENTE: La tiene, Embajador.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): La Comisión está presta para responder en la medida de sus posibilidades a cuanta interrogante tengan que formular a los miembros de la Comisión los señores Representantes de los hermanos países de América.

El PRESIDENTE: Muy bien. ¿Está complacido el señor Embajador de México? Tiene el uso de la palabra.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE MEXICO (Sr. de la Colina): Muchas gracias, señor Presidente. Por el momento yo desearía saber, si es posible --tengo la impresión, quizás equivocada, después de haber escuchado atentamente todo cuanto nos ha dicho nuestro colega, el ilustrado Representante de la República Argentina, y de la rápida lectura que al propio tiempo estaba haciendo de este Documento que acabamos de corregir-- si, como me parece, hubo cierta unidad de criterios de ambos bandos contendientes, en la posible eliminación de los generales. Quizás yo esté equivocado, pero como que parece desprenderse de esta lectura y de esta idea de que en ambos bandos como que los coroneles estaban más o menos dispuestos a crear, digamos, un

alto mando distinto de aquél que hasta ahora ha permanecido. Yo no sé si sería posible que elaboráramos o si simplemente no tienen ninguna idea sobre el particular.

El PRESIDENTE: ¿Desearía responder esa inquietud del señor Representante de México, señor Presidente de la Comisión?

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Con mucho gusto. Tal como lo dice el informe, señor Presidente, el pedido de exclusión de los siete militares, cuyos nombres he leído en el informe de la Comisión, fue un reclamo de la Junta presidida por el Coronel Caamaño, y transmitida por la Comisión a la Junta Militar presidida por el Coronel Benoit. El Acta de Santo Domingo, por otra parte, fija con claridad, y están las firmas estampadas, quiénes son las partes que ratifican el acuerdo del Acta de Santo Domingo. Creo con eso haber respondido a la inquietud del señor Embajador de México.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE MEXICO (Sr. de la Colina): Ahora otro punto más, si me es posible.

El PRESIDENTE: Con mucho gusto.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE MEXICO (Sr. de la Colina): Yo desearía saber, si también esto es posible, que nos pudieran dar alguna opinión, los distinguidos señores Representantes, sobre la impresión que ellos traigan respecto del grado de infiltración de los comunistas en las fuerzas rebeldes o constitucionalistas o como se les quiera llamar. Hubo, por ejemplo, la indicación respecto de este señor francés Rivière que venía de Indochina, y que es un entrenador de hombres-ranas, etc.; ¿quizás haya alguna idea de que este individuo tuviera ligas estrechas, por ejemplo, con otros comunistas o si ellos han traído la impresión, por lo menos, de que dentro del alto mando de este grupo, de este sector rebelde, tengan ya una dirección definida comunista de importancia? Gracias, señor Presidente.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Yo, por mi parte, como integrante de la Comisión, ya no como Presidente, no tengo ningún inconveniente en contestar la pregunta del señor Embajador de México, pero a los efectos de la mecánica para las respuestas, yo quiero dar la oportunidad para que la Presidencia la formule en términos generales, para no privar a mis distinguidos miembros de la Comisión de sus derechos legítimos a responder como miembros de la Comisión, como lo somos todos. Vale decir, que no quisiera yo aparecer acaparando las respuestas porque sin perjuicio de una respuesta podemos dar a otro de los integrantes de la Comisión la oportunidad para dar la respuesta que a su juicio también debe darse. De manera que para respetar un trato igualitario y no verme yo en foco en la violenta e inelegante actitud de estar apareciendo en el monopolio de la contestación, pregunto a los señores miembros de la Comisión si quieren

algunos de ellos responder, porque yo por mi parte sí voy a responder. Entonces, le pido que le ceda primero la palabra al señor Embajador Vázquez Carrizosa de Colombia.

EL PRESIDENTE: El señor Embajador de Colombia y miembro de la Comisión Especial responderá la pregunta del señor Embajador de México.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COLOMBIA (Sr. Vázquez Carrizosa): Señor Presidente, el señor Representante de México pregunta cuál es la opinión, voy a decir mía, porque no voy a responder en nombre de la Comisión, sobre el grado de infiltración comunista de ambos bandos. Desde luego la pregunta debe de encaminarse al mando o al sector dirigido por el Coronel Francisco Caamaño, porque no creo que se refiera la cuestión a que el General Wessin y Wessin, el Coronel Saladín o algunos de sus compañeros, tengan alguna tendencia comunista. Respecto del sector dirigido por el Coronel Francisco Caamaño, existe de parte de varios agentes diplomáticos acreditados en la República Dominicana la opinión --y puedo decir de Representantes diplomáticos latinoamericanos-- de que si no el Coronel Francisco Caamaño, el cual no me consta que sea personalmente comunista, sí existen numerosos elementos dentro de su bando, que si no están afiliados al Partido Comunista, son elementos activos a favor del sistema de gobierno o de los propósitos políticos de Fidel Castro. Muchos agentes diplomáticos con los cuales he de conversar --y no cito determinadas naciones para no comprometer a países aquí representados-- tienen la convicción muy firme de que en ese bando existe un buen número de elementos, no digo afiliados, matriculados, a un Partido Comunista oficialmente organizado, pero sí inclinados a una tendencia bien conocida que prevalece en la República de Cuba.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE MEXICO (Sr. de la Colina): Gracias, señor Embajador.

EL PRESIDENTE: ¿Algún miembro de la Comisión desearía contribuir a la respuesta que ha requerido el señor Representante de México? ¿El señor Representante de México ya está complacido de la información que se le ha ofrecido? El señor Embajador de Guatemala.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Si me permite señor Presidente, yo no sé qué mecánica tendrá la Presidencia para medir el tipo de preguntas.

EL PRESIDENTE: Bueno, Su Excelencia dijo que deseaba que sus colegas tomaran parte en las respuestas, en su carácter digamos personal, a los efectos de distribuir el ejercicio de la respuesta y naturalmente la Presidencia tomó nota de que Su Excelencia había invitado al colega de Colombia para que respondiera la pregunta del señor Embajador de México. Yo por cortesía estoy preguntando a Su Excelencia si algunos otros colegas quisieran expresar conceptos sobre la misma pregunta que formuló el Embajador de México. Le ruego a Su Excelencia decirme si alguno otro de sus colegas quisiera hacer alguna pregunta.

El DELEGADO DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Yo voy a agregar muy poco, por supuesto, a lo que acaba de manifestar con el brillo de siempre, el Embajador de Colombia, diciendo que este relato afirmado por un gran número de Representantes del Cuerpo Diplomático, es público y notorio a quien lo quisiera recabar, pero no obstante el respeto que me merece la opinión del Cuerpo Diplomático, para fijar esto en términos de cierta precisión, porque a mí me preocupó tanto como al señor Embajador, el poder averiguar esta pregunta, yo quise ir a la fuente y conversamos estando todos con los diversos hombres que estaban en esta agrupación rebelde, y cosa notable, desde el jefe de la revolución, el Coronel Caamaño, hasta quien se titula Ministro de la Presidencia, reconocieron que eran su gran problema. Nos explicaron en cierta medida en forma sintética el proceso de la historia de la República Dominicana; nos hicieron confesión de cómo se les fue incorporando poco a poco una cantidad de elementos que ellos mismos calificaban de comunistas y que el problema de ellos fue evitar la infiltración para el copamiento y que aseguraban tener el control. Lo dijeron con claridad, e incluso en una parte --yo ya en la difícil tarea a veces de dividir esta formal nominación de presidencia en la que no hay ningún mérito superior a la de ninguno, porque quizás en los otros cuatro miembros están muy por encima las funciones que realizó el Presidente-- conversé con el Coronel Caamaño y le pregunté fraternalmente si él creía, con honradez, que existía esta infiltración. Me la confirmó; pero me dio la impresión de su coraje para el enfrentamiento. Me dijo: "no van a copar al movimiento y mi preocupación está en que perdiendo ellos la posibilidad del control, han quedado detrás de los francotiradores; hoy están entre los que no quieren la solución de la República Dominicana" y ya le ponía el rótulo político a buena parte de los francotiradores, que existen en las dos partes. Vale decir, señor Embajador, que usted comprenderá el alcance de la responsabilidad de la respuesta y la profundidad de la pregunta. Yo quisiera satisfacer la misma inquietud suya, pero he cumplido con lealtad, diciéndole objetivamente la conversación. Yo creo que los que más tienen que averiguar esta pregunta son los actores, los protagonistas de esta hora que está viviendo la República Dominicana. Esto es lo que yo quería decir por ahora, señor Presidente.

El PRESIDENTE: Muy bien, señor Embajador.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE MEXICO (Sr. de la Colina): Estimo profundamente, señor Embajador de Colombia, esta respuesta, que hice a ambos, pero naturalmente por lo que se refiere a la respuesta con que usted nos ilustra un aspecto más. Muchísimas gracias, señor Embajador.

El PRESIDENTE: ¿Desearía el Embajador de Guatemala expresar conceptos sobre la pregunta que hiciera el señor Embajador de México?

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): Señor Presidente, por de pronto no; ciertamente en la Comisión no se discutió este punto para ofrecer conclusiones de la Comisión; la Comisión tuvo también una serie de cosas que considerar y dado que en esto no hay criterio de la Comisión todavía, no deseo yo presentar ningún punto de vista por el momento.

EL PRESIDENTE: El Embajador del Brasil.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE BRASIL (Sr. Penna Marinho): Senhor Presidente, para corroborar as afirmativas aqui feitas pelos meus colegas da Colômbia e da Argentina e acrescentar mais um aspecto que creio poderia melhor esclarecer a focalização que se poderia dar a esse problema. Desejo acrescentar, Senhores Delegados Especiais, que com o colapso total da autoridade pública -- pois nem as forças da Junta de Governo (Benoit, Santana e Saladin), nem as do Coronel Caamaño controlavam a situação -- o Estado dominicano praticamente desaparecera como entidade jurídico-política, tornando-se uma espécie de território de ninguém. O arsenal havia sido franqueado ao povo e toda uma população desorientada, de adolescentes e fanáticos, empunhava armas automáticas modernas, num estado de exaltação que era ainda mais exacerbado por constantes transmissões radiofônicas de caráter ostensivamente subversivo. Nem eu, nem qualquer dos membros desta Comissão, creio, está em condições de afirmar com segurança que o movimento do Coronel Caamaño, insuflado pela figura realmente popular do ex-Presidente Bosch, seja um movimento nitidamente comunista. Mas um fato é indiscutível: diante do estado de verdadeira anarquia em que ficou por vários dias engolfado o país, especialmente a capital, onde bandos de franco-atiradores saqueavam, matavam e não obedeciam a ninguém, qualquer grupo organizado que desembarcasse na Ilha poderia dominar a situação. Por esse motivo, e nesse sentido coincide a maioria dos depoimentos dos chefes de missão diplomática ali acreditados, todos os membros da Comissão são acordes em admitir que o movimento de Caamaño, embora autenticamente democrático em suas origens, pois nenhum de nós acredita sinceramente que Caamaño seja comunista, poderia converter-se rapidamente numa insurreição comunista, máxime se se viesse a constituir um governo dessa índole, suscetível de obter o apoio e a ajuda das grandes potências marxistas-leninistas. Portanto, Senhor Presidente, nós não acreditamos que o Coronel Caamaño e seus assessores mais diretos sejam comunistas. Entretanto, como todo o movimento Caamaño se assenta em bases realmente populares, certas áreas fugindo do controle desse grupo democrático dirigente, bem possível seria que esse movimento se desviasse de suas verdadeiras origens e seguisse o plano oblíquo desses movimentos de base popular, mas que podem ser facilmente controlados por agentes hábeis e peritos na arte de transformar movimentos populares democráticos em revoluções marxistas-leninistas. Muito obrigado, Senhor Presidente.

EL PRESIDENTE: El señor Representante del Ecuador. Su Excelencia el Embajador Jácome ha solicitado la palabra.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DEL ECUADOR (Sr. Jácome): Yo debo sumarme con toda sinceridad y con todo calor a las palabras ya pronunciadas por Su Señoría y por el distinguido Representante de México, en elogio a la abnegación, al trabajo impropio, al espíritu de sacrificio con que la Comisión ha desempeñado hasta aquí sus funciones, habiendo logrado que la situación que encontró al llegar quede favorablemente modificada en algo siquiera al momento de su salida; y yo quisiera ahora que estamos pidiendo opiniones a los distinguidos colegas de la Comisión, si tienen alguna impresión, respecto de alguna fórmula de entendimiento o si en ambos existe algún deseo de llegar a una paz, convertir el cese de fuego, convertir la tregua en una paz que pueda permitir la organización política de la República Dominicana y el proceso natural que debe seguirse hasta que haya un régimen estable constituido o constitucional, porque ha sido halagador oír este criterio, por lo menos de una parte, y es que el llamado gobierno constitucional, del Coronel Caamaño, está seguro de poder controlar en un momento dado y copar estas infiltraciones que estuvieran empeñadas en no hacer la paz, sino en que continúe el estado caótico en que ha permanecido hasta hoy Santo Domingo para aprovechar de él; pero si el comando tiene la esperanza y la confianza de poder controlar eso, es natural que lo que piense el comando respecto de una posibilidad de una fórmula de paz estable, es decir, de un entendimiento con los otros, con los actuales enemigos, sería muy útil y muy constructivo porque ya tendríamos una perspectiva favorable de llegar en un momento más o menos próximo, con un poco de tenacidad, con una mediación amistosa, fraternal, a que estos dos combatientes entiendan que esa sería la mejor garantía que podría tener América y que pudiera tener la República Dominicana de que esas infiltraciones y esos elementos que quisieran que continúe el caos, queden eliminados y por lo tanto definitivamente neutralizados. Yo querría saber qué opinión se han formado los distinguidos miembros de la Comisión que han podido seguramente conversar con las partes en contienda, qué impresión tienen acerca de la opinión o de las fórmulas o de las esperanzas que ellos tengan, respecto de un avenimiento definitivo que pueda normalizar la situación.

EL PRESIDENTE: ¿Desearía la Comisión complacer la pregunta del señor Representante del Ecuador? ¿Algunos de los colegas de la Comisión, el señor Presidente, el Embajador García Bauer, el Embajador Vázquez Carrizosa, el Embajador Penna Marinho, el señor Presidente de la Comisión, el Embajador Colombo, en su carácter de Representante de Argentina?

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Quizás sea ésta la pregunta que yo voy a contestar con más emoción americana, señor Presidente. No puedo ocultarle, señor Embajador, señores Embajadores, que también, al igual que al señor Embajador de México, le confesé recién que compartía y comparto su inquietud con respecto a su pregunta y que era quizás la que más me preocupaba. Lo urgente desde que salimos no era encontrar el banderín

ideológico que distinguiera a las Partes, sino que terminara la lucha de lo que ya era un arroyo de sangre y podía transformarse en un río de sangre en América. Conversamos con las dos Partes y créame, señor Presidente: yo al principio tuve la sensación de que había muerto el derecho; era el caos en la República Dominicana. Todos compartimos ese temor; todos los miembros de la Comisión, los asesores militares, la Secretaría General, nuestros asesores civiles, cuando llegamos teníamos la sensación del caos, algo que jamás habíamos visto ni imaginado. He vivido la sensación de que no existía el derecho y creíamos muy difícil encontrar la posibilidad de que se deseara una solución que pudiera ser factible; inclusive, a pesar de la autoridad moral de lo que representábamos. Eramos muy pocos como hombres, como personas, pero traíamos sobre nosotros la tradición histórica de este Sistema cuyo 75.º aniversario celebramos, y esto nos alimentaba a todos los miembros de la Comisión y desde el primer hombre con quien hablamos del bando rebelde, el Coronel Caamaño, hasta el primer hombre con quien hablamos del Comando de la Junta Militar, el Coronel Benoit, a los dos los vimos cansados de esa lucha que enlutaba a América. En los dos vimos un amor tan igual como nuestro propósito de conseguir la paz; yo mentiría, señor Presidente, si le dijera que he visto ganas de pelea a esa altura del drama de la República Dominicana. Se quería la paz y nos contagiaron en el entusiasmo de lograrla, pero cuál no sería nuestra sorpresa, señor Embajador, de algo más importante que ese propósito, que al fin y al cabo lo queremos todos: las dos partes dijeron que la solución estaba en el Sistema Interamericano. Nadie se atribuía el derecho de imponerla porque, no se engañe nadie, la Parte que quiera triunfar en Santo Domingo está apuñaleando a la República hermana. Los dos comprendían la intensidad del drama que vivía Santo Domingo; los dos depositaron la fe en el Sistema Interamericano. Y en el curso de las conversaciones, cuando todos los miembros de la Comisión preguntaban la fe de ellos para estar dentro de la órbita, les contestaron todos que sí; toda su fe. Pero llegó a más, señor Embajador: incluso, voluntariamente, el Coronel Caamaño hizo el relato. Si su caso fuera denunciado en las Naciones Unidas, ¿Qué haría usted? le había preguntado un periodista, y nos confesó, nos dijo que él contestó que de ninguna manera aceptaba esa vía porque él estaba dentro del Sistema y dentro del Sistema había que buscarla; por eso se sentía feliz de ver la Comisión de paz que iba de la OEA. Por eso depositaba su fe en que la Organización de los Estados Americanos diera la solución. Y cuando hablamos con el Coronel Benoit nos hizo idéntica afirmación: su fe en el Sistema. Yo creo que en medio de la agonía de la República Dominicana, estaba más vivo que nunca este Sistema que entre nosotros tanto hemos hablado de fortalecer y que en una hora de prueba, en medio de la lucha bravía que quizás no sé si yo me hubiera acordado del Sistema, veía que allí los dos se prendían a esto, como la única posibilidad de una solución que, salvando el drama de ellos, mantuviera la paz en América, porque los dos se daban cuenta de la posibilidad que estaba comprometiéndose: era la paz del continente lo que ellos se daban cuenta que podía llegar a conmovirse si no se ponía coto a tiempo. Esto es, señor Embajador, lo que yo, con gran satisfacción, le puedo decir, y busque dentro del Sistema la solución como la vamos a buscar todos y usted verá como el Sistema podrá conseguirla.

EL PRESIDENTE: ¿El señor Representante de Guatemala contribuye a la respuesta que ha requerido el señor Representante del Ecuador?

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): Señor Presidente, yo quiero agregar algunas palabras a lo que ha dicho el señor Embajador de la Argentina, en respuesta a la pregunta dirigida por el señor Embajador del Ecuador. Yo, como miembro de la Comisión y como Embajador de Guatemala, corroboró lo que ha expresado el señor Embajador de la Argentina, en relación con esa fe que se tiene en que el Sistema Interamericano puede ayudar a resolver el problema que hoy dolorosamente se registra en la República Dominicana. Evidentemente se está cansado de la lucha y se desea llegar a alguna solución; yo, por lo menos, pude advertir que si hay en el fondo un deseo de llegar a un entendimiento de parte de las partes para superar estas dificultades que actualmente se presentan; a nosotros nos sorprendió, por ejemplo, cuando iniciábamos las conversaciones con el Comando Rebelde, que advertiéramos la presencia ahí de un coronel que era elemento de enlace de la Junta Militar de San Isidro con la Nunciatura Apostólica y la forma como lo trataban, desde el Coronel Caamaño hasta los otros miembros del Comando Rebelde y nos sorprendió porque estaba en un terreno completamente opuesto al que él representaba; no se miraba un odio como se podría registrar en circunstancias como éstas; somos testigos, pues, de esa deferencia, de esa forma de trato que se hacía. También a la misma Comisión, el Comando Rebelde le ofreció entregar a la Organización de los Estados Americanos alrededor de 500 prisioneros que tenía para que se hiciese cargo de ellos; es decir, hechos como éste evidencian cómo desean terminar con esta situación que está dividiendo al pueblo en la República Dominicana; de esos hechos y de otros que nosotros contemplamos, yo saco en conclusión que en el fondo hay un deseo, un vivo deseo de llegar a un entendimiento. El asunto es encontrar la fórmula para que ese entendimiento se transforme en una realidad.

EL PRESIDENTE: Han solicitado otros distinguidos Representantes la palabra. Pregunto a los honorables miembros de la Comisión, si alguno de ellos quisiera contribuir a la respuesta sobre la pregunta del señor Representante del Ecuador. El señor Representante del Ecuador.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DEL ECUADOR (Sr. Jácome): Sí, gracias, señor Presidente. Yo agradezco infinitamente esta respuesta que es verdaderamente prometedora porque se ha confirmado la sospecha que puede tener todo elemento humano que conoce lo que es la tragedia de una guerra civil; que esa gente que ha ensangrentado su país y ha causado tantas muertes, que ha visto sufrir tanto y que ha hecho sufrir tanto, estaría ya en el momento en que ansía la paz y en que quizás tenga cada cual por dentro su remordimiento por los sufrimientos, y por las desgracias que ha causado, ésta es una reacción eminentemente humana que conocemos. Me ha satisfecho igualmente oír que ambas partes depositan su fe en el Sistema Interamericano, pero ahora he visto una información respecto de declaraciones hechas por el Coronel Caamaño en el sentido de que no aceptará la fuerza interamericana establecida por la resolución última de esta Reunión de Consulta; ya

hemos visto que parece también que el Coronel Caamaño y sus partidarios no han aceptado el actual estado de cosas, la presencia de tropas extranjeras en Santo Domingo, de manera que ¿no será acaso que el Coronel Caamaño, y en el fondo todos los dominicanos, sea cual fuere su ideología, y cual fuere la barricada en que han estado, preferirían una misión de paz a una misión con fusiles? Podríamos pensar en una misión permanente de paz de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, que reciba las mismas impresiones pero que ya vaya a buscar una fórmula concreta, a acercarse a estas Partes que están ansiosas de entenderse y darles la oportunidad de no sentirse presionadas por armas ni con la sospecha adentro de que esas armas están jugando el juego de los adversarios. Querría, y me atrevo a hacer esta pregunta a los honorables miembros de la Comisión, y perdonen que después de las fatigas y el cansancio en que deben estar, yo abuse todavía de su tiempo con estas preguntas. Muchas gracias.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Algo dijimos, así un poco circunstancialmente, contestando la pregunta del señor Embajador de México, sobre esta inquietud que le preocupa al señor Embajador del Ecuador. Aquí es la instancia más importante para decir la verdad completa, no a medias. Y yo la voy a decir como la vi yo. El esfuerzo --dije-- es común y el afán de conseguir la paz, señor Embajador, pero no es que sospeche sino que tengo la certeza que los dos bandos en lucha no controlan sus movimientos, porque el cese del fuego lo han acatado los grupos en lucha, pero conspira contra la ejecución del Acta de Santo Domingo, un ingrediente incontrollable, un elemento que la historia de quien lo sufre prueba que no tiene solución por los métodos de la paz, y que se agranda cuando se traza en las tentativas de la paz porque les ocurrirá, en gran medida, lo que nos pasaba a nosotros, que parlamentando por la paz, ordenándose el cese del fuego más absoluto por los comandos, para conversar con la misión de paz, tuvimos que parlamentar durante dos horas y media bajo el tiroteo incesante de ametralladoras y fusiles. ¿Quién hacía eso? ¿El Coronel Caamaño? Yo creo que no, categóricamente no. Este es el ingrediente del francotirador, porque en un pueblo donde se reparten armas a los civiles, el control no se produce nada más que en dos formas: cuando el civil deponga el arma y la entrega con voluntad, o cuando se llega con una fuerza superior a la del civil. Calculen todos lo que es de difícil la tarea de imaginarse una tentativa de paz, en donde tengamos de nuevo a la firma de las dos partes, tengamos la zona de seguridad y se esté provocando el incidente para que el hecho se produzca como factor desencadenante de la catástrofe tremenda. Yo les confieso honradamente que hasta ahora no me explico cómo no ha pasado algo más grande. La provocación de los francotiradores es permanente. Hay en los francotiradores, sin duda alguna, las dos clases de francotiradores que hay en este tipo de procesos, el que agarró el arma y la sigue manejando con un resentimiento al que no lo convencer las razones que dan para que la deponga, o el que se sigue manejando con el resentimiento de quien no puede controlar una revolución. Es decir, son factores que no podrá controlar una misión por más bandera de la paz que lleve. El Estado de Santo Domingo no adquirirá la paz mientras no pueda ser impuesta en un clima donde estén

dadas las condiciones para que en la paz de Santo Domingo se recupere la normalidad institucional de ese país. Honradamente, señor Embajador, yo en la opción que usted me da, sacrifico mi deseo, que es igual al suyo, por un concepto realista que sólo se bebe estando, desgraciadamente, allí. El deseo nuestro y, lo hemos comentado muchas veces con los cinco embajadores que tuvimos esta misión, sería el de que todos ustedes hubieran estado, que no faltara ninguno, señor Presidente. Que vieran en el teatro de los hechos lo que hemos visto nosotros; y en este proceso de confusión tremenda en que es difícil encontrar el hilo que al tirarlo nos vaya descifrando este enigma, donde hay confusión política, confusión militar, desastre económico, confusión popular, angustia general, nadie puede encontrar el elemento que oriente. Yo creo, señor Embajador, que la paz de la República Dominicana hay que ir con urgencia a buscarla, y tardar nosotros lo menos posible en los debates, porque una hora de debate es una hora que usted le da de oportunidad a quien, con buenas o malas intenciones, todavía aprieta el gatillo para que no se cumpla en definitiva el Acta de Santo Domingo. Esa es mi impresión personal.

El PRESIDENTE: ¿Nada más quiere que exprese el señor Representante del Ecuador? Ofrezco la palabra al señor Representante del Uruguay, Su Excelencia el Embajador señor Emilio Oribe.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DEL URUGUAY (Sr. Oribe): Señor Presidente, antes que nada quiero hacer más las palabras de los distinguidos Embajadores que han hablado antes que yo, en el sentido de felicitar a la Comisión por su tarea y de expresar la admiración de mi Delegación por la forma en que ha realizado esta primera parte de su cometido. Así que a todos ellos nuestras felicitaciones más calurosas. Como es avanzada la hora, señor Presidente, yo quisiera limitarme a dos cuestiones muy concretas. La primera de las cuestiones es la siguiente: para que esta Reunión de Consulta sea competente para tomar medidas para pacificar y para seguir adelante la obra iniciada, es necesario, antes que nada, en la opinión de mi Delegación, que se establezca honradamente si la situación en la República Dominicana es una situación tal, es susceptible de poner en peligro la paz y la seguridad del Continente. Este es el requisito del Artículo 19 de la Carta para que pueda llevarse a cabo una acción colectiva en asuntos que, normalmente, son de la jurisdicción doméstica de los Estados. Como se sabe, dice el Artículo 19 "las medidas que de acuerdo con los tratados vigentes se adopten para el mantenimiento de la paz y de la seguridad, no constituyen violación de los principios enunciados en los Artículos 15 y 17 que son aquellos que se refieren a la no intervención". De manera que, entiende mi Delegación, es necesario un pronunciamiento de esta Reunión de Consulta en el sentido de que los sucesos de la República Dominicana constituyen una situación que pone en peligro la paz y la seguridad del Continente. Partiendo de esa base, quisiera preguntar a la Comisión si ellos son de la opinión de que es así. O sea, que la situación en la República Dominicana constituye una amenaza para la paz y la seguridad del Continente. Esa es la primera pregunta. Y la segunda pregunta es la siguiente, señor Presidente:

la primera parte de la tarea que le fue confiada a la Comisión ha sido cumplida y todos los felicitamos, hemos recibido un informe muy completo que será estudiado por las Delegaciones y por las Cancillerías. Quedaría, entonces, la segunda parte de la tarea de la Comisión, aquella que bajo la letra b) dice: "efectuar una investigación de todos los aspectos de la situación existente en la República Dominicana que han conducido a la convocatoria de la Reunión". Naturalmente que comprende mi Delegación muy bien que esto no se puede realizar en una tarde ni en un día. Pero quería preguntar simplemente si la Comisión cree que tiene elementos de juicio suficientes para, dentro de un plazo razonable, emitir un informe sobre ese punto. Muchas gracias, señor Presidente.

El PRESIDENTE: ¿Alguno de los distinguidos miembros de la Comisión desearía referirse a la primera pregunta que ha formulado el señor Representante del Uruguay? El señor Representante de Colombia, Su Excelencia el Embajador Vázquez Carrizosa.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COLOMBIA (Sr. Vázquez Carrizosa): Con mucho gusto señor Presidente. La primera pregunta es: ¿la situación es tal que puede poner en peligro la paz y la seguridad? Mi respuesta es sí; sí existe una situación que ponga en peligro la paz y la seguridad. Los motivos son muy claros. No es lo mismo un disturbio ni siquiera una guerrilla en un Estado miembro donde subsisten los elementos del orden y las autoridades constituidas, que en un Estado donde se nota, se aprecia y se registra la carencia del Estado. ¿Qué hacer, señor Delegado, frente a la carencia del Estado? ¿Qué hace el Sistema cuando el Estado no existe? ¿Qué pasa cuando la sangre corre por las calles; qué pasa, señor Delegado, cuando un país americano --y voy a decirlo francamente para que Su Excelencia lo medite con toda la clarividencia que le reconocemos-- se encuentra en esas condiciones, en las proximidades de Cuba? ¿Nos sentamos en los balcones a ver el fin de la tragedia? ¿Nos sentamos todos como en una corrida de toros a que venga la cuadrilla? ¿Qué hacer, señor Delegado? Estamos en un movimiento de lucha del comunismo internacional; y estamos en un mundo, señor Delegado, en que América no está dividida siquiera por el mar de otros continentes. Hacemos parte del mundo y hacemos parte de las condiciones del mundo. La República Dominicana, como cualquier país de América, está integrada en el Sistema, y es el Sistema el que sufre con la acefalía del Estado de cualquiera de sus miembros. El problema no es tan sólo de términos jurídicos, de hermenéutica precisa para encarar un hecho con criterio de abogado. El problema es de hondo sentido político, de honda significación, de trascendencia continental, mucho más grave de la que pudiera tener cualquiera de las otras revoluciones americanas. Revoluciones en América ha habido muchas; las ha habido en mi país, las ha habido, creo yo, en el suyo, y no creo que una revolución justifique en el suyo la intervención del Sistema Interamericano. No ha sido esa mi teoría, no ha sido esa la teoría de mi país; pero la acefalía del Estado es un problema que no se registra sino en muy pocas ocasiones. ¿Qué hacer, señor Delegado, como lo registra el informe, frente a un Presidente de una Junta que dice: "yo soy incapaz de mantener el orden frente a las misiones diplomáticas" y qué hacer, señor Delegado, cuando ese Jefe presenta una nota en donde pide el auxilio de otro país y confiesa con la sinceridad con que lo escuchamos:

"Señores representantes de la Comisión Especial, es que los representantes diplomáticos me pidieron protección y yo no tenía elementos para darles protección". Ahí está la respuesta a su primera pregunta. Y viene la segunda, ¿qué pasa con la investigación? Es muy claro, señor Delegado: los hechos políticos complejos, las situaciones multitudinarias son de muy difícil investigación. Todos los que nos hemos aproximado a los problemas de la criminología sabemos de la sicología de multitudes: todo aquello que se estudia en las facultades, que es muy sencillo, una investigación de un hecho local, de un hecho, digamos, individual; pero cuando median las multitudes, cuando están de por medio grandes movimientos, se puede llevar a cabo una investigación, se deben llevar a cabo investigaciones. Pero son investigaciones evidentemente difíciles. Yo no ahorraría esfuerzo para apoyar cualquier mecanismo, agencia o comisión que adelantara esa investigación. Sería muy conveniente. Pero, desde luego, esas investigaciones sobre hechos complejos no son muy fáciles, porque pasaron muchas cosas; en realidad se sucedieron dos o tres revoluciones; hubo una primera revolución de coroneles; después hubo una revolución de un partido; y después una revolución de toda una serie de guerrilleros; de manera que cada cual, sobre el mismo hecho, podrá tener una impresión distinta. Yo creo que más que una investigación del pasado, lo que le interesa a la Reunión de Consulta y lo que le interesa a América, no es la investigación del pasado sino la investigación del futuro. Es la investigación del futuro lo que nos interesa. No es detenernos en un proceso de responsabilidades para saber quién comenzó a disparar primero, quién entró primero al Palacio Nacional, quién abrió las ventanas, quién sacó la ametralladora, quién vió, quién oyó; todo aquello sería un proceso interminable; se llenarían muchas páginas, muchos procedimientos. Pero lo importante no es mirar hacia atrás, sino mirar hacia adelante.

EL PRESIDENTE: Señor Representante del Uruguay.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DEL URUGUAY (Sr. Oribe): Agradezco muy especialmente al Embajador Vázquez Carrizosa sus palabras; ha contestado perfectamente lo que yo quería saber.

EL PRESIDENTE: El señor Embajador del Brasil.

EL REPRESENTANTE ESPECIAL DEL BRASIL (Sr. Penna Marinho): Sim, Senhor Presidente. E desejo também dizer aos Senhores Delegados que a minha resposta é também sim. São dois governos, mas cada um mais fraco do que o outro, totalmente incapazes e impotentes para controlar a situação que dominara o país. A paz foi feita em termos precários. A Ata de São Domingos não é uma paz definitiva, é uma trégua difícil, um armistício transitório que poderá desaparecer a qualquer momento. Por isso, a Comissão sugeriu, entre as medidas que em meu conceito poderiam ser adotadas imediatamente pela Décima Reunião de Consulta, a designação de um grupo técnico-militar permanente na cidade de São Domingos para vigiar o "cese de fuego", bem como outras medidas acordadas pelas partes na Ata de São Domingos. Temos que velar por essa paz e temos que criar condições para que a luta não se reinicie; porque ela poderá reiniciar-se, Senhor Presidente, a cada instante. Muito obrigado.

EL PRESIDENTE: Señores miembros de la Comisión, ¿algún otro distinguido Representante miembro de la Comisión desearía producirse sobre la pregunta? El señor Presidente de la Comisión, Embajador Colombo.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): La verdad, señor Presidente, que después de las palabras de mis distinguidos colegas, los Embajadores del Brasil y de Colombia, muy poco es lo que podría yo agregar; pero la responsabilidad y trascendencia de la pregunta, que inteligentemente formula el señor Embajador del Uruguay, obliga a que todos fijemos la posición sobre este interrogante. Cuando se decidió, entre las facultades, la facultad investigadora, no puedo ocultar que sentí lo mismo que siento siempre que se nombra una comisión investigadora. Generalmente no investiga nada; son pocas las comisiones investigadoras que en la vida parlamentaria de todos nuestros países, exhiben una jurisprudencia muy fecunda de sus resultados. Pero, esta Comisión Investigadora sí tenía la posibilidad de un acierto. Y era porque apuntaba a dos objetivos fundamentales que estaban dictando los hechos de la República Dominicana. Yo entendí, en primer término, la investigación para determinar el alcance de esa peligrosidad frente a los hechos que le preocupan al señor Embajador del Uruguay. Si éste es un hecho que no compromete la paz, nosotros lo vamos a comprobar de inmediato. Si esto está bajo el control de los grupos responsables que sacuden la tensión americana, en la lucha de esta historia americana que está llena de lucha entre hermanos; en esta incorregible vocación que cíclicamente se escribe en la historia de nuestros países, que demora el avance del derecho y de la democracia, lo íbamos a comprobar de inmediato; lo hemos comprobado. Esto pudo ser el comienzo de una lucha circunscrita a los dos grupos con perfiles definidos. Pero la presencia de esos factores incontrolables que yo ruego a los señores Embajadores analicen en todas sus partes, en la evaluación de los hechos para sus conclusiones, los va a impresionar como nos impresionó a nosotros sin verlos: han adquirido mayor peligrosidad que los propios grupos en banda. Han adquirido la calificación, para mí, del elemento determinante de la suerte de lo que se vaya a hacer. Si no existieran esos grupos ni la confesión de los responsables de los movimientos en lucha de que no los pueden controlar, frente a la existencia de una zona de seguridad, pactada en libertad por ambas partes, con la presencia

de una fuerza militar norteamericana que está abocada, fundamentalmente al proceso de la custodia de la zona diplomática, también creería yo, señor Presidente, que quizás podríamos circunscribir el proceso y tener fe en que la paz no estuviera comprometida con ~~fronteras~~ tan evidentes como en este proceso; porque en toda revolución, aunque sea de barrio, está la posibilidad de que sea la chispa de un proceso que afecte la paz de América. Pero, la dimensión de este proceso, con elementos de perturbación de ambas partes, que están hostigando permanentemente la protección de la zona de seguridad, y en la que todavía, señor Presidente, --y a mí me ha llamado la atención--, existe el control de impedir el enfrentamiento de una lucha técnicamente calificada de militar; vale decir, que no existe el enfrentamiento militar de la defensa de la zona con los grupos contendientes en la lucha civil. Y esa lucha puede desencadenarse frente al hostigamiento permanente de quienes están buscando el proceso que la desencadene. De ahí, señor Embajador, que esto reclame la urgencia de que acertemos todos en la medida para salir del paso; que acertemos en la medida para conjurar el peligro indiscutible que se cierne sobre la paz en el Continente, que es el objetivo de nuestra Organización. Porque todos son importantes: desarrollo económico, tranquilidad social, justicia, progreso de los países; pero todos edificados sobre la paz, porque sin paz no habrá posibilidades de triunfo del Sistema Interamericano. No le quepa la menor duda, señor Embajador, que la paz continental está seriamente comprometida. Pero, con respecto a la segunda parte de la investigación, que también es tarea, algo hemos aportado en el término en que hemos podido investigar. Más que la investigación está la palabra de los propios actores. Este hecho es una confesión, y a confesión de parte, relevo de prueba, señor Embajador. No se trata de que nosotros tipifiquemos la ideología, que nadie los coloque en la violencia de andar haciendo estas tareas, cuando existe, fundamentalmente calificado, el episodio por los propios conductores de los movimientos. Si es necesario, esa medida debe agotarse hasta la última instancia. Lo hemos dicho en las sesiones anteriores: mi Delegación va a estar dispuesta y va a efectuar una investigación exhaustiva de los hechos, para distribuir las culpas de acuerdo con las acciones. No haremos nada que sea tapar la parcialidad de una responsabilidad; pero en el tren de prioridades, la investigación ha sido bien puesta por el señor Embajador del Uruguay. Lo primero que había que investigar era la proyección del episodio, la posibilidad de alterarse la paz del Continente, la necesidad de la urgencia, en caso de que fuera comprobada. Los cinco miembros de la Comisión hemos compartido el criterio en aquella oportunidad de estar allí, y lo reafirmamos hoy. Tan en peligro está la paz del Continente, señor Presidente, que si con urgencia el Sistema no acude al llamado de ambas partes en lucha, creo que no está comprometida la paz de América, sino que ya está rota la paz de América. La urgencia está dada en la medida en que hemos comprobado la inquietud del señor Embajador del Uruguay.

EL PRESIDENTE: Pregunto a Su Excelencia el Embajador de Guatemala si desearía contribuir con sus palabras a la respuesta.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): Señor Presidente, quiero también sumar mi voz y mi opinión a la expresada por mis distinguidos colegas miembros de la Comisión. Voy a contestar también tan enfáticamente como lo hizo el señor Embajador de Colombia, que sí están en peligro la paz y la seguridad. Como ya se dijo antes, nosotros, en la Comisión, muchas veces nos preguntamos y comentamos sobre la conveniencia de que todos los miembros de esta Reunión pudieran visitar la República Dominicana y ver, en el propio teatro de los sucesos, la situación que prevalece en aquel país: había un estado de guerra, cuando nosotros llegamos, sin agua, sin luz, sin teléfono, sin servicios públicos. El vestíbulo del propio hotel en que estábamos era un espectáculo de guerra: con niños y mujeres durmiendo en el propio vestíbulo. El Cuerpo Diplomático que se entrevistó con nosotros, también nos expuso la grave situación por la que habían atravesado y estaban atravesando; la anarquía reinante; supimos de los ataques de que habían sido víctimas las propias misiones diplomáticas; los heridos, incluso de misiones diplomáticas que tienen heridos como asilados; y esto era una situación que se agravaba de hora en hora. La paz, la seguridad, indudablemente están afectadas en forma grave cuando no hay una autoridad que sea respetada, porque aunque hay quienes proclaman representar la autoridad en cada sector, se evidencia luego que no la tienen en forma tal que impere la paz; y aunque firmen documentos como el cese de fuego concertado antes de que nosotros llegáramos, o bien el Acta de Santo Domingo, firmada por nosotros; sin embargo, se ve que no pueden controlar absolutamente la situación cuando se ven incidentes con espectáculos de heridos y de muertos. Nosotros preguntábamos cuántos muertos había habido allá, cuántos heridos; y creo poder decir, como opinión recogida de personas de quienes se puede decir que están, en lo posible, mejor informadas sobre este asunto, que no menos de mil quinientos muertos ha habido en Santo Domingo. Y ¿cuál es la repartición de fuerza? ¿Cómo está el país? La lucha ha sido hasta ahora sólo en la propia ciudad de Santo Domingo; pero ¿quién nos asegura que no se regará por todo el país? El Mando rebelde asegura que ellos lo han mantenido pacificado, porque no han querido exaltar los ánimos en el resto del país; y la Junta Militar de San Isidro asegura que ellos controlan el resto del país. ¿Cuál es la verdadera realidad? La Comisión no tuvo tiempo de viajar por todo el territorio de la República Dominicana; pero que es evidente el caos, que la situación se deteriora, que cambia de hora en hora, eso es notorio. Al día siguiente de habernos entrevistado, bajo el tiroteo, como se ha dicho aquí, con el Comando Militar Constitucionalista; al día siguiente el mismo Jefe del Comando se proclamaba Presidente de la República, Presidente Constitucional; y la Junta Militar de San Isidro, que nosotros entrevistamos y que firmó el Acta de Santo Domingo, ya no existe, según los cables que traen hoy las agencias noticiosas. El teletipo acaba de traer, por ejemplo, un cable que dice: "Domingo Imbert, Presidente de la Nueva Junta de Cinco Miembros, rápidamente convocó a una rueda de prensa y demandó un esfuerzo pacificador para reconstruir el país y la unidad nacional sin discriminaciones de afiliación política". Describió al Coronel Caamaño como un buen amigo personal. Los otros miembros de la nueva Junta son: Julio Postigo, de 61 años, abogado que algunos estiman, militante del Partido Revolucionario de Juan Bosch; Carlos Crisolía Poloney, de 47 años, gobernador de una provincia bajo el depuesto régimen de Donald Reid Cabral; Alejandro Seber Copo, de 41 años, ingeniero, y el coronel Benoit,

integrante de la Junta Militar anterior de tres miembros. Imbert no explicó cómo ni por qué se produjo la renuncia de la Junta previa, ni cómo se formó la nueva. Aunque Caamaño no pudo ser localizado para obtener una declaración, el dirigente del Partido Revolucionario, José Francisco Peña Gómez, dijo por la radio rebelde que el nuevo grupo representaba una maniobra solapada contra los intereses del pueblo dominicano. Nosotros oíamos constantemente, en la República Dominicana, rumores, versiones que nos llegaban de que se estaba incitando por la radio a las armas, aun durante el cese de fuego. Las circunstancias que prevalecen en Santo Domingo son de las más difíciles, tremendamente difíciles; y sería bueno que los Señores Representantes, fueran a ver cómo se desarrollan las cosas ahí y cómo aun nosotros, y en el mismo informe que hemos presentado, no podemos dar exactamente el cuadro de la situación prevaleciente y que nos ha angustiado profundamente. La situación, indudablemente, pone en peligro la paz y la seguridad, y no sólo de la República Dominicana. El señor Representante del Uruguay también se ha referido a la misión de investigación; y, efectivamente, entre las tareas confiadas a la Comisión está la de efectuar una investigación de todos los aspectos de la situación existente en la República Dominicana que han conducido a la convocatoria de la Reunión; pero una investigación como la que se pide, no es una investigación que pueda hacerse en pocas horas. La Comisión tenía que darle prioridad a lo que exige prioridad, y lo primero es tratar de obtener la paz, las condiciones de seguridad; que se vuelva, hasta donde es posible, a la normalidad, dentro del ambiente prevaleciente; a efecto de que se pueda llevar a cabo una investigación como la que creemos que es la que ha pedido la Reunión de Consulta. Nosotros estamos de acuerdo con que se lleve a cabo esa investigación hasta donde se quiera; pero dentro del poco tiempo que hemos estado allá y con todas las tareas que hemos tenido, aunque hemos obtenido opiniones, puntos de vista de diversos lados; aunque hemos pedido a todos y a cada uno de los miembros del Cuerpo Diplomático que nos presenten por escrito sus puntos de vista, lo que les consta a ellos sobre la situación; aunque hemos pedido a los propios bandos en lucha que también expongan a la Comisión y a la Reunión lo que ellos consideren la verdad de la República Dominicana y hemos pedido también lo mismo a los gobernadores de las provincias que se entrevistaron con nosotros, y así a todos cuantos tuvimos oportunidad de ver y de interpelar; aunque hemos pedido que nos den todos los elementos de juicio para que sirvan de base a esta investigación y para que la Comisión pueda ofrecer a esta Reunión de Consulta las conclusiones de esa tarea; ha sido muy poco el tiempo; no podemos dar conclusiones en el informe que acabamos de presentar, ni tan luego que podamos cambiarlas un poco más tarde. Se han dado los puntos de vista, las informaciones que han sido recabadas, a veces en conversaciones personales, como la que refería el Embajador de la Argentina, respecto a la conversación que sostuvo con el Coronel Caamaño; a veces conversaciones que hemos tenido con miembros de la Comisión, con diferentes personajes de aquella escena; pero también debemos oír a todas las partes interesadas, a todos los que quieran exponer; y esa investigación lleva algún tiempo. Esa es la respuesta que debemos dar al señor Embajador del Uruguay. Respecto a este segundo punto, hemos hecho todo lo que hemos podido, dentro del poco tiempo, para tratar de que sea efectivo el cese de fuego, para la protección de los asilados, de los refugiados, para la

distribución de alimentos, para que lleguen alimentos, medicinas, etc., y se puedan distribuir con la seguridad necesaria. Hemos llevado a cabo una gran tarea en muy poco tiempo, pero en cuanto a investigación, podemos decir que apenas si hemos comenzado. Y a pesar de lo poco que se ha visto, algo se ha dicho por parte de miembros de esta Comisión en respuesta a preguntas que se han hecho aquí.

El PRESIDENTE: Tengo entendido que el señor Representante del Uruguay está muy complacido de la forma tan amplia como han sido contestadas las interesantes preguntas que formuló a los honorables miembros de la Comisión.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DEL URUGUAY (Sr. Oribe): Como no, señor Presidente, quiero expresar otra vez mi reconocimiento, y creo que es fundamental lo que se ha manifestado aquí en este momento; porque la convicción de los señores miembros de la Comisión permitirá seguramente al Organo de Consulta, tomar las medidas adecuadas.

El PRESIDENTE: Tiene la palabra el señor Representante del Paraguay, señor Yódice.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DEL PARAGUAY (Sr. Yódice): Muchas gracias, señor Presidente. Quiero en primer término sumarme a las palabras de felicitación que se han vertido aquí para los señores Embajadores que integran nuestra Comisión Especial que viajará a Santo Domingo y que cumpliera una gran tarea de la cual todos nos enorgullecemos. Estoy muy feliz porque desde el momento en que pedí la palabra hasta ahora se haya producido una serie de intervenciones de los distinguidos Embajadores que integran la Comisión, porque esas intervenciones hacen que esta felicitación mía a ellos sea ahora mucho más cálida. Como ha dicho el señor Presidente de la Comisión, el ilustrado Embajador de la Argentina, don Ricardo Colombo, ésta es la instancia de la sinceridad y a la Delegación del Paraguay le place sobremanera la actuación de los Embajadores de esta Comisión. La Delegación del Paraguay, señor Presidente, se enorgullece de esta Comisión porque ella ha cumplido eficazmente, en primer lugar, su misión en el aspecto de la pacificación, en la medida de lo posible; se enorgullece de esta Comisión porque ha justificado la confianza que en ella tenía la Delegación del Paraguay en el sentido de que los distinguidos Embajadores que la integraron, cuya capacidad y americanismo cabal todos conocemos, como dijera en la oportunidad de aprobarse su integración, investigarían sobre la existencia o no de intervención del comunismo internacional en los sangrientos sucesos dominicanos. Si no hubiera formulado la pregunta que formuló al respecto el ilustrado Representante de México, la hubiera formulado yo, quizá en distinta forma, en el sentido de que no me hubiera limitado exclusivamente a señalar, a inquirir, sobre la posibilidad de intervención comunista en un determinado grupo, sino en todos los aspectos del grave conflicto que hoy aflige al pueblo dominicano. Para el Gobierno del Paraguay, como lo expresé claramente en la oportunidad de aprobarse la integración de la fuerza colectiva interamericana, desde un comienzo estuvo en juego la seguridad continental. Las respuestas de los señores Embajadores que integran la Comisión que hoy nos informa a

varias preguntas que se formularon sobre estos delicados aspectos de la situación dominicana han sido categóricas. Mi Gobierno estaba en lo cierto. La seguridad continental está amenazada. Existía y existe el peligro de que el caos y la anarquía permitan al comunismo internacional transformar a la República Dominicana en una nueva Cuba. El Embajador de Colombia, don Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, con su claridad, valentía y energía habituales, ha manifestado categóricamente el carácter eminentemente político del problema que estamos viviendo; él ha dicho acertadamente, ante una pregunta del Embajador del Uruguay, que la paz de América está amenazada, la seguridad continental está amenazada y existe la posibilidad de que, del caos y la anarquía en la República Dominicana, surja una nueva Cuba, un nuevo gobierno comunista en el continente. Estamos orgullosos de la actuación de nuestra comisión porque ella trae mucha claridad, como dijo el señor Embajador del Uruguay, al problema que estamos encarando. Para el Paraguay la duda ya no existía cuando dije así al votarse la resolución de integración de la fuerza interamericana, cito: "El Gobierno del Paraguay aprueba el envío de fuerzas estadounidenses a la República Dominicana, considerando que no se trata de una intervención armada en perjuicio del derecho de autodeterminación del pueblo dominicano, sino por el contrario de una medida de defensa continental contra la intervención de fuerzas Castro-comunistas. El Gobierno del Paraguay entiende que la intervención armada norteamericana ha sido necesaria ante la urgencia de detener la anulación del principio de autodeterminación del pueblo dominicano, mediante fuerzas y recursos comunistas extracontinentales y cubanos, siendo evidente la dificultad del Sistema Interamericano de proceder con rapidez y energía. El Gobierno del Paraguay reitera su apoyo al proyecto de creación de una fuerza continental y participará en ella siempre que así lo haga una mayoría substancial de gobiernos de los Estados miembros."

Señor Presidente, si hay un punto que lamentar es el que, por el momento, esta valiente, esta clara definición que nos trae nuestra Comisión de la gravedad del problema dominicano, sea sólo del conocimiento de los Delegados a esta Reunión de Consulta. Evidentemente hemos de llegar a un momento en que el ilustrado criterio de la Presidencia y los señores Delegados, creo yo, determinará que estas conclusiones tan trascendentes de nuestra Comisión sean del conocimiento de la América toda, de todos los pueblos del continente. Porque para esta Delegación, señor Presidente, estas conclusiones, las que constan en el informe escrito y las respuestas a preguntas aquí formuladas, no deben ser solamente del conocimiento de los Delegados, deben ser del conocimiento de los pueblos. Yo pongo énfasis en este punto porque tengo como orgullo que mi Delegación desde un primer momento ha tenido la preocupación, y ha sentado una posición en relación a la gravedad del conflicto, dada la intervención del comunismo internacional en los sucesos dominicanos. Yo congratulo una vez más a los integrantes de nuestra Comisión, confío en que las conclusiones que ellos ahora nos aportan de su viaje a Santo Domingo, y las que luego nos seguirán trayendo, ayudarán en mucho a esta Reunión de

Fig. 6

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respuestas de los eminentes comisionados. Naturalmente, vendrá la oportunidad de formular manifestaciones de fondo en nombre de nuestros gobiernos sobre la letra del informe tan importante que nos han presentado los colegas de la Comisión. Ofrezco la palabra al señor Representante de Chile.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE CHILE (Sr. Magnet): Gracias, señor Presidente. Creo que el criterio que acaba de sentar con tan buen juicio la Presidencia, conviene perfectamente al sentido que entiendo dar a mis palabras en este momento. Aunque la Delegación de Chile, por razones muy claras que expuso en su oportunidad, se abstuvo de votar la constitución de la Comisión que ahora está de vuelta entre nosotros, no podría sino sumarme, muy breve pero muy sinceramente, a las palabras de elogio que ella ha merecido, y creo que la posición que ha asumido mi país a este respecto, no me inhibe, para beneficio de todos, formular algunas preguntas que interesan a mi país, y entiendo que a todos los demás.

En el Acta de Santo Domingo, a que se ha referido el señor Presidente, en su exposición, se hace mención de una zona de seguridad en esa misma ciudad, cuyos límites estarían trazados en un plano anexo a este documento. Esta zona de seguridad, señor Presidente, creo que es un factor muy importante del cese del fuego que se ha obtenido, y creo que su delimitación clara y su conocimiento, no sólo por las Partes sino por todos, ayudará mucho a formar juicio sobre lo que pueda ocurrir si, como pudiera ser de temer, esta zona de seguridad fuese violada. Yo pediría, señor Presidente, si la Comisión no lo tiene a mal, que este plano fuese, no sólo incorporado al Acta, sino puesto en circulación, a la brevedad posible, por Secretaría.

El PRESIDENTE: Pregunto. Me imagino que el señor Presidente de la Comisión deseará responder la pregunta del Embajador Magnet.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): La Comisión, por mi intermedio, adelanta que el mapa es entregado en este acto, y yo le pido mil excusas al señor Embajador de Chile por no estar agregado junto con el informe en el reparto que hemos hecho. Quizás la explicación de ello esté en ese agradecimiento inmerecido que ha hecho el señor Embajador al trabajo de la Comisión. Razones materiales impidieron hacerlo, pero, en este acto yo lo entrego a la Presidencia, para que admita con la mayor urgencia posible el reparto de este mapa, como acertadamente nos pide el señor Embajador de Chile, porque es fundamental para la mejor ilustración de los señores Embajadores.

El PRESIDENTE: Así procederá la Presidencia, señor Presidente, Embajador Colombo.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE CHILE (Sr. Magnet): Quiero dejar en claro que en mis palabras no había ni el menor asomo de cargo o reproche a la Comisión.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Yo quiero dejar perfectamente en claro que ni siquiera remotamente he sospechado esa actitud de que lo sé caballero y un distinguido embajador que honra al Sistema Interamericano.

EL PRESIDENTE: Para su segunda pregunta, señor Embajador.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE CHILE (Sr. Magnet): Es más que una pregunta, señor Presidente, el deseo de lograr una especie de amistad. Me parece haber deducido claramente que tanto del texto como del contexto mismo del informe que hemos tenido el agrado de escuchar, como especialmente del Acta de Santo Domingo, que ya conocíamos y que está contenida en este informe, y que fue firmada el 5 de mayo, se desprende que no hay, o no había en esa fecha en la República Dominicana un gobierno constituido, en situación de representar al país, sino dos partes o bandos en lucha. La Comisión, con el conocimiento que le daba su actuación en el terreno, y con su espíritu de imparcialidad, juzgó necesario oír a esas dos partes o bandos, para llegar a un resultado útil. Quisiera preguntar por su digno intermedio, señor Presidente, al Presidente de la Comisión, si esta comprobación a que he llegado corresponde a la verdad.

EL PRESIDENTE: ¿Traslado la pregunta al señor Presidente o a los distinguidos miembros de la Comisión?

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Yo creo entender que hemos contestado con anterioridad el sentido de la pregunta del señor Embajador. Es decir, hemos afirmado, todos los miembros de la Comisión, la sensación de caos en que encontramos la República Dominicana, la inexistencia de principios de autoridad, la existencia de dos grupos que aparecían como abanderados en la lucha, y con los cuales nos sentimos nosotros impulsados a entablar contacto de inmediato. No sé si hasta aquí le satisface al señor Embajador, y le ruego me anuncie si le queda un margen de duda para aclararlo.

EL PRESIDENTE: ¿Qué podría expresar el señor Embajador de Chile?

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE CHILE (Sr. Magnet): Me parece que lo expuesto por el señor Embajador significa el asentimiento de lo que yo. . .

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Creo que es lo mismo, señor Embajador.

El PRESIDENTE: ¿Hay alguna otra pregunta? El señor Embajador.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE CHILE (Sr. Magnet): Si no abuso de su benevolencia y de la Reunión, señor Presidente, no sé si sería demasiado exigente que pidiera a la Comisión que nos ilustrara, si ha podido averiguarlo, acerca del número de exiliados o refugiados que aún queda en las Embajadas de Santo Domingo; si ha logrado averiguar ese dato.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): La verdad es que en este momento, señor Embajador, sería imposible de contestar a su pregunta; porque, felizmente, ha tenido principio de ejecución la salida de los asilados. Yo tengo la información de los asilados de mi Embajada: han sido 14, que ya han podido salir. Es decir, que esto se altera en la medida en que llega la colaboración, alimentos y demás, porque los asilados aprovechan los elementos de aviación que llegan para poder combinar sus viajes; de manera que en estos momentos me sería prácticamente imposible, por el transcurso del tiempo producido entre nuestra llegada y ahora, decirle qué número de asilados ha podido salir del país. De mi Embajada han salido 14.

El PRESIDENTE: ¿Está complacido el señor Embajador?

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE CHILE (Sr. Magnet): No sé si sería demasiado insistir, señor Presidente; si con el testimonio de los demás miembros de la Comisión pudiésemos llegar siquiera a una cifra aproximada.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE BRASIL (Sr. Penna Marinho): Senhor Embaixador do Chile, desejo informá-lo de que na Embaixada do Brasil havia trinta e oito asilados, dos quais apenas seis desejaram deixar a República Dominicana. Os outros trinta e dois disseram-nos que preferiam aguardar a normalização da situação em seu país. De maneira que apenas seis asilados em nossa Embaixada deixaram a República Dominicana.

El PRESIDENTE: ¿El señor Embajador Vázquez Carrizosa desearía contribuir algo?

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COLOMBIA (Sr. Vázquez Carrizosa): En la Embajada de Colombia en Santo Domingo había cerca de 30 asilados, algunos de los cuales no querían abandonar el territorio dominicano. Muchos de ellos, especialmente mujeres y niños, salieron en el avión destinado a llevar alimentos, medicinas y equipo médico, el 5 de mayo de este año.

El PRESIDENTE: El señor Embajador de Guatemala.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): En la Embajada de Guatemala había 28 asilados, de los cuales nueve ya dejaron el asilo, y hay 19 asilados actualmente, los cuales se evacuarán en el avión que llegará de Guatemala con víveres y medicinas tan pronto como sea posible, y de lo cual ya ha sido comunicada la Secretaría.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE CHILE (Sr. Magnet): Señor Presidente, quisiera dejar testimonio de mi satisfacción, y rendir homenaje público al patriotismo dominicano, puesto que tan abundante o grande número de personas no haya querido abandonar su país, a pesar de las condiciones de caos que allí reinan.

El PRESIDENTE: Concedemos la palabra al señor Representante de El Salvador, Embajador de Clairmont Dueñas.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE EL SALVADOR (Sr. Clairmont Dueñas): Muchas gracias, señor Presidente. Voy a hacer una pregunta, pero ahora quiero expresar el reconocimiento de mi Gobierno por la magnífica labor que la Comisión ha llevado a cabo ante los trágicos sucesos de la República Dominicana. Nuestro reconocimiento, señores. La pregunta es la siguiente, y quiero hacer referencia al reparto de armas que se hizo entre la población civil. Yo desearía preguntar a los señores miembros de la Comisión si ellos, pues, tuvieron el tiempo necesario de investigar en qué forma es que se realizó este reparto, cuál fue la fuente, si se conoce, si el reparto se hizo en forma indiscriminada o entre elementos de alguna tendencia especial, y quiénes fueron los motivadores de este reparto. Muchas gracias.

El PRESIDENTE: Traslado la pregunta a los ilustrados colegas de la Comisión. El señor Embajador del Brasil, tenga la bondad.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE BRASIL (Sr. Penna Marinho): Senhor Presidente, desejo responder à pergunta formulada pelo Senhor Embaixador de El Salvador e o faço em bases precárias porque precárias foram as informações que obtivemos e, sobretudo, contraditórias. Havia, porém, um consenso comum nestas respostas, de que o arsenal de armas havia sido aberto, franqueado à população e que a população civil, uma parte controlada pelo Coronel Caamaño, ficou municionada com armas automáticas consideradas por várias autoridades a quem entrevistamos como as mais perfeitas e modernas de que dispunha a República Dominicana e pudemos verificar, quando fomos entabular negociações com o grupo chefiado pelo Comandante do Governo revolucionário, Coronel Caamaño, pudemos divisar várias pessoas, adolescentes, senhoras, todos armados de metralhadora, formando pequenos grupos nas ruas do bairro de São

Domingos dominado pelos rebeldes. De maneira que houve uma distribuição de todas as armas que estavam guardadas no arsenal da República Dominicana entre a população civil que apoiava o grupo do Coronel Caamaño. Esta é a informação que pudemos recolher nos contatos que tivemos com as diversas autoridades da República Dominicana.

El PRESIDENTE: El señor Embajador Vázquez Carrizosa, Delegado Especial de Colombia.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COLOMBIA (Sr. Vázquez Carrizosa): No puedo pronunciarme, desde luego, sobre la forma como se hizo la distribución de armas, pero lo cierto es que en el sector de la ciudad donde se encontraba el Comando del Coronel Caamaño era visible y notoria la presencia de armas, de ametralladoras, de todo ciudadano que estaba en la calle y de todos los que nos rodeaban. Cada ciudadano llevaba su ametralladora, de modo que la profusión de armas era igual al número de personas que nos circundaba. Muchas gracias.

El PRESIDENTE: ¿El señor Embajador de Guatemala desearía expresar conceptos al respecto?

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): Sí, desde luego se observaba en el pueblo, en lo que pudimos nosotros ver, que armas automáticas y de otra clase estaban en poder de muchos civiles jóvenes, y hasta mujeres. Ahora, según información que tuve el domingo 25 de abril por la madrugada, se armó a muchos civiles jóvenes con armas automáticas en el Campamento 16 de Agosto.

El PRESIDENTE: El señor Representante de El Salvador, señor de Clairmont Dueñas.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE EL SALVADOR (Sr. de Clairmont Dueñas): Muchas gracias, señores Delegados. Una segunda pregunta si me lo permite el señor Presidente. Quisiera preguntar a los señores miembros de la Comisión, si se ha visto o se ha previsto o se ha instruido, depende en qué sentido digamos la palabra, la posibilidad de que el sector controlado por el Coronel Caamaño, esté recibiendo suministro de armas de otro país, fuera de la República; de otro país, digamos el caso de Cuba, o se está sosteniendo con el armamento que ellos tienen allí en estos momentos.

El PRESIDENTE: El señor Representante de Colombia, Embajador Vázquez Carrizosa.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COLOMBIA (Sr. Vázquez Carrizosa): Es tanta la profusión de ametralladoras en el sector de la ciudad que visitamos, que en realidad la importación de ese artefacto resulta innecesaria.

El PRESIDENTE: Los señores representantes que deseen contribuir a la respuesta. Concedo la palabra al señor Representante de Venezuela, Embajador Tejera París.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE VENEZUELA (Sr. Tejera París): Señor Presidente, quisiera hacer dos preguntas a la Comisión, la primera, sobre armas justamente. ¿La Comisión supo de la existencia o pudo verificar de algún sistema de distribución o de algún inventario por el cual, en las próximas actividades pacificadoras que pudiera controlar, qué parte del armamento ha sido devuelto? La experiencia mía en cosas parecidas ha sido que es posible lograr una devolución muy crecida de armas entregadas al pueblo y después con una búsqueda complementaria de casa en casa se puede llegar a controlarlas. Generalmente los militares son muy buenos burócratas, generalmente hacen inventarios, por eso no es absurda la pregunta que hago.

El PRESIDENTE: Remito la pregunta al señor Presidente de la Comisión, Embajador Colombo.

El PRESIDENTE DE LA COMISION (Sr. Colombo): Señor Presidente, esa pregunta que formula el distinguido Embajador de Venezuela, yo también la formulé a todos los bandos o grupos, en Santo Domingo. Todos se afligían de no poderme dar la certeza de un elemento de juicio que hubiera sido muy valioso. Casi ya al venirnos, con motivo de las actuaciones que informan nuestro despacho, nuestro informe, de la única parte que obtuvimos una contestación que es útil a la inquietud del señor Embajador, fue por parte de Estados Unidos, donde el señor Embajador de Estados Unidos en Santo Domingo me manifestó que muchas personas que llegan a la zona de seguridad, llegan y entregan sus armas. Esta es una pregunta que yo traté de profundizar en cuanto a cantidad; no fueron precisos en la contestación. Me insistió nada más que éste era un informe que tenía del General Palmer, que le había manifestado al señor Embajador de Estados Unidos que en alguna cantidad, ya habían armas que devolvía la gente que llegaba a la zona por diversos motivos, muchos de ellos que llegaban en busca de alimentos, o de asistencia médica, y que hacían voluntariamente entrega de sus armas. Esto es cuanto yo podría contestar creyendo que hago algún aporte a su preocupación, señor Embajador; nada más.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE VENEZUELA (Sr. Tejera París): Muchas gracias, señor Presidente. La otra pregunta sería ésta: me ha producido mucha impresión y optimismo el hecho de que la Comisión pudo comprobar tanto entre los constitucionalistas como entre los rebeldes un deseo ferviente de hacer intervenir a la OEA, para buscar una solución y que, incluso, según creo haber oído del señor Presidente de la Comisión, el propio Coronel Caamaño dijo que rechazaba la solución del Consejo de Seguridad y prefería una solución de la OEA porque forma parte del Sistema. Ahora bien, quería preguntarles esto: la Comisión exploró u oyó hablar de alguna metodología de algún sistema especial, por ejemplo de la presencia de una alta comisión de notables o de una alta comisión de buenos oficios que pudiera ayudar, en el sentido de regresar a normalidad constitucional ahora. Cree la Comisión que habría alguna posibilidad de que eso fuera aceptado por todos los bandos en pugna, entiendo que ahora hay un nuevo cambio en el país.

El PRESIDENTE: Transmito la pregunta a los señores comisionados, señor Vázquez Carrizosa, tenga la bondad.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COLOMBIA (Sr. Vázquez Carrizosa): Es prematuro todavía avanzar en eso; claro que se pueden advertir signos de contacto, puntos de referencia comunes, pero dentro de un ambiente de tensión, de zozobra como el que nos rodeaba, es muy difícil pensar en el momento en fórmulas de un Gobierno que uniera dos partes; no lo excluyo para el futuro, pero aparte de una igual referencia a la Organización de los Estados Americanos, le resulta imposible creo yo a la Comisión, a menos que mis colegas tengan otro concepto, contestar en forma más precisa esa pregunta. No se esbozó ninguna solución. Es que no era nuestra labor investigar condiciones políticas de un nuevo Gobierno; nosotros teníamos una misión muy precisa de acuerdo con la resolución del 1.º de mayo, cual era el cese del fuego, obtener garantías para la salida de los refugiados, obtener condiciones de seguridad para las Embajadas y organizar la ayuda humanitaria, inclusive los términos de referencia de la Resolución del 1.º de mayo no nos autorizaban para entrar en discusiones que le conciernen al pueblo dominicano, y personalmente es mi tesis que la misión nuestra era esencialmente crear condiciones de paz y no prejuzgar sobre la voluntad de los dominicanos respecto a su propio destino; por lo menos ése es mi pensamiento.

El PRESIDENTE: La palabra al señor Representante de Guatemala, miembro de la Comisión para contestar aspectos relacionados con la pregunta del señor Tejera París.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): En relación a la pregunta que hace el señor Embajador de Venezuela nada mejor que ver los términos de referencia de la Comisión, tal como se especificaron en la resolución de esta reunión del 1.º de mayo; esa tarea a que se refiere el señor Representante de Venezuela no se encuentra en los términos de referencia y por consiguiente le estaba vedado a la Comisión entrar en ese terreno. Indudablemente, y eso ya lo expusimos antes, hay deseo de entendimiento, se percibe el deseo de llegar a la paz, puesto que hay una cantidad de relaciones, hay gente, familiares de un lado, y familiares del otro lado; el mismo Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático, pues, nos hablaba de cómo por conducto de él se han prestado tan magníficos oficios a la causa humanitaria, hacían preguntas sobre qué había acontecido con los familiares de quienes les había llegado el rumor de si habían sido heridos o muertos y él servía de conducto para darles explicaciones y tranquilizarlos; es decir, ese ambiente sí ha existido y si el señor Embajador de Venezuela, por ejemplo, recuerda el cable que yo leí anteriormente, puede ver que ahí se habla de una persona entre los miembros de esta nueva junta que describió a Caamaño como un amigo personal y dice también de un abogado que algunos estiman militante del partido revolucionario de Juan Bosch; en otras palabras da a entender que como que hay un deseo de que haya algún acercamiento; que se percibe pues ese deseo de entendimiento y, desde luego, que hay fe en el Sistema Interamericano. ¿Cómo se canaliza ese deseo? Cómo puede ayudar la OEA a la solución de ese problema que tiene que ser resuelto fundamentalmente por los propios dominicanos, es una cosa que tendrá que ser considerada en un momento oportuno por el sistema, por los órganos del sistema.

El PRESIDENTE: Habla el Delegado Especial de Venezuela.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE VENEZUELA (Sr. Tejera París): Quiero aclarar primero que mi pregunta no tuvo por objeto hacer una crítica a la Comisión ni mucho menos, y mucho menos pensar que hubiera podido querer ir más allá de los términos de referencia; se trata sólo, quizás no me expliqué bien de esto, existe la idea, no sé si ustedes concen, que ha sido expresada informalmente ya por una proposición de la Delegación de Costa Rica, de proponer una comisión delegada, una comisión que por delegación de esta conferencia acusa a la República Dominicana con el fin de llevar ya a cabo la segunda parte de la paz, o sea la administración de la mecánica de la paz y el regreso a la normalidad institucional, no la formación de gobierno y esas cosas; entonces me preguntaba yo si habría ya alguna idea, pues esas ideas saltan normalmente, había ocurrido en una forma u otra ya en distintos países, si no había existido algo. Esa era mi pregunta. Ahora, una tercera pregunta quería hacer.

El PRESIDENTE: Sobre estas preguntas se producirá el señor Presidente de la Comisión. Embajador Colombo, tenga la bondad.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Simplemente porque no quiero dejar de decir dos palabras sobre esta preocupación del distinguido Embajador de Venezuela, que comparto la expresión que acaba de manifestar el señor Embajador García Bauer en el sentido de que nuestra tarea estaba obsesionada en el proceso inmediato tratando de lograr la paz inmediata e inclusive, mediatamente, también teníamos la obsesión y seguimos teniéndola como sin duda todos, todos sin excepción, que el problema de la solución política de la República Dominicana sea en la más perfecta respuesta a la autodeterminación de los pueblos y que dicte a los dominicanos finalmente cuál debe ser el camino de su vida institucional; a nosotros nos ha bastado saber que acatan la jurisdicción y la competencia del sistema, que el sistema acierta en la solución, pero no creo tampoco, señor Presidente, con el mayor respeto para el señor Embajador de Venezuela, que ésta sea la instancia de empezar a hablar de esas inquietudes, precisamente por lo mismo que dijo el señor Embajador antes, de que nos concretáramos al informe y la respuesta a los señores Embajadores, y las preguntas y las respuestas a la Comisión.

El PRESIDENTE: Habla el Delegado Especial de Venezuela.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE VENEZUELA (Sr. Tejera París): Solamente para información personal, como lo estamos haciendo todos. Y otra cosa ésta, que por experiencia de mi propio país, especialmente en la época de la dictadura de Pérez Jiménez, digo que la infiltración comunista se hace generalmente en todas las partes en discordia, se trata de hacer en los distintos bandos en discordia, y la experiencia actual da como resultado que es mucho más fácil y mucho más frecuente la alianza de los comunistas con elementos de la extrema derecha que con los elementos liberales corrientes, entonces yo me pregunto si la Comisión notó o preguntó si del lado de Benoit, Wessin y Wessin y compañía

no se notó la presencia de agentes provocadores o si se hizo alguna investigación de si había comunistas del otro lado, porque algunas de sus acciones parecen, dan sensación de provocaciones más que de actos sensatos.

El PRESIDENTE: ¿Desearía, señor Presidente de la Comisión, producirse al respecto?

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Con mucho gusto, ésa también es una pregunta muy oportuna, y también creo que en cierta medida la hemos contestado cuando hemos asignado la existencia de franco tiradores en las dos partes; es decir que existencia de franco tiradores hay en todas partes, es un elemento general de perturbación que envuelve el proceso del país, sin que nosotros podamos asignar la ideología que particulariza en su pregunta el señor Embajador, pero es evidente que el que juega de franco tirador cuando hay dos grupos y se ha escapado del control de los comandos naturales está jugando por su propia ideología. Nada más señor Presidente.

El PRESIDENTE: ¿El Embajador Penna Marinho desearía pronunciarse sobre la pregunta del Embajador Tejera París? ¿El Embajador Vázquez Carrizosa? ¿El Embajador Bauer?; ¿está complacido señor Embajador?

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE VENEZUELA (Sr. Tejera París): Bueno, sólo quería hacer esta reflexión y es que si hay franco tiradores de ambas partes, porque no pueden ser los franco tiradores de Weissin comunistas, y los franco tiradores de Caamaño derechistas o nacionalistas simplemente.

El PRESIDENTE: ¿Algún comentario sobre las últimas expresiones, señor Presidente?

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): A mí no me gustaría seguir en este diálogo porque eso hace llegar a una selva de conjeturas, señor Embajador, pero creo que basta decir, que hay una diferencia fundamental: los propios comandos del Coronel Caamaño reconocían la existencia de elementos comunistas que trataban de perforar el control de su movimiento, afirmación que yo no escuché ni creo que haya escuchado ninguno de los señores miembros, por parte del Coronel Benoit.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE VENEZUELA (Sr. Tejera París): Puede que tengan menos sensibilidad política.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Bueno, eso va por su cuenta, según las apreciaciones.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE VENEZUELA (Sr. Tejera París): Bueno, yo me fijé en eso y me pareció, pero solamente quería precisar esta situación. Muchas gracias, señor Embajador.

El PRESIDENTE: Se las damos a usted, señor Embajador. Escuchemos la palabra del señor Embajador de los Estados Unidos, Embajador señor Bunker.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS (Sr. Bunker): Mr. Chairman, I would like to express on behalf of my delegation, and indeed on behalf of my Government, appreciation and praise to all of the members of the Committee of the Meeting, individually and collectively, who, under the brilliant leadership of my friend and colleague, Ambassador Colombo, have accomplished so much in so brief a period, and under, as they have described to us, the most difficult and trying circumstances. We have heard the report of the Committee this evening, and I am confident that this Meeting will agree with me, that the Act of Santo Domingo marks an outstanding achievement in what has been our priority objective under the terms of the resolution, an agreement on an effective cease-fire in the Dominican Republic. As Ambassador Colombo has reported, the Secretary of State has communicated to the Committee that the United States supports its work in Santo Domingo, and pledges to cooperate fully in the observance of the provisions of the Act of Santo Domingo.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Señor Presidente, algo pasa en la traducción simultánea, porque yo escucho más fuerte el inglés del señor Embajador, que el español que me debe dictar el traductor.

EL PRESIDENTE: ¿Está más fuerte el parlante del señor Embajador?

EL DELEGADO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS (Sr. Bunker): Shall I proceed? Well, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the questions which have been put by my distinguished colleagues to the Committee, and the answers of the members, have shed further light and have made a very great contribution toward a greater understanding of the situation existing in the Dominican Republic; a contribution so valuable that I think it should become public knowledge, Mr. Chairman. I believe that it was agreed at our previous meeting that the proceedings of the private meetings and the records would become public. I trust that that will be so in this case, because I think the record is extremely valuable to provide a much wider public knowledge of the actual conditions in the Dominican Republic. The Committee has succeeded in taking this first step of major importance. It seems to me that this Meeting can now move to a second major stage of the task, for I think we can all agree that much remains to be done before conditions return to normal in that tragic and torn country. It is quite obvious, from what the Committee has said, that there is today no effective national government in the Dominican Republic. There are contending forces, each in control or perhaps quasi-control in separate areas, but no political grouping or faction can lay a well-founded claim to being the government of the country. It remains, Mr. Chairman, for the Dominican people, with the help of the OAS to which I understand they are looking, from the words of the Committee, to organize a government and to provide for future constitutional arrangements of their own choosing. It seems to me that it is of the greatest importance that the OAS should endeavor to assist patriotic and outstanding citizens of the

Dominican Republic, and I am sure they can be found, to establish a provisional government of national unity, which could eventually lead to a permanent representative regime through democratic processes. Mr. Chairman, we must now seek to find paths of peace and to build on the base which has been established by this Act of Santo Domingo. I want again to express the appreciation of my Government for the splendid work of this Committee because the members have established, through what they have done here, really, the first and essential base for any further progress. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

El PRESIDENTE: Ofrezco la palabra al señor Representante del Uruguay, Embajador Oribe.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DEL URUGUAY (Sr. Oribe): Señor Presidente, yo quisiera apoyar lo que ha dicho el señor Embajador de los Estados Unidos, en cuanto a la publicidad de las actas de la sesión, desde el entendido naturalmente de que va a ser hecho como de costumbre, o sea que serán actas completas, versión taquigráfica. Muchas gracias, señor Presidente.

El PRESIDENTE: Así se acordará. El señor Embajador Facio, Delegado Especial de Costa Rica.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COSTA RICA (Sr. Facio): Señor Presidente, yo no sé si será demasiado tarde para hacer una preguntita que yo tenía aquí pendiente.

El PRESIDENTE: Con mucho gusto.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COSTA RICA (Sr. Facio): En primer lugar quiero comenzar sumándome a las manifestaciones de felicitación a los distinguidos miembros de la Comisión Especial por su espléndida labor. Segundo, la pregunta que voy a hacer tiene por objeto aclararme una preocupación que tengo en cuanto a la posibilidad de obtener una pacificación efectiva de la República Dominicana. Quiero preguntar a los miembros de la Comisión si tuvieron entrevistas con el Cnel. Caamaño o los miembros de su grupo después de que ese bando se constituyó en lo que ellos alegan ser el Gobierno Constitucional de la República Dominicana.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Precisamente el valor del Acta de Santo Domingo es haberse firmado con posterioridad a que el Coronel Caamaño y el grupo que a él le responde se constituyera en el titulado Gobierno Constitucional, nada más.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COSTA RICA (Sr. Facio): Entonces, si tuvieron oportunidad de discutir con ellos esa pretensión de ser ellos el único gobierno constitucional de la República Dominicana, porque eso de si mantienen o no esa pretensión en forma absoluta o relativa depende de que pueda haber una pacificación por vía de mediación entre los dos grupos.

El PRESIDENTE: Le cedo de nuevo la palabra.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Señor Presidente, contestando a esta importante pregunta que formula el señor Embajador de Costa Rica, mucho me satisface decirle que la Comisión entregó al Coronel Caamaño el Acta, previamente, incluso, para que la estudiara, para que tuviera toda la posibilidad de entrar hasta en los vericuetos de sus posibilidades jurídicas de consecuencias, porque lo que nosotros queríamos lograr era crear el primer paso que nos condujera a todos a la paz de la República Dominicana, y de ahí que si usted lee el comienzo del Acta de Santo Domingo, le está señalando lo que tuvo el Coronel Caamaño y el Coronel Guerra como calificación de esta Acta y el calificativo de las Partes. Recuerdo simplemente que dice: "las Partes abajo firmantes que declaran representar con las calidades que mencionan", es decir, que en el acto de la firma declaró el carácter y como nosotros no teníamos ninguna autoridad para entrar a juzgar títulos, lo que hubiera implicado una peligrosa incursión en un terreno que nos estaba vedado, nos concretamos a estampar las calidades de cada uno de los grupos y con gran lealtad decirlo con toda la franqueza y sin ninguna duda jurídica en el comienzo de esta Acta, que será sin duda alguna la vía por la que se comenzará a trabajar con seriedad por la pacificación definitiva de Santo Domingo.

EL PRESIDENTE: El Embajador Facio desea hacer otra pregunta.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COSTA RICA (Sr. Facio): Primero, muchas gracias. No, estoy satisfecho y, desde luego, la pregunta no implicaba en ninguna forma crítica ni censura ni afán de que salieran de esa norma.

EL PRESIDENTE: El señor Embajador Vázquez Carrizosa, Delegado Especial de Colombia.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COLOMBIA (Sr. Vázquez Carrizosa): El señor Embajador de Costa Rica pregunta si el gobierno constitucional invoca la calidad de gobierno para todo el país y si autoriza la presencia de otro gobierno.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COSTA RICA (Sr. Facio): No; desde luego que es evidente que cada una de las partes, que cada uno que se proclama gobierno pretende serlo; pero si precisamente de ese contacto ustedes han llegado a la conclusión de que el Coronel Caamaño está en una posición irreductible, de no ceder. Y hago esta pregunta porque posteriormente a que se firmó el Acta de Santo Domingo Caamaño ha insistido en que no acepta la participación de la fuerza interamericana y que la solución es que él es el Presidente y que se le reconozca como Presidente Constitucional y que él representa la legalidad.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Previamente, señor Embajador, me gustaría saber si esa comunicación del Coronel Caamaño consta oficialmente comunicada.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COSTA RICA (Sr. Facio): No, es una publicación.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Por eso me extrañaba mucho que el Coronel Caamaño dirigiera esa nota.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COSTA RICA (Sr. Facio): No, no, doctor; es una declaración del periódico.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): ¡Si seguimos a los periódicos en este proceso señor Embajador. . . !

El PRESIDENTE: El señor representante de Colombia.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COLOMBIA (Sr. Vázquez Carrizosa): Una cosa es lo que dicen los periódicos y otra cosa es lo que sucede en la realidad; pero hay que advertir que son muchas las noticias que se publican que habría que investigar o saber hasta qué punto corresponden a lo que se dijo o a lo que se hace. Yo no puedo decir sino lo siguiente: tanto la demarcación de la zona como la existencia de un corredor que comunica la zona de San Isidro con el centro de la ciudad fueron discutidas personalmente con el Coronel Caamaño. Existía una duda inclusive sobre las condiciones de la guardia en el corredor. Había ocurrido un incidente la víspera, ocurren muchos incidentes, respecto de alguna patrulla que se había internado más allá de las dos cuadras que de lado y lado estaban autorizadas por los reglamentos, para la seguridad de esa vía pública; y alegaba el doctor Héctor Aristy que era intolerable que las patrullas norteamericanas fueran más allá del límite. El asesor militar que nos acompañaba, que era el asesor militar del señor Embajador de Guatemala, que había tenido oportunidad de conocer los reglamentos y la verdad del incidente, explicó en términos perfectamente justos la veracidad del hecho, rectificando la apreciación del doctor Aristy, pero como el doctor Aristy insistiera, el Coronel Caamaño intervino, con cierta energía, para decir "no, es que esto entre militares, nosotros nos entendemos; yo creo que lo que dice el señor asesor militar es cierto, creo que eso es aceptable; no tengo ninguna objeción". Le relato ese hecho por si le aclara sus dudas.

El PRESIDENTE: El Delegado Especial de Guatemala, señor García Bauer.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): Sólo quería mencionar, en relación con algo de lo que se ha hablado últimamente, sobre todo por el Embajador de Costa Rica y también respecto a una pregunta que fue hecha antes, que en el Documento 17 Add. 3, el cuarto mensaje radiofónico del Secretario General de la OEA, doctor José A. Mora, se informa --el documento lo tienen todos en la mesa-- que la Junta Militar ya se trasladó a Santo Domingo y se encuentra radicada en el Congreso Nacional, Centro de los Héroes; luego . . .

El PRESIDENTE: ¿De la Junta Militar que se trasladó a Santo Domingo? la de cinco o la de . . .

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): Sí, la Junta Militar que estaba en San Isidro. No dice aquí la de cinco, o la de tres, porque no sé si lo hizo antes de que constara de cinco, y luego dice, y eso está en el documento de hoy 7 de mayo. "En cuanto a lo que está ocurriendo aquí, la situación sigue muy delicada, porque el acuerdo de cese de fuego se está cumpliendo con muchas dificultades. Particularmente, dice, se ve afectado por emisiones radiales que confunden y exaltan los ánimos de la población. Se están haciendo todos los esfuerzos para que la Estación Santo Domingo no siga emitiendo mensajes, exaltando al pueblo. Si ello se consiguiera, se evitaría el estado de violencia. Lo mismo con respecto a la Radio San Isidro. Ayer estuve en las dos emisoras y transmití un mensaje tendiente a pacificar los ánimos e instando al pueblo dominicano a cumplir lo convenido en el Acta de Santo Domingo. Sin embargo, Radio Santo Domingo y Radio San Isidro siguen transmitiendo mensajes que contribuyen a encender los ánimos y a mantener la situación de violencia." Y en este mismo documento, también, se habla de los asilados que han salido y se da una información de última hora sobre los asilados. Esto es importante en relación con las preguntas que nos fueron hechas anteriormente.

El PRESIDENTE: Muchas gracias, ¿El Embajador Facio está complacido?

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COSTA RICA (Sr. Facio): Muchas gracias.

El PRESIDENTE: El señor Representante de Honduras, Embajador Midence, tenga la bondad.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE HONDURAS (Sr. Midence): Mi Delegación desea sumarse a las anteriores felicitaciones ofrecidas a la distinguida Comisión por la magnífica labor desarrollada bajo tan difíciles circunstancias. Mi Delegación se siente segura que el informe que hoy han entregado será de inmenso valor a esta Décima Reunión de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores. Muchas gracias.

El PRESIDENTE: El señor Embajador Bonilla Atilles, Delegado Especial de la República Dominicana.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA (Sr. Bonilla Atilles): Señor Presidente, señores Delegados: Creo que de los Delegados aquí presentes ninguno puede sentir el dolor que yo siento frente a todo lo que he escuchado esta noche. Serían pocas las palabras para expresar mi agradecimiento a los señores miembros de la Comisión. Acabo de tener una conversación a larga distancia con el señor Antonio Imbert, desde Santo Domingo y me ha dicho que en una búsqueda de posibles soluciones la Junta Militar le ha entregado el poder a una junta cívico-militar integrada por los señores: Antonio Imbert, Presidente; Julio Ortigo, Alejandro Seller, Carlos Grisolia

Poloné y el Coronel Pedro Benoit. Esta Junta tratará de cooperar con la misión de la Organización de los Estados Americanos a fin de buscar soluciones que considere que todavía es prematuro hablar de ellas. Me informó también que la Junta ha tratado con el doctor Mora el problema de las radiodifusiones, y se ha comprobado que la Radio San Isidro no ha hecho ninguna transmisión inflamatoria. En cuanto al último ataque al Palacio Nacional, de que habló el Embajador Bunker, me han confirmado que allí hay refugiados civiles. No estoy exponiendo esto como acusaciones sino como hechos. Lo que más me interesa por el momento, ya que en ello va en-vuelta mi propia responsabilidad y la responsabilidad del Gobierno, cualquiera que sea, y la del pueblo dominicano, es que de esta Reunión salga la necesaria e imprescindible declaración de que los hechos que ocurren en Santo Domingo amenazan la paz del continente. Después de conocer los hechos, ésa es la única justificación, que tendrá este Organismo por haber dictado las medidas que ha dictado. No propongo que este problema se trate o se discuta esta noche porque me parece que todos estamos lo suficientemente fatigados, moral y físicamente, para no poder enfrentar ese problema de inmediato; pero sí urjo a la Décima Reunión de Consulta a que a la mayor brevedad posible tome enfáticamente esta determinación que contribuirá a evitar que el fuego siga inflamándose, no solamente en el continente americano sino en todos los ámbitos políticos del mundo. Creo que no tengo más nada que decir.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DEL BRASIL (Sr. Penna Marinho): Senhor Presidente, antes de terminar esta sessão e complementando de certo modo o relatório da Comissão Especial que acaba de ser apresentado pelo Embaixador Ricardo Colombo, Presidente da mesma, permita-me, Senhor Presidente, mencionar um ponto que merece ser levado ao conhecimento desta Reunião de Consulta. Quero referir-me à magnífica atividade desenvolvida por Sua Excelência Monsenhor Emmanuel Clarizio, Nuncio Apostólico em São Domingos. Figura de excepcional projeção, verdadeiro Don Camilo em grande gala, com trânsito livre em tôdas as áreas políticas de São Domingos, desloca-se Sua Excelência, com a mesma espantosa facilidade, do Quartel General do Coronel Caamaño para a Junta de Governo e desta para a Embaixada norte-americana. É respeitado amigo de Caamaño, como o é de Benoit ou do Embaixador Bennett. Todos o estimam o consideram com a mesma intensidade. Deve-se à sua alta compreensão das coisas, ao seu comovente espírito de solidariedade humana e ao seu profundo amor ao povo dominicano, o não ter o drama dêsse país assumido proporções mais terríveis. Sei que a Reunião de Consulta já prestou sua mui justa homenagem a Sua Excelência Monsenhor Emmanuel Clarizio, mas nunca será demais pôr em relêvo, para eterna gratidão da América, o admirável labor dêsse extraordinário prelado em favor da paz e da tranqüilidade na perturbada República Dominicana. A Delegação do Brasil, interpretando sentimentos que sabe serem os de tôda a Comissão Especial da Décima Reunião de Consulta, deseja, nesta ocasião, manifestar o seu mais profundo reconhecimento e tôda a sua admiração pela permanente e infatigável colaboração prestada por Monsehor Emmanuel Clarizio, Nuncio Apostólico em São Domingos à

Comissão Especial da Décima Reunião de Consulta durante a sua estada na República Dominicana. Muito obrigado.

El PRESIDENTE: El señor Embajador Ricardo Colombo tiene la palabra.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Señor Presidente, la Delegación de la Argentina se suma con toda emoción a las palabras del señor Embajador del Brasil por la trascendental obra que ha realizado el señor Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático, mensajero de la paz en la República Dominicana. El único homenaje, --porque ya está todo dicho-- que yo puedo hacer en estas circunstancias, es expresar aquí, señor Presidente, ante toda la conferencia, sus palabras finales cuando nos estrechamos en un abrazo: Transmítame --me dijo-- mi bendición a la Reunión de Cancilleres para que alcance los altos objetivos de la paz, que hay que salvarlos a toda costa en esta República donde ejerzo este apostolado. Nada más, señor Presidente.

El PRESIDENTE: Tiene la palabra el señor Embajador Vázquez Carrizosa, Delegado Especial de Colombia.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COLOMBIA (Sr. Vázquez Carrizosa): Señor Presidente, es apenas justo decir algunas palabras, como ya lo han hecho mis colegas del Brasil y de la Argentina, para subrayar el merecimiento del señor Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático, el Nuncio Apostólico, en medio de una gestión tan difícil. Hay más; ninguna de nuestras gestiones habría sido posible sin el concurso, sin el consejo, sin la ayuda de tan eminente representante diplomático. Y más todavía, para el futuro, sería muy difícil entrar a opinar sobre el futuro de la República Dominicana sin hablar siquiera con quien perfectamente identifica el ideal del Papa Juan XXIII sobre la coexistencia de los hombres de buena voluntad. Pero he solicitado la palabra para un punto que quizá no es de la hora pero sí puede ser de otras. Nuestro informe termina con una serie de recomendaciones que no pretendo que se discutan en esta sesión, pero que señalo a la Presidencia para que en la forma en que los reglamentos lo permitan o se crea oportuno, se sometan a la discusión de la Décima Reunión de Consulta, porque no se trata de cuestiones políticas, como las hemos discutido intensamente, sino de puntos concretos, de la organización futura, de la actividad en la República Dominicana. Se trata de puntos concretos que son de suprema urgencia, ya para la supervigilancia del cese de fuego, para la designación de un grupo capacitado para organizar la vida humanitaria al pueblo dominicano y evaluar sus necesidades, para el estudio y planeación de la fuerza interamericana y para permitir la coordinación de todos sus servicios. La consideración detenida, atenta e inmediata de estos puntos me parece absolutamente necesaria. Muchas gracias.

El PRESIDENTE: El señor Delegado Especial de Guatemala, miembro de la Comisión, tiene la palabra.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE GUATEMALA (Sr. García Bauer): Yo sólo quiero referirme en esta ocasión al homenaje que le han rendido mis distinguidos colegas, los señores miembros de la Comisión, a Su Excelencia el señor Nuncio Apostólico y Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático en Santo Domingo, Monseñor Emmanuel Clarizio, por la gran labor que ha venido realizando desde que se inició este grave conflicto en la República Dominicana. Con la Comisión el señor Nuncio Apostólico fue excepcionalmente amable, le prestó todas las facilidades a su alcance, y fue por sus grandes servicios que la Comisión pudo cumplir con lo que cumplió. El estuvo presente, infatigablemente, en las entrevistas que sostuvimos tanto con el Comando del Coronel Caamaño como con la Junta Militar y, por la confianza que le tenían ambas partes, en su presencia se firmó el "Acta de Santo Domingo". El siempre usó de la persuasión a efecto de que se reflexionase sobre los propósitos nobles que daba la Organización de los Estados Americanos a tierras dominicanas. Como dijo el señor Embajador del Brasil, el señor Nuncio Apostólico era respetado en todas las áreas, fuese cual fuere la autoridad que ejerciera poder. Es persona en quien han confiado las diferentes partes y mediante sus buenos oficios, mediante la gran colaboración que prestó a la Comisión, ésta pudo desempeñar la tarea que desempeñó. Por eso la Comisión se sintió conmovida y sintió que se interpretaban los deseos de la propia Comisión cuando en la Nunciatura Apostólica en Santo Domingo nosotros le entregamos al Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático el mensaje de Su Excelencia el señor Presidente de la Décima Reunión Sevilla Sacasa, comunicándole lo decidido con respecto a la gestión del Excelentísimo señor Emmanuel Clarizio, por esta Reunión hace unos pocos días.

EL PRESIDENTE: Tiene la palabra el señor Embajador Colombo, Delegado Especial de la Argentina.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Yo quiero agregar simplemente una mención que me parece de estricta justicia. A fin de poder dar cumplimiento con la urgencia que el caso requiere, la Comisión compuesta de cinco miembros debió acelerar su viaje con todos los elementos de juicio posibles para que la Décima Reunión de Consulta pudiera informarse con la mayor profundidad posible, pero nos preocupaba profundamente que antes de nuestra partida no resolviéramos un problema fundamental frente a la fe en el sistema, que habían expresado las dos partes en lucha, y esto era el vínculo de la Comisión en el lugar de los hechos para que quedara presente la Comisión ante la emergencia de poder tener que actuar en cumplimiento de esa competencia acatada por las partes. Ello fue motivo para que el señor Delegado de Panamá, en un gesto que lo honra y que no quiero silenciarlo, se quedara en el lugar de los hechos representando a nuestra misión. De esa manera, de acuerdo con las conversaciones que sostuvimos con las partes, sería como si la Comisión estuviese presente y, junto con los asesores militares y el personal civil se pudiese hacer

cuanta gestión fuera posible para solucionar en la medida de nuestras posibilidades las dificultades producidas por los hechos que han ocurrido y ocurren en la República Dominicana. Le confieso, señor Presidente, que este generoso gesto del señor Delegado de Panamá, de ese país que tantos motivos tiene para contar con nuestra fraternidad, histórica en problemas fundamentales, debe señalarse en esta sesión. Panamá está con nosotros en la Comisión, representada por su distinguido Delegado. El Embajador Calamari quiso estar también físicamente presente en la Comisión pero no pudo hacerlo. Yo quiero destacar este gesto del Delegado de Panamá porque es de estricta justicia hacerlo a quien se ha quedado firme con la bandera del sistema en medio de la lucha. Nada más.

EL PRESIDENTE: Estamos seguros de que nuestro ilustre colega, el Embajador Calamari, ha se sentirse muy satisfecho del elogio que se le tributa a su noble compatriota y querido colega nuestro, el Embajador Frank Morrice.

Ha solicitado la palabra el señor Embajador Díez de Medina, Delegado Especial de Bolivia; luego el señor Embajador Tejera París, Delegado Especial de Venezuela.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE BOLIVIA (Sr. Díez de Medina): Señor Presidente, yo no he pedido la palabra para hacer ninguna pregunta; no tengo preguntas que hacer. Solamente tengo palabras de elogio, de cálido elogio y de felicitación para los distinguidos miembros de la Comisión Especial de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, de la Décima Reunión de Consulta, por la forma inteligente y sacrificada en que han cumplido la delicada misión que les fue encomendada. Solamente deseo agregar, señor Presidente, mi deseo de que en el acta de esta sesión plenaria figuren también algunas referencias de felicitación y de reconocimiento a la labor que está cumpliendo en la República Dominicana con tanto brillo el doctor José Antonio Mora, Secretario General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos. Muchas gracias.

EL PRESIDENTE: Muy bien, así lo haremos. Tiene la palabra el señor Embajador Colombo, Delegado Especial de la Argentina.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): El señor Embajador de Bolivia ha hecho muy bien en adelantarse a un acto de justicia que la Comisión iba a cumplir por la labor brillante que comenzó antes de nuestra llegada a la República Dominicana, el señor Secretario General de la Organización, doctor José A. Mora, e incluir expresamente en el homenaje al personal de la Secretaría, que no obstante lo reducido de su número se multiplicó en su esfuerzo y colaboró con eficiencia por el mejor éxito de nuestra gestión. Por eso yo celebro que el señor Embajador de Bolivia haya adelantado esta instancia, pero dejo expresa constancia de que teníamos reservado ese punto para someterlo en esta sesión.

El PRESIDENTE: El señor Embajador de Bolivia y la ilustrada Comisión han interpretado muy bien los sentimientos y el pensamiento de la Presidencia y de todos nuestros colegas. El señor Embajador Tejera París, Delegado Especial de Venezuela tiene la palabra.

El DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE VENEZUELA (Sr. Tejera París): El señor Delegado de Bolivia se ha adelantado a decir lo que yo pensaba y que es ciertamente el pensamiento de todos los que estamos aquí. Mi intención era y ahora lo confirmo, pedir a la Presidencia que ordene a esta Décima Reunión de Consulta para la Comisión, para el señor Secretario General, y para los funcionarios de la Secretaría General un voto de aplauso por el trabajo que han efectuado. El examen que ha pasado la Comisión ha sido duro tanto allá como aquí, y creo que estos colegas merecen no solamente el agradecimiento nuestro, el de nuestros gobiernos y el de los pueblos, por ser éste un problema que afecta la totalidad de la seguridad del Hemisferio, sino además, en este momento, el entusiasmo de un aplauso que estoy seguro que el señor Presidente será el primero en iniciar. [APLAUSOS]

El PRESIDENTE: El elogio y homenaje que la honorable Comisión Especial ha tributado al ilustre prelado Emmanuel Clarizio, Nuncio Apostólico de Su Santidad en la República Dominicana y Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático en Santo Domingo, lo compartimos todos. Lo compartimos con verdadero agrado, con afecto, estimándolo como un deber de todos nosotros. Sus servicios a la paz de América, sus votos y sus bendiciones las agradecemos con un aplauso emocionado; con emoción, digo yo, que corresponde a la emoción que él experimentó cuando recibió nuestra expresión de reconocimiento profundo por su magnífica labor para la paz de América y para aquel pueblo al que todos amamos tanto: la República Dominicana. Esta sesión plenaria de carácter privado ha sido sumamente importante. Hemos conocido el interesante informe de la Comisión Especial. Hemos formulado amplias preguntas; hemos obtenido respuestas magníficas y muy claras, por medio de las cuales hemos apreciado aun más todavía la extraordinaria labor realizada por la Comisión. Nuestro reiterado aplauso y elogio para ella y sus ilustres miembros, de quienes todos nosotros nos honramos llamándonos sus colegas y amigos. Salvo mejor criterio de Vuestras Excelencias citaría para una sesión plenaria de la Décima Reunión de Consulta para que consideremos el informe en los aspectos que ha señalado la honorable Comisión, para que la Reunión se produzca sobre el informe de la Comisión Especial. Hemos formulado preguntas y hemos obtenido las respuestas; viene ahora la tarea de considerar el informe y analizar el pronunciamiento de la Décima Reunión de Consulta sobre las recomendaciones que propone la Comisión Especial, las conclusiones a que ésta ha llegado. Apenas me permitiría yo preguntar a Vuestras Excelencias si la sesión plenaria de mañana debe ser pública; entiendo que debe serlo. Debe ser pública a los efectos de que la opinión pública conozca todo lo que manifestemos, tanto con respecto a la labor de la Comisión como de los aspectos que contiene su interesante informe. Yo apoyaría otra sesión de carácter privado, si así lo pidiese la Comisión, pero esta sesión a la cual voy a convocar oportunamente este día, tendrá que ser pública y su objeto será considerar el informe

de la Comisión Especial, discutirlo y proponer decisiones acerca de las recomendaciones que ella nos propone. Los señores Delegados ya conocen y tienen en sus carpetas para lectura oportuna el "cuarto mensaje radiotelefónico" que nos dirigió nuestro ilustre Secretario General doctor Mora¹. No es necesario leerlo, puesto que estoy seguro de que los señores Delegados ya lo han leído. Por lo que respecta al acta de esta sesión plenaria, les ruego tomar nota de que disponen de 24 horas para formular ante la Secretaría y hacer las correcciones de estilo de rigor. Les ruego tomar conocimiento de este plazo a los efectos de que la Secretaría pueda abreviar la edición definitiva de las actas de la sesión plenaria.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): Señor Presidente, desearía que me repitiera de nuevo la última parte en cuanto al plazo y hora, según el plan de la Presidencia, de lo que sugiere. Quisiera que me hiciera el gran favor de volverlo a repetir.

EL PRESIDENTE: Sí señor. Vamos a levantar la sesión para convocarla dentro de pocas horas, digamos, tal vez por la tarde, una sesión plenaria de la Décima Reunión de Consulta, de carácter público, con el objeto de considerar el informe de la Comisión Especial. Considerarlo, analizarlo, discutirlo y decidir lo relacionado con las recomendaciones o conclusiones a que ha llegado la Comisión. El carácter de esa sesión se supone que debe ser público. La próxima sesión plenaria no será privada como ésta, será pública, a los efectos de que la opinión pública del Continente se entere no solamente del informe de la Comisión Especial, porque yo estoy sugiriendo con esto que sea público el informe, salvo que los señores miembros de la Comisión, por algún motivo, indiquen a la Presidencia la conveniencia de que todavía no sea público sino que se debe esperar hasta la sesión de mañana.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA ARGENTINA (Sr. Colombo): En absoluto, señor Presidente.

EL PRESIDENTE: Entonces, señores, el Informe de la Comisión Especial es público desde este momento. Por consiguiente, puede entregarse a la prensa y transmitirse a quien lo desee. Naturalmente, si en la sesión de mañana arribamos a conclusiones sobre las sugerencias que ha hecho la honorable Comisión, nos sentiremos sumamente complacidos. En todo caso creo que ha llegado el momento de que la Reunión de Consulta haga pronunciamientos sólidos ante la caótica situación que parece que se torna peor cada hora. Por eso voy a tener cuidado en citar dentro de unas 5 ó 6 horas, posiblemente para esta tarde a las 4 ó 5 de la tarde, en este mismo sitio, la quinta sesión plenaria de la Décima Reunión de Consulta, para conocer el informe de la honorable Comisión. El señor Representante de Venezuela.

1. El texto completo del Cuarto Mensaje del Señor Secretario General se publica como documento 17, Add. 3.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE VENEZUELA (Sr. Tejera París): Señor Presidente, sólo para rogar a usted si pudiera incluir en el orden del día dos puntos concretos que creo que corresponden al enunciado que Vuestra Excelencia acaba de hacer: primero sería consideración de si la situación actual de la República Dominicana afecta a la seguridad del Continente; segundo, implementación e implantación de medidas destinadas a colaborar con el pueblo dominicano en el regreso a su plena constitucionalidad democrática.

EL PRESIDENTE: Muy bien; me parece que no hay objeción alguna para que en la sesión pública que celebraremos en breve discutamos esos dos aspectos, el uno que sugiriera el distinguido Representante del Uruguay y que acogiera el señor Representante de Venezuela, y el otro a que acaba de aludir el distinguido Representante, Embajador Tejera París. El señor Representante de la República Dominicana tiene la palabra.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA (Sr. Bonilla Atilés): Señor Presidente, me reservo para mañana formalizar en un proyecto de resolución la propuesta que he hecho de que el Organismo de Consulta declare que la situación dominicana constituye una amenaza para la paz del Hemisferio.

EL PRESIDENTE: Muy bien. El señor Representante del Paraguay había solicitado la palabra.

EL DELEGADO DEL PARAGUAY (Sr. Yódice): Nada más que dos preguntas, señor Presidente: Entiendo, no he escuchado, mejor, de sus labios, una decisión respecto al pedido del Delegado de los Estados Unidos de que las actas de esta sesión de hoy se hagan públicas, apoyado por el distinguido Representante del Uruguay. Desde ya anticipo, porque también es sugestión mía, que yo también estoy de acuerdo con ese pedido de que las actas de esta sesión sean públicas.

EL PRESIDENTE: Así lo resolvió la Presidencia.

EL DELEGADO DEL PARAGUAY (Sr. Yódice): Muchas gracias, perdone.

EL PRESIDENTE: No tenga cuidado.

EL DELEGADO DEL PARAGUAY (Sr. Yódice): Ahora, otra pregunta que hago al distinguido Representante de Costa Rica, debido a una intervención anterior del Embajador de Venezuela, porque se refiere a este punto de la consideración de medidas tendientes a la normalización democrática de la República Dominicana, y no recuerdo haber escuchado en el transcurso de esta Décima Reunión de Consulta una proposición informal del distinguido Embajador Facio respecto a la constitución, como dijo el Embajador de Guatemala, de una comisión de notables o cosa así; por eso yo quería preguntar si hubo o no esa exposición informal del Embajador Facio, porque no quisiera pecar de no informar a mi Cancillería de algo que se habría planteado aquí. Muchas gracias.

EL PRESIDENTE: Agradecemos. El señor Delegado de Costa Rica.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE COSTA RICA (Sr. Facio): Señor Representante del Paraguay, no he hecho todavía ninguna proposición de ese género. No sé si se aclara así: se ha discutido, no es obra mía el proyecto, un proyecto para implementar algunas de las recomendaciones de la Comisión. Con mucho gusto le doy una copia, ahora al final, no es un proyecto de la Delegación de Costa Rica; ha sido discutido entre varias delegaciones y no es nada concreto.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DEL PARAGUAY (Sr. Yódice): Comprendo, Muchas gracias, Yo quería saber si aquí fue planteado.

EL PRESIDENTE: El Embajador Tejera París.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DE VENEZUELA (Sr. Tejera París): Quería pedirle a la Comisión de Credenciales, posiblemente tendrá un trabajo que hacer mañana temprano para reexaminar las credenciales de todos nosotros, porque parece que hay ciertas dudas y que convendría aclarar notablemente la luz de los acontecimientos que fueron transmitidos por el cable que el señor Embajador de la República Dominicana nos confirmara hace un rato.

EL PRESIDENTE: El señor Embajador Jácome, Representante del Ecuador.

EL DELEGADO ESPECIAL DEL ECUADOR (Sr. Jácome): Como Presidente de la Comisión de Credenciales debo informar que he convocado a la Comisión para mañana a las 3:30 de la tarde; de manera que todos los señores Representantes que tengan alguna duda respecto de sí mismos o de sus colegas pueden presentar sus quejas a la Comisión.

EL PRESIDENTE: Señores, hemos tomado conocimiento de lo que acaba de expresar el colega, Presidente de la Comisión de Credenciales, y llegó el momento de levantar la sesión y anunciar que queda convocada la quinta sesión plenaria de la Décima Reunión de Consulta para esta tarde a las 4:00 de la tarde, en este mismo sitio. Se levanta la sesión.